M.John Teddy v. Deputy Inspector General of Police, Armed Police Range, Chennai-600 010 & Ors.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDATED : 09.06.2009CORAMTHE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.CHANDRUW.P.NOs.32621 and 32622 of 2006M.John Teddy.. Petitioner in W.P.No.32621/2006K.Francis.. Petitioner in W.P.No.32622/2006Vs.1.Deputy Inspector General of Police, Armed Police Range, Chennai-600 010.2.The Commandant, V Battalion, Tamil Nadu Special Police, Avadi, Chennai-600 109.3.Assistant Commandant, VII Battalion, Tamil Nadu Special Police, Avadi, Chennai-600 109... Respondents in both petitionsThese writ petitions have been preferred under Article 226of the Constitution of India praying for the issue of a writ ofcertiorarified mandamus to quash the impugned order of dismissalfrom service passed by the second respondent herein in hisproceedings in P.R.Nos.90/95 and 89/95 dated 26.12.96 and confirmedby the first respondent herein in his proceedingsRc.No.B2/10658/97, Appeal 29/97, Rc.No.B2/10657/97 Appeal 28/97dated 22.10.97 and to direct the respondents to reinstate theapplicants into service with all consequential monetary and servicebenefits. For Petitioners: Mr.G.BalaFor Respondents: Mr.P.Gurunathan, GACOMMON ORDERHeard both sides.2.These two petitioners were the Police Constables attachedto the Tamil Nadu Special Police, V Battalion stationed at Avadi.They have filed O.A.Nos.10410 and 10411 of 1997 before the Tamil https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Nadu State Administrative Tribunal, challenging the orders ofdismissal, dated 26.12.96 which was confirmed by the orders, dated22.10.1997, dismissing them from service. 3.Pending the O.As., the Tribunal, by its order, dated5.1.98 granted an interim stay of the dismissal. Prima facie, theTribunal found that immediately after the charge memo, dated21.11.95 in PR Nos.90/95 and 89/95 without waiting for theexplanations, an Enquiry Officer was appointed and this wasallegedly in violation of Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu PoliceSubordinate Service (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules. This groundwas raised before the domestic enquiry as well as before theappellate authority and hence the non consideration of the samewill vitiate the orders of dismissal. On notice from the Tribunal,the second respondent has filed reply affidavits, dated 18.5.98. 4.In view of the abolition of the Tribunal, the mattersstood transferred to this court and were renumbered asW.P.Nos.32621 and 32622 of 2006. 5.The charge against the petitioners was that on 13.11.95around 10.00 PM till 14.11.95 at 4.30 AM, the petitioners left thecamp without any permission. They also took the police jeep withregistration No.TNH 8886 and misused the same, bringing disreputeto the service. The Assistant Commandant of the Tamil Nadu SpecialPolice, VIII Battalion was appointed as an Enquiry Officer. 6.It was stated that after taking out the jeep and leavingthe camp, they had driven the vehicle to Mahabalipuram and went toone Swagath Lodge at 2.45 AM. They forced themselves as a raidingparty and entered the hotel and went to Room No.3, wherein Rameshand Devi, a couple were staying. They assaulted Ramesh and tookaway the woman Devi in their jeep. When the hotel workers tried toprevent them, they were also assaulted by them. Thus, they havekidnapped the said woman Devi. The Inspector of Police,Mamallapuram Police station registered a case against thepetitioners in Crime No.1298/95 under Sections 363, 341, 447 and323 IPC. The petitioners were informed about the witnesses to beexamined as well as the documents relied upon in the enquiry. 7.The petitioners gave their explanations, denying thecharges. They also stated that since a criminal case is pending,the oral enquiry should be stalled. A further exception was alsotaken that appointment of the enquiry officer before the chargememo was illegal. 8.In the reply affidavits, it was stated that the criminalcase was independent of the domestic enquiry conducted against thepetitioners. With reference to the appointment of the enquiryofficer, it was stated that in order to have a fair and impartialenquiry, the third respondent was appointed as an Enquiry officer,who belonged to an another Battalion. The petitioners were also https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ given permission to peruse the documents. After conducting aproper enquiry, the enquiry officer drew up the minutes, holdingthat the charges against the petitioners were proved. 9.The second respondent called for further representationsfrom the petitioners on 11.12.96. After considering the saidrepresentations, the petitioners were dismissed, by the order,dated 26.12.97. The petitioners preferred an appeal to the firstrespondent. The first respondent considered the appeal and rejectedthe same, by order, dated 22.10.97. 10.Even in the appeal memo, the petitioners have notmentioned anything about their involvement in the incident andmerely contended about the so-called defect in the matter ofappointment of the enquiry officer. It is not clear as to how theTribunal can grant an interim stay of termination on 5.11.98,especially when the petitioners were out of service even as earlyas on 26.12.96, i.e. nearly one year before the grant of theinterim stay. The conduct of the Tribunal in granting such aninterim order is repugnant to the rule of law and not permitted inservice jurisprudence. Because of the interim order of stay, it isstated in the reply affidavits that the petitioners were restoredto duty on 10.2.98 and they had joined duty on 18.2.98. 11.Since the enquiry regarding the petitioners leaving thecamp without intimation and they were misusing the police jeep,there is no necessity to stall the enquiry proceedings, pending theoutcome of the criminal case. The criminal case stands on adifferent footing and related to the assault and kidnap of a woman.Therefore, there is no illegality in proceeding with the domesticenquiry. 12.In this context, it is necessary to refer to thejudgment of the Supreme Court in Indian Overseas Bank, Anna Salaiand another Vs. P.Ganesan and others reported in 2007 (5) CTC 632.It is necessary to refer to the following passages found in thesaid judgment in paragraphs 20 and 21, which are as follows:"20. ...What was necessary to be noticed by theHigh Court was not only existence of identical factsand the evidence in the matter, it was also required totake into consideration the question as to whether thecharges levelled against the delinquent officers, bothin the criminal case as also the in disciplinaryproceedings, were same. Furthermore it was obligatoryon the part of the High Court to arrive at a findingthat the non-stay of the disciplinary proceedings shallnot only prejudice the delinquent officers but thematter also involves a complicated question of law.21. The standard of proof in a disciplinaryproceedings and that in a criminal trial is different.If there are additional charges against the delinquentofficers including the charges of damaging the property https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ belonging to the Bank which was not the subject-matterof allegations in a criminal case, the departmentalproceedings should not have been stayed."13.The petitioners beginning from the charge memo nevertook any stand regarding their defence against the allegations.They have been indulging only on raising a technical ground, i.e.appointment of an enquiry officer before the submission of theirexplanations. Even in the appeal memo, there was no statement madeby them regarding the merits of the charges. It is not as if therespondents never had material before ordering the enquiry. On theother hand, the petitioners were involved in a criminal case thattoo outside their territorial limits, where a criminal case wasalso registered against them. This must have really embarrassed therespondents, who were answerable to their superiors and theGovernment about the conduct of their subordinates. The respondentshave conducted a proper enquiry with reference to the official roleplayed by the two petitioners and they were found guilty of thosetwo charges, which have no relevance to the criminal case. They,being the members of a disciplined force, cannot be allowed tocommit such gross misconducts lest public faith in such a force mayget eroded. The Tribunal was also grossly erred in granting aninterim order after one year of their dismissal. 14.The counsel for the petitioners stated that thanks tothe interim order, the petitioners have been in service for thelast 10 years and therefore, the court should take a sympatheticview in dealing with the punishment. This Court is unable toconcede the said request made by the petitioners. In this regard,it is necessary to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court inState of West Bengal and others Vs. Banibrata Ghosh and othersreported in (2009) 3 SCC 250. In paragraph 32 of the saidjudgment, it has been stated as follows:"31.Shri Ghosh, learned Senior Counsel,appearing for the respondents, at this stage, says thatwe should take a compassionate view of the matter, sinceas a result of this judgment, the respondent would bethrown in a state of unemployment. We are afraid, wecannot show any such misplaced sympathy, which was shownby the Division Bench. We are told at the Bar that thisCourt had issued directions to make the payment ofsalaries and some payments have been made to therespondent. We direct that such payments shall not berecovered from the respondent."15.It was further contended that the appellate authoritydid not deal with the objections raised by the petitioners and itwas also bereft of reasons. Therefore, the order must be set aside.The Supreme Court in Chairman Disciplinary Authority, Rani LaxmibaiShetriya Gramin Bank Vs. Jagadish Sharan Varshney and othersreported in JT 2009 (4) SC 519 has held that the order of theappellate authority need not contain elaborate reasons. It it is https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ shown that the appellate authority had applied its mind that issufficient. In the present case, a detailed reply affidavit hasalso been filed on behalf of the respondents. Therefore, the saidobjection does not stand to reason.16.The Supreme Court has held that once there is a properenquiry, in which legal evidence is let in, then theproportionality of the resultant punishment cannot be gone into bythe High Courts as it has very limited judicial review over suchactions. It is therefore necessary to refer to the judgment of theSupreme Court in V.S.P. v. Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babureported in (2008) 5 SCC 569. It is necessary to refer thefollowing passages found in paras 20 and 21, which are as follows:"20. The jurisdiction of the High Court in thisregard is rather limited. Its power to interfere withdisciplinary matters is circumscribed by well-knownfactors. It cannot set aside a well-reasoned order onlyon sympathy or sentiments. (See Maruti Udyog Ltd. v.Ram Lal; State of Bihar v. Amrendra Kumar Mishra; SBIv. Mahatma Mishra; State of Karnataka v. Ameerbi; Stateof M.P. v. Sanjay Kumar Pathak and Uttar Haryana BijliVitran Nigam Ltd. v. Surji Dev.)21. Once it is found that all the proceduralrequirements have been complied with, the courts wouldnot ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishmentimposed upon a delinquent employee. The superior courtsonly in some cases may invoke the doctrine ofproportionality. If the decision of an employer isfound to be within the legal parameters, thejurisdiction would ordinarily not be invoked when themisconduct stands proved. (See Sangfroid Remedies Ltd.v. Union of India.) " 17.In the light of the above, there is no case made out.Accordingly, the writ petitions stand dismissed. However, therewill be no order as to costs. Sd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.RegistrarvvkTo1.Deputy Inspector General of Police, Armed Police Range, Chennai-600 010. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

2.The Commandant, V Battalion, Tamil Nadu Special Police, Avadi, Chennai-600 109.3.Assistant Commandant, VII Battalion, Tamil Nadu Special Police, Avadi, Chennai-600 109.1 cc To M/s.G.Bala & Daisy, Advocate, SR.21725.W.P.NOs.32621 and 32622 of 2006SGL(CO)RVL 10.06.2009