Dulhar Kishku v. State of Himachal Pradesh

Manu Kishku and CCL were not found in their rooms.

9.5 On   23.05.2022,   complainant   and   Arun   Kumar got   lodged   the   missing   report   of   Ravi   Prakash   with   Police 6 2026:HHC:22839 Station Manpura.   Search was made for Ravi Prakash, but he could not be found.   However, his dead body was found in the bushes near the jungle in village Theda.

9.6 The   complainant   has   lastly   got   recorded   in   his statement that due to the grudge, as referred to above, Ravi Prakash was killed by Munshi Marandi, Manu Kishku and CCL.     Upon   which,   the   police   registered   the   case   under Sections 302, 201 read with Section 34 of IPC and criminal machinery swung into motion.

9.7 Police   visited   the   spot   and   the   spot   was photographed and videographed.  Forensic team also visited the spot.   Dead body was lifted from the spot and taken to the hospital.  Physical evidence from the spot was collected. Dead   body   was   initially   taken   to   CHC   Nalagarh   for postmortem, from where, dead body was referred to IGMC Shimla for postmortem.

9.8 The   cause   of   death   has   been   mentioned   in   the postmortem report, as under:­ “In all probabilities, the deceased died as a result of crushing trauma to head grossly.”

9.9 Thereafter,   CCTV   footage   of   the   area   was 7 2026:HHC:22839 obtained and perused.  During investigation, CDRs of mobile phone number of the accused persons were obtained and it was found that on the intervening night of 19/20.05.2022, applicant had talked to accused Manu Kishku and deceased Ravi Prakash.  She was also found to have in constant touch with CCL and one Mool Chand.

9.10 During   investigation,   on   02.06.2022,   accused Dulhar   Kishku   (applicant)   made   a   disclosure   statement, under   Section   27   of   the   Evidence   Act,   disclosing   therein, that she has kept concealed two jeans, coloured black and blue, in her rented room, under a suitcase.  In pursuance of the   said   disclosure   statement,   she   got   recovered   those clothes.

9.11 On 04.06.2022, applicant Dulhar Kishku made a statement,   under   Section   27   of   Evidence   Act,   and   got recovered her and her husband’s clothes, which were taken into possession.

9.12 During investigation, it was found that deceased Ravi  Prakash  used   to   call applicant  Dulhar  Kishku.     This fact was also disclosed by the applicant Dulhar Kishku to 8 2026:HHC:22839 accused Nitish Kumar and Munshi Marandi.  Thereafter, all the   accused,   namely   Munshi   Marandi,   applicant,   Mool Chand, CCL and Manu Kishku hatched a conspiracy to kill Ravi Prakash.

9.13 Consequently,   on   21.05.2022,   Munshi   Marandi and   Manu   Kishku   took   Ravi   Prakash   to   vegetable   market Kharuni, where they consumed liquor.  Thereafter, they took Ravi Prakash to their room, from where, they took him to jungle, where, they had killed Ravi Prakash and concealed his dead body.

9.14 During   investigation,   accused   Manu   Kishku, Mool   Chand   were   not   nabbed,   as   such,   they   have   been declared as proclaimed offender.

9.15 After the completion of investigation, police has filed the charge sheet.

9.16 The   case   is   now   stated   to   be   listed   before   the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nalagarh, on 08.10.2026 to 14.10.2026.

9.17 On the basis of above facts, a prayer has been made to dismiss the application. 9 2026:HHC:22839

10. As stated above, there were total 34 prosecution witnesses   in  the   present  case,  out  of   which,   16  witnesses have   been   examined   and   six   have   been   given   up.     12 witnesses are yet to be examined.   The applicant has been arrested on 01.06.2022, and after a gap of about four years, the   prosecution   could   not   conclude   the   trial   against   the applicant.

11. The   learned   counsel   for   the   applicant   has   also placed on record the zimni orders passed by the learned trial Court.     Perusal   of   these   zimni   orders   demonstrate   that matter was earlier listed on 12.05.2026 to 16.05.2026, but, on those dates, evidence could not be concluded, as such, the   matter   has   now   been   listed   in   the   month   of   October,

12. The applicant is seeking the relief of bail on the ground of undue delay in the trial, by highlighting the   snail   pace   of   trial,   as   discussed   above.   Right   to speedy trial has been held to be fundamental right by the   Constitutional   Bench   of   the   Hon’ble   Supreme Court, in a case titled as Abdul Rehman Antulay and 10 2026:HHC:22839 others   versus   R.S.   Nayak   and   another,   reported   in (1992) 1 Supreme Court Cases 225. In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the accused has right to speedy trial, which flows from Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Relevant paragraph 86 of the said judgment, is reproduced, as under: “86. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We  must   forewarn   that   these   propositions  are   not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are: (1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the   accused   to   be   tried   speedily.   Right   to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the social interest also, does not make it any the less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or   innocence   of   the   accused   is   determined   as quickly as possible in the circumstances. (2) Right   to   speedy   trial   flowing   from   Article   21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of   investigation,   inquiry,   trial,   appeal,   revision and   re­trial.   That   is   how,   this   Court   has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view. (3) The   concerns   underlying   the   right   to   speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are: (a)   the   period   of   remand   and   pre­conviction detention   should   be   as   short   as   possible.   In other   words,   the   accused   should   not   be subjected   to   unnecessary   or   unduly   long incarceration prior to his conviction; (b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to   his   vocation   and   peace,   resulting   from   an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and 11 2026:HHC:22839 (c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non­availability of witnesses or otherwise. (4)  At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it   is   usually   the   accused   who   is   interested   in delaying   the   proceedings.   As   is   often   pointed out, “delay is a known defence tactic”. Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies upon   the   prosecution, delay   ordinarily prejudices   the   prosecution.   Non­availability   of witnesses, disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really  work against the interest of the prosecution.   Of   course,   there   may   be   cases where   the   prosecution,   for   whatever   reason, also delays the proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is — who is responsible for the delay? Proceedings taken by either party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and interest, as   perceived   by   them,   cannot   be   treated   as delaying   tactics   nor   can   the   time   taken   in pursuing such proceedings be counted towards delay.   It   goes   without   saying   that   frivolous proceedings   or   proceedings   taken   merely   for delaying the day of reckoning cannot be treated as   proceedings   taken   in   good   faith.   The   mere fact   that   an   application/petition   is   admitted and   an   order   of   stay   granted   by   a   superior court is by itself no proof that the proceeding is not   frivolous.   Very   often   these   stays   are obtained on ex parte representation. (5)   While   determining   whether   undue   delay   has occurred   (resulting   in   violation   of   Right   to Speedy Trial) one must have regard to all the attendant   circumstances,   including   nature   of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload   of   the   court   concerned,   prevailing local conditions and so on — what is called, the systemic   delays.   It   is   true   that   it   is   the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and   State   includes   judiciary   as   well,   but   a realistic   and   practical   approach   should   be adopted in such matters instead of a pedantic one. (6)  Each   and   every   delay   does   not   necessarily 12 2026:HHC:22839 prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. As has been observed by   Powell,   J.   in   Barker   [33   L   Ed   2d   101]   “it cannot be said how long a delay is too long in a system   where   justice   is   supposed   to   be   swift but deliberate”. The same idea has been stated by White, J. in U.S. v. Ewell [15 L Ed 2d 627] in the following words: ‘… the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is   necessarily   relative,   is   consistent   with delays, and has orderly expedition, rather than mere   speed,   as   its   essential   ingredients;   and whether   delay   in   completing   a   prosecution amounts   to   an   unconstitutional   deprivation   of rights depends upon all the circumstances.’ However, inordinately long delay may be taken as   presumptive   proof   of   prejudice.   In   this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not   be   allowed   to   become   a   persecution.   But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case. (7)  We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the ‘demand’ rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the court at the behest of the   prosecution.   Hence,   an   accused's   plea   of denial   of   speedy   trial   cannot   be   defeated   by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he did make such   a   demand   and   yet   he   was   not   tried speedily, it would be a plus point in his favour, but   the   mere   non­asking   for   a   speedy   trial cannot   be   put   against   the   accused.   Even   in USA,   the   relevance   of   demand   rule   has   been substantially watered down in Barker [33 L Ed 2d 101] and other succeeding cases. (8) Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors — ‘balancing  test’ or ‘balancing process’ — and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. (9)   Ordinarily   speaking,   where   the   court   comes   to the   conclusion  that  right   to  speedy  trial  of  an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction,   as   the   case   may   be,   shall   be quashed. But this is not the only course open. 13 2026:HHC:22839 The   nature   of   the   offence   and   other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing   of   proceedings   may   not   be   in   the interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order — including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or reducing   the   sentence   where   the   trial   has concluded   —   as   may   be   deemed   just   and equitable in the circumstances of the case. (10) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time­limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification   on   to   the   shoulders   of   the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial of   right   to   speedy   trial,   it   is   primarily   for   the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the   same   time,   it   is   the   duty   of   the   court   to weigh   all   the   circumstances   of   a   given   case before   pronouncing   upon   the   complaint.   The Supreme   Court   of   USA   too   has   repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time­limit in spite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor do we think that not fixing any such outer limit ineffectuates the guarantee of right to speedy trial. (11) An objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be   addressed   to   the   High   Court.   Even   if   the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should   not   stay   the   proceedings,   except   in   a case   of   grave   and   exceptional   nature.   Such proceedings   in   High   Court   must,   however,   be disposed of on a priority basis.” (self emphasis supplied)

13. A   three   Judge   Bench   of   the   Hon’ble   Supreme Court,   in   another   case,   titled   as  Raj   Deo   Sharma   versus State of Bihar, reported in (1998) 7 Supreme Court Cases 507, has supplemented the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme 14 2026:HHC:22839 Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay’s case (supra), by issuing the   additional   directions.   Relevant   paragraph   13   of   the judgment in Raj Deo Sharma’s case (supra), is reproduced as under: “17.  After  deep  consideration  of  the  matter,  we proceed to supplement the propositions laid down by the Constitution Bench in Antulay case [(1992) 1   SCC   225   :   1992   SCC   (Cri)   93]   with   the following directions: (i)   In   cases   where   the   trial   is   for   an   offence punishable   with   imprisonment   for   a   period   not exceeding seven years, whether the accused is in jail or  not, the court shall close  the  prosecution evidence on completion of a period of two years from the date of recording the plea of the accused on  the  charges  framed   whether  the  prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not within the said period and the court can proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case. (ii)   In   such   cases   as   mentioned   above,   if   the accused has been in jail for a period of not less than   one­half   of   the   maximum   period   of punishment   prescribed   for   the   offence,   the   trial court shall release the accused on bail forthwith on such conditions as it deems fit. (iii) If the offence under trial is punishable with imprisonment   for   a   period   exceeding   7   years, whether   the   accused   is   in   jail  or   not,   the   court shall   close   the   prosecution   evidence   on completion   of   three   years   from   the   date   of recording the plea of the accused on the charge framed,   whether   the   prosecution   has   examined all   the   witnesses   or   not   within   the   said   period and   the   court   can   proceed   to   the   next   step provided by law for the trial of the case, unless for very exceptional reasons to be recorded and in   the   interest   of   justice   the   court   considers   it necessary to grant further time to the prosecution to   adduce   evidence   beyond   the   aforesaid   time­ limit. (iv)   But   if   the   inability   for   completing   the 15 2026:HHC:22839 prosecution   within   the   aforesaid   period   is attributable   to   the   conduct   of   the   accused   in protracting the trial, no court is obliged to close the   prosecution   evidence   within   the   aforesaid period in any of the cases covered by clauses (i) to (iii). (v) Where the trial has been stayed by orders of the court or by operation of law, such time during which   the   stay   was   in   force   shall   be   excluded from   the   aforesaid   period   for   closing   the prosecution   evidence.   The   above   directions   will be   in   addition   to   and   without   prejudice   to   the directions   issued   by   this   Court   in   “Common Cause”   A   Registered   Society   v.   Union   of   India [(1996)   4   SCC   33   :   1996   SCC   (Cri)   589]   as modified   by   the   same   Bench   through   the   order reported   in   “Common   Cause”   A   Registered Society   v.   Union   of   India   [(1996)   6   SCC   775   : 1997 SCC (Cri) 42] .”

14. In a case, titled as  Dharmendra Kirthal versus State of Uttar Pradesh and another, reported in  (2013) 8 Supreme Court Cases 368, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held the right to speedy and fair trial to be an integral part of   very   soul   of   Article   21   of   the   Constitution   of   India. Relevant   paragraphs   30   to   33   of   the   judgment,   is reproduced, as under: “30. Keeping the aforesaid enunciation in view, we shall presently proceed to deal with the stand and   stance   of   both   the   sides.   The   first submission   which   pertains   to   the   denial   of speedy trial has been interpreted to be a facet of Article   21   of   the   Constitution.   In   Kartar   Singh [Kartar   Singh   v.  State   of   Punjab,   (1994)  3   SCC 569   :   1994   SCC   (Cri)   899]   ,   the   majority, speaking   through   Pandian,   J.,   has   expressed thus: (SCC p. 638, paras 85­86) 16 2026:HHC:22839 “85.  The   right   to   a   speedy   trial   is   not   only   an important   safeguard   to   prevent   undue   and oppressive incarceration, to minimise anxiety and concern   accompanying   the   accusation   and   to limit the possibility of impairing the ability of an accused   to   defend   himself   but   also   there   is   a societal interest in providing a speedy trial. This right has  been  actuated  in  the  recent  past  and the courts have laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. In fact, lot of cases are coming before the courts for quashing   of   proceedings   on   the   ground   of inordinate   and   undue   delay   stating   that   the invocation   of   this   right   even   need   not   await formal indictment or charge. 86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to   life   and   liberty   guaranteed   and   preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins   with   the   actual   restraint   imposed   by arrest   and   consequent   incarceration   and continues   at   all   stages,   namely,   the   stage   of investigation,   inquiry,   trial,   appeal   and   revision so   that   any   possible   prejudice   that   may   result from impermissible and avoidable delay from the time   of   the   commission   of   the   offence   till   it consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this   context,   it   may   be   noted   that   the constitutional   guarantee   of   speedy   trial   is properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 31.   Be   it   noted,   the   Court   also   referred   to   the pronouncements   in   Hussainara   Khatoon   (1)   v. State of Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23] , Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admn. [(1978) 4 SCC 494 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 155] , Hussainara Khatoon (4) v. State of Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 98 : 1980 SCC (Cri)   40]   ,   Hussainara   Khatoon   (6)   v.   State   of Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 115 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 57] , Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar [(1983) 2 SCC 104 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 361] , T.V. Vatheeswaran v. State of T.N. [(1983) 2 SCC 68 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 342] and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] . 32. The   present   provision   is   to   be   tested   on the   touchstone   of   the   aforesaid   constitutional principle. The provision clearly mandates that the 17 2026:HHC:22839 trial under this Act of any offence by the Special Court   shall   have   precedence   and   shall   be concluded in preference to the trial in such other courts   to   achieve   the   said   purpose.   The legislature thought it appropriate to provide that the   trial   of   such   other   case   shall   remain   in abeyance. It is apt to note here that “any other case”   against   the   accused   in   “any   other   court” does not include the Special Court. The emphasis is   on   speedy   trial   and   not   denial   of   it.   The legislature has incorporated such a provision so that an accused does not face trial in two cases simultaneously   and   a   case   before   the   Special Court does not linger owing to clash of dates in trial.   It   is   also   worthy   to   note   that   the   Special Court has been conferred jurisdiction under sub­ section (1) of Section 8 of the Act to try any other offences with which the accused may, under any other law for the time being in force, have been charged and proceeded at the same trial. 33. As far as fair trial is concerned, needless to emphasise, it is an integral part of the very soul of Article 21 of the Constitution. Fair trial is the quintessentiality   of   apposite   dispensation   of criminal justice. In Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat [(2004) 4 SCC 158 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 999] , it has been held as follows: (SCC p. 183, para 33) “33. The principle of fair trial now informs and energises many areas of the law. It is reflected in   numerous   rules   and   practices.   It   is   a constant, ongoing   development   process continually   adapted   to   new   and   changing circumstances, and exigencies of the situation —peculiar at times and related to the nature of crime, persons involved— directly or operating behind, social impact and societal needs and even   so   many   powerful   balancing   factors which may come in the way of administration of criminal justice system.” (self emphasis supplied)

15. Similar   view   has   been   taken   by   a   two   Judges’ Bench   of   the   Hon’ble   Supreme   Court,   in   case,   titled   as 18 2026:HHC:22839 Hussain and another versus Union of India, reported in (2017) 5 Supreme Court Cases 702. Relevant paragraphs 9 to 12 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “9. As already noticed, speedy trial is a part of reasonable,   fair   and   just   procedure   guaranteed under Article 21. This constitutional right cannot be denied even on the plea of non­availability of financial resources. The court is entitled to issue directions   to   augment   and   strengthen   the investigating   machinery,   setting   up   of   new courts,   building   new   court   houses,   providing more   staff   and   equipment   to   the   courts, appointment   of   additional   Judges   and   other measures   as   are   necessary   for   speedy   trial [Hussainara Khatoon (4) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 98, para 10 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 40]. 10.  Directions given by this Court in Hussainara Khatoon (7) v. State of Bihar, (1995) 5 SCC 326 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 913, to this effect which were left to   be   implemented   by   the   High   Courts   are   as follows: (SCC p. 328, para 2) “2. Since this Court has already laid down the guidelines by orders passed from time to time in this writ petition and in subsequent orders passed in different cases since then, we do not consider it necessary to restate the guidelines periodically   because   the   enforcement   of   the guidelines   by   the   subordinate   courts functioning in different States should now be the responsibility of the different High Courts to which they are subordinate. General orders for release of undertrials without reference to specific fact situations in different cases may prove to be hazardous. While there can be no doubt   that   undertrial   prisoners   should   not languish   in   jails   on   account   of   refusal   to enlarge them on bail for want of their capacity to   furnish   bail   with   monetary   obligations, these are matters which have to be dealt with on   case­to­case   basis   keeping   in   mind   the guidelines   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   the orders   passed   in   this   writ   petition   and   in subsequent cases from time to time. Sympathy 19 2026:HHC:22839 for   the   undertrials   who   are   in   jail   for   long terms on account of the pendency of cases has to be balanced having regard to the impact of crime,   more   particularly,   serious   crime,   on society   and   these   considerations   have   to   be weighed having regard to the fact situations in pending   cases.   While   there   can   be   no   doubt that trials of those accused of crimes should be disposed   of   as   early   as   possible,   general orders   in   regard   to   Judge­strength   of subordinate   judiciary   in   each   State   must   be attended  to,   and   its   functioning   overseen,   by the   High   Court   of   the   State   concerned.   We share the sympathetic concern of the learned counsel   for   the   petitioners   that   undertrials should   not   languish   in   jails   for   long   spells merely   on   account   of   their   inability   to   meet monetary obligations. We are, however, of the view that  such  monitoring   can  be  done  more effectively by the High Courts since it would be easy for those Courts to collect and collate the statistical information in that behalf, apply the broad guidelines already issued and deal with the   situation   as   it   emerges   from   the   status reports   presented   to   it.   The   role   of   the   High Court  is  to  ensure  that  the  guidelines  issued by   this   Court   are   implemented   in   letter   and spirit. We think it would suffice if we request the   Chief   Justices   of   the   High   Courts   to undertake   a   review   of   such   cases   in   their States   and   give   appropriate   directions   where needed   to   ensure   proper   and   effective implementation   of   the   guidelines.   Instead   of repeating   the   general   directions   already issued,   it   would   be   sufficient   to   remind   the High Courts to ensure expeditious disposal of cases.”

11.   Deprivation   of   personal   liberty   without ensuring   speedy   trial   is   not   consistent   with Article   21.   While   deprivation   of   personal   liberty for some period may not be avoidable, period of deprivation   pending   trial/appeal   cannot   be unduly   long.   This   Court   has   held   that   while   a person in custody for a grave offence may not be released   if   trial   is   delayed,   trial   has   to   be expedited or bail has to be granted in such cases Aid   Committee Legal [Supreme   Court 20 2026:HHC:22839 (Representing   Undertrial   Prisoners)   v.   Union   of India,   (1994)   6   SCC   731,   para   15   :   1995   SCC (Cri) 39]. 12. Timely delivery of justice is a part of human rights.   Denial   of   speedy   justice   is   a   threat   to public confidence in the administration of justice. Directions   of   this   Court   in   Noor   Mohammed   v. Jethanand,   (2013)   5   SCC   202,   are   as   follows: (SCC p. 217, para 34) “34. … Therefore, we request the learned Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan as well as the other learned Chief Justices to conceive and adopt a mechanism, regard being had to the priority of cases, to avoid such inordinate delays   in   matters   which   can   really   be   dealt with in an expeditious manner. Putting a step forward  is  a step  towards  the destination.  A sensible inspiration   and   a committed   collective   endeavour   would indubitably   help   in   this   regard.   Neither   less, nor more.” individual (self emphasis supplied)

16. A   three   Judge   Bench   of   the   Hon’ble   Supreme Court, in case, titled as Union of India versus K.A. Najeeb, reported in  (2021) 3 Supreme Court Cases 713, has held that   when   a   timely   trial   would   not   be   possible   and   the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time,   the   Courts   would   ordinarily   be   obligated   to   enlarge accused   on   bail.   Relevant   paragraphs   11   and   15   of   the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “11. The High Court's view draws support from a batch   of   decisions   of   this   Court,   including   in Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 , laying down that gross delay in disposal of such cases would justify 21 2026:HHC:22839 the invocation of Article 21 of the Constitution and consequential   necessity   to   release   the   undertrial on bail. It would be useful to quote the following observations   from   the   cited   case:   (SCC   p.   622, para 10) “10. Bearing in  mind  the nature of the crime and   the   need   to   protect   the   society   and   the nation,  TADA  has prescribed  in  Section 20(8) stringent   provisions   for   granting   bail.   Such stringent provisions can be justified looking to the nature of the crime, as was held in Kartar Singh   case   [Kartar   Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899] , on the  presumption  that  the  trial of  the  accused will   take   place   without   undue   delay.   No   one can   justify   gross   delay   in   disposal   of   cases when undertrials perforce remain in jail, giving rise   to   possible   situations   that   may   justify invocation of Article 21.” *** *** ***

15.   This   Court   has   clarified   in   numerous judgments that the liberty guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution would  cover within its protective ambit   not   only   due   procedure   and   fairness   but also   access   to   justice   and   a   speedy   trial.   In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial   Prisoners)   v.   Union   of   India   [Supreme Court   Legal (Representing Aid   Committee Undertrial   Prisoners)   v.   Union   of   India,   (1994)   6 SCC 731, para 15 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 39]  , it was held   that   undertrials   cannot   indefinitely   be detained pending trial. Ideally, no person ought to suffer adverse consequences of his acts unless the same   is   established   before   a   neutral   arbiter. However,   owing   to   the   practicalities   of   real   life where to secure an effective trial and to ameliorate the risk to society in  case a  potential criminal is left   at   large   pending   trial,   the   courts   are   tasked with   deciding   whether   an   individual   ought   to   be released   pending   trial   or   not.  Once   it   is   obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused   has   suffered   incarceration   for   a significant   period   of   time,   the   courts   would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail.” (self emphasis supplied) 22 2026:HHC:22839

17. In the recent decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in  Pradeep Kumar @ Banu versus State of Punjab, in Cr. Appeal No. 1341/2026 (arising out of SLP   (Crl.)   No.   18775/2025,   the   similar   view   has again been reiterated. Relevant paragraphs 5 and 6 of the judgment are reproduced as under: “5.   Prosecution   proposes   to   examine   23 witnesses   to   drive   home   that   charges against   the   appellant,   but  none  has   been examined.  Thus,   the   trial  is   likely   to  take some time to conclude. 6. Almost two years have passed  since the appellant was arrested without trial having commenced   and   conclusion thereof nowhere   being   in   sight.   Incarceration without trial amounts to punishment.”

18. The applicant is a woman and the legislature in its wisdom, has provided a window for a child, or a woman   or   sick   or   infirm,   in   the   shape   of   proviso   to Section   480(ii)   of   BNSS,   which   is   reproduced,   as under:­ “480. When bail may be taken in case of non­ bailable offence. Provided that the Court may direct that a person referred to in clause (i) or clause (ii) be released on bail if such person is a child or is a woman or is sick or infirm.” 23 2026:HHC:22839

19. Considering the above facts, this Court is of the view that there is undue delay in the trial and the trial is moving in snail pace and witnesses have been summoned in a piecemeal manner.

20. Considering   the   above   facts,   applicant   has made   out   a   case   for   releasing   her   on   bail. Consequently, her bail application is allowed.

21. Consequently,   the   applicant   is   ordered   to   be released, on bail, during the pendency of trial, arising out of FIR   No.   72/2022,   dated   25.05.2022,   under   Sections 302,   201,   120­B   of   IPC,  registered   with  Police   Station Manpura,   Police   District   Baddi,   H.P.  on   her   furnishing personal   bonds   in   the   sum   of   Rs.   1,00,000/­,   with   two sureties of the like amount, to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court.

22. This   order,   however,   shall   be   subject   to   the following conditions:­ a)  The   applicant   shall   regularly   attend   the   trial Court   on   each   and   every   date   of   hearing   and   if prevented by any reason to do so, seek exemption from   appearance   by   filing   the   appropriate application; 24 2026:HHC:22839 b)   The   applicant   shall   not   tamper   with   the prosecution evidence nor hamper the investigation of the case in any manner whatsoever; c)  The  applicant  shall  not  make  any  inducement, threat or promises to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade them from disclosing   such   facts   to   the   Court   or   the   Police Officer; and d)   The   applicant   shall   not   leave   the   territory   of India without the prior permission of the Court.

23. Any of the observations, made hereinabove, shall not be taken, as an expression of opinion, on the merits of the   case,   as   these   observations   are   confined,   only   to   the disposal of the present bail application.

24. It   is   made   clear   that   respondent­State   is   at liberty to move an appropriate application, in case, any of the bail conditions is found violated by the applicant.

25. The Registry is directed to forward a soft copy of the   bail   order   to   the   Superintendent   of   Jail,   Sub   Jail Nalagarh,   District   Solan,   H.P.,   through   e­mail,   with   a direction to  enter the  date of grant of  bail  in  the e­prison software.

26. In   case,   the   applicant   is   not   released   within   a 25 2026:HHC:22839 period   of   seven   days   from   the   date   of   grant   of   bail,   the Superintendent   of   Jail,   Sub   Jail   Nalagarh,   District   Solan H.P., is directed to inform this fact to the Secretary, DLSA, Solan.   The   Superintendent   of   Jail,   Sub   Jail   Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P., is further directed that if the applicant fails to furnish the bail bonds, as per the order passed by this Court, within a period of one month from today, then, the said fact be submitted to this Court. 17th June, 2026 (Pramod Kumar) (Virender Singh) Judge