IN THEHIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH A^T BILASPUR v. Chowk

S.B.: HON'BLE MR. ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE. J. Civil Revision No. 70 OF 2012 APPLICANT/ DEFENDANT RESPONDENT/ PLAINTIFF Rajendra Kumar Khandelwal Versus Saraswati Devi Gupta REVISION UNDER SECTION 23-E OF THE C.G. ACCOMODATION CONTROL ACT, 1961. Present:- Mr. Anshuman Shrivastava, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Advocate for the respondent. ORDER (Passedon 01/12/2012)

1. This is a civil revision filed by the non-applicant/ tenant under Section 23-E of the C.G. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 against the order dated 26/3/2012 passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, Rajnandgaon (C.G.) CaseNo. 02-A/1990. By impugned order, the Rent Cdntrollihg Authority 2. (for short called "RCAW) allowed the eviction application filed by the applicant (landlady-respondent herein) under Section 23-A of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short called "the Actw) and in consequence directed eviction ofthe non-applicant (petitioner herein) from the suit accommodation.

3. So the question which arise for consideration in this revision is whether RCA was justified in allowing the eviction application of the applicant (landlady)?

4. Facts of the case are these:- ^>

5. The dispute relates to eviction of the petitioner herein from the suit house.

6. The respondent is the landlady. She is widow. She let out her shop to petitioner on monthly rent for non- residential purpose. She filed an application under Section 2 3-A read with Section 2 3-J of the Act against the petitioner before the RCA clamming petitioner's eviction from the suit shop. The eviction was claimed on the ground of landlady's bonafide need for starting business in the suit shop by her major son- Bhagwati Gupta. She alleged that she has no other suitable accommodation of her own available in city where she can start her business through her son and hence the application for eviction.

7. The non-applicant (petitioner herein) denied the need of the applicant-landlady and contended that she has several other shops available in town where she can start her so called business, that the need alleged and set up in the application is not bonafide, that applicant is now too old to do any business, that her son is already doing bUsiness and hence noneed for the shop in question for doing any business. These were essentially the defense of denial taken by the petitioner in his written statement. Parties adduced evidence.

8. The RCA by impugned order, allowed the eviction application of the landlady. It was held that her need is bonafide, that she requires the suit shop for starting the business for her major son, thaf she has no other suitable accommodatibn of her own in city where she can start her business. With these findings, the RCA allowed this application which has now given rise to filing of this revision by the tenant (non-applicant).

9. Submission of the learned counsel for fhe revision petitioner (tenant) was that firstly, the need set up by the landlady was not bonafide. Secondly, the landlady has -\v.^\ several houses/shops available in the city where the alleged business can be started by her or/and her son. Thirdly, no proper issues were framed on certain material pleadings which caused prejudice to the parties and in particular to the petitioner while contesting the eviction application. Fourthly, that there are subsequent events which have a material bearing over the controversy and the same were not taken into account resulting in rendering the impugned order bad in law, and lastly, the appreciation done by the RCA of the facts and evidence was not proper and hence all the finding recorded by the RCA are bad in law and hence liable to be set aside.

10. In reply, learned counsel supported the impughed order and prayed for its upholding.

11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, I find no merit in the revision and hence the same is liable to be dismissed resulting in upholding of the impugned order of eviction.

12. At the outset, I may mention and rathe^ take note ofthe fact that whenever the eviction is sought by the special category of the landlord specified in Section 23-J of the Act then there arise a deeming statutory presumption in their favour as contained in Act of their need to be bonafide as provided in Section 23 of the Act. True it is that it is rebut table at the benefit of the instance of the tenant but statutory presumption landlord/landlady while considering his/her plea ofbonafide need. Since in this case, the landlady is a special category of landlady-widow and hence she was entitled to claim the benefit of presumption to be drawn in her favour and which the RCA did draw so do I while deciding this revision.

13. in my view, Now even otherwise, the landlady (applicant) was able to plead and prove her bonafide need for starting business as contemplated under Section 23-A in the shop for her major son so also was able to plead and prove '•^^f^yf /- ^ that she does not have any suitable vacant shop available in the city where she can start her business. Firstly, it is the choice of the landlady to decide where and in which place and what type of business, she has to do and how it is has to be done. In this matter, the tenant has no role to play by the tenant telling his landlady or advice her. Secondly, the city but though took the defense that landlady has several shops in failed to adduce or/and point out which shop/accommodation was actually available as a vacant to landlady where she could start her business and yet did not start despite the shop lying vacant. In other words, she may be owning several shops but if all the shops are in occupation of other tenants then such shops can not be said to be available to her for starting business. In such case, it is for the landlady to decide as to against which tenant she would like to proceed to file an eviction petition for starting business.In this matter, the tenant has no right to tell his landlady that she should have flled eviction petition against "Aw tenant or aBW tenant instead of filing against him. Thirdly, all the shops which the tenant (petitionfer) in this case pointed out were in occupation of tenants. Fourthly, merely because the landlady has gone old does not mean that she can not start any business through her major son. On the other hand, she has every right to claim eviction for her own need or for the need of her major son for her survival and of her son. Fifthly, merely because the son is doing some business does not mean that he can not start any otherbusiness.It for all these reasons; submission on all these factual issues has no merit. 14; I am ndt impressed by the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner when he contended that no issues were framed on material pleadings. In the first place when parties had led evidence on all the issues without raising any objections then there was no question of any prejudice being caused to both. Moreover, no one was 0<\0 prevented from leading any evidence. The submission has then no merit.It is rejected. I

15. impressed by the yet other submission when it was contended that subsequent events am also not on the availability of alternative accommodation were not looked into. The impugned order in my view did take into account all the evidence and then finding was returned. In this revision also no such evidence was brought to my notice to show that it was not looked into or ignored while rendering the finding of bonafide need or availability of alternative accommodation. I therefore find no merit in this submission also.

16. I ha^e gone thrbugh the entire evidence keeping consideration the pleadings of the parties and find that applicant-landlady was able to plead and prove her case of need as required under the Act whereas the tenant was not able to rebut the presumption. This Cburt while hearing revision even if decide the matter like an appeal and undertakes the evidence which it has done even then no flaw \. can be noticed in the impugned finding ofthe RCA.

17. Learned counsel for the petitioner however cited some authorities which I perused. In my opinion, they are more on facts appearing in thaf particular case and hence are of no application here to this case. I need notdetail them any more.

18. In the light of foregoing discussion, I find no merit in the civil revision. It is accordingly dismissed.

19. As a result of the rejection of civil revision, the non- applicant (petitioner herein) must vacate fhe suit shop and hand over possession to the landlady (respondent herein) within three months provided he deposit all arrears of rent till date and also deposit three months rent by way of demands for use and occupation. It be done within two \ \ ji~ "^ ';. '^^^ ^' . v ^'y ^,:,,,,^' Tiwari ^ ^<' weeks to enable him to stay for three months else. He will have to vacate forthwith.

20. No cost(s). (AI AbhayManohar Sapre Sd/- Judgc