SATYENDRA BALASAHEB BHONSALE v. RAMNATH BANSILAL GOLECHA AND ORS.

Diksha Rane 31.2 IA 10442 2025.docIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONINTERIM APPLICATION NO. 10442/2025INFIRST APPEAL ST. NO. 22660/2025SATYENDRA BALASAHEB BHONSALE..APPLICANTVS RAMNATH BANSILAL GOLECHA AND ORS. ..RESPONDENTS------------Adv. R. S. Navandar a/w. Adv. D. B. Gade for appellants/applicants.Adv. Tanishka Chavan a/w. Adv. Bharat Gadhavi, Adv. Aniket Shitolei/b. Adv. Tejesh Dande for respondent no.1 – original plaintiff.------------ CORAM :RAJESH S. PATIL, J. DATE : 21 APRIL 2026. P.C. :1)This interim application has been filed by original defendantno.13 for seeking condonation of delay of 2077 days in filing FirstAppeal St. No.22660/2025 challenging the judgment and decreedated 26/9/2019 passed by the CJSD, Pune, in Special Civil SuitNo.1249 of 2008.2)Heard learned counsel for all the parties and with their help, Ihave gone through the documents on record.3)The judgment and decree passed on 26/9/2019 passed by theCJSD, Pune, in Special Civil Suit No.1249/2008 has been challengedby three parties in this Court. 1 Diksha Rane 31.2 IA 10442 2025.doc4)In the present proceeding, he is defendant no.13, so alsodefendant no.17 (First Appeal St.No.10662/2023) and defendantno.18 (First Appeal No.1176/2022).5)The first appeal filed by the defendant no. 18 is in time andtherefore, the same would be required to be admitted and heard onmerits.6)The present applicant is defendant no.13, is challenging thesame judgment and decree which is challenged by defendant no.18,and if the delay condonation application is rejected, once the firstappeal filed by defendant no.18 is admitted, the present applicantwho is respondent therein is also required to be heard, and he maybe advised to file cross appeal to the same.7)In order to condone the delay, the applicant has filed anaffidavit, as well as an additional affidavit explaining the delay. Thepreliminary ground is that the applicant is not a resident ofMaharashtra but of Madhya Pradesh, and he used to travel to Pune toattend the court proceedings.8)It is his case that the Power of Attorney holder is to act on hisbehalf. The said Power of Attorney holder is not safeguarded hisrights, hence, the decree is suffered by him, and it was not2 Diksha Rane 31.2 IA 10442 2025.doccommunicated to him of passing of decree. He further stated that theapplicant was not properly represented in the proceeding before thetrial Court, therefore, in the interest of justice, the delay may becondoned and the first appeal be heard on merits.9)Learned counsel for the applicant has relied upon the judgmentof Improvement Trust, Ludhiani vs. Ujagar Singh and others1.10)Learned counsel for the respondent no.1/original plaintiff hasopposed this application as the decree is passed in her client’s favour.She has relied upon the judgment of Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. vs.Karnataka Housing Board and others2.11)Learned counsel appearing for the applicant in the presentinterim application submits that delay should be condoned in theinterest of justice and her client is ready to pay a cost ofRs.5,00,000/-.12)Supreme Court in the judgment of Collector, Land Acquisition,Anantnag and another Vs. Mst. Katji and Others reported in 1987 SC1353, has held that: “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedanticapproach should be made. Why not every house’s delay. Every second’sdelay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sensepragmatic manner.”1(2010) 6 SCC 78622025 SCC OnLine SC 19693 Diksha Rane 31.2 IA 10442 2025.doc13)Supreme Court in the case of S. Ganesharaju (Dead) throughLrs V. Narasamma (Dead) through Lrs reported in (2013) 11 SCC341, more specifically, paragraph Nos. 12 and 13, of the saidjudgment held that a liberal construction to the cause of delay shouldbe given. The said paragraphs are reproduced herein below: 12. The expression “sufficient cause” as appearing in Section 5 of theLimitation Act, 1963, has to be given a liberal construction so as toadvance substantial justice. Unless the respondents are able to showmalafides in not approaching the court within the period of limitation,generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. The trend of thecourts while dealing with the matter with regard to condonation ofdelay has tilted more towards condoning delay and directing theparties to contest the matter on merits, meaning thereby that suchtechnicalities have been given go-by.13. The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy or foreclose theright of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort todilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. 14)Bombay High Court in the judgment of Kamalbai NarasaiyyaShrimal and Another Vs. Ganpat Vithalrao Gavare reported in 2007(1) MH. L.J. 807, paragraph Nos.13 and 15 has held:13. The factual position is manifestly clear on bare perusal of theapplication for condonation filed by the petitioners before the learnedDistrict Judge. The only relevant statement in the application is thus:“The delay caused in preferring the appeal is of six months. Thecaused delay is not intentional one. The appellants are poor andhelpless persons. If the delay is not condoned appellant may causeirreparable loss which cannot be compensated in terms of money. Thesuit was for recovery of possession and present appellants are tenants.If the delay is not condoned then appellants will become shelterless.”15. The expression “sufficient cause” cannot be erased from section ofthe Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which woulddefeat the very purpose of section 5 of the Limitation Act. There mustbe some cause which can be termed as a sufficient one for the purpose4 Diksha Rane 31.2 IA 10442 2025.docof delay condonation. I do not find any such “sufficient cause” statedin the application and as such no interference in the impugned orderis called for.”15)Considering the law as laid down by the above mentionedjudgments and the facts of the present proceeding and the applicantis voluntarily ready to pay a cost of Rs.5,00,000/-, I am of the viewthat the delay can be condoned.16)As far as the judgment of Shivamma (supra) is concerned, thesaid judgment is dealing with delay of 3966 days. There was noconnected second appeal which is within time, therefore, there is noneed to club these matters and to be heard together. 17)Considering the law as laid down in the above mentionedjudgments and the facts of the present case where first appeal filed bythe defendant no.18 is within time and the impugned judgment inthe said first appeal and in the present proceeding is one and thesame, this interim application deserves to be allowed, subject to costto be paid. 18)Interim Application stands allowed in terms of prayer clause(b), subject to cost of Rs.500,000/- to be paid within a period of twoweeks to the Deepstambh Foundation, Manobal, Kusumba, District –Jalgaon – 425 003, having NGO Registration No. AABTD7731N, CSR5 Diksha Rane 31.2 IA 10442 2025.docNO. CSR00027855, from the date of uploading this order on theofficial website of the Bombay High Court. 19)The details of the bank Account for payment of cost are asunder:-Name:Deepstambh Foundation, Manobal, Kusumba,District – Jalgaon – 425 003, having NGORegistration No. AABTD7731N, CSR NO.CSR00027855Bank Name:ICICI BankAccount No.:037501008110IFSC Code:ICIC0000375Branch:Jalgaon(Rajesh S. Patil, J.)6