Dr.Manoj Madhukar Sawalkar v. Sau.Dhanashree Dhanraj Yerpude

the petitioner and his counsel were absent. The trial Court fixed the matter on 20/06/2011 for dismissal by observing that the petitioner had no interest in prosecuting the proceedings. The petitioner filed an application on 28/06/2011 for setting aside the “no evidence order” and for permission to file the affidavit. That application was allowed subject to payment of costs of rupees five hundred. Again, on 25/07/2011 an adjournment was sought and on the next date of hearing, i.e. on 19/09/2011, an application filed by the petitioner for grant of adjournment, was rejected. The Assistant Charity Commissioner observed that the petitioner was prolonging the matter. The Assistant Charity Commissioner fixed the matter for the evidence of the respondents on 23/09/2011. Again, on that day, the petitioner moved an application for grant of adjournment on the ground of his ill-health. Though a medical certificate was not produced, the Assistant Charity Commissioner granted an opportunity to the petitioner, on humanitarian ground, by way of a last chance and the case was adjourned to 05/10/2011. The petitioner moved an application for setting aside the “no evidence order” and for permission to lead evidence. Again, the Assistant Charity Commissioner by taking a lenient view in the matter, granted permission to the petitioner to lead evidence subject to payment of costs of rupees five hundred. In spite of grant of an opportunity, the petitioner failed to tender evidence on the next date of hearing i.e. on 14/10/2011 and instead sought an adjournment. The said application was rejected. On 02/11/2011 the Assistant Charity Commissioner once again accommodated the petitioner due to the illness of the counsel. Thereafter, the wp1714.12-Order matter was listed on 08/11/2011, 15/11/2011, 29/11/2011, 05/12/2011, 08/12/2011, 19/12/2011, 02/01/2012 and 10/01/2012. Since the petitioner was not desirous of prosecuting the proceedings and tendering evidence, the Assistant Charity Commissioner had no other alternative but to proceed without the evidence of the petitioner-reporting trustee. The Assistant Charity Commissioner observed in the order dated 11/01/2012 that the High Court had directed the Charity Commissioner to expedite the matter and the petitioner was consistently trying to prolong the matter for one reason or the other. On 17/01/2012 an application was moved by the petitioner for setting aside the order dated 11/01/2012. However, the same was filed without an affidavit or signature of the petitioner. The said application was rejected by an order dated 17/01/2012 and the matter was posted for the evidence of the respondents. The respondent tendered his evidence on 23/01/2012. On 31/01/2012 the petitioner again moved an application for adjournment. The Assistant Charity Commissioner, however, rejected the application for cogent reasons recorded in the order. On 09/02/2012 neither the petitioner, nor his counsel were present. On 14/02/2012 an application was moved for taking action against some of the respondents. However, neither the petitioner, nor his counsel were present when the application for taking action was decided. The Assistant Charity Commissioner rejected the application and directed that the matter be fixed on 27/02/2012. On 27/02/2012 the petitioner and his counsel were absent. The respondents' counsel was present and heard and the case was closed for judgment. When the case was closed for judgment, the petitioner moved the application for setting aside the order foreclosing the right of the petitioner to tender evidence and wp1714.12-Order for permission to tender the evidence of the reporting trustee. However, the said application was rejected by the impugned order dated 09/04/2012. There is no fault whatsoever with the approach of the Assistant Charity Commissioner in deciding the application and rejecting the same. The Joint Charity Commissioner as well as the High Court had directed the Assistant Charity Commissioner to decide the change report enquiry proceedings as early as possible. The criminal proceedings against the petitioner were stayed till the change report was decided. It appears that due to the stay of the criminal proceedings till the decision of the change report enquiry proceedings, the petitioner took all possible steps to ensure that the Assistant Charity Commissioner does not decide the change report enquiry proceedings. The dates and events mentioned herein above clearly show that the petitioner was not only not inclined in prosecuting the proceedings but was also trying to ensure that the change report enquiry proceedings are not decided so that the stay granted to the criminal case would be operational. On more than a couple of occasions, the Assistant Charity Commissioner had directed that the evidence of the petitioner be closed and on a prayer made by the petitioner, the orders were set aside, some times subject to the payment of costs. But the petitioner did not mend his ways. The petitioner probably believed that though the petitioner would not appear in the proceedings before the Assistant Charity Commissioner, the orders of the Assistant Charity Commissioner could be set aside by the Assistant Charity Commissioner himself, as was done by him on more than a couple of occasions. The order clearly shows that the petitioner was not only negligent in prosecuting the matter, but was also abusing the process of the Court, by trying to wp1714.12-Order ensure that the proceedings should not be decided so that the stay to the criminal proceedings pending against him would continue. The Assistant Charity Commissioner cannot be blamed for passing the impugned order and rejecting the application for setting aside the order dated 11/01/2012. Neither has the petitioner tendered his evidence, nor has the petitioner cross-examined the witnesses of the respondents in spite of grant of several opportunities. The petitioner had tried to make the position of the Assistant Charity Commissioner miserable by not attending the Court on the important dates of hearing. The order is just and proper and calls for no interference, in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. JUDGE KHUNTE