M. Somasundaram v. The District Collector-cum-Accommodation Controller,Singaravelar Maligai, Rajaji Salai,Chennai 600 001

For Appellants : Mr.G. Ethirajalu for Mr.C. PrakasamFor Respondent-1 in: Mrs. Bhavani SubburayanOSA.Nos.377, 378/07 & Special Govt. Pleader (C.S.)R-2 in OSA.376.07For Respondent-1 in: Mr.T.R. RajagopalanOSA.No.376/07 & R-2 Senior Counsel for in OSA.No.377/2007 Mr.M. Stalin- - -COMMON JUDGMENTP.K. MISRA, JThe present appellants have filed C.S.No.420 of 2007 in theOriginal Side of the Madras High Court claiming the following reliefs:-"(a) For a declaration declaring that the three SaleDeeds dated 10.03.1996 registered as Document No.2001/96,2009/96 & 2007/96 at the office of The Sub Registrar,Purasawalkam, Chennai, executed in favour of the 3rdDefendant by Defendants 4 to 14 are sham, nominal andtherefore null and void and not binding on the 2ndPlaintiff.(b) For a consequential Declaration declaring that thethree Sale Deeds dated 30.10.2000 registered as DocumentNos.3661 of 2000, 3665 of 2000 and 3667 of 2000 at theoffice of The Sub Registrar, Purasawalkam, Chennai, executedin favour of the 2nd Defendant is sham, nominal and thereforenull and void and not binding on the 2nd Plaintiff.(c) For a Declaration declaring that the 2nd Plaintiffis the absolute owner of the suit 'A' Schedule property byvirtue of Will dated 01-07-1978 executed by DaisyDevasagayam.(d) To Grant Permanent Injunction restraining the 1stDefendant, his men, agents, staff, subordinates andofficials or any person claiming through or engaged onbehalf of the 1st Defendant from and in any way interferingwith the Plaintiffs peaceful possession and enjoyment ofpremises bearing Door No.80, Millers Road, Kilpauk, Chennai600 010 either by way of dispossessing, eviction or in anyother manner pending disposal of the above suit." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

2. During pendency of such suit, they filed O.A.No.606 of2007 against Defendant No.1, namely, the District Collector-cum-Accommodation Controller, for injunction restraining such defendantfrom in any way interfering with the plaintiffs' peaceful possessionand enjoyment of the schedule property either by way ofdispossessing, eviction or in any other manner pending disposal ofthe suit.The second defendant filed Application No.6129 of 2007 forrejection of the plaint in C.S.No.420 of 2007. 2. By a common order dated 14.11.2007, the learned singleJudge has rejected the plaint in C.S.No.420 of 2007 thereby allowingApplication No.6129 of 2007 and consequently rejecting O.A.No.606 of2007 with costs of Rs.10,000/- to be paid to the Tamil Nadu StateLegal Services Authority.3. O.S.A.No.376 of 2007 is directed against the orderallowing Application No.6129 of 2007, O.S.A.No.377 of 2007 isdirected against the order relating to rejection of the suit andO.S.A.No.378 of 2007 is directed against the order whereby theapplication filed by the plaintiffs for injunction has been rejectedon account of rejection of the plaint itself. All the three appeals,which are thus against one common order, have been heard together andshall be governed by this common judgment. 4. Learned single Judge has rejected the plaint by invokingOrder VII Rule 11 apparently on the ground that the present suitC.S.No.420 of 2007 is barred under Order II Rule 2, Order XXIII andRule 1 C.P.C., and the filing of the suit is an abuse of process ofthe Court inasmuch as it amounts to re-litigation. 5. For appreciating the questions raised in the presentappeals, it is necessary to notice in brief the factual background asapparent from the plaint or as admitted by the parties in course ofhearing before the learned single Judge or before us. For convenience, the parties are described as they are describedin C.S.No.420 of 2007.6. There is no dispute that one J.G. Devasahayam was theadmitted owner of the properties now in dispute. He had one brotherRajamani and one sister Soundaram Sundaresan. The aforesaidDevasahayam expired on 28.1.1962 leaving behind her widow AmyDevasahayam and two unmarried daughters Daisy and Padmini. AmyDevasahayam died on 22.1.1978. Daisy expired on 11.11.1979 andPadmini expired on 118.1995. 6.1 Rajamani's branch is represented by Defendant Nos.4 to 10and Soundaram Sundarersan's branch, who died on 10.11.1986, isrepresented by Defendant Nos.11 to 14. Defendant No.3 has purchasedthe properties in dispute by registered sale deeds dated 10.3.1996 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ from Defendant Nos.4 to 14. 6.2. Plaintiff No.2 is the son of Plaintiff No.1. They are notrelated to J.G. Devasahayam. 6.3 The property at Door Nos.79 and 80, Millers Road, Kilpauk,was handed over to the Accommodation Controller, the first defendant.Subsequently, the first plaintiff, who was working as a steno-typistunder the Tamil Nadu Transport Department, was inducted by theAccommodation Controller as a tenant in respect of Door No.80 ('A'schedule property) with condition regarding payment of rent directlyto Daisy. It is claimed by the plaintiffs that Daisy, who wasstaying in the same house, had executed a Will on 1.7.1978 in favourof the second plaintiff in respect of A to D schedule properties, 'A'schedule is 50% of undivided share over land and building in premisesbearing Door No.80, Millers Road, Kilpauk, 'B' schedule is 50% ofundivided share over land and building in premises bearing DoorNo.79, Millers Road, Kilpauk and 'C' schedule is 50% of undividedshare over land and building in premises bearing Door No.34, BalfourRoad, Kilpauk and 'D' scheule is 50% of undivided share over land andbuilding in premises bearing Door No.9, Vinayagar Koil Street,Purasawalkam. Daisy expired on 11.11.1979. Defendant No.8 had filedO.P.No.59/1981 to declare Padmini as a lunatic and to appoint him asher guardian. The High Court by order dated 22.6.1983 declaredPadmini as lunatic. Subsequently, Padmini expired on 11.8.1985.The first defendant subsequently sent a letter dated 12.8.1993 to thefirst plaintiff to vacate 'A' schedule property on the ground thatthe first plaintiff had retired from Government service, even thoughthe first plaintiff had informed the 1st defendant regarding existenceof the Will executed by Daisy. The first defendant again sent aletter dated 24.3.1995 threatening to evict the plaintiffs withoutconsidering the request of the second plaintiff to release suchproperty in favour of him. At that stage, the plaintiffs filedO.S.No.2902 of 1995 against the first defendant for injunction, butthe suit was withdrawn. The plaintiffs had filed appeal against theorder of the first defendant before the Secretary to the Governmentand, at the time of filing of the present suit, such appeal wasstated to be pending and stay had been granted. One R. Gnanadhikkamhad filed O.P.No.41 of 1991 claiming that a Will, dated 8.8.1986 hadbeen executed in his favour by Mrs. Soundaram Sundaresan in respectof the assets previously belonging to Daisy Devasahayam. Thereafterthe children of Soundaram Sundaresan had filed Application Nos.2902and 2903 of 1987 to set aside the order made in O.P.No.59 of 1981regarding lunancy proceedings, but in such application there has beenno whisper about the Will dated 8.8.1986 by Soundaram Sundaresan. Byorder dated 3.10.1988, the High Court had passed an order inApplication No.1127/87, 2902 and 2903 of 1987 directing all thepersons claiming under J.G. Deivasahayam to file appropriate suit andestablish their rights over the properties of Padmini Devasahayam, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ which they claimed to have succeeded after the death of Daisy.Defendant Nos.11 to 14 subsequently filed W.P.No.15660 of 1989 forissuing a Writ of Mandamus to implement G.O.Ms.No.1338 dated10.5.1988, whereunder the Government had directed that the rent for'C' schedule property should be paid to them. Though initially byorder dated 22.12.1989 such writ petition was allowed, subsequently,11th defendant, the father of Defendants 5 to 7, had filed anapplication for recalling such order and ultimately the High Courtrecalled the earlier order and dismissed the writ petition filed byDefendant Nos.11 to 14 on the ground that they had suppressed thematerial facts and directed that criminal proceedings should beinitiated. Even though initially the High Court granted probate inrespect of O.P.No.41 of 1991, subsequently, the second plaintiff hadfiled Appln.No.704 of 1991 to revoke the probate and Appln.No.748 of1991 for restraining Gnanathikkam from putting up any construction.In the said application it was claimed by the second plaintiff thatDaisy had executed a Will dated 1.7.1978. Subsequently, the secondplaintiff had filed O.P. for grant of probate on 26.8.1991, but thesame was numbered as O.P.No.210/1995. The second plaintiff alsoissued notice to the Accommodation Controller not to handoverpossession of the disputed property to anyone. Defendant Nos.4 to 7jointly executed a sale deed on 10.6.1996 in favour of Defendant No.3in respect of 1/4th share in the property in Door No.80, MillersRoad. On the very same, Defendant Nos.8, 9 and 10 jointly executedanother sale deed in favour of the very same Defendant No.3 inrespect of 1/4th share in the very same property and Defendant Nos.11to 14 had executed a sale deed in favour of Defendant No.3 in respectof 1/2 share in the very same property. The first defendant onceagain sent a notice dated 22.2.2000 directing the first plaintiff tovacate and deliver possession of 'A' schedule property. At thatstage, the plaintiffs filed O.S.No.2411 of 2000 against the firstdefendant for permanent injunction. While such suit was pending, thesecond defendant filed a petition for being impleaded on the groundthat he had purchased 'A' and 'B' schedule property from 3rddefendant, who in turn had purchased the properties from DefendantNos.4 to 14. The second defendant produced the sale deeds only on13.1.2005 before the trial court in O.S.No.2411 of 2000, which wasmarked as Exs.B-1 to B-3 and claimed title. From the documents filedby Defendant No.2 in course of cross-examination, the plaintiffs cameto know that suppressing the orders of the High Court in W.P.No.15660of 1989 and O.A.Nos.704 of 1991 and 741 of 1991, Defendant Nos.4 to14 had colluded together and created sale deeds in favour ofDefendant No.3 and such sale deeds in favour of Defendant No.3 aresham and nominal. The defendants had also suppressed the pendency ofprobate petition numbered as O.P.No.210 of 1995. Validity of suchsale deeds dated 10.6.1996 had been impugned by raising severalcontentions. Three sale deeds in favour of Defendant No.2 were alsoassailed on similar grounds. Plaintiff No.2 claims title by virtueof the Will. It is claimed that because of the subsequent sale deeds https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ and the stand of the defendants, the plaintiffs have filed thecomprehensive suit for title in respect of 'A' schedule propertywith liberty to file appropriate suit against 'B' 'C' and 'D'schedule properties and it has been stated that they undertake towithdraw O.S.No.2411 of 2000 pending before the City Civil Court asthe only prayer in the said suit was for permanent injunction.7. Defendant No.2 in his application numbered asApplication No.6129 of 2007 for rejection of the plaint has statedthat widow and the two unmarried daughters of J.G. Devasahayamhaving died intestate, the property was inherited by the heirs of thebrother and sister of D.G. Devasahayam and they by separate saledeeds dated 10.6.1996 had sold the property to Defendant No.3 andsubsequently Defendant No.3 had sold the property to Defendant No.2by registered sale deeds 30.10.2000. Since J.G. Devasahayam wasresiding outside, the property had been entrusted to theAccommodation Controller, who had allotted a portion of the premisesof Door No.80 to the first plaintiff as tenant. Since the firstplaintiff had retired from service with effect from 31.12.1990, theAccommodation Controller had issued a letter dated 21.9.1993 tovacate the premises. Such Accommodation Controller initiatedeviction proceedings under Section 3(a) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings(Lease and Rent) Control Act. The plaintiffs filed O.S.No.2902 of1995 against the Accommodation Controller for bare injunction and, atthat stage, for the first time, the plaintiffs came up with a storyof alleged Will in their favour. When the suit was ripe for trialduring the year 2000, the plaintiffs withdrew the same, which wasaccordingly dismissed on 7.7.2000. Thereafter, the AccommodationController again initiated eviction proceedings, but, theplaintiffs, on the basis of similar allegations as had been made inO.S.No.2902 of 1995, filed a fresh suit numbered as O.S.No.2411 of2000 again for bare injunction and obtained an interim order ofinjunction. In the meantime, Defendant No.2, who had purchased theproperty from Defendant No.3, had filed an application dated31.7.2001 before the Accommodation Controller for release of the saidproperty from the Government Tenancy under Section 3A(i)(a) of theRent Control Act. The Accommodation Controller vide proceedings,dated 21.9.1993, ordered release of the subject property and directedthe plaintiffs to vacate and handover possession, but the plaintiffscontinued to remain in illegal possession. At that stage, DefendantNo.2 got himself impleaded in O.S.No.2411 of 2000 and the plaintiffsthereafter were merely dragging on the suit and subsequently filedW.P.No.20769 of 2004 and obtained stay in respect of the very samesubject matter but, subsequently, such writ petition was withdrawn.Even during pendency of such suit, the second plaintiff filedRCOP.No.414 of 2002 for eviction against his father, the firstplaintiff. Even after hearing of the suit was completed and thematter was reserved for judgment, the plaintiffs filed applicationafter application with a view to drag on the proceedings but, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ ultimately on 8.6.2007, they withdrew O.S.No.2411 of 2000 as by thenthey had already filed the present suit C.S.No.420 of 2007 and hadobtained an ex-parte injunction. The present suit has been filedonly with a view to drag on the proceedings to continue the illegaloccupation. Defendant No.2 has claimed that the prayer No. (a) and(b) relating to earlier sale deeds as null and void was barred by thelaw of limitation. So far as prayer No.(c) is concerned, it wasasserted in the application :- "12. As regards prayer (c) of the suit to declare the2nd Plaintiff as the absolute Owner of the suit property byvirtue of alleged Will date 1-7-1978, I humbly submit thatthe same is also not maintainable. The Plaintiffs havefiled O.P.No.210 of 1995, before this Hon'ble Court seekingprobate of the alleged Will. The Plaintiffs have stated intheir evidence before the City Civil Court in O.S.NO.2411of 2000 that unless they get probate of the alleged Willthey will not get right over the property. That has beentheir stand all these years. The alleged probateproceedings are also kept pending by the Plaintiffs formore than 12 years. Hence the relief sought for in prayerC is against law."So far as the prayer relating to (d) injunction is concerned, itis contended that the plaintiffs had filed two earlier suits for thesame relief and they are playing fraud by using the process of theCourts to suit their illegal ends. In respect of probateproceedings, it has been further indicated that though the allegedWill was in respect of three other properties, namely, Door No.79 atMillers Road, Door No.34 at Balfour Road and Door No.9 at VinayagarKoil Street, the suit for declaration has been filed only in respectof the suit property at Door No.80, Millers Road, which wasindicative of the fact that the Will was not at all genuine and theonly intention of the plaintiffs was to delay the matter as they werein possession.8. A counter was filed by the second plaintiff by statingthat the petition under Order VII Rule 11 was not maintainable. Itwas stated in the counter that the sale deeds in favour of DefendantNo.2 and his vendor Defendant No.3 were all collusive and nominaltransactions. It was further stated that the earlier suits werebased on different cause of action. It was further stated thatprobate proceedings in O.P.No.210 of 1995 had been filed forprobating the Will, but, subsequently by amendment to the IndianSuccession Act in 2002, the Will executed by an Indian Christian neednot be probated and, therefore, the plaintiffs became the owner ofthe property. The plaintiffs filed the present suit when the saledeeds were disclosed and produced in the court. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

9. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants hassubmitted that for rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.,the Court is required to come to a conclusion only on the basis ofthe allegations made in the plaint that the suit is barred by anylaw. In this context it has been submitted that the earlier twosuits had in fact been withdrawn and had not been decided on meritand, therefore, the bar under Order II Rule 2 was not applicable.Moreover, two earlier suits were only the suits for bare injunctionand the present suit is one for declaration that the sale deeds infavour of Defendant No.3 and Defendant No.2 are null and void andalso for declaration of the title of the plaintiffs and, therefore,it cannot be said that the present suit is based on some cause ofaction. For the aforesaid reasons, the learned counsel for theappellant has also submitted that the bar under Order XXIII Rule 1(3)would not be applicable inasmuch as the present suit is a compendioussuit for title and for declaration that the sale deeds in favour ofDefendant Nos. 2 and 3 are null and void and also for injunction. 10.Order II Rule 2, Order VII Rule 11 and Order XXIII Rule1(3) & (4) being relevant, are extracted hereunder :-Order II Rule 2: "2. Suit to include the whole claim. - (1) Every suitshall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff isentitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but aplaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in orderto bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court.(2) Relinquishment of part of claim. - Where aplaintiff omits to sue in respect of or intentionallyrelinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall notafterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted orrelinquished. (3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs.- Aperson entitled to more than one relief in respect of thesame cause of action may sue for all or any of suchreliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of theCourt, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwardssue for any relief so omitted."Order VII Rule 11:"11. Rejection of plaint.- The plaint shall berejected in the following cases:-(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and theplaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct thevaluation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails todo so;(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued butthe plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped,and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supplythe requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by theCourt, fails to do so;(d) where the suit appears from the statement in theplaintiff to be barred by any law;(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with theprovisions of rule 9Provided that the time fixed by the Court for thecorrection of the valuation or supplying of the requisitestamp-papers shall not be extended unless the Court, forreasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff wasprevented by any cause of an exceptional nature fromcorrecting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamppapers, as the case may be, within the time fixed by theCourt and that refusal to extend such time would causegrave injustice to the plaintiff."Order XXIII Rule 1(3) & (4)"(3) Where the Court is satisfied,-(a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formaldefect, or(b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing theplaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matterof a suit or part of a claim,it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiffpermission to withdraw from such suit or such part of theclaim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect ofthe subject-matter of such suit or such part of the claim.(4) Where the plaintiff -(a) abandons any suit or part of claim under sub-rule(1), or https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (b) withdraws from a suit or part of a claim withoutthe permission referred to in sub-rule (3), he shall beliable for such costs as the Court may award and shall beprecluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect ofsuch subject-matter or such part of the claim."11. Apart from thebar Order II Rule 2 and Order 23 Rule1, the learned single Judge has also applied the doctrine of abuse ofprocess of court and the doctrine of re-litigation. It is necessaryat this stage to notice the latter principles.12. In (1998) 3 SCC 573 (K.K. MODI v. K.N. MODI ANDOTHERS), the appellant before the Supreme Court had filed a petitionunder Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, challenging thedecision of the Chairman and Managing Director of IFCI on the footingthat it was an award in the arbitration proceedings between the twogroups. On the very same day, they had also filed a civil suitchallenging the very same decision of the Chairman and ManagingDirector of IFCI on the basis of substantially the same allegationsas had been made in the arbitration petition. In one paragraph,however, it had been stated that the same reliefs were being claimedin a suit in the event of it being held that the decision of theChairman and Managing Director of IFCI was not an arbitration awardbut was just a decision. Learned single of the Delhi High Court heldthat filing of the suit was an abuse of process of the court as theallegations in the arbitration petition and the suit were identicaland had been instituted on the same day and accordingly the singleJudge struck down the plaint by invoking jurisdiction under Order 6Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Division Bench, whileadmitting the appeal, passed an order reviving the order passed bythe learned single Judge wherein the single Judge had directed thatno meeting should be held. From different orders, Special LeavePetitions were filed. The Supreme Court posed the followingquestions :-"15. The present proceedings raise two main questions:Question 1: Whether clause 9 of the Memorandum ofUnderstanding dated 24-1-1989 constitutes an arbitrationagreement; and whether the decision of the Chairman, IFCIdated 8-12-1995 constitutes an award? andQuestion 2: Whether Suit No. 1394 of 1996 is an abuseof the process of court? "12.1 While dealing with Question No.1, the Supreme Court hadagreed with the conclusion of the learned single Judge that theproceedings before the Chairman, IFCI, were not arbitrationproceedings and, therefore, his decision was not an award Therefore, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ such SLP was rejected. While dealing with Question No.2, the SupremeCourt observed as follows :-"41. He has submitted that in the event of it beingheld that clause 9 of the Memorandum of Understanding isnot an arbitration clause and the decision of the Chairman,IFCI, is not an award, it is open to the appellants to filea suit to challenge the decision. This is the reason whyalong with the arbitration petition, a suit has also beenfiled as an alternative method of challenging the decisionin the event of it being held that the decision of theChairman and Managing Director, IFCI, is not an award. Hehas contended that filing a separate proceeding in thiscontext cannot be considered as an abuse of the process ofthe court; and the learned Single Judge was not right instriking out the plaint under Order 6 Rule 16 of the Codeof Civil Procedure.42. Under Order 6 Rule 16, the court may, at any stageof the proceeding, order to be struck out, inter alia, anymatter in any pleading which is otherwise an abuse of theprocess of the court. Mulla in his treatise on the Code ofCivil Procedure, (15th Edn., Vol. II, p.1179, note 7) hasstated that power under clause (c) of Order 6 Rule 16 ofthe Code is confined to cases where the abuse of theprocess of the court is manifest from the pleadings; andthat this power is unlike the power under Section 151whereunder courts have inherent power to strike outpleadings or to stay or dismiss proceedings which are anabuse of their process. In the present case the High Courthas held the suit to be an abuse of the process of thecourt on the basis of what is stated in the plaint.43. The Supreme Court Practice 1995 published by Sweet& Maxwell in paragraphs 18/19/33 (p.344) explains thephrase “abuse of the process of the court” thus:“This term connotes that the process of thecourt must be used bona fide and properly and mustnot be abused. The court will prevent improper use ofits machinery and will in a proper case, summarilyprevent its machinery from being used as a means ofvexation and oppression in the process of litigation. ... The categories of conduct rendering a claimfrivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process are notclosed but depend on all the relevant circumstances.And for this purpose considerations of public policyand the interests of justice may be very material.” https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

44. One of the examples cited as an abuse of theprocess of the court is relitigation. It is an abuse of theprocess of the court and contrary to justice and publicpolicy for a party to relitigate the same issue which hasalready been tried and decided earlier against him. Thereagitation may or may not be barred as res judicata. Butif the same issue is sought to be reagitated, it alsoamounts to an abuse of the process of the court. Aproceeding being filed for a collateral purpose, or aspurious claim being made in litigation may also in a givenset of facts amount to an abuse of the process of thecourt. Frivolous or vexatious proceedings may also amountto an abuse of the process of the court especially wherethe proceedings are absolutely groundless. The court thenhas the power to stop such proceedings summarily andprevent the time of the public and the court from beingwasted. Undoubtedly, it is a matter of the court’sdiscretion whether such proceedings should be stopped ornot; and this discretion has to be exercised withcircumspection. It is a jurisdiction which should besparingly exercised, and exercised only in special cases.The court should also be satisfied that there is no chanceof the suit succeeding.45. In the case of Greenhalgh v. Mallard1 the Court hadto consider different proceedings on the same cause ofaction for conspiracy, but supported by differentaverments. The Court held that if the plaintiff has chosento put his case in one way, he cannot thereafter bring thesame transaction before the Court, put his case in anotherway and say that he is relying on a new cause of action. Insuch circumstances he can be met with the plea of resjudicata or the statement or plaint may be struck out onthe ground that the action is frivolous and vexatious andan abuse of the process of the court.46. In Mcllkenny v. Chief Constable of West MidlandsPolice Force1 the court of appeal in England struck out thepleading on the ground that the action was an abuse of theprocess of the court since it raised an issue identical tothat which had been finally determined at the plaintiffs’earlier criminal trial. The Court said even when it is notpossible to strike out the plaint on the ground of issueestoppel, the action can be struck out as an abuse of theprocess of the court because it is an abuse for a party torelitigate a question or issue which has already beendecided against him even though the other party cannotsatisfy the strict rule of res judicata or the requirementof issue estoppel. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

47. In the present case, the learned Judge was of theview that the appellants had resorted to two parallelproceedings, one under the Arbitration Act and the other byway of a suit. When the order of interim injunctionobtained by the appellants was vacated in arbitrationproceedings, they obtained an injunction in the suit. Thelearned Single Judge also felt that the issues in the twoproceedings were identical, and the suit was substantiallyto set aside the award. He, therefore, held that theproceeding by way of a suit was an abuse of the process ofthe court since it amounted to litigating the same issue ina different forum through different proceedings.48. This perception of the learned Judge may besubstantially correct though not entirely so. Undoubtedly,if the plaint in the suit is viewed as challenging only thearbitration award, a suit to challenge the award would berelitigating the issues already raised in the arbitrationpetition. The suit would also be barred under Section 32 ofthe Arbitration Act, 1940. Section 32 of the ArbitrationAct, 1940 provides that notwithstanding any law for thetime being in force, no suit shall lie on any groundwhatsoever for a decision upon the existence, effect orvalidity of an arbitration agreement or award, nor shallany arbitration agreement or award be set aside, amended,modified or in any way affected otherwise than as providedin this Act."12.2 Ultimately, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part byobserving :-"53. The appeal of the appellants from the judgment ofthe learned Judge striking out the plaint is, therefore,partly allowed and the suit, to the extent that itchallenges independently the decision of the Chairman andManaging Director, IFCI as a decision and not as an award,is maintainable in the sense that it is not an abuse of theprocess of the court. We make it clear that we are notexamining the merits of the claim nor whether the plaint inthe suit discloses a cause of action in this regard. Theplaint leaves much to be desired and it is for the trialcourt to decide these and allied questions. The plaintinsofar as it challenges the decision as an award and on thesame grounds as an award; or seeks to prevent theenforcement of that award by the Chairman, Modipon Ltd. orin any other way has been rightly considered as an abuse ofthe process of the court since the same reliefs have alreadybeen asked for in the arbitration petition. Transfer CaseNo. 13 of 1997 is, therefore, partly allowed." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

13. From the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Courtincluding the observation made in several decisions, which werenoticed in the aforesaid decision, the concept of rejecting a plaintby invoking jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC., on the ground that alitigation virtually amounts to "relitigation" and thus an abuse ofprocess of court has gained ground.14. At this stage, it may be convenient to notice somerelevant decisions relating to applicability of Order 7 Rule 11 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure.15. In (2006) 1 Supreme 677 : (2006) 3 SCC 100 (MAYAR(H.K.) LTD. & OTHERS v. OWNERS & PARTIES, VESSEL M.V. FORTUNE EXPRESS& OTHERS), while dealing with the scope of Order VII Rule 11, it wasobserved :-"10. Under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, the court hasjurisdiction to reject the plaint where it does not disclosea cause of action, where the relief claimed is undervaluedand the valuation is not corrected within the time as fixedby the court, where insufficient court fee is paid and theadditional court fee is not supplied within the period givenby the court, and where the suit appears from the statementin the plaint to be barred by any law. Rejection of theplaint in exercise of the powers under Order 7 Rule 11 ofthe Code would be on consideration of the principles laiddown by this Court. In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal thisCourt has held that if on a meaningful, not formal readingof the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, inthe sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, the courtshould exercise its power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Codetaking care to see that the ground mentioned therein isfulfilled. In Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill thisCourt has held that where the plaint discloses no cause ofaction, it is obligatory upon the court to reject the plaintas a whole under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, but the ruledoes not justify the rejection of any particular portion ofa plaint. Therefore, the High Court therein could not actunder Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the Code for striking downcertain paragraphs nor the High Court could act under Order6 Rule 16 to strike out the paragraphs in the absence ofanything to show that the averments in those paragraphs areeither unnecessary, frivolous or vexatious, or that they aresuch as may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fairtrial of the case, or constitute an abuse of the process ofthe court. In ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunalit was held that the basic question to be decided whiledealing with an application filed by the defendant under https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is to find out whether the realcause of action has been set out in the plaint or somethingillusory has been projected in the plaint with a view to getout of the said provision. In Saleem Bhai v. State ofMaharashtra5 this Court has held that the trial court canexercise its powers under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code at anystage of the suit before registering the plaint or afterissuing summons to the defendant at any time before theconclusion of the trial and for the said purpose theaverments in the plaint are germane and the pleas taken bythe defendant in the written statement would be whollyirrelevant at that stage. In Popat and Kotecha Property v.State Bank of India Staff Assn. this Court has culled outthe legal ambit of Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code in thesewords: (SCC p.516, para 19)“19. There cannot be any compartmentalisation,dissection, segregation and inversions of thelanguage of various paragraphs in the plaint. Ifsuch a course is adopted it would run counter to thecardinal canon of interpretation according to whicha pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertainits true import. It is not permissible to cull out asentence or a passage and to read it out of thecontext in isolation. Although it is the substanceand not merely the form that has to be looked into,the pleading has to be construed as it standswithout addition or subtraction of words or changeof its apparent grammatical sense. The intention ofthe party concerned is to be gathered primarily fromthe tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as awhole. At the same time it should be borne in mindthat no pedantic approach should be adopted todefeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities.” 11. From the aforesaid, it is apparent that the plaintcannot be rejected on the basis of the allegations made bythe defendant in his written statement or in an applicationfor rejection of the plaint. The court has to read theentire plaint as a whole to find out whether it discloses acause of action and if it does, then the plaint cannot berejected by the court exercising the powers under Order 7Rule 11 of the Code. Essentially, whether the plaintdiscloses a cause of action, is a question of fact which hasto be gathered on the basis of the averments made in theplaint in its entirety taking those averments to be correct.A cause of action is a bundle of facts which are required tobe proved for obtaining relief and for the said purpose, thematerial facts are required to be stated but not the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ evidence except in certain cases where the pleadings reliedon are in regard to misrepresentation, fraud, wilfuldefault, undue influence or of the same nature. So long asthe plaint discloses some cause of action which requiresdetermination by the court, the mere fact that in theopinion of the Judge the plaintiff may not succeed cannot bea ground for rejection of the plaint. In the present case,the averments made in the plaint, as has been noticed by us,do disclose the cause of action and, therefore, the HighCourt has rightly said that the powers under Order 7 Rule 11of the Code cannot be exercised for rejection of the suitfiled by the plaintiff-appellants."16. In (2006) 5 SCC 658 (BALASARIA CONSTRUCTION (P) LTD. v.HANUMAN SEVA TRUST AND OTHERS), while dealing with the questionrelating to dismissal of a suit on the ground of limitation, it wasobserved :-"8. After hearing counsel for the parties, goingthrough the plaint, application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPCand the judgments of the trial court and the High Court, weare of the opinion that the present suit could not bedismissed as barred by limitation without proper pleadings,framing of an issue of limitation and taking of evidence.Question of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact.Ex facie in the present case on the reading of the plaint itcannot be held that the suit is barred by time. The findingsrecorded by the High Court touching upon the merits of thedispute are set aside but the conclusion arrived at by theHigh Court is affirmed. We agree with the view taken by thetrial court that a plaint cannot be rejected under Order 7Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure."17. 2007(5) MLJ 187 (SC) : (2007) 5 SCC 614 [HARDESH ORESPVT. LTD. AND ANOTHER v. HEDE AND COMPANY), it was observed :-"12. Aggrieved by the order of the trial court theappellants preferred two appeals before the High Courtwhich have been dismissed by the impugned order. Before theHigh Court it was urged that in deciding an applicationunder Order 7 Rule 11 CPC the contentions raised in defenceor submissions advanced by the respondent-defendant abouttheir case need not be considered and the matter must bedecided on the basis of averments in the plaint and thedocuments annexed with the plaint. The trial court hadfallen into an error when it referred to the defence of thedefendant to determine as to whether the plaint was liableto be rejected as barred by limitation. It also noticed thesubmission urged on behalf of the appellant that the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ question of limitation was a mixed question of law and factand, therefore, such a question could be adjudicated onlyin the trial."18. In the present case, though Defendant No.2 had raised acontention that the suit, particularly the relief relating todeclaration of the sale deeds in favour of Defendant No.3 andDefendant No.2 were illegal and void was barred by limitation, thelearned single Judge has not specifically rejected the suit on theground of limitation, apparently on the footing that some factualaspect was required to be considered. At any rate, the learnedcounsel for Defendant No.2 / respondent has also stated that thepresent suit has not been dismissed on the ground of limitation andonly on the bar under Order II Rule 2 and Order 23 Rule 1(4) of CPCand the doctrine of relitigation had been invoked. Therefore, thedismissal of the suit on the question of limitation does not strictlyarise at the present. The decisions noticed above make it clear thatthe applicability of Order VII Rule 11 has to be decided on the basisof the averments made in the plaint itself and not on the basis ofthe plea of the defendants. However, while considering whether asuit is to be dismissed on the ground that it is an abuse of processof court or hit by the doctrine of "relitigation", obviously thecourt is not confined to the averments made in the plaint, but thecourt is required to look into undisputed surrounding circumstancesto come to a conclusion whether filing of the suit is an abuse ofprocess of court and hit by the doctrine of relitigation.19. With the above prefatory factual and legal backdrop,the contentions are required to be considered. Learned counsel forthe appellants has raised the following contentions :-(1) The bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC., was not available to beraised on the following grounds :-(a) Two earlier suits were only for injunction,whereas the present suit is for declaration that the saledeeds in favour of Defendant Nos.3 and 2 are void and fordeclaration of title of Plaintiff No.2, which causes ofaction were not available to Plaintiff No.2 in the year1995 or 2005 as the Plaintiff No.2 was yet to obtainprobate in respect of the Will in his favour.(b) The bar under Order II Rule 2 would be applicablein a subsequent suit only when the suit has been decided onmerit and, in the present case, since the earlier suits hadnot been decided on merit and had been withdrawn, there wasno occasion for the learned single Judge to invoke theprinciple of Order II Rule 2 CPC.(c) The bar under Order II Rule 2 is not applicable https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ since the cause of action in the second suit filed in theyear 2000 was different from the cause of action for thefirst suit and the cause of action for filing the presentsuit is different from the cause of action in the firstsuit in the year 1995 and the second suit filed during theyear 2000.(2) So far as the bar under Order 23 CPC is concerned, learnedcounsel for the appellants has raised a similar contention by statingthat two earlier suits were for bare injunction, whereas the presentsuit is a comprehensive suit for declaration of title of PlaintiffNo.2 and for declaration that the sale deeds in favour of DefendantNos.3 and 2 are void. (3) So far as the bar on the ground of re-litigation and abuseof process of court is concerned, it is contended by him that such abar can be invoked only when the earlier suit had been decided onmerit and, since the present suit is on the basis of separate causeof action, he could not have filed such a suit earlier fordeclaration of title inasmuch as he was yet to obtain probate inrespect of the Will and, therefore, he could not claim any titlekeeping in view the provisions contained in Section 213 of the IndianSuccession Act and only by virtue of the amendment to Section 213 byinsertion of provision relating to non-applicability of Section 57 ofthe Indian Succession Act to Indian Christian, a person can only beentitled to sue for title based on the Will without obtaining probate.20. Learned single Judge, while considering the question ofapplicability of bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC., has summarised theposition of law by observing as follows :-"(a) The previous and second suit must arise out ofthe same cause of action.(b) Both the suits must be between the same parties;and(c) The earlier suit must have been decided onmerits."21. However, in course of discussion, the learned singleJudge has observed that the earlier suit was not decided on meritsonly because the plaintiffs have withdrawn the suit and theplaintiffs having omitted to include for declaration of secondplaintiff's title in the earlier suit, the subsequent suit is barredby Order II Rule 2 CPC.22. Though there are some decisions of different HighCourts, which indicate that to attract the bar under Order II Rule 2 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ CPC., the earlier suit should have been decided on merits, whichposition was apparently accepted by the learned single Judge asapparent from the conclusion in para 32 (c), in the present case,the earlier suits were not decided on merits, but were withdrawn.Therefore, a doubt may arise as to whether the bar under Order IIRule 2 CPC could be invoked. That however, may not improve theposition for the present appellants in view of the fact that evenassuming that the bar under Order II Rule 2 may not apply on accountof the fact that the earlier suits had not been decided on merits buthad been withdrawn, the appellants are to overcome the bar createdunder Order 23 of CPC., inasmuch as the earlier suits were withdrawnwithout applying for leave to file a fresh suit.23. To overcome the bar under Order 23, the learned counselfor the appellants has raised a contention that the present suit ison the basis of a different cause of action as compared to the twoearlier suits. This aspect requires careful consideration.24. The first suit, namely O.S.No.2902 of 1995 was forinjunction seeking to restrain the first defendant, the AccommodationController, as he had issued notice to the first plaintiff, thefather of Plaintiff No.2. A reference has been made therein to theeffect that a Will has been executed in favour of Plaintiff No.2 andPlaintiff No.2 had applied for probate of such Will. In the presentsuit, there is a prayer for declaration that the sale deeds executedby Defendant Nos.4 to 14 in favour of Defendant No.3 are void and thesubsequent sale deeds executed by Defendant No.3 in favour ofDefendant No.2 are equally void. It is no doubt true that such saledeeds having been executed in the year 1996 and 2006, the prayer (a)and (b) in the suit were not available to be made in the year 1995.However, the question is whether the prayer for declaration of titleof Plaintiff No.2 was available to be made at that stage. Similarly,by the time when the subsequent suit was filed in the year 2000,though the sale deeds in favour of Defendant No.2 were yet to beexecuted, the sale deeds were already executed by Defendant Nos.4 to14 in favour of Defendant No.3 in the year 1996. The contention ofthe appellants is that the factum of such execution of the sale deedsby Defendant Nos.4 to 14 was not within the knowledge of theplaintiffs as such execution came to their knowledge only during thetrial of the suit and, therefore, they could not have sought for adeclaration that the sale deeds in favour of Defendant No.3 werevoid. But, again the question crops up whether at that stage theplaintiffs could have sought for declaration of the title. 25. In the above context, the learned counsel for theappellants has placed reliance upon Section 213 of the IndianSuccession Act. The relevant provision of Section 213, which isapplicable to the present case, before amendment and after amendmentare to the following effect :- https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Before amendment :-"213. Right as executor or legatee when established.-(1) No right as executor or legatee can be established inany Court of Justice, unless a Court of competentjurisdiction in India has granted probate of the Willunder which the right is claimed, or has granted letters ofadministration with the Will or with a copy of anauthenticated copy of the Will annexed.(2) This section shall not apply in the case of Willsmade by Muhammadans, and shall only apply-... (omitted as not necessary) "After amendment :-"213. Right as executor or legatee when established.-(1) No right as executor or legatee can be established inany Court of Justice, unless a Court of competentjurisdiction in India has granted probate of the Willunder which the right is claimed, or has granted letters ofadministration with the Will or with a copy of anauthenticated copy of the Will annexed.(2) This section shall not apply in the case of Willsmade by Muhammadans or Indian Christians, and shall onlyapply-...(omitted as not necessary) "26. It is claimed by him that by virtue of Section 213(1)of the Indian Succession Act, no right to the property could havebeen claimed by praying for declaration of title until a probate isobtained and since a probate proceeding was already pending, theplaintiffs could not have sued for declaration of title. In thisconnection, it is further contended that, even though the probateproceeding is still pending, only in view of the amendment to Section213, the cause of action seeking declaration of title is nowavailable to Plaintiff No.2 as probate is no longer required afteramendment.27. The aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for theappellants is apparently on the basis of misconception. The questionis whether Plaintiff No.2, who is seeking declaration of title inthe present suit filed in the year 2007, could have also sued fordeclaration of title in the year 1995 or 2000 or not? It is not thatthe plaintiffs were not aware that the Defendant Nos.4 to 14 wereclaiming their title to the property. Narration of facts and events, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ as per the present plaint, clearly indicates that some of thedefendants were laying their separate claim to the property. It maybe that there was some internecine dispute among them, but the factremains that they either conjointly or separately, were laying theirclaim. If at all there was a cause of action for declaration oftitle now, there is similar cause of action available in the year1995. The contention that since probate proceedings had beeninitiated and till probate was granted no title can be established,is not a complete answer inasmuch as there was no bar for filing thesuit for declaration, though without obtaining the probate no suchtitle could have been established. 28. There are several decisions of various High Courts,which indicate that there may not be any necessity to wait forobtaining a probate for filing the suit and the probate can beobtained any time before the suit itself is decided on merits. Theproper course is to file the suit for declaration and, if required,pray for stay of such proceedings in view of pendency of probateproceedings. As per Section 211 of the Indian Succession Act, titleto the property vests on the Executor of the Will as soon as theExecutant expires. This is because of the well known concept injurisprudence that succession to a particular property never lies invacuum be it on the basis of any Will or otherwise. The propertypasses on to the successor either on the basis of the Will or in theabsence of any Will on the basis of law relating to succession.Section 213 only creates an embargo relating to establishing suchtitle in a court of law. 29. That such a suit is required to be filed as and whenthe cause of action arises can be viewed from another angle by takingan illustration.Supposing a person, who claims title by virtue of beingsuccessor on the basis of a Will, is forcibly dispossessed by aperson who sets up independent title by adverse possession, would itbe open to the person claiming through the Will to contend that heneed not sue for possession on the basis of the title because he isyet to obtain probate. In this context it has to be borne in mindthat there is no specific period of limitation for applying forprobate, whereas a suit for possession on the basis of title has tobe filed within the prescribed period of limitation. Therefore, inour opinion, Plaintiff No.2 could have also prayed for declarationof title in the year 1995 or in the year 2000. 30. Apart from the above, in our considered opinion, theprayers relating to declaration that the sale deeds executed infavour of Defendant No.3 and thereafter in favour of Defendant No.2are null and void and even the prayer for declaration of PlaintiffNo.2's own title are all unnecessary prayers which were not required https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ for the purpose of determining the main issue. There is no disputeby any body that the property belonged to one J.G. Devasahayam andafter his death it was inherited by his widow and two daughters. Inother words, there is no dispute that Daisy Devasahayam was the ownerof a part of the property which is now claimed under the Will by theplaintiffs. Even the defendants claim their title through DaisyDevasahayam. In such a sense, when there is no dispute regardingtitle of the last-holder and the only dispute is relating to mode ofsuccession, namely, whether it should be on the basis of the Will orotherwise, it cannot be said that any cloud on the title to theproperty has arisen now and not earlier. Since Defendants 4 to 14either separately or jointly were claiming their title on the basisof intestate succession and the present Plaintiff No.2 was claimingtitle on the basis of testamentary succession, it cannot be said thatthe cause of action for suing for declaration has arisen only afterfiling of two previous suits. In our considered opinion, the verysame cause of action was equally available before filing of the suitin 2000 as well as in 1995.31. Learned counsel for the appellants has also claimedthat at the time when the first suit was filed in the year 1995, nosale deeds had been executed by the defendants 4 to 14 in favour ofDefendant No.3 and even though subsequently such defendants 4 to 14executed sale deeds in favour of Defendant No.3 in the year 1996,such factor was not within the knowledge of the plaintiffs when thesubsequent suit was filed in the year 2000 and only when theplaintiffs became aware of such sale deeds in course of hearing ofthe suit of 2000, they sought to amend the plaint by including theprayer for declaration of title and declaration that the sale deedsare invalid, but unfortunately such prayer for amendment was rejectedand, therefore, they have now filed a compendious suit including allthe relevant prayers and more particularly after amendment of theIndian Succession Act.32. In the subsequent suit of 2000, Defendant No.2, who wasthe ultimate purchaser, had got himself impleaded. The suit was onefor injunction. The present plaintiffs are not eo nomine party tothe sale deeds executed by Defendant Nos.4 to 14 in favour ofDefendant No.3, who in turn executed sale deeds in favour ofDefendant No.2. The plaintiffs are obviously not claiming titlethrough Defendant Nos.4 to 14. In such view of the matter, there isno necessity for them to pray for declaration that the sale deeds arevoid inasmuch as being not party to the documents, they can simplyignore the sale deeds and pursue their claim either on the basis ofpossession alone or even on the basis of title and possession.Therefore, the reliefs now included appear to be mere camouflage toget over the hurdle of Order 23 Rule 1. In this context, it has tobe kept in view that the plaintiffs withdrew the suit after theyfiled a fresh suit and obtain a fresh order of injunction against the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ very same Accommodation Controller and, even though they had includedother defendants including the last purchaser, they had not prayedfor injunction as against Defendant No.2.33. The question can now be examined from the point of viewof relitigation. If the Will in favour of Plaintiff No.2 was legaland binding, on that basis, Plaintiff No.2, if he is in possession,can sue for permanent injunction against the entire world. If he isnot in possession, he had a right to sue for recovery of possession.He had already filed a suit for injunction. Even at that stage offiling of the first suit in the year 1995, he was aware thatDefendant Nos.4 to 14 were claiming right over the property and as amatter of fact he had impleaded all those persons in the probateproceedings initiated by him. Therefore, if he had deliberatelyomitted to include those defendants in the suit filed in the year1995 as well as in the suit filed in the year 2000, he was requiredto pursue his remedy as available in law against all the persons whoare required to be sued. The very fact that he has allowed the firstsuit to be withdrawn when the matter became ripe for hearing withouttaking to its logical end and similarly the second suit was withdrawneven after conclusion of the trial and when the matter was pendingfor judgment, are very relevant factors to consider whether hissubsequent suit filed in the year 2007 is an abuse of process ofcourt. In the very first suit he has obtained an injunction againstthe Accommodation Controller and withdrew the same on some pretext.Thereafter, after few days he again filed a similar suit forinjunction against the very same Accommodation Controller. In suchsuit, Defendant No.2, who had already purchased the property from therival claimants and thereby claiming absolute right for himself, hasgot himself impleaded. While hearing in such suit was concluded andthe matter was reserved for judgment, he filed the present suit,obtained an injunction again against the Accommodation Controlleronly without seeking for injunction against the last purchaser,namely, Defendant No.2 or any other defendant and only afterobtaining an ex-parte injunction, he got the earlier suit of 2000dismissed as withdrawn. In these circumstances, the conclusion ofthe learned single Judge that the plaintiffs were trying to abuse theprocess of court appears to be fully justified keeping in view thefurther fact that in between, while all such controversies arepending, Plaintiff No.2 filed a proceeding under the Rent Control Actagainst his father, who is a co-plaintiff in all the suits seekingfor eviction. In these circumstances, even assuming that,technically speaking, the bar under Order II Rule 2 was notapplicable and similarly bar under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC., was notapplicable, at least the doctrine of relitigation was applicable. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

34. Under these circumstances, we find that the orderpassed by the learned single Judge by rejecting the plaint appears tobe justified. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs. Sd/- Asst.Registrar/true copy/ Sub Asst.RegistrardpkTo1.The Sub-Asst. Registrar, Original Side, High Court, Madras.+1 cc to Mr.C.Prakasam, Advocate, SR.No.336391 cc To The Government Pleader, SR.33388+1 cc to Mr.M.Stalin, Advocate, SR.No.33495COMMON JUDGMENT INOSA.NOs.376 to 378/2007AKR {CO}TP/31.8.2009.