Kishore Agency v. Smt. Sweta Tandon & Ors.

O R D E R (08/05/2012) These revisions are directed against the order dated

03.01.2012 passed in Eviction Case No.70/90 (7)/2008 of the Rent Controlling Authority, Kotwali, Jabalpur. Since the common order is challenged, these two revisions are disposed of by this common order. However, the facts are taken from Civil Revision No.61/2012.

2. Facts giving rise to filing of this revision are that the respondent No.1 claiming herself to be a specified landlady as defined under Section 23-J of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (herein after referred to as ‘Act’) made an 2 application under Section 23-A of the Act for eviction of the petitioner initially stating that the said petitioner was inducted as a tenant by her husband on a monthly rent of Rs.8,000/-, in the demise premises, owned by the husband of the respondent No.1. The husband of respondent No.1 had died on 06.01.2008. The respondent No.1 is require to look after two children, one son and one daughter, and is thus require the demise premises bonafidely for establishing a coaching institute for computer training and courses for making additional income so that in these hard financial days, she may provide proper education to her children. It was contended that the petitioner was not making payment of regular rent and instead of making payment of the rent to respondent No.1, a meager sum of Rs.3,000/- was being paid to the in-laws of respondent No.1. The Rent Controlling Authority issued summons of the said application to the petitioner and the reply was filed that in fact the owner of the said Kishore Agency, the alleged tenant, was Shri Chandralal Shivlani and not Sanjay Shivlani. Said Chandralal Shivlani was impleaded as respondent in the said application filed by the respondent No.1 and after receiving the reply of the application filed by the respondent No.1, the evidence of the parties were recorded by the Rent Controlling Authority and holding that the petitioner was tenant of respondent No.1 and that the house was required bonafidely by the respondent No.1, the order of eviction was passed. It was also directed that since agreed rent of the demise premises was Rs.3,000/- per month, the petitioner was required to deposit the said amount from the date of filing of the application, i.e.

17.11.2008 and the respondent No.1 was required to pay an year’s rent to the petitioner under the provisions of Section 23-G(2) of the Act. This revision is directed against this order. 3

3. The respondent No.1 has also come before this Court in Civil Revision No.79/2012 challenging the part of the order where the agreed rent of the demise premises is said to be Rs.3,000/- per month and has contended that in fact the rent is Rs.8,000/- but erroneously the same has been denied. Both the revisions have been heard together.

4. It is vehemently contended by learned Counsel for the petitioner that on overall assessment of the evidence produced by the respondent No.1, it cannot be said that there was any bonafide need available in favour of respondent No.1 for grant of an order of eviction of the tenant under the provisions of Section 23-A of the Act. It is vehemently contended that in various decisions it is categorically held that if there is a dispute between the co- owners of the demise premises, on an application made by the specified landlord only, such an order of eviction should not be granted. It is contended that in view of the pronouncement of law by this Court as also by the Apex Court, the order impugned is bad in law.

5. Undisputedly there may be a dispute in between the in-laws with respect to the ownership of the house demised to the petitioner but that is to be resolved by the Civil Court in a suit, which is filed. However, the petitioner himself has admitted that the demise premises was let out to it for the purposes of establishing an agency or keeping a godown, by the husband of the respondent No.1. Respondent No.1 in fact has categorically contended that the house in dispute was owned by one late Biharilal, who has executed a registered Will in favour of the husband of respondent No.1. This particular allegation made in paragraph 1 of the application has not been suitably replied by the petitioner but with respect to execution of the registered Will, he has denied the document. However, the petitioner has 4 admitted the contents of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the application where the respondent No.1 has categorically contended that after the death of her husband, she has become owner of the house in dispute. After this admission, there was no scope left for disputing such a contention raised by the respondent No.1. Further the dispute in between the family members of the respondent No.1 has been averred in reply but to that extent nothing has been produced to show that the particular demise premises was also subject matter of dispute. Even otherwise when it was admitted that the respondent No.1 was the landlady of the demise premises, even by the proprietor of the petitioner agency in the written statement, only this much was required to be seen whether she was having any bonafide need or not for claiming eviction of the petitioner.

6. In the evidence the respondent No.1 has categorically proved that her income was not such that she may earn sufficient money to look after her growing children. As far as the allegations with respect to receiving the income from other sources, that was specifically denied. The fact that the respondent No.1 was a qualified lady, capable of starting a coaching institute, was not denied. On the other hand, no other evidence was produced by the petitioner to show that the respondent No.1 was having any other accommodation to fulfill her need or that he was not genuinely having any bonafide need. After marshalling the entire evidence, the learned Rent Controlling Authority has rightly reached to the conclusion that the bonafide need of the landlady was established and, therefore, the order was rightly passed.

7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance in the case of Hameeda Begum vs. Champa Bai Jain 5 and others, 2004(1) MPLJ 50 and it is contended that in view of the law laid-down by the Division Bench of this Court, such a suit though could be filed but possession is not to be delivered only to one. If the petitioner has himself admitted that the respondent No.1 is the sole landlady of the demise premises, how the benefit of such a decision can be given to the petitioner, is not understood. In the case of Ranbir Talib alias Ranbir Satwant Singh vs. M/s Bhatia Gas, AIR 2012 SCW 1669, the law is made very clear by the Apex Court that if the Rent Controlling Authority has arrived into a definite finding with respect to the bonafide need, the same is not to be interfered in exercise of revisional power by this Court. Thus, there is no force in such submissions made by learned Counsel for the petitioner.

8. Once it is established that the respondent No.1 was having bonafide need and for the said need the eviction order was rightly issued by the Rent Controlling Authority, it is required to be seen whether the Rent Controlling Authority was also competent to decide the quantum of rent recoverable from the petitioner. The application was not made under Section 7 of the Act to that effect nor the issue was decided in that respect by the Rent Controlling Authority. For such purposes, the matter was to be left open by the Rent Controlling Authority. As the summary enquiry is required to be conducted in a case filed under Section 23-A of the Act, production of evidence in proof of rent was not required and if such enquiry is not conducted nor any evidence is produced in that respect, the Rent Controlling Authority was not right in holding that the agreed rent of the demise premises was Rs.3,000/-. This particular aspect is required to be adjudicated by the competent Court if a dispute is raised in appropriate manner, therefore, to that extent the order of the Rent 6 Controlling Authority cannot be affirmed. However, the eviction order of the petitioner is to be maintained and an opportunity is to be granted to respondent No.1 to raise a demand for recovery of rent by disputing the quantum of rent before the appropriate forum. If such a demand is raised, the order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority will not come in the way of the Court in deciding the said dispute in appropriate manner, of course after extending full opportunity to the petitioner.

9. Consequently, this revision fails and is hereby dismissed. The revision filed by respondent No.1 being Civil Revision No.79/2012 is also disposed of with a liberty to respondent No.1 to raise the dispute, if desired, in appropriate forum with respect to quantum of rent and recovery thereof against the petitioner. There shall be no order as to cost. (K.K. Trivedi) Judge Skc