SHRI BASAVARAJ S v. STATE OF KARNATAKA, BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY

wholly illusory and deprives defendants of a meaningful opportunity of contest, particularly in suits involving valuable immovable property rights.

#13. It was further submitted that the impugned amendment disproportionately affects litigants residing in rural areas. Civil litigation concerning agricultural lands, village sites, residential houses and Gram Panchayat properties invariably depends upon revenue records maintained by different authorities such as Village Accountants, Tahsildars, Survey Departments and Revenue Offices. Procurement of certified copies of RTCs, mutation entries, Tippani, survey sketches, grant orders, records and other foundational documents frequently consumes considerable time owing administrative and logistical constraints. An inflexible forfeiture provision, it is argued, would therefore visit HC-KAR - 16 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 genuine litigants with irreversible civil consequences without any fault attributable to them.

#14. Learned counsel questioned constitutional validity of newly inserted Section 158A on the ground that it prima facie trenches upon the field occupied by Sections 122 to 127 of the Code, which preserve the rule-making power of the High Courts in matters of civil procedure.

#15. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the following judgments; (i) Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1 (ii) Kailash v. Nanhku and Others (2005) 4 SCC 480 (iii) Salem Bar association, TN v. Union of India (2005) 6 SCC 344 (iv) Prakash Corporates v. Dee Vee Projects Ltd. (2022) 5 SCC 112 HC-KAR - 17 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 IV. Stand of the State

#16. Per contra, the learned Additional Advocate General Kiran Ron defended the validity of the Amendment Act by contending that the State Legislature possesses unquestionable legislative competence under Entry 13 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to amend procedural law applicable within the State.

#17. It is contended the object of amendment is to ensure expeditious disposal of civil disputes, eliminate avoidable delays and strengthen procedural discipline in trial courts. According to the State, procedural timelines have repeatedly been upheld in different statutory enactments including the Commercial Courts Act, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and the Consumer Protection legislation.

#18. It is further contended that the Legislature has merely substituted one procedural timeline with another by extending the period from ninety to one hundred and HC-KAR - 18 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 twenty days and that such legislative exercise cannot be construed as an attempt to overrule judicial decisions.

#19. Learned Additional Advocate General also submits that modern technological advancements, digitisation of land records, online availability of revenue documents and the increasing use of artificial intelligence legal drafting substantially reduce the practical difficulties projected by the petitioners. According to him, the amendment advances the constitutional objective of speedy justice without extinguishing substantive rights. It is lastly contended that in the event this Court finds any ambiguity in the provision, the proper constitutional course would be to adopt the doctrine of reading down rather than striking down the legislation. V. Scope of Judicial Review

#20. Before adverting to the rival submissions, it requires to be noticed that every legislation enacted by a competent legislature carries with it a presumption of HC-KAR - 19 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 constitutionality. Courts ordinarily favour of sustaining legislative enactments. At the same time, where a statute is alleged to transgress constitutional limitations or to nullify binding constitutional principles declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, judicial review becomes not merely permissible but obligatory.

#21. The Court is therefore required to examine whether the impugned amendment merely alters the statutory procedure within the legislative domain or whether it travels beyond permissible legislative limits by extinguishing judicial discretion which has been recognised as an integral component of procedural fairness under the Code.

#22. Heard learned Senior Counsel, S.P Shankar and learned Senior Counsel, Vikram Huilgol and counsels appearing for the petitioners and learned Additional Advocate General, Kiran Ron. HC-KAR - 20 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 VI. Points for Consideration

#23. In the light of the pleadings, submissions and statutory framework, the following points arise consideration: (i) Whether Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 2024, insofar as it prescribes a rigid outer limit of one hundred and twenty days for filing the written statement and excludes judicial discretion, is an attempt by the State Legislature to override or nullify the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India, and if so, whether such legislative action is constitutionally impermissible? (ii) Whether the impugned amendment, by taking away judicial discretion to receive written statements beyond one hundred and twenty days, runs contrary to the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in HC-KAR - 21 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 Salem Advocate Bar Association and the subsequent judgments following the said decision? (iii) Whether the State Legislature, while exercising its legislative power to amend procedural law under the Concurrent List, can impose an absolute embargo upon the inherent powers of the Civil Court preserved under Section 151 of the Code and the judicial discretion recognised under Order VIII Rule 10? (iv) Whether the Legislature, having introduced an absolute embargo under the third proviso to Order V Rule 1, without correspondingly amending Order VIII Rule 10, Section 151 and has created an apparent inconsistency within the Code itself, and whether such partial legislative amendment warrants reading down impugned provision so as to preserve the harmonious operation of the Code? (v) Whether the first proviso to order VIII rule 10, inserted by section 4(iv)(d) of the Karnataka HC-KAR - 22 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 Amendment Act, 2024, can be construed as nullifying the substantive provision of rule 10 and the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association(supra). (vi) Whether the impugned provision results in denial of a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend civil proceedings, particularly those involving immovable properties situated in rural areas where procurement of foundational revenue records is often beyond the control of the litigants? (vii) Whether Section 158A of the Amendment Act is consistent with the scheme of Sections 122 to 127 of the Code relating to the rule-making power of the High Courts? (viii) Whether the impugned amendment, though enacted with the objective of ensuring expeditious disposal of civil suits, disproportionately impairs access HC-KAR - 23 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 to justice and is liable to be read down in the light of the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court?

#24. Since the principal challenge revolves around the interpretation placed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court upon Order VIII Rules 1 and 10 of the Code and the constitutional limitations upon legislative action, becomes necessary to first examine the evolution of the law commencing from the Constitution Bench decisions on mandatory and directory provisions and culminating in the judgments rendered in Salem Advocate Bar Association(supra) and subsequent line of authorities. VII. Evolution of the law – Mandatory v. Directory provision and Jurisprudential foundation of Salem Advocate Bar Association (supra)

#25. Having noticed the statutory background and the rival submissions, this Court now proceeds to examine the judicial evolution of Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code. The HC-KAR - 24 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 controversy involved in the present writ petition cannot be decided merely by comparing the text of the Central Amendment with the Karnataka Amendment. The issue has to be examined in the backdrop of the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court interpreting the very provision. The binding precedents do not merely interpret the words employed in Order VIII Rule 1, they expound the constitutional philosophy governing procedural law and the limits within which procedural prescriptions operate.

#26. It is a settled principle that where the Hon’ble Supreme Court interprets a statutory provision, what becomes binding under Article 141 is not merely the conclusion reached in the case, but the ratio decidendi underlying interpretation. Consequently, before examining whether the State Legislature has altered the statutory language, this Court is required to ascertain the precise principle declared by the Hon’ble Apex Court while construing Order VIII Rule 1. HC-KAR - 25 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 Procedural Law – An Instrument to Advance Justice

#27. The jurisprudential foundation governing procedural statutes was laid much before the amendments introduced by Parliament in 1999 and 2002.

#28. In Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah7, the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that the Code of Civil Procedure is designed to facilitate justice and not to obstruct it. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that procedural provisions cannot be interpreted with such technical rigidity as to frustrate adjudication on merits. The Hon’ble Supreme Court cautioned that every procedural enactment must be informed by the principles of natural justice so that parties whose civil rights are affected receive an effective opportunity of participation.

#29. The observations of Justice Vivian Bose, have become a guiding beacon for procedural jurisprudence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that a Code of 7 AIR 1955 SC 425 HC-KAR - 26 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 Procedure is intended to regulate the machinery of justice. It is not an end in itself. Excessive technicality in construing procedural provisions defeats the very object of the Code. These principles acquired greater significance after Parliament introduced rigid timelines into Order VIII Rule 1 through the Amendment Acts of 1999 and 2002. VIII. Tests for Determining Whether a Provision is Mandatory or Directory

#30. The important milestone Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court decision in Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board, Rampur8. The Constitution Bench authoritatively laid down that the mere use of the word “shall” does not automatically render a statutory provision mandatory. The Hon’ble Supreme Court formulated the governing tests for determining whether a provision is mandatory or directory. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the following factors require consideration: 8 AIR 1965 SC 895 HC-KAR - 27 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 (a) the object sought to be achieved by the statute; (b) the purpose for which the provision is enacted; (c) the legislative intent; (d) the consequences flowing from construing the provision as mandatory or directory; (e) the inconvenience or injustice likely to result from either construction; (f) the relationship between the provision and the remaining provisions of the statute; and (g) the overall scheme of the enactment.

#31. Thus, the Constitution Bench made abundantly clear that interpretation cannot be founded merely upon grammatical expressions. Context, purpose, legislative intent consequences equally determinative. These principles subsequently became the very foundation upon which Order VIII Rule 1 came to be interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. HC-KAR - 28 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 Procedural Time Limits and Absence of Penal Consequences

#32. Before Order VIII Rule 1 came up consideration, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to examine a similar procedural timeline in Topline Shoes Ltd. v. Corporation Bank9. The issue before the Hon’ble Supreme Court concerned Section 13(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 prescribing a time limit for filing a reply before the Consumer Forum. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that although the statute prescribed a definite period, it did not provide any express penal consequence for non-compliance. The legislative intent was to expedite proceedings and not to deny adjudication on merits. The Hon’ble Supreme Court therefore held that the provision was directory.

#33. The ratio emerging from Topline Shoes (supra) is that where the statute merely prescribes a procedural timeline without expressly extinguishing 9 (2002) 6 SCC 33 HC-KAR - 29 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 substantive rights or completely disabling judicial discretion, Courts should ordinarily construe such provisions as directory unless compelling circumstances indicate otherwise. IX. Amendment of Order VIII Rule 1

#34. Parliament thereafter introduced significant amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure through the Amendment Acts of 1999 and 2002. Order VIII Rule 1, after amendment, provided that the defendant shall file the written statement within thirty days from service of summons and that the Court may extend the time, but not beyond ninety days. The amendment undoubtedly reflected the legislative concern over delay in civil trials. The Statement of Objects and Reasons demonstrated Parliament’s intention to eliminate repeated adjournments and to ensure procedural discipline. Significantly, however, Parliament did not provide any express consequence declaring that a written statement filed beyond ninety HC-KAR - 30 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 days shall become non est or that the Court shall lose jurisdiction to receive it. Simultaneously, Order VIII Rule 10 remained unaltered. The provision reads as under: “Where any party from whom a written statement is required fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, the Court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, while Rule 1 introduced a procedural time schedule, Rule 10 continued to confer a wide discretion upon the Court.

#35. The authoritative pronouncement interpreting the amended Rule came in Kailash v. Nanhku (supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court considered whether expiry of ninety days automatically deprived the Court of jurisdiction to receive a written statement. After examining the purpose of the amendment, it was held that the object of prescribing the time schedule was to expedite HC-KAR - 31 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 trials and not to scuttle them. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that procedural law ordinarily regulates the manner in which rights are enforced. Unless Legislature clearly intends forfeiture, procedural prescriptions ought not to destroy substantive rights. The Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that although the proviso employs negative language, it does not expressly prohibit the Court from extending time beyond ninety days.

#36. More importantly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that no penal consequence had been provided for failure to file the written statement within the prescribed period. The Hon’ble Supreme Court therefore concluded that the provision merely creates a disability against the defendant but does not extinguish the Court’s jurisdiction. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the prescribed period should ordinarily be followed, departure from the rule should be by way of exception, extension cannot be granted routinely, exceptional circumstances must exist, HC-KAR - 32 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 reasons must be recorded, and costs may be imposed. Thus, Kailash (supra) preserved procedural discipline without sacrificing judicial discretion.

#37. The controversy attained finality in Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India (supra). The principal questions before the Hon’ble Supreme Court were: (a) whether the ninety-day period is mandatory; (b) whether Courts lose jurisdiction after ninety days; (c) whether judicial discretion survives in exceptional cases.

#38. While answering these questions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not confine itself merely to the text of Order VIII Rule 1. It examined the broader principles governing interpretation of procedural statutes by referring to Sangram Singh, Raza Buland Sugar (supra) and Topline Shoes (supra). HC-KAR - 33 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026

#39. The Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the use of the word “shall” is not conclusive. Legislative intent has to be gathered from the context, purpose and consequences. The Hon’ble Supreme Court emphatically reiterated that rules of procedure exist to advance justice and not to defeat it.

#40. The Hon’ble Supreme Court approved the celebrated observations of Justice Krishna Iyer in State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari10: “Procedural law is not to be a tyrant but a servant; not an obstruction but an aid to justice; procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress of justice.” The above observations have since become one of the foundational principles governing interpretation of procedural statutes. 10 (1979) 1 SCC 719 HC-KAR - 34 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 X. Harmonious Construction of Order VIII Rules 1 and 10

#41. The most significant contribution of Salem Advocate Bar Association (supra) lies in the harmonious interpretation adopted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Instead of reading Rule 1 isolation, the Court interpreted Rule 1 together with Rule 10. The Court noticed that although Rule 1 prescribes ninety days, Rule 10 expressly empowers the Court to “make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit.” If Rule 1 were construed as completely mandatory, Rule 10 would become largely redundant. Applying the doctrine of harmonious construction, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Rule 10 preserves judicial discretion even after expiry of ninety days. Consequently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the defendant does not acquire an automatic right to extension. Equally, the Court does not lose jurisdiction merely because ninety days have expired. HC-KAR - 35 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 Judicial discretion survives. Its exercise, however, must remain exceptional. Ratio Decidendi of Salem Advocate Bar Association

#42. The true ratio of Salem Advocate Bar Association (supra) may therefore be summarized thus: (a) the ninety-day period is directory; (b) procedural timelines are intended to expedite justice and not defeat adjudication; (c) use of the word “shall” is not determinative; (d) absence of express penal consequences is significant; (e) Order VIII Rules 1 and 10 must be harmoniously construed; (f) Rule 10 preserves judicial discretion; (g) inherent judicial powers are not extinguished; (h) extension beyond ninety days is permissible only in exceptionally hard cases; (i) reasons must be recorded; HC-KAR - 36 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 (j) discretion cannot be exercised routinely.

#43. The importance of Salem Advocate Bar Association (supra) lies not merely in declaring ninety days as directory. Its enduring significance lies in the constitutional recognition that procedural prescriptions cannot altogether extinguish judicial discretion where denial of such discretion would result in failure of justice. It is this principle, rather than the numerical period of ninety days, which constitutes the binding declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution.

#44. The subsequent decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have consistently reaffirmed and applied this principle. Those authorities require detailed examination before this Court considers whether the impugned Amendment Act can be sustained by adopting the doctrine of reading down.

#45. The discussion shall now proceed to the subsequent line of authorities beginning with R.N. Jadi & Brothers v. Subhashchandra(supra) and culminating in HC-KAR - 37 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 Desh Raj(supra), Shoraj Singh (supra) and Bharat Kalra (supra), which reaffirm and strengthen the ratio laid down in Kailash(supra) and Salem Advocate Bar Association(supra). Binding Effect of the Law Declared in Salem Advocate Bar Association

#46. Having examined the historical evolution culminating in the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India (supra), it now becomes necessary to examine whether the principle laid down therein has continued to hold the field or has undergone any subsequent modification. The answer is found in an unbroken line of authorities rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court over the last two decades. Far from diluting the principle enunciated in Kailash(supra) and Salem Advocate Bar Association(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed that the time HC-KAR - 38 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 schedule prescribed under Order VIII Rule 1, in ordinary civil suits, is directory and that judicial discretion survives beyond the stipulated period, albeit to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances.

#47. The consistency with which this principle has reiterated assumes considerable constitutional significance. Once a statutory provision has repeatedly received authoritative interpretation by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, that interpretation becomes an integral part of the provision itself. Any subsequent legislative amendment must therefore be examined in the light of the law so declared.

#48. The important decision after Salem Advocate Bar Association(supra) is R.N. Jadi & Brothers v. Subhashchandra (supra). In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was again confronted with the question whether a written statement filed beyond the prescribed period deserved rejection solely on account of delay. While affirming the principles laid down HC-KAR - 39 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 Kailash(supra) Salem Advocate Bar Association(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that procedural prescriptions cannot be interpreted in a manner that results in denial of justice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court invoked the celebrated maxim, “Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit”, meaning thereby that an act of the Court shall prejudice no person.

#49. More importantly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court once again emphasised that procedural law is merely the handmaid of justice and that rigid adherence to procedural technicalities cannot defeat substantial rights. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that procedural provisions are intended to facilitate adjudication upon merits and not to create artificial barriers against adjudication. Reaffirming Kailash(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that though the Legislature intended speedy disposal of civil disputes, it never intended that genuine litigants should be denied an opportunity of defence in deserving cases. HC-KAR - 40 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 The Consistent Judicial Philosophy

#50. The decisions rendered after R.N. Jadi (supra) demonstrate remarkable consistency. Every Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has adopted interpretative approach, namely procedural timelines deserve strict compliance; Courts must discourage dilatory tactics; judicial discretion nevertheless survives; discretion must be exercised only upon exceptional circumstances; and, justice on merits remains the governing consideration. Thus, what emerges is not a series of isolated judgments but a coherent and consistent jurisprudence governing Order VIII Rule 1.

#51. A significant reiteration of the principle is found in Desh Raj v. Balkishan (Dead) through LRs (supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the earlier judgments beginning from Kailash(supra), Salem Advocate Bar Association(supra) and R.N. Jadi(supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court specifically noticed its earlier HC-KAR - 41 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 decision in Atcom Technologies Ltd. v. Y.A. Chunawala & Co.11, wherein it had recognised that the inherent discretion of Courts to condone delay in filing written statements continued to survive under the ordinary provisions of the Code. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that such judicial discretion is neither unguided nor arbitrary. Its contours have gradually been defined by judicial precedents. The Hon’ble Supreme Court illustratively observed that circumstances beyond the control of a litigant, despite due diligence, may justify extension of time. Thus, Desh Raj(supra) recognised that judicial discretion forms an integral part of procedural fairness under the Code.

#52. The principle was once again reaffirmed in Shoraj Singh v. Charan Singh (supra). In the said case, the Allahabad High Court had refused to receive the written statement solely on the ground that it was filed beyond the prescribed period. Reversing the decision of 11 (2018) 6 SCC 639 HC-KAR - 42 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 the High Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court had completely misdirected itself in ignoring the binding ratio laid down in Kailash (supra) and Salem Advocate Bar Association (supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court categorically reiterated that the prescribed period under Order VIII Rule 1 is directory and not mandatory. The judgment reinforces an important constitutional principle, namely, that subordinate Courts are bound by the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 141.

#53. The next decision requiring consideration is Bharat Kalra v. Raj Kishan Chabra (supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court was once again confronted with the question whether delay in filing the written statement should result in denial of defence. Relying upon Kailash(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that refusal to receive the written statement merely because of delay would be wholly unreasonable where the delay could adequately be compensated by costs. The Hon’ble HC-KAR - 43 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 Supreme Court observed that while procedural discipline must undoubtedly be maintained, such discipline cannot become punitive so as to deprive a party of defending valuable civil rights. The Hon’ble Supreme Court therefore reiterated that the ends of justice are better served by compensating delay through costs rather than foreclosing adjudication altogether. XI. Commercial Courts Act – A Distinct Legislative Scheme

#54. Considerable reliance was placed by the learned Additional Advocate General upon the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, which prescribe an absolute outer limit of one hundred and twenty days for filing written statements. This submission deserves careful consideration. The Commercial Courts Act constitutes a special legislation enacted by Parliament governing commercial disputes of specified value. Unlike the ordinary Code of Civil Procedure, Parliament consciously amended Order VIII Rule 1 in its application to commercial disputes HC-KAR - 44 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 by expressly providing that upon expiry of one hundred and twenty days, the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement. The mandatory consequence is therefore expressly incorporated within the statute itself. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently treated commercial litigation as forming a separate class owing to the specialised nature of commercial transactions and the legislative policy of ensuring strict adherence to timelines. The legislative scheme governing commercial disputes therefore cannot automatically be imported into ordinary litigation involving to agricultural lands, residential houses, partition suits, easementary rights, inheritance disputes and other civil causes governed by the general Code. Distinction Between Commercial Litigation and Ordinary Civil Litigation

#55. Ordinary civil litigation occupies a wholly different field. A substantial percentage of civil litigation before Trial Courts in this State concerns disputes relating HC-KAR - 45 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 to agricultural lands, ancestral properties, partition, declaration of title, village houses, Gram Panchayat sites, tenancy rights and boundary disputes. Unlike commercial litigation where documentary evidence ordinarily remains within the control of corporate litigants, property disputes frequently require procurement of numerous public documents maintained by different governmental authorities. The Court cannot ignore the ground realities prevailing in rural Karnataka. Revenue records are often maintained at different administrative levels.

#56. Certified copies of mutation extracts, RTCs, Tippani, survey sketches, phodi records, grant registers, village maps and historical records are not always readily available. Procurement of such records frequently depends upon administrative processes over which litigants have little control. Delay in securing foundational documents is therefore not necessarily attributable to negligence or dilatory tactics. HC-KAR - 46 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 XII. Procedural Fairness and Access to Justice

#57. Access justice constitutes one of fundamental facets of Article 14. A fair opportunity to defend is equally an indispensable component of civil adjudication. Civil Courts adjudicate disputes affecting proprietary rights, inheritance, possession, status and livelihood. The consequences flowing from a decree often have irreversible civil consequences extending across generations. It is precisely for this reason that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that procedural provisions must facilitate adjudication upon merits. A defendant who is denied an opportunity to file a written statement may ultimately suffer a decree affecting valuable property rights without his defence ever being examined. Such consequences explain why the Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently insisted upon preservation of limited judicial discretion. HC-KAR - 47 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026

#58. It is at juncture the present controversy assumes constitutional significance. The petitioners contend that the Amendment Act does not merely substitute the figure “90 days” by “120 days”. Rather, it seeks to legislatively eliminate the judicial discretion which the Hon’ble Supreme Court held to survive under Order VIII Rule 10. The distinction is substantial. The ratio of Salem Advocate Bar Association(supra) is not confined to the numerical period prescribed under Rule 1. The decision proceeds upon a broader constitutional premise that procedural prescriptions governing filing of written statements cannot altogether extinguish judicial discretion.

#59. If the legislative amendment merely enlarges the time from ninety days to one hundred and twenty days while preserving judicial discretion in deserving cases, no constitutional issue may arise. The controversy arises because the impugned amendment introduces a forfeiture clause coupled with an express prohibition against the HC-KAR - 48 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 Court receiving the written statement thereafter. The question therefore is not whether the Legislature can prescribe one hundred and twenty days. The real question is whether it can altogether extinguish judicial discretion which has repeatedly been recognised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as an integral part of procedural justice under the Code.

#60. The answer to this question necessarily requires examination of the constitutional limits upon legislative power, the doctrine of separation of powers, Article 141, Article 14, the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness and the distinction between legislative overruling and legislative removal of the basis of a judgment. These constitutional principles shall now be examined.

#61. Having examined the evolution of the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the next question that falls for consideration is whether the Karnataka Legislature, while exercising its legislative competence under the Concurrent List, could enact the impugned HC-KAR - 49 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 amendment in the manner in which it has done. The controversy now travels beyond the realm of statutory interpretation and enters the constitutional domain.

#62. The challenge mounted by the petitioners is not founded upon lack of legislative competence. Indeed, learned Senior Counsels and counsels appearing for petitioners in batch of petitions fairly submitted that the State Legislature possesses competence under Entry 13 of List III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule to amend the Code of Civil Procedure in its application to the State. The grievance is that while exercising such legislative power, the Legislature has transgressed constitutional limitations by virtually nullifying the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution and by extinguishing judicial discretion which forms an integral component of fair procedure. The distinction between legislative competence constitutional validity assumes significance. A Legislature may possess competence to legislate on a particular HC-KAR - 50 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 subject, yet the legislation may still be liable to constitutional scrutiny it violates a constitutional limitation, infringes a fundamental right, or seeks to impermissibly trench upon the judicial domain. XIII. Legislative Competence under the Concurrent List

#63. The Code of Civil Procedure is relatable to Entry 13 of List III, which deals with “Civil Procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure. Parliament and the State Legislatures, therefore, possess concurrent legislative competence in the field of civil procedure. Article 254 contemplates that where a State law relating to a Concurrent List subject receives Presidential assent, it may prevail within the State notwithstanding inconsistency with an earlier Central enactment, subject to Parliament’s overriding power to subsequently legislate. Thus, the competence of the Karnataka Legislature to amend procedural provisions of the Code cannot seriously be doubted. However, HC-KAR - 51 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 legislative competence is only the first step. Every legislative enactment, though enacted by a competent Legislature, must satisfy constitutional requirements under Part III and the basic constitutional framework. a. Separation of Powers

#64. The Constitution envisages a delicate balance between the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. Though India does not follow a rigid separation of powers, Constitution nevertheless demarcates constitutional functions assigned to each organ. Article 50 specifically directs the State to take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in public services. Judicial independence is one of the essential features of the Constitution. Equally essential is judicial authority to interpret statutes enacted by the Legislature. Once the Hon’ble Supreme Court interprets a statutory provision, the interpretation becomes the law declared under Article HC-KAR - 52 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026

#141. The Legislature cannot simply declare that the judicial interpretation shall cease to operate. b. Legislative Overruling and Removal of the Basis

#65. It is by now settled that the Legislature cannot directly overrule a judicial decision. At the same time, the Legislature is competent to remove the statutory basis upon which the judgment proceeds by suitably amending the law. The distinction between these two concepts is fundamental. Legislature may alter the law retrospectively or prospectively. It may change statutory conditions. It may substitute the foundation upon which a judgment rested. However, it cannot merely declare that a judicial pronouncement shall no longer bind.

#66. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly recognised this distinction. The Legislature cannot exercise judicial power. Nor can it declare that the interpretation placed by Courts upon an existing provision shall stand obliterated without altering the legal foundation. HC-KAR - 53 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026

#67. It therefore becomes necessary to examine what precisely constituted the ratio of Salem Advocate Bar Association(supra). As noticed earlier, the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not merely interpret the numerical period of ninety days. The Hon’ble Supreme Court harmoniously construed Order VIII Rules 1 and 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that procedural law advances justice; Rule 10 preserves judicial discretion; inherent judicial power survives; extension beyond ninety days is permissible in exceptional cases.

#68. Thus, the basis of the judgment was not the figure “90”. The basis lay in preservation of judicial discretion. The impugned Amendment Act undoubtedly substitutes ninety days by one hundred and twenty days. If the amendment had merely enlarged the period from ninety days to one hundred and twenty days, little constitutional difficulty may have arisen. The difficulty arises because the amendment further provides that upon expiry of one hundred and twenty days, the defendant HC-KAR - 54 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 shall forfeit the right to file the written statement; and the Court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record. The consequence of the amendment is not merely procedural. It completely disables judicial discretion. The discretion preserved under Order VIII Rule 10, recognised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, is thereby rendered ineffective. c. Effect of Partial Legislative Amendment and the Necessity of Harmonious Construction

#69. One significant aspect of impugned amendment, which has not received adequate attention during the course of arguments, is that the Karnataka Legislature has chosen to amend only one limb of the statutory scheme governing filing of written statements while leaving the remaining provisions of the Code completely untouched. The third proviso inserted to Order V Rule 1 prescribes an outer limit of one hundred and twenty days and further declares that upon expiry of the said period, the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the HC-KAR - 55 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 written statement and the Court shall not permit the written statement to be taken on record. Significantly, while introducing the proviso to Rule 10 of Order VIII, the Legislature has consciously left the substantive provision of Rule 10 untouched. The Legislature has neither amended nor omitted these enabling words which constitute the very source of judicial discretion recognised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. However, the Legislature has not correspondingly amended Section 151, of the Code, which continue to occupy the field and continue to confer discretion upon the Civil Court and preserve the procedural autonomy of the High Court.

#70. This legislative omission assumes considerable constitutional significance. The Code of Civil Procedure is a self-contained procedural enactment. Its provisions cannot be read in isolation. Every provision has to be construed as part of an integrated statutory scheme. It is a cardinal principle of statutory interpretation that one provision of a statute cannot be interpreted in a manner that renders HC-KAR - 56 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 another provision redundant, otiose or incapable of operation. The Court is under a duty to adopt an interpretation that preserves internal consistency and gives effect to every provision enacted by the Legislature.

#71. Order VIII Rule 10 has consciously been retained in its original form, by merely adding a proviso. It continues to authorise the Court, where a written statement is not filed within the time permitted, either to pronounce judgment or “to make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit.” These words are of the widest amplitude and unmistakably preserve judicial discretion. Likewise, Section 151, which saves the inherent powers of every Civil Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, remains untouched.

#72. If the newly inserted third proviso to Order V is construed literally as completely denuding the Civil Court of every discretion after expiry of one hundred and twenty days, the consequence would be that Order VIII Rule 10 HC-KAR - 57 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 becomes substantially ineffective, Section 151 stands impliedly curtailed in one important area of procedural law, and the harmonious scheme of the Code recognised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association (supra) stands disrupted. Such an interpretation cannot readily be accepted.

#73. It is a settled principle that repeal by implication is not favoured in law. Equally well settled is the principle that implied curtailment of judicial powers is not to be readily inferred unless the legislative intention is expressed in the clearest possible language. Courts ordinarily presume that the Legislature was conscious of the existing statutory framework while introducing an amendment. Had legislative intention been completely extinguish judicial discretion preserved under Order VIII Rule 10 and Section 151, nothing prevented the Legislature from expressly amending those provisions as well. The conspicuous absence of any such corresponding amendment is a significant indicator that the Legislature HC-KAR - 58 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 did not intend to rewrite the entire procedural architecture of the Code.

#74. The Court cannot lose sight of another important circumstance. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association (supra) did not interpret Order VIII Rule 1 in isolation. The Court harmoniously construed Rule 1 together with Rule 10 and held that the discretion preserved under Rule 10 enabled the Court, in exceptionally hard cases, to receive the written statement even after expiry of the prescribed period. That ratio has held the field for nearly two decades. If the Legislature intended to displace that interpretation, it was incumbent upon it to amend not the very provision namely Rule 10 of Order VIII upon which the Hon’ble Supreme Court founded its reasoning. The Legislature having consciously refrained from doing so, it would be inappropriate for this Court to infer an implied legislative intent to extinguish judicial discretion. HC-KAR - 59 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026

#75. The same reasoning applies with greater force to Section 151 of the Code. The inherent powers of a Civil Court are not conferred by implication, they are expressly recognised by the statute itself. Though such powers cannot override an express statutory prohibition, they cannot be held to have been impliedly abrogated by a partial amendment unless the legislative intent is manifest beyond doubt. The impugned amendment contains no express provision excluding the operation of Section 151. Nor does it declare that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court shall cease to exist in relation to applications for receiving written statements. In the absence of such express language, this Court would be slow to attribute to the Legislature an intention to denude Civil Courts of their inherent jurisdiction.

#76. The partial nature of the amendment thus creates an apparent inconsistency within the Code itself. On the one hand, the newly inserted proviso appears to mandate forfeiture of the right to file the written HC-KAR - 60 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 statement. On the other hand, Rule 10 of Order VIII continues to preserve judicial discretion, Section 151 continues to preserve inherent powers. The only constitutionally permissible method of reconciling these provisions is by adopting the doctrine of harmonious construction.

#77. It is a settled principle that where two provisions of the same statute appear to be in conflict, the Court should endeavour to reconcile them rather than permit one provision to destroy the other. Reading down is but an extension of this principle. The doctrine enables the Court to preserve the validity of a legislative enactment by assigning to it a construction that is consistent with the Constitution and with the remaining provisions of the statute.

#78. This Court is therefore of the considered opinion that the Legislature, by mere adding of proviso, while consciously leaving untouched Order VIII Rule 10, Section 151, has itself furnished a compelling reason for adopting HC-KAR - 61 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 the doctrine of reading down. Such an interpretation alone preserves the internal coherence of the Code, gives meaningful operation to every provision enacted by Parliament, respects the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court Salem Advocate Bar Association(supra), and simultaneously advances the legislative object of securing expeditious disposal of civil disputes. Any other interpretation would result in one provision of the Code impliedly repealing or rendering nugatory several other provisions, a consequence which settled principles of statutory interpretation do not countenance. XIV. Section 89 of the Code

#79. Another significant anomaly that appears to have escaped the attention of the Legislature while amending Order V by introducing the third proviso and proviso to Rule 10 of Order VIII, concerns the interplay between the amended provision and Section 89 of the HC-KAR - 62 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 Code of Civil Procedure. Section 89 casts a statutory obligation on the Court to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement, particularly in disputes involving family members where preservation of relationships is of paramount importance. In such suits, parties often seek time to negotiate and resolve their differences outside the adversarial process. Consequently, delay in filing the written statement may not be attributable to negligence or dilatory tactics, but to bona fide attempts at settlement encouraged by the Court itself. If the amended provision is construed as imposing an inflexible outer limit for filing the written statement, irrespective of the pendency of settlement efforts, it would defeat the very object underlying Section 89. More importantly, it would denude the Court of its inherent power to extend the time for filing the written statement in appropriate and exceptional circumstances, even where such extension would facilitate an amicable resolution of the dispute. The amendment, therefore, fails to account for this distinct class of civil HC-KAR - 63 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 disputes where the legislative policy itself mandates judicial intervention to foster reconciliation rather than expedite adversarial adjudication. Such an omission renders the rigid prescription susceptible to criticism, as it overlooks situations in which procedural flexibility is indispensable to advance the larger objective of securing enduring and peaceful settlement of family disputes.

#80. Order VIII Rule 10 assumes considerable significance. Even today it continues to provide that where the written statement is not filed, the Court may either pronounce judgment or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. These words confer a wide judicial discretion. They are not accidental. The Legislature consciously retained them even while amending Rule 1 of Order VIII of CPC. It was precisely this discretion which the Hon’ble Supreme Court harmonised with Rule 1 of Order VIII in Salem Advocate Bar Association(supra). Therefore, unless Rule 10 itself stands amended, complete exclusion of judicial discretion would produce an apparent HC-KAR - 64 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 conflict within the Code of Civil Procedure itself. A construction which harmonises Rules 1 and 10 deserves preference over one rendering Rule 10 substantially otiose. XV. Section 151 of the Code

#81. Though inherent powers cannot override express statutory provisions, they continue to exist to prevent abuse of process and to secure the ends of justice wherever the Code remains silent. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kailash(supra) and Salem Advocate Bar Association(supra) recognised that procedural provisions should not be interpreted in a manner which altogether excludes judicial power to prevent failure of justice.

#82. Section 151 of the Code is a saving provision which preserves the inherent powers of every Civil Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. It neither creates an independent source of substantive HC-KAR - 65 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 jurisdiction nor authorises the Court to act in derogation of an express statutory provision. The inherent jurisdiction is supplementary in nature and operates where the Code is silent or where its procedural machinery requires judicial intervention to secure justice.

#83. The Amendment Act introducing the third proviso to Order V Rule 1 prescribes an outer limit of one hundred and twenty days for filing the written statement and stipulates forfeiture of the right thereafter. The amendment undoubtedly regulates the exercise of judicial discretion in matters relating to filing of written statements and substantially narrows the field within which such discretion may be exercised. Nevertheless, the Legislature has not amended or excluded the operation of Section

#151. In the absence of an express provision abrogating the inherent powers of the Civil Court, it would be impermissible to infer their complete extinction by implication. HC-KAR - 66 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026

#84. The settled position of law is that while Section 151 cannot be invoked to defeat or routinely circumvent an express statutory mandate, neither can it be rendered wholly otiose by a partial legislative amendment. Its operation survives in those exceptional situations where strict adherence to the procedural prescription would itself result in manifest injustice or abuse of the process of the Court, provided such exercise does not rewrite or nullify the legislative scheme.

#85. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Amendment Act cannot be construed as extinguishing the inherent jurisdiction preserved under Section 151 of the Code. What stands curtailed is the routine exercise of discretion to extend the time for filing the written statement beyond one hundred and twenty days, what survives is the Court’s narrow and exceptional jurisdiction to secure the ends of justice in circumstances of an extraordinary nature. Such an interpretation alone harmonises the amended proviso with Section 151, HC-KAR - 67 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 preserves the coherence of the Code as an integrated procedural enactment and accords with the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal12, Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. Kanhayalal Bhargava13, Kailash v. Nanhku (supra) and Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India(supra). Consequently, an interpretation completely extinguishes every vestige of judicial discretion requires careful constitutional scrutiny. XVI. Article 14 – Manifest Arbitrariness

#86. Tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution, this Court is of the considered opinion that the legislative objective of prescribing an outer limit of one hundred and twenty days for filing the written statement is, in itself, neither arbitrary nor constitutionally infirm. Expeditious disposal of civil disputes is a legitimate 12 1962 AIR 527 13 AIR 1966 SC 1899 HC-KAR - 68 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 legislative objective and an indispensable component of an effective justice delivery system. The constitutional infirmity, however, lies not in the prescription of the time limit, but in the incorporation of the expressions that, upon the expiry of one hundred and twenty days, “the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement” and “the Court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record”, if those expressions are construed as creating an absolute and inflexible embargo, wholly excluding judicial discretion.

#87. Such a construction to satisfy constitutional requirements of fairness, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness that permeate Article 14. It indiscriminately places a litigant who has deliberately adopted dilatory tactics on the same footing as one who, despite acting bona fide and with due diligence, is prevented by circumstances wholly beyond his control from filing the written statement within the prescribed period. By treating inherently unequal situations alike, the HC-KAR - 69 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 CNR: KAHC010177992026 provision, if literally construed, produces a consequence that is manifestly disproportionate to the object sought to be achieved. The forfeiture of the valuable right to defend a civil action, irrespective of the nature of the dispute, the conduct of the litigant or the existence of compelling circumstances, bears no rational nexus to the legislative objective of securing procedural discipline and, appropriate cases, may itself become a source of procedural injustice.

#88. The constitutional guarantee under Article 14 is not confined to prohibiting hostile discrimination, it also mandates that legislative measures must satisfy the tests of fairness, reasonableness and rationality. As repeatedly emphasised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu14, Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India15, Kailash v. Nanhku(supra), Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India(supra), Atcom Technologies Ltd. v. Y.A. ORDER (i) The writ petitions are allowed in part. (ii) The third proviso inserted to Order V Rule 1, third proviso inserted to Rule 1 of Order VIII and proviso to Rule 10 of Order VIII of the Code of Civil Procedure by Section 4 of the Karnataka Amendment Act, 2024 is read down in the manner indicated in paragraphs 131, 132, 157 and 158 of this judgment. (iii) Therefore the constitutional challenge to Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 2024 is not accepted. (iv) The expressions “the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement” and “the Court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record” shall not be construed as completely excluding the judicial discretion of the Civil Court in exceptionally rare cases where refusal would result in grave miscarriage of justice. HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010177992026 - 148 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 (v) It is declared that Section 158-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 2024 shall be construed harmoniously with the scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure and shall not be interpreted as overriding or abrogating the statutory rule- making powers of the High Court preserved under Sections 122 to 127 of the Code, the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 225 and 227 of the Constitution, or the binding law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 141. To the aforesaid extent, Section 158-A stands read down. (vi) The jurisdiction preserved by this judgment to receive a written statement beyond the prescribed period shall be exercised by all Civil Courts in the State only in strict adherence to the principles, limitations and illustrative guidelines contained in paragraph 162 of this judgment, and only upon recording reasons demonstrating the existence of exceptional and compelling circumstances. (vii) It further declared that the provisions introduced by Section 4 of the Code HC-KAR CNR: KAHC010177992026 - 149 - NC: 2026:KHC:39343 WP No. 8032 of 2026 C/W WP No. 9372 of 2026 of Civil Procedure (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 2024 shall operate prospectively and shall apply only to suits instituted on or after the date of commencement of the Amendment Act. Suits instituted prior thereto shall continue to be governed by the unamended provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, in terms of the law declared by this Court in Smt. T.Gayathri and Another v. Smt. Prabhajit Dhariwal (W.P. No.8090 of 2026). Before parting, this Court places on record its sincere appreciation for the valuable research assistance rendered by Ms. Varsha.V and Ms. Anuja Malai, Law Researchers attached to this Court. Sd/- (SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) JUDGE CA, ALB CT:BCK LIST NO.: 19 SL NO.: 1