Elephant G.Rajendran v. Mr.R.K.Chandramohan & Ors.

relief to the accused and that he also contacted a Union Ministerin his cell phone and wanted the learned Judge to speak to thatUnion Minister. According to the petitioner, such a conductdisplayed by the first respondent also calls for contempt action.7. It is further alleged that since the first respondentis holding a statutory office, his conduct in attempting tointerfere with the course of justice by using the name of a UnionMinister for achieving an illegal action and therefore, he isdisqualified from holding the office of the Chairman of Bar Councilof Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry. According to the petitioner, byvirtue of the gravity of the conduct indulged in by the firstrespondent, his continuance in the office of Chairman, Bar Councilof Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry would injure and damage thereputation of the said institution.8. The petitioner by making reference to the variousnewspaper reports would contend that apart from initiating suo motocontempt action against the first respondent, necessary QuoWarranto should be issued calling upon the first respondent toexplain as to under what authority he is holding the office of theChairman, Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry, apart fromnecessary directions to the Bar Council of India to initiateappropriate action against him.9. When the writ petitions were moved before a learnedSingle Judge on 17.07.2009, at the S.R. stage for maintainability,the learned Single Judge on noting that the petitioner has filedthe writ petitions by way of Public Interest Litigation, directedthe Registry to post the matter before the Hon'ble The ChiefJustice for posting before an appropriate Bench. Thereafter, thewrit petitions were posted for admission on 27.08.2009, and on thatdate, the petitioner filed an affidavit sworn to by an Advocate inwhich the said Advocate supported the version of the petitioner. 10. We also noted the averments of the petitioner in hisaffidavit, where it was stated that the learned Judge has written aletter to the Hon'ble The Chief Justice of the Madras High Court,we directed the Registrar General of this Court to inform the Courtas to any such letter has been addressed by the learned Judge tothe Hon'ble The Chief Justice. It was further directed that if anysuch letter had really been addressed, to circulate the same tothis Court.11. When the writ petitions were posted again on31.08.2009, the Registry placed before us the letter of the learnedJudge dated 02.07.2009. After going through the letter of thelearned Judge, as we were prima facie satisfied that a case wasmade out for admission, RULE NISI was issued. On that date, noticewas taken on behalf of the first respondent by his counsel and forthe appearance of other respondents, it was directed to be postedafter eight weeks. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

12. It was again on 13.10.2009, when the learned counselfor the first respondent sought for some more time for filing hiscounter, the case was posted to 27.10.2009. The case was thenposted on 12.11.2009, 23.11.2009, 25.11.2009, 30.11.2009,01.12.2009, 04.12.2009, 15.12.2009, 21.01.2010, 22.02.2010,19.07.2010, 20.07.2010, 21.07.2010 and thereafter on 19.10.2010,when arguments were heard and orders reserved.13. On behalf of the first respondent, counter affidavitswere filed in both the writ petitions and by the third respondentChairman of the Bar Council of India, New Delhi in W.P.No.17354 of2009.14. In the counter affidavit filed by the first respondentin the writ for Quo Warranto, the first respondent raised apreliminary objection by contending that none of the ingredientscalling for issuance of Quo Warranto having been alleged in theaffidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the prayer of thepetitioner cannot be granted. According to the first respondent awrit of Quo Warranto would lie only if the appointment of theperson is contrary to the rules governing the appointment, that theperson so appointed is ineligible to hold the post and office inquestion should be a public office to which the person is appointedand it cannot be in respect of an elected office.15. In W.P.No.17354 of 2009, the first respondent wouldcontend that based on the affidavit averments and allegations, thepetitioner should only approach the competent authority for takingany action in accordance with law and that going by the provisionscontained in the Advocates Act, if at all the petitioner isaggrieved, he should only approach the State Bar Council in thefirst instance and thereafter the Bar Council of India. The firstrespondent therefore contended that the writ petition cannot be aremedy.16. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the thirdrespondent, Bar Council of India, the only relevant stand which canbe culled out as stated in paragraph 16 is to the effect that theBar Council of India is always ready and willing to offer all thebest co-operation for achieving due and proper administration ofjustice, if this Court directs for any such action within thepurview of the provisions of the Advocates Act and the Rules framedthereunder in the interest of justice. The rest of the statementscontained in the counter affidavit of the third respondent are notgermane for our consideration and therefore we are not referring tothe same in detail.17. In his submissions, the petitioner who appeared inperson contended that the first respondent not having denied thevarious averments contained in the affidavit of the petitioner, itshould be taken that those averments are true and furtherproceedings should be taken on that basis. The learned petitionerwould contend that having regard to the magnitude of the conduct https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ alleged against the first respondent and keeping in mind thepivotal post of Chairman of the State Bar Council held by the firstrespondent which is a Statutory Body controlling the members of theBar in the State, apart from initiating appropriate contempt actionagainst the first respondent, the third respondent Bar Council ofIndia should also be directed to enquire into the allegations andpunish the first respondent by suspending his practice.18. The learned petitioner would request this Court toforward his complaint to the Bar Council of India for proceedingagainst the first respondent. The petitioner relied upon thedecisions reported in 1972 (1) SCC 651 (R.L.Kapur Vs. State ofMadras), 1993 (4) SCC 441 (Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn.v. Union of India), 1998 (4) SCC 409 (Supreme Court Bar AssociationVs. Union of India), 1998 (7) SCC 248 (Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocate,in Re.), AIR 1974 SC 2269 (C.I.T. Bombay Vs. R.H.Pandit), 2001 (7)SCC 231 (B.R. Kapur v. State of T.N.,) in support of hissubmissions.19. As against the above submissions, Mr.Vijay Narayan,learned senior counsel appearing for the first respondent byreferring to Sections 3(2)(b), 3(3), 2(1)(j), 6(1)(c), 7(1)(b), 8,35 and 36 of the Advocates Act as well as Chapter II Part VI of theBar Council of India Rules contended that any allegations againstthe first respondent in the course of his discharge of professionalduty as an Advocate can be by way of a complaint before the StateBar Council and the third respondent Bar Council of India onlypossess appellate jurisdiction and therefore if at all thepetitioner wants to make any grievance as against the firstrespondent, he should have worked out his remedy under theprovisions of the Advocates Act and the Bar Council of India Rulesand hence the writ petitions are not maintainable.20. As far as his claim for taking any action against thefirst respondent by way of contempt is concerned, the learnedsenior counsel would contend that by virtue of Section 20 of theContempt of Courts Act, any such contempt action should have beeninitiated within one year. In support of his submissions, thelearned senior counsel relied upon the decisions reported in 2000(3) SCC 171 (Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal), 2001 (7) SCC 549(Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian), 2005 (1) SCC 254 (Bal Thackrey Vs.Harish Pimpalkhute), AIR 2001 SC 3315 (State of Kerala Vs.M.S.Mani), AIR 1993 SC 892 (Janata Dal Vs. H.S.Chowdhary), 2004 (3)SCC 363 (Dr.B.Sing Vs. Union of India), AIR 2005 SC 540 (DattarajNathuji Thaware Vs. State of Maharashtra), 2005 (5) SCC 136 (GurpalSingh v. State of Punjab), 2007 (10) SCC 614 (Neetu Vs. State ofPunjab), 2008 (6) CTC 811 (T.Venkateswaran Vs. Muthuraj) and AIR1982 SC 149 (S.P.Gupta Vs. Union of India).21. The learned counsel would also contend that since thecontentions of the petitioner do not fit in any of the PublicInterest Litigation guidelines set done by the Hon'ble SupremeCourt, on that ground as well, the writ petitions are notmaintainable. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

22. In these two writ petitions, the nature of reliefclaimed are threefold, that by virtue of the first respondent'smisbehaviour with the learned Judge in a judicial matter whilerepresenting a party as an Advocate, he is disqualified fromcontinuing in the post of Chairman of the Bar Council of Tamil Naduand Pondicherry, that having regard to the gravity of themisbehaviour indulged in by the first respondent, he should beproceeded with by way of contempt action and for the very samereason, the Bar Council of India should be directed to initiateaction against him and suspend his practice.23. Before going into the details of the nature ofmisbehaviour of the first respondent alleged in the writ petitions,we feel it appropriate to refer to the principles laid down in thevarious decisions placed before us on either side to reach a justconclusion. 24. We are conscious of the fact that the allegationsalleged against the first respondent, if made out, would definitelycall for serious action against him, in as much as, the firstrespondent made a crude attempt to interfere in the administrationof justice.25. Keeping the above perception in mind, we wish to definethe scope of consideration of the claims made in the writ petitionsand the stand of the first respondent in his attempt to meet thoseallegations. The decisions cited before us really throws muchlight on the issues raised and therefore we wish to be guided bythe principles laid down therein.26. In the decision reported in 1993 (4) SCC 441 (SupremeCourt Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India) in paragraphs 53and 57 the Hon'ble Supreme Court highlighted the Constitutionalguarantees to safeguard the independence of Judiciary, which is asfollows:"53. For securing the above cherished objectivesequally to all citizens irrespective of their religion,race, caste, sex, place of birth and the chronic socio-economic inequalities and disadvantages, the Constitutionhaving very high expectations from the judiciary, hasplaced great and tremendous responsibility, assigned avery important role and conferred jurisdiction of thewidest amplitude on the Supreme Court and High Courts,and for ensuring the principle of the ‘Rule of Law’ whichin the words of Bhagwati, J. (as the learned ChiefJustice then was) “runs through the entire fabric of theConstitution”. To say differently, it is the cardinalprinciple of the Constitution that an independentjudiciary is the most essential characteristic of a freesociety like ours.*****57. Regarding the significance of this principle,Chandrachud, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ in Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth said thatthe independence of judiciary is the ‘cardinal feature’and observed that the judiciary which is to act as abastion of the rights and freedom of the people is givencertain constitutional guarantees to safeguard theindependence of judiciary." (Emphasis added)27. In the decision reported in 1995 (2) SCC 584 (VinayChandra Mishra vs. None) the Hon'ble Supreme Court highlighted thepivotal role played by the superior Courts and also the duties andresponsibilities of the legal practitioners vis-a-vis their clientsand the Courts. Such statement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court arefound in paragraphs 39, 41 and 42 which are as under:"39. The rule of law is the foundation of ademocratic society. The Judiciary is the guardian of therule of law. Hence judiciary is not only the thirdpillar, but the central pillar of the democratic State.In a democracy like ours, where there is a writtenConstitution which is above all individuals andinstitutions and where the power of judicial review isvested in the superior courts, the judiciary has aspecial and additional duty to perform, viz., to overseethat all individuals and institutions including theexecutive and the legislature act within the frameworkof not only the law but also the fundamental law of theland. This duty is apart from the function ofadjudicating the disputes between the parties which isessential to peaceful and orderly development of thesociety. If the judiciary is to perform its duties andfunctions effectively and remain true to the spirit withwhich they are sacredly entrusted to it, the dignity andauthority of the courts have to be respected andprotected at all costs. Otherwise, the very cornerstoneof our constitutional scheme will give way and with itwill disappear the rule of law and the civilized life inthe society. It is for this purpose that the courts areentrusted with the extraordinary power of punishingthose who indulge in acts whether inside or outside thecourts, which tend to undermine their authority andbring them in disrepute and disrespect by scandalisingthem and obstructing them from discharging their dutieswithout fear or favour. When the court exercises thispower, it does not do so to vindicate the dignity andhonour of the individual judge who is personallyattacked or scandalised, but to uphold the majesty ofthe law and of the administration of justice. Thefoundation of the judiciary is the trust and theconfidence of the people in its ability to deliverfearless and impartial justice. When the foundationitself is shaken by acts which tend to createdisaffection and disrespect for the authority of thecourt by creating distrust in its working, the edificeof the judicial system gets eroded.***** https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

41. As held by this Court in the matter of Mr‘G’, A Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court (1995) 1 SCR490, “the Court, in dealing with cases ofprofessional misconduct is not concerned withordinary legal rights, but with the special andrigid rules of professional conduct expected ofand applied to a specially privileged class ofpersons who, because of their privilegedstatus, are subject to certain disabilitieswhich do not attach to other men and which donot attach even to them in a non-professionalcharacter. ... He [a legal practitioner] isbound to conduct himself in a manner befittingthe high and honourable profession to whoseprivileges he has so long been admitted; and ifhe departs from the high standards which thatprofession has set for itself and demands ofhim in professional matters, he is liable todisciplinary action”.42. In Lalit Mohan Das v. Advocate General, Orissa (1957SCR 167), this Court observed:“A member of the Bar undoubtedly owes a dutyto his client and must place before the Courtall that can fairly and reasonably besubmitted on behalf of his client. He may evensubmit that a particular order is not correctand may ask for a review of that order. At thesame time, a member of the Bar is an officerof the Court and owes a duty to the Court inwhich he is appearing. He must uphold thedignity and decorum of the Court and must notdo anything to bring the Court itself intodisrepute. The appellant before us grosslyoverstepped the limits of propriety when hemade imputations of partiality and unfairnessagainst the Munsif in open Court. Insuggesting that the Munsif followed noprinciple in his orders, the appellant wasadding insult to injury, because the Munsifhad merely upheld an order of his predecessoron the preliminary point of jurisdiction andCourt fees, which order had been upheld by theHigh Court in revision. Scandalising the Courtin such manner is really polluting the veryfount of justice; such conduct as theappellant indulged in was not a matter betweenan individual member of the Bar and a memberof the judicial service; it brought intodisrepute the whole administration of justice.From that point of view, the conduct of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ appellant was highly reprehensible." (Emphasisadded)28. In the decision reported in 1998 (4) SCC 409 (SupremeCourt Bar Association Vs. Union of India) the Hon'ble Supreme Courtdealt with the power to punish for contempt and the procedure fortaking action against the Advocates for professional misconduct inparagraphs 42, 43, 71, 77, 78 and 79 which read as follows:"42. The contempt of court is a specialjurisdiction to be exercised sparingly and with cautionwhenever an act adversely affects the administration ofjustice or which tends to impede its course or tends toshake public confidence in the judicial institutions.This jurisdiction may also be exercised when the actcomplained of adversely affects the majesty of law ordignity of the courts. The purpose of contemptjurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of thecourts of law. It is an unusual type of jurisdictioncombining “the jury, the judge and the hangman” and it isso because the court is not adjudicating upon any claimbetween litigating parties. This jurisdiction is notexercised to protect the dignity of an individual judgebut to protect the administration of justice from beingmaligned. In the general interest of the community it isimperative that the authority of courts should not beimperilled and there should be no unjustifiableinterference in the administration of justice. It is amatter between the court and the contemner and thirdparties cannot intervene. It is exercised in a summarymanner in aid of the administration of justice, themajesty of law and the dignity of the courts. No such actcan be permitted which may have the tendency to shake thepublic confidence in the fairness and impartiality of theadministration of justice.43. The power of the Supreme Court to punish forcontempt of court, though quite wide, is yet limited andcannot be expanded to include the power to determinewhether an advocate is also guilty of “professionalmisconduct” in a summary manner, giving a go-by to theprocedure prescribed under the Advocates Act. The powerto do complete justice under Article 142 is in a way,corrective power, which gives preference to equity overlaw but it cannot be used to deprive a professionallawyer of the due process contained in the Advocates Act,1961 by suspending his licence to practice in a summarymanner while dealing with a case of contempt of court.*****71. Thus, after the coming into force of theAdvocates Act, 1961 with effect from 19-5-1961, mattersconnected with the enrolment of advocates as also theirpunishment for professional misconduct is governed by theprovisions of that Act only. Since, the jurisdiction togrant licence to a law graduate to practise as an https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ advocate vests exclusively in the Bar Council of theState concerned, the jurisdiction to suspend his licencefor a specified term or to revoke it also vests in thesame body.*****77. However, the exercise of powers under thecontempt jurisdiction cannot be confused with theappellate jurisdiction under Section 38 of the Act. Thetwo jurisdictions are separate and distinct. We are,therefore, unable to persuade ourselves to subscribe tothe contrary view expressed by the Bench in V.C. Mishracase because in that case the Bar Council had notdeclined to deal with the matter and take appropriateaction against the advocate concerned. Since there was nocause pending before the Bar Council, this Court couldnot exercise its appellate jurisdiction in respect of amatter which was never under consideration of the BarCouncil.78. Thus, to conclude we are of the opinion thatthis Court cannot in exercise of its jurisdiction underArticle 142 read with Article 129 of the Constitution,while punishing a contemner for committing contempt ofcourt, also impose a punishment of suspending his licenceto practice, where the contemner happens to be anadvocate. Such a punishment cannot even be imposed bytaking recourse to the appellate powers under Section 38of the Act while dealing with a case of contempt of court(and not an appeal relating to professional misconduct assuch). To that extent, the law laid down in Vinay ChandraMishra, Re is not good law and we overrule it.79. An advocate who is found guilty of contemptof court may also, as already noticed, be guilty ofprofessional misconduct in a given case but it is for theBar Council of the State or Bar Council of India topunish that advocate by either debarring him frompractice or suspending his licence, as may be warranted,in the facts and circumstances of each case. The learnedSolicitor General informed us that there have been caseswhere the Bar Council of India taking note of thecontumacious and objectionable conduct of an advocate,had initiated disciplinary proceedings against him andeven punished him for “professional misconduct”, on thebasis of his having been found guilty of committingcontempt of court. We do not entertain any doubt that theBar Council of the State or Bar Council of India, as thecase may be, when apprised of the establishedcontumacious conduct of an advocate by the High Court orby this Court, would rise to the occasion, and takeappropriate action against such an advocate. UnderArticle 144 of the Constitution “all authorities, civiland judicial, in the territory of India shall act in aid https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ of the Supreme Court”. The Bar Council which performs apublic duty and is charged with the obligation to protectthe dignity of the profession and maintain professionalstandards and etiquette is also obliged to act “in aid ofthe Supreme Court”. It must, whenever facts warrant, riseto the occasion and discharge its duties uninfluenced bythe position of the contemner advocate. It must act inaccordance with the prescribed procedure, whenever itsattention is drawn by this Court to the contumacious andunbecoming conduct of an advocate which has the tendencyto interfere with due administration of justice. It ispossible for the High Courts also to draw the attentionof the Bar Council of the State to a case of professionalmisconduct of a contemner advocate to enable the StateBar Council to proceed in the manner prescribed by theAct and the Rules framed thereunder. There is nojustification to assume that the Bar Councils would notrise to the occasion, as they are equally responsible touphold the dignity of the courts and the majesty of lawand prevent any interference in the administration ofjustice. Learned counsel for the parties present beforeus do not dispute and rightly so that whenever a court ofrecord records its findings about the conduct of anadvocate while finding him guilty of committing contemptof court and desires or refers the matter to beconsidered by the Bar Council concerned, appropriateaction should be initiated by the Bar Council concernedin accordance with law with a view to maintain thedignity of the courts and to uphold the majesty of lawand professional standards and etiquette. Nothing is moredestructive of public confidence in the administration ofjustice than incivility, rudeness or disrespectfulconduct on the part of a counsel towards the court ordisregard by the court of the privileges of the Bar. Incase the Bar Council, even after receiving “reference”from the Court, fails to take action against the advocateconcerned, this Court might consider invoking its powersunder Section 38 of the Act by sending for the record ofthe proceedings from the Bar Council and passingappropriate orders. Of course, the appellate powers underSection 38 would be available to this Court only and notto the High Courts. We, however, hope that such asituation would not arise." (Emphasis added)29. In the decision reported in 1998 (7) SCC 248 (AjayKumar Pandey, Advocate, in Re.) while considering the misbehaviourof the lawyers in the Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held asunder in paragraph 27, 32 and 34, which reads as follows:"27. Does the law give a lawyer, unsatisfiedwith the result of a case, any licence to permithimself the liberty of scandalising a court by castingunwarranted imputations against the Judge in dischargeof his judicial functions? Does the lawyer enjoy anyspecial immunity under the Contempt of Courts Act, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ where he is found to have committed a gross contempt ofcourt? The answer has to be an emphatic NO.*****32. The tendency of maligning the reputation ofjudicial officers by disgruntled elements who fail tosecure an order which they desire or which they expectis on the increase. It is unfortunate that even somedisgruntled lawyers also indulge in the sameobjectionable activities. No latitude can be given to alitigant who attempts to browbeat the court. In theinstant case, the contemner, let alone showing anyremorse or regret adopted an arrogant, defiant andcontemptuous attitude. The contemner has been reckless,persistent and guilty of undermining the dignity of thecourts and his actions are motivated, deliberate anddesigned. Sympathy in a case like this would be totallymisplaced. Mercy has no meaning. The action of thecontemner calls for a deterrent punishment so that italso serves as an example to others and there is norepetition of such a contempt by anyone else. We,therefore, having found the contemner guilty ofcommitting contempt of court, sentence him to undergosimple imprisonment for a period of four months and topay a fine of Rs.1000 (one thousand) and in default ofpayment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonmentfor a period of 15 days.*****34. Looking to the established facts of thisCourt, it is apparent that the conduct of the contemnerwas highly contumacious and even atrocious. He hasabused professional privileges while practising as anadvocate. We, therefore, deem it appropriate, in viewof the observations made in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v.Union of India to direct that the copy of this judgmenttogether with the relevant record be forwarded to theChairman, Bar Council of India, who may refer the caseto the committee concerned for appropriate action as isconsidered fit and proper." (Emphasis added)30. In AIR 1974 SC 2269 (C.I.T. Bombay Vs. R.H.Pandit) theHon'ble Supreme Court has held that the practice of the Court isthe law of the Court.31. In 2001 (7) SCC 231 (B.R. Kapur v. State of T.N.,) thescope of jurisdiction of the Writ of Quo Warranto has been statedas under in paragraph 79 :"79. Insofar as it relates to Article 361 of theConstitution, that the Governor shall not be answerableto any court for performance of duties of his office asGovernor, it may, at the very outset, be indicated thatwe are considering the prayer for issue of the writ ofquo warranto against Respondent 2, who according to thepetitioner suffers from disqualification to hold the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ public office of the Chief Minister of a State. A writof quo warranto is a writ which lies against the person,who according to the relator is not entitled to hold anoffice of public nature and is only a usurper of theoffice. It is the person, against whom the writ of quowarranto is directed, who is required to show, by whatauthority that person is entitled to hold the office.The challenge can be made on various grounds, includingon the grounds that the possessor of the office does notfulfil the required qualifications or suffers from anydisqualification, which debars the person to hold suchoffice......."32. In the decision reported in 2005 (5) SCC 136 (GurpalSingh v. State of Punjab) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has given aword of caution as well as scope of entertaining the PublicInterest Litigation as under in paragraphs 5, 6 and 10:"5. The scope of entertaining a petition styledas a public interest litigation, locus standi of thepetitioner particularly in matters involving service ofan employee has been examined by this Court in variouscases. The Court has to be satisfied about (a) thecredentials of the applicant; (b) the prima faciecorrectness or nature of information given by him; (c)the information being not vague and indefinite. Theinformation should show gravity and seriousnessinvolved. Court has to strike balance between twoconflicting interests: (i) nobody should be allowed toindulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirchingthe character of others; and (ii) avoidance of publicmischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking toassail, for oblique motives, justifiable executiveactions. In such case, however, the Court cannot affordto be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to seethat under the guise of redressing a public grievance,it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by theConstitution to the executive and the legislature. TheCourt has to act ruthlessly while dealing withimpostors and busybodies or meddlesome interlopersimpersonating as public-spirited holy men. Theymasquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to actin the name of pro bono publico, though they have nointerest of the public or even of their own to protect.6. Courts must do justice by promotion of goodfaith, and prevent law from crafty invasions. Courtsmust maintain the social balance by interfering wherenecessary for the sake of justice and refuse tointerfere where it is against the social interest andpublic good. (See State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu andA.P. State Financial Corpn. v. GAR Re-Rolling Mills.)No litigant has a right to unlimited draught on thecourt time and public money in order to get his affairssettled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ justice should not be misused as a licence to filemisconceived and frivolous petitions. [See Buddhi KotaSubbarao (Dr.) v. K. Parasaran.] Today people rush tocourts to file cases in profusion under this attractivename of public interest. They must inspire confidencein courts and among the public.****10. Public interest litigation is a weaponwhich has to be used with great care and circumspectionand the judiciary has to be extremely careful to seethat behind the beautiful veil of public interest anugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as aneffective weapon in the armoury of law for deliveringsocial justice to the citizens. The attractive brandname of public interest litigation should not beallowed to be used for suspicious products of mischief.It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrongor public injury and not publicity-oriented or foundedon personal vendetta. As indicated above, court must becareful to see that a body of persons or member of thepublic, who approaches the court is acting bona fideand not for personal gain or private motive orpolitical motivation or other oblique consideration.The court must not allow its process to be abused foroblique considerations by masked phantoms who monitorat times from behind. Some persons with vested interestindulge in the pastime of meddling with judicialprocess either by force of habit or from impropermotives and try to bargain for a good deal as well asto enrich themselves. Often they are actuated by adesire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. Thepetitions of such busybodies deserve to be thrown outby rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate caseswith exemplary costs." (Emphasis added)33. In the decision reported in 2003 (4) SCC 712 (HighCourt of Gujarat v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat,) the scopeand power of the writ of Quo Warranto has been susceptibly statedas under in paragraph 22 & 23 :"22. The High Court in exercise of its writjurisdiction in a matter of this nature is required todetermine at the outset as to whether a case has beenmade out for issuance of a writ of certiorari or a writof quo warranto. The jurisdiction of the High Court toissue a writ of quo warranto is a limited one. Whileissuing such a writ, the Court merely makes a publicdeclaration but will not consider the respective impactof the candidates or other factors which may berelevant for issuance of a writ of certiorari. (SeeR.K. Jain v. Union of India, SCC para 74.) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

23. A writ of quo warranto can only be issuedwhen the appointment is contrary to the statutoryrules. (See Mor Modern Coop.Transport Society Ltd. v.Financial Commr. & Secy. to Govt. of Haryana.)"34. The scope of issuance of writ of Quo Warranto has beenvividly stated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in one of its earliestdecisions reported in AIR 1965 SC 491 (University of Mysore v. C.D.Govinda Rao), paragraph 7 which is relevant for our purpose whichreads as under:"7. As Halsbury has observed:“An information in the nature of a quowarranto took the place of the obsoletewrit of quo warranto which lay against aperson who claimed or usurped an office,franchise, or liberty, to enquire by whatauthority he supported his claim, inorder that the right to the office orfranchise might be determined.”Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceedingaffords a judicial enquiry in which any personholding an independent substantive public office,or franchise, or liberty, is called upon to showby what right he holds the said office, franchiseor liberty; if the inquiry leads to the findingthat the holder of the office has no valid titleto it, the issue of the writ of quo warranto oustshim from that office. In other words, theprocedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction andauthority on the judiciary to control executiveaction in the matter of making appointments topublic offices against the relevant statutoryprovisions; it also protects a citizen from beingdeprived of public office to which he may have aright. It would thus be seen that if theseproceedings are adopted subject to the conditionsrecognised in that behalf, they tend to protectthe public from usurpers of public office; in somecases, persons, not entitled to public office maybe allowed to occupy them and to continue to holdthem as a result of the connivance of theexecutive or with its active help, and in suchcases, if the jurisdiction of the courts to issuewrit of quo warranto is properly invoked, theusurper can be ousted and the person entitled tothe post allowed to occupy it. It is thus clearthat before a citizen can claim a writ of quowarranto, he must satisfy the court, inter alia,that the office in question is a public office andis held by usurper without legal authority, andthat necessarily leads to the enquiry as towhether the appointment of the said alleged https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ usurper has been made in accordance with law ornot."35. As regards initiation of any proceedings for contemptand while analysing the limitation prescribed under Section 20 ofthe Contempt of Courts Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held asunder in paragraph 15 in the decision reported in 2000 (3) SCC 171(Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal):"15. In the cases contemplated by (i) or (ii)above, it cannot be said that any proceedings forcontempt have been initiated. Filing of an applicationor petition for initiating proceedings for contempt ora mere receipt of such reference by the court does notamount to initiation of the proceedings by court. Onreceiving any such document it is usual with thecourts to commence some proceedings by employing anexpression such as “admit”, “rule”, “issue notice” or“issue notice to show cause why proceedings forcontempt be not initiated”. In all such cases thenotice is issued either in routine or because thecourt has not yet felt satisfied that a case forinitiating any proceedings for contempt has been madeout and therefore the court calls upon the oppositeparty to admit or deny the allegations made or tocollect more facts so as to satisfy itself if a casefor initiating proceedings for contempt was made out.Such a notice is certainly anterior to initiation. Thetenor of the notice is itself suggestive of the factthat in spite of having applied its mind to theallegations and the material placed before it thecourt was not satisfied of the need for initiatingproceedings for contempt; it was still desirous ofascertaining facts or collecting further materialwhereon to formulate such opinion. It is only when thecourt has formed an opinion that a prima facie casefor initiating proceedings for contempt is made outand that the respondents or the alleged contemnersshould be called upon to show cause why they shouldnot be punished; then the court can be said to haveinitiated proceedings for contempt. It is the resultof a conscious application of the mind of the court tothe facts and the material before it. Such initiationof proceedings for contempt based on application ofmind by the court to the facts of the case and thematerial before it must take place within a period ofone year from the date on which the contempt isalleged to have been committed failing which thejurisdiction to initiate any proceedings for contemptis lost. The heading of Section 20 is “limitation foractions for contempt”. Strictly speaking, this sectiondoes not provide limitation in the sense in which theterm is understood in the Limitation Act. Section 5 ofthe Limitation Act also does not, therefore, apply. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Section 20 strikes at the jurisdiction of the court toinitiate any proceedings for contempt."36. As regards the power of the High Court to punish forcontempt under Article 215 and the harmonious manner in whichSection 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act can be interpreted hasbeen laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 30, 42 and44 in the decision reported in 2001 (7) SCC 549 : CDJ 2001 SC 447(Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian). The said paragraph is extractedwhich reads as under :"30. There can be no doubt that both thisCourt and High Courts are courts of record and theConstitution has given them the powers to punish forcontempt. The decisions of this Court clearly showthat this power cannot be abrogated or stultified.But if the power under Article 129 and Article 215is absolute, can there by any legislation indicatingthe manner and to the extent that the power can beexercised? If there is any provision of the lawwhich stultifies or abrogates the power underArticle 129 and/or Article 215, there can be littledoubt that such law would not be regarded as havingbeen validly enacted. It, however, appears to usthat providing for the quantum of punishment or whatmay or may not be regarded as acts of contempt oreven providing for a period of limitation forinitiating proceedings for contempt cannot be takento be a provision which abrogates or stultifies thecontempt jurisdiction under Article 129 or Article215 of the Constitution.*****42. The decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal caseto the effect that initiation of proceedings underSection 20 can only be said to have occurred whenthe court formed the prima facie opinion thatcontempt has been committed and issued notice to thecontemner to show cause why it should not bepunished, is taking too narrow a view of Section 20which does not seem to be warranted and is not onlygoing to cause hardship but would perpetrateinjustice. A provision like Section 20 has to beinterpreted having regard to the realities of thesituation. For instance, in a case where a contemptof a subordinate court is committed, a report isprepared whether on an application to court orotherwise, and reference made by the subordinatecourt to the High Court. It is only thereafter thata High Court can take further action under Section15. In the process, more often than not, a period ofone year elapses. If the interpretation of Section20 put in Om Prakash Jaiswal case is correct, itwould mean that notwithstanding both the subordinatecourt and the High Court being prima facie satisfied https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ that contempt has been committed the High Courtwould become powerless to take any action. On theother hand, if the filing of an application beforethe subordinate court or the High Court, making of areference by a subordinate court on its own motionor the filing of an application before an Advocate-General for permission to initiate contemptproceedings is regarded as initiation by the courtfor the purposes of Section 20, then such aninterpretation would not impinge on or stultify thepower of the High Court to punish for contempt whichpower, dehors the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 isenshrined in Article 215 of the Constitution. Suchan interpretation of Section 20 would harmonise thatsection with the powers of the courts to punish forcontempt which is recognised by the Constitution.***** 44. Action for contempt is divisible intotwo categories, namely, that initiated suo motu bythe court and that instituted otherwise than on thecourt’s own motion. The mode of initiation in eachcase would necessarily be different. While in thecase of suo motu proceedings, it is the court itselfwhich must initiate by issuing a notice, in theother cases initiation can only be by a party filingan application. In our opinion, therefore, theproper construction to be placed on Section 20 mustbe that action must be initiated, either by filingof an application or by the court issuing notice suomotu, within a period of one year from the date onwhich the contempt is alleged to have beencommitted."37. Keeping the above legal principles in mind, when werecapitulate the core allegation of the petitioner against thefirst respondent, on 29.06.2009, the first respondent whileappearing on behalf of the accused in an Anticipatory Bailapplication alleged to have misbehaved in the Court by makingcertain unwarranted allegations against the learned Judge when thelearned Judge expressed his opinion that there was no merit togrant the Anticipatory Bail applied for.38. The further allegation is that in spite of the learnedJudge's advice to the first respondent not to exceed his limits, hecontinued with his defiant behaviour and at one point of time, thelearned Judge stated to have retorted and said that the firstrespondent exerted influence on the learned Judge to favour theaccused by granting the Anticipatory Bail and that at the instanceof the first respondent an Union Minister also tried to applypressure on the learned Judge.39. In order to ascertain the correctness of theallegations, we deem it appropriate to refer to the letter of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ learned Judge dated 02.07.2009, addressed to the Hon'ble The ChiefJustice instead of making reference to either the allegationscontained in the petitioner's affidavit or any other materialplaced before the Court.40. The letter of the learned Judge is dated 02.07.2009,and the relevant part where there is specific reference to thefirst respondent contained in the said letter are as under:"On 12.06.2009, at about 2 P.M. during LunchRecess, while I was in the Chamber, High Court,Madras, my Office Assistant Mr.Mujibir Ali informedme that Mr.Chandramohan, Chairman, Bar Council ofTamil Nadu, is waiting and seeking for an appointmentto meet me and, immediately, I allowed him to comein. To start with, he discussed about the generalsubject on Advocates and so proceeding, he said thattwo persons, who are father and son/accused in acriminal case, are family friends of a Union Ministerby name Raja, and that the petition filed by them foranticipatory bail must be considered favourably.Simultaneously, he handed over his mobile phone bysaying that the Union Minister is on the line to havea talk with me. Right away, I discouraged suchconduct of Mr.Chandramohan and told him that the casewould be disposed of in accordance with law, iflisted before me.*****Subsequently, on 29.06.2009, secondanticipatory bail petition came to be filed for thesame accused and on behalf of Mr.Chandramohan(counsel on record for the petitioners/accused), whowas present in court, Mr.Masood, Advocate, argued bystating that some new points need to be submittedand, for such purpose, the Case Diary must besummoned. Adverting to the counter filed by theprosecution and referring to the view I had alreadytaken during the previous occasion and pointing outthat there was no change of circumstance topositively consider the case of the petitioners, itwas conveyed that there was no valid reason or groundto grant the prayer in the 2nd petition. It was alsoobserved that the counsel may argue the case indetail, however, this time orders would be passed onmerits and they would not be allowed to withdraw thepetition. Again, the counsel insisted that the casediary must be called for and the case be heard indetail with reference to the materials collectedduring the course of investigation. I have impressedupon the representing counsel by explicating thatalike direction could be given to the prosecutiononly in the event of the Judge satisfying that suchcourse is inevitable and absolutely necessary in agiven situation and that, on mere demands and as amatter of routine, such exercise cannot be https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ undertaken. At that time, Mr.Chandramohan stood upand made a similar demand and when I emphaticallydeclined to accede to his adamant demand, hevociferously remarked that the Court is always takingsides with the prosecution and not accepting thesubmissions made by the counsel for the accused whilegiving importance to the Prosecutor. On suchpointless remark, I said that the counsel engaged toargue on his behalf has made his submission and he isnot supposed to pass such slanderous and derogatoryremarks; for, all these days, the court has beenpassing orders after hearing the parties andassessing the cases on their own merits and inaccordance with law. In spite of that,Mr.Chandramohan, insisted that the Case Diary must besummoned and the matter be adjourned to some otherday. Since Mr.Chandramohan highly raised his voiceand his approach towards the court was quarrelsome, Itold him that a person like him, an advocate holdingposition as Chairman of a State Bar Council, shouldnot behave in such a fashion. Still the learnedAdvocate was outburst and uncontrollable, and Iobserved that a counsel, who made an attempt to exertinfluence on the court by using the name of a CabinetMinister, cannot be allowed to succeed in snatchingan order in his favour by advancing threat. Due tosuch odd experience, I had to direct the Registry toplace the papers before Your Lordship for obtainingorders to post the case before some other learnedJudge.The case concerned was taken up at the end inthe afternoon and inside the court hall, there wereabout 4 to 5 Advocates present and no one from thePress was there. That being so, the oralobservations actually made came to be translated bythe Print and Electronic media with their owninterpretations and ideas......I have written this letter/report to appriseYour Lordship the actual state of affairs involved."(Emphasis added)41. After perusing the contents of the above letter, at thevery outset we wish to state that there is no reason to doubt theveracity of the statement of the learned Judge in the absence ofany allegations of ill-will or mala fides alleged against thelearned Judge. 42. It will be appropriate to mention at this juncture thatwhen the whole basis for the initiation of this Public InterestLitigation was by way of reaction to the unprecedented incidentwherein an Advocate who is also holding a responsible position asChairman of the State Bar Council alleged to have misbehavedtowards the learned Judge in the Court Hall and also the reactionof the learned Judge in the open Court Hall which revealed to great https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ extent the conduct of the first respondent in having attempted toinfluence the learned Judge earlier relating to the grant ofAnticipatory Bail and the nature of such incident was set out bythe petitioner in his affidavit with little more particulars, thefirst respondent was expected to explain the situation in his ownwords if any different happenings had taken place.43. The conduct of the first respondent in havingmaintained silence in his counter affidavit goes to show to a verylarge extent the first respondent in effect admitted theallegations. It will be relevant to state that the behaviour of thefirst respondent in Court was witnessed by the State Prosecutor whowas present as well as the counsel on Record by name one Mr.Masood,who argued the case on behalf of the first respondent, whorepresented the accused in the Anticipatory Bail application. Noaffidavit was filed by the said counsel about what transpired inCourt. The above facts only lead us to reach a conclusion that theoutburst of the learned Judge was true and the reflection of thesame as contained in his letter remains uncontroverted. Though theletter was called for from the Registry and produced before Court,the first respondent did not evince any interest to know thecontents. No steps were taken at his instance either for getting acopy of the letter or its contents. It is also relevant to statethat the first respondent neither repented for nor displayed anyconduct of remorse in order to show any lenience. 44. The sum and substance of the allegations contained inthe letter is that not being able to bear the extreme behaviour ofthe first respondent, the learned Judge apart from advising him tomaintain the decorum of the Court by specifically referring to hisstatus as the Chairman of the State Bar Council and also referredto his earlier behaviour in the Chambers of the learned Judge whenhe tried to influence the learned Judge by using the name of aCentral Cabinet Minister.45. Therefore, if really such an incident had not takenplace inside the Court Hall, the first person to have refuted thatstatement should have been the first respondent. That apart, sincehe had the assistance of another Advocate by name Mr.Masood, thesaid Advocate could have also explained the situation if the saidsituation was different from what has been alleged by the learnedJudge. Therefore, we are convinced and also emboldened to statethat whatever stated by the learned Judge in his letter dated02.07.2009, as reflecting the exactitude of the incident thathappened on 29.06.2009, in the Court Hall. 46. For the very same reason, we proceed to state thatwhatever stated by the learned Judge as against the firstrespondent on 12.06.2009, at about 2.00 pm during lunch recess inhis Chambers will also have to be taken as a gospel truth (a sayingheld in esteem). https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

47. In fact when the first respondent filed his counteraffidavit in the writ petitions, after noticing that there was nospecific reference; leave alone denial of the allegations levelledagainst him vis-a-vis the learned Judge; we pointed out the same tothe learned counsel, to which the representation on behalf of thefirst respondent was that since they are raising a preliminaryissue as regards the maintainability of both the writ petitions,the first respondent is not traversing the allegations.48. We however made it clear to the learned senior counselappearing for the first respondent that it is always open to thefirst respondent to come forward with any additional affidavitrelating to the allegations or the incident and that such anopportunity will not be extended to him if he fails to avail at theearliest point of time. 49. However, on behalf of the first respondent a firm standwas taken that he is not inclined to traverse those factualallegations levelled against him and that he wanted to stand orfall by the preliminary issues raised in the counter affidavit. 50. Therefore, de hors the prayers of the petitioner inthese two writ petitions, we find an onerous responsibility isimposed on us to deal with the first respondent having regard tothe nature of allegations levelled against him by no less than aperson who was a sitting Judge of this Court, more so, as the firstrespondent is in the status as Chairman of the State Bar Councilwhich institution inter alia has disciplinary control over severalthousand lawyers practising in the High Court as well as in thesubordinate courts and other quasi judicial institutions.51. In order to justify any conclusion to be ultimatelyarrived at in this proceedings, the allegations levelled againstthe first respondent needs to be examined in little more detail ascontained in the letter dated 02.07.2009, of the learned Judge.52. According to the learned Judge, the first respondentwas allowed to meet him in his Chambers on 12.06.2009, at about2.00 p.m. for the simple reason that the first respondent washolding the office of Chairman, Bar Council of Tamil Nadu andPondicherry and was waiting and seeking an appointment to meet him.Unfortunately, such a courtesy extended by the learned Judgeappeared to have been abused by the first respondent by making areference to some accused in a criminal case for whom he wasappearing. 53. Apart from that, he went to the extent of telling thelearned Judge that he should pass favourable orders in theanticipatory bail applications. To crown it all, he wanted thelearned Judge to talk to some Union Minister who was stated to bewaiting on a call in the first respondent's mobile phone. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

54. In the said situation, the learned Judge was stated tohave appropriately told the first respondent that any judicialmatter will be disposed of in accordance with law if listed beforehim.55. In fact, in our considered view, such a reaction of thelearned Judge was much more courteous than was expected and thefirst respondent for what has been alleged against him by thelearned Judge, in our considered opinion did call for a verystringent action at that point of time itself by handing him overto the appropriate authorities. Apparently, the learned Judge didnot want to precipitate his conduct and thereby bring greatdisrepute to the institution. Unfortunately, the first respondentwho is holding a high office as Chairman, State Bar Council insteadof realising the magnanimous attitude of the learned Judge,displayed a much more disastrous attitude by behaving in a unrulymanner in the Court Hall on 29.06.2009, when the learned Judge hadno other option except to reveal in the open Court the monstrousand unpardonable behaviour of the first respondent in the openCourt in the presence of Advocates and thereby brought it to theknowledge of the public at large.56. The monstrosity of the allegations cannot be belittledby trying to find out whether such a conduct can be brought withinthe parameters of the issuance of the writ of Quo Warranto or to bedealt with as it used to be by the Bar Council while dealing withcases of professional misconduct alleged against the Advocates byeither a litigant public or others. The magnitude of the behaviourof the first respondent, in our considered opinion wasunprecedented and the same has got to be dealt with an iron hand inorder to ensure that such a behaviour is not even dreamt to beattempted by any other unscrupulous element under the garb ofwearing the glorious robes of an Advocate. 57. We wish to reinforce our perception and state thatuncontraverted conduct of the first respondent is of such a gravemagnitude which gave a severe blow to the institution and cannot betreated as a simple attempt of tactical advantage tried to begained by approaching the learned Judge. We are convinced thathaving regard to the uncontraverted allegations placed before us atthe instance of the petitioner and fully supported with very manydetails by the learned Judge in his letter dated 02.07.2009, thisCourt cannot glibly swallow such a monstrous behaviour of the firstrespondent against the institution which would otherwise result inencouraging such unscrupulous elements to wag their tail againstthe institution thinking that the same can be got over in the Courtby resorting to legal jargons. 58. We are of the considered view that unless such aconduct is nipped at the bud, it will erode the Majesty of theinstitution and provide scope for bringing the Majesty of theinstitution as well as the Hon'ble Judges to great disrepute. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

59. In this context, it will be appropriate to borrow theexpression of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in1993 (4) SCC 441 (Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Unionof India), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court stated that theConstitution having very high expectations from the judiciary, hasplaced great and tremendous responsibility, assigned a veryimportant role and conferred jurisdiction of the widest amplitudeon the Supreme Court and High Courts, and for ensuring theprinciple of the ‘Rule of Law’ which “runs through the entirefabric of the Constitution”. It was also stated that anindependent judiciary is the most essential characteristic of afree society like ours. It was further stated that theindependence of judiciary is the ‘cardinal feature’ and that thejudiciary which is to act as a bastion of the rights and freedom ofthe people is given certain constitutional guarantees to safeguardthe independence of judiciary.60. Before proceeding to pass final orders in these writpetitions, we feel that the various principles set out by theHon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions referred in the earlierparagraphs can be listed out, which reads as under: (a) The Constitution having very highexpectations from the judiciary, has placed greatand tremendous responsibility, assigned a veryimportant role and conferred jurisdiction of thewidest amplitude on the Supreme Court and HighCourts.(b) It is the cardinal principle of theConstitution that an independent judiciary is themost essential characteristic of a free societylike ours.(c) The Judiciary is the guardian of the ruleof law. Hence judiciary is not only the thirdpillar, but the central pillar of the democraticState.(d) The judiciary has a special andadditional duty to perform, viz., to oversee thatall individuals and institutions including theexecutive and the legislature act within theframework of not only the law but also thefundamental law of the land.(e) If the judiciary is to perform its dutiesand functions effectively and remain true to thespirit with which they are sacredly entrusted toit, the dignity and authority of the courts haveto be respected and protected at all costs.(f) It is for this purpose that the courtsare entrusted with the extraordinary power of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ punishing those who indulge in acts whether insideor outside the courts, which tend to underminetheir authority and bring them in disrepute anddisrespect by scandalising them and obstructingthem from discharging their duties without fear orfavour.(g) The foundation of the judiciary is thetrust and the confidence of the people in itsability to deliver fearless and impartial justice.(h) When the foundation itself is shaken byacts which tend to create disaffection anddisrespect for the authority of the court bycreating distrust in its working, the edifice ofthe judicial system gets eroded.(i) At the same time, a member of the Bar isan officer of the Court and owes a duty to theCourt in which he is appearing. He must uphold thedignity and decorum of the Court and must not doanything to bring the Court itself into disrepute.(j) Scandalising the Court in such manner isreally polluting the very fount of justice; suchconduct as the appellant indulged in was not amatter between an individual member of the Bar anda member of the judicial service; it brought intodisrepute the whole administration of justice.(k) In the general interest of the communityit is imperative that the authority of courtsshould not be imperilled and there should be nounjustifiable interference in the administrationof justice.(l) No such act can be permitted which mayhave the tendency to shake the public confidencein the fairness and impartiality of theadministration of justice.(m) It is possible for the High Courts alsoto draw the attention of the Bar Council of theState to a case of professional misconduct of acontemner advocate to enable the State Bar Councilto proceed in the manner prescribed by the Act andthe Rules framed thereunder.(n) whenever a court of record records itsfindings about the conduct of an advocate whilefinding him guilty of committing contempt of courtand desires or refers the matter to be consideredby the Bar Council concerned, appropriate actionshould be initiated by the Bar Council concerned https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ in accordance with law with a view to maintain thedignity of the courts and to uphold the majesty oflaw and professional standards and etiquette.(o) The tendency of maligning the reputationof judicial officers by disgruntled elements whofail to secure an order which they desire or whichthey expect is on the increase.(p) No latitude can be given to a litigantwho attempts to browbeat the court.(q) Sympathy in a case like this would betotally misplaced. Mercy has no meaning.(r) The Court has to be satisfied about (i)the credentials of the applicant; (ii) the primafacie correctness or nature of information givenby him; (iii) the information being not vague andindefinite. The information should show gravityand seriousness involved.(s) Courts must maintain the social balanceby interfering where necessary for the sake ofjustice and refuse to interfere where it isagainst the social interest and public good. (t) Court must be careful to see that a bodyof persons or member of the public, who approachesthe court is acting bona fide and not for personalgain or private motive or political motivation orother oblique consideration. 61. Applying the above principles, we are convinced thatthe unprecedented behaviour of the first respondent consists ofseveral facets of conduct which was unbecoming of the lawyer orAdvocate who despite authority given to him by Advocates Act isnevertheless an Officer of the Court. By attempting to influence aHon'ble Judge by getting entry into his Chambers in respect of ajudicial matter itself on the face of it a highly condemnable actapart from such conduct to be described or brought within any ofthe specified misconduct under the Bar Council of India Rules andthe Advocates Act.62. The first respondent could gain entry into the Chambersof the learned Judge mainly because of his status as Chairman ofthe State Bar Council. As a Chairman he was representing severalthousand lawyers practising in this State as well as in the Courtsin other States. Every year when fresh law graduates seek forenrolment as Lawyer, such enrolment is carried out in the BarCouncil at the behest of the Chairman and its members. We need notelaborate the high responsibility and the leadership quality to bedisplayed as the Chairman of the State Bar Council for the otherlawyers to emulate, atleast the junior members of the Bar. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

63. Apart from making an attempt to influence the learnedJudge, the letter of the learned Judge discloses that he alsoattempted to influence him by stating that some other UnionMinister wanted to talk to the learned Judge which the learnedJudge stated to have politely declined and also advised him not tomake any such attempt to interfere in the judicial administration.64. Apart from behaving in such a ruthless manner in theChambers of the learned Judge, the first respondent was stated tohave behaved, in the words of the learned Judge, in a very unrulymanner in the open Court while on behalf of the first respondentsome other counsel viz., one Mr.Masood stated to have argued theAnticipatory Bail application and in the said situation there wasno warrant for the first respondent to have interfered in theproceedings.65. Going by the words of the learned Judge, the firstrespondent stated to have persisted in his adamant behaviour inspite of the learned Judge cautioning him not to make slanderousand derogatory remarks. The first respondent stated to have alsoraised his voice and that his approach was quarrelsome towards thelearned Judge and the letter of the learned Judge also states thatin spite of the learned Judge pointing out to him having regard tohis position as Chairman of the State Bar Council, he shouldmaintain a better behaviour, he continued with his outburst andthat the same was uncontrollable and ultimately because of theextreme conduct displayed by the first respondent, the learnedJudge had to request the Hon'ble The Chief Justice to post the casebefore some other learned Judge.66. The above factors vividly explain the magnitude of thebehaviour of the first respondent towards the learned Judge, theCourt and the institution and that he was unmindful of theconsequence that would arise therefrom. Such a defiant attitudedisplayed by the first respondent only shows that he can go to anyextreme and then try to get rid of it by taking umbrage under somelegal lacuna, such as no ground made out for issuance of QuoWarranto or no scope to initiate any contempt action.67. Having noticed such an extreme conduct of the firstrespondent and having been satisfied with the factum of such aconduct displayed by him, we are of the considered opinion that itcalls for very stringent action against the first respondent touphold the majesty of law and the administration of justice.68. Having travelled thus far, now, when we examine theprayers of the petitioner, one is for issuance of writ of QuoWarranto and the other one is for issuance of writ of Mandamusdirecting the Bar Council of India, New Delhi the third respondentin W.P.No.17354 of 2009, to initiate appropriate action within atime frame against the first respondent following the decision ofthe Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 1998 (7) SCC 248 (Ajay KumarPandey, Advocate, in Re.). https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

69. Dealing with the second prayer, we feel it appropriateto refer to some of the relevant provisions of the Advocates Act,1961. 70. Under Section 2(1)(g) the 'High Court' has been definedto mean except in sub-section (1) and (1A) of Section 34 andSections 42 and 43, does not include a Court of the JudicialCommissioner, and in relation to a State Bar Council, it means inthe case of a Bar Council constituted for a State or for a Stateand one or more Union Territories, the High Court for the State.71. Under Section 6(1)(c) among the functions of the StateBar Council it includes power to entertain and determine cases ofmisconduct against advocates on its roll.72. Under Section 7(1)(f),(g) & (l), the Bar Council ofIndia's functions includes to deal with and disposal of any matterarising under this Act, which may be referred to it by the StateBar Council; to exercise general supervision and control over StateBar Councils and to perform all other functions conferred on it byor under this Act.73. Section 9 empowers the Bar Council to constitute one ormore disciplinary committees and who all can be members of suchcommittees have been set out. Under Section 10(A)(5), the mannerin which the disciplinary committee should function has been setout.74. Under Sections 35 and 36 of the Act, the disciplinarypowers of the State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India havebeen prescribed. The powers of the disciplinary committee havebeen set out under Section 42. 75. Under Section 48(B) the Bar Council of India have beengiven supernumerary powers to have control over the State BarCouncils with further power to give directions to the State BarCouncils or to any of its committees and on such directions beinggiven by the Bar Council of India it has been mandatorily ordainedupon the State Bar Councils to comply with such directions.76. By virtue of the powers contained under Section 49(1)(c) of the Act, Rules have been framed by the Bar Council of India,wherein in Chapter-II, the duties of the Advocates towards theCourt, to the client, to the opponent and to the colleagues havebeen set out in detail, apart from certain other duties and otherobligations.77. Under Chapter-III of the said Rules, the prohibitionimposed on an Advocate who has been removed by an order of theHon'ble Supreme Court or by the High Court or the Bar Council hasbeen set out. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

78. Under Part VII of the said Rules, the manner in which acomplaint and enquiry under Sections 35, 36 and 36-B of the Act areto be dealt with have been detailed.79. Keeping the above statutory provisions in mind, when weexamine the case on hand, and the prayer of the petitioner, we areconvinced that having regard to the magnitude of the misbehaviourdisplayed by the first respondent as described by us in the earlierparagraphs, we feel that appropriate directions should be issued tothe third respondent to initiate necessary disciplinary actionagainst the first respondent and proceed against him in accordancewith the relevant provisions of the Advocates Act and the BarCouncil of India Rules.80. In fact as noted by us earlier and fortunately for us,the third respondent in paragraph 16 of his counter affidavit hasexpressed an undertaking that it is ready and willing to offer allthe best co-operation for achieving due and proper administrationof justice, if this Court directs for any such action within thepurview of the provisions of the Advocates Act and the Rules framedthereunder in the interest of justice.81. When we examine the scope of issuance of such directionto the third respondent, we have to keep in mind that the firstrespondent having all along been the Chairman of the Bar Council ofTamil Nadu, it will not be appropriate to entrust the task ofproceeding against him by way of disciplinary action with the BarCouncil of Tamil Nadu. We should not be taken to mean that we havedeveloped any lack of confidence in the State Bar Council. It iswell known that justice should not only be done, but should alsoseems to be done. Noting the kind of behaviour displayed by thefirst respondent before a learned Judge of this Court, we do notwish to give any scope or room for repetition of such conductbefore a Forum where the first respondent was keeping control fromthe date he was holding office as its Chairman. Further, as notedearlier, under Section 7(1)(f),(g) and (l), the functions of theBar Council of India includes its power to deal with and dispose ofany matter arising under the Act, which may be referred to it by aState Bar Council or which it can exercise by way of generalsupervision and control over such Bar Council and also perform allother functions conferred on it by or under the Advocates Act. 82. Further Section 36(2) of the Act specifically reads asunder""36. Disciplinary powers of Bar Council ofIndia:"(1) *****(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in thisChapter, the disciplinary committee of the Bar Councilof India may, either of its own motion or on a reportby a State Bar Council or an application made to it byany person interested, withdraw for inquiry beforeitself any proceedings for disciplinary action against https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ any advocate pending before the disciplinary committeeof any State Bar Council and dispose of the same."83. The said Section 36(2) of the Act in any case providesa non-obstante clause contained in that Chapter namely Chapter-Vwhich contains Section 35 by which on its own motion or on a reportby the State Bar Council or based on an application made to it byany person interested can withdraw for enquiry before itself anyproceedings for disciplinary action against any Advocate pendingbefore the disciplinary committee of any State Bar Council anddispose of the same.84. In the event of such an exercise being made by the BarCouncil of India under Section 36(2) by virtue of Section 36(3), itis only to be observed, so far as may be, the procedure laid downin Section 35 namely the provisions which empowers the State BarCouncil to impose punishment on Advocates for misconduct.85. We are therefore, of the view that it will be moreappropriate if the task of proceeding against the first respondentby way of disciplinary action for his misbehaviour can be directedto be made by the third respondent Bar Council of India.86. Before issuing necessary directions in that respect, wealso feel it necessary to state as to why such a course has to beadopted as against the first respondent. In the earlier paragraphswe have narrated in detail as to the nature of behaviour of thefirst respondent on 12.06.2009, in the Chambers of the learnedJudge and on 29.06.2009, in the Open Court.87. In this context, when we refer to Chapter II of the BarCouncil of India Rules, under Section I, the duties of the Advocateto the Court has been mentioned. In the preamble of the saidSection I, it has been stated as under:"An advocate shall, at all times, comforthimself in a manner befitting his status as anofficer of the Court, a privileged member of thecommunity; and a gentleman, bearing in mind that whatmay be lawful and moral for a person who is not amember of the Bar, or for a member of the Bar in hisnon-professional capacity may still be improper foran advocate. Without prejudice to the generality ofthe foregoing obligation, an advocate shallfearlessly uphold the interests of his client, and inhis conduct conform to the rules hereinaftermentioned in both letter and in spirit. The ruleshereinafter mentioned contain canons of conduct andetiquette adopted as general guides; yet the specificmention thereof shall not be construed as a denial ofthe existence of other equally imperative though notspecifically mentioned."Paragraphs 1 to 3 are also relevant, which are as under:"1. An advocate shall, during thepresentation of his case and while otherwise acting https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ before a Court, conduct himself with dignity andself-respect. He shall not be servile and wheneverthere is proper ground for serious complaint againsta judicial officer, it shall be his right and dutyto submit his grievance to proper authorities.2. An advocate shall maintain towards theCourts a respectful attitude, bearing in mind thatthe dignity of the judicial office is essential forthe survival of a free community.3. An advocate shall not influence thedecision of a court by any illegal or impropermeans. Private communications with a judge relatingto a pending case are forbidden."88. We are convinced that the conduct of the firstrespondent, as narrated by the learned Judge in his letter dated02.07.2009, squarely fits into the above paragraphs as well as thepreamble. Therefore, it is imperative that the first respondenthaving behaved in such an unmindful conduct, derogatory to theinterest of the institution, it is just and necessary that thethird respondent Bar Council of India proceed against the firstrespondent by way of appropriate disciplinary action.89. We are also convinced that in the interest of public atlarge and in order to ensure that such belligerent behaviour andunbecoming conduct of an Advocate should not reoccur again beforeany Judicial Forum, it is just and proper that such a drasticaction is initiated against the first respondent.90. In order to ensure that such action directed to beinitiated is in accordance with the provisions contained under theAdvocates Act, we direct the petitioner to prefer a formalcomplaint before the State Bar Council within two weeks from thedate of receipt of a copy of this order by enclosing a copy of thisorder and simultaneously, file a copy of such complaint before thethird respondent Bar Council of India. The Bar Council of India isfurther directed to exercise its powers under Section 36(2) of theAct and withdraw to itself the complaint now directed to be made bythe petitioner before itself for enquiry and dispose of the same inthe manner set out under Section 36(3) and other relevantprovisions of the Advocates Act.91. While issuing such directions, we also deem itnecessary to pass certain other orders in order to ensure that theproceedings to be initiated against the first respondent areproceeded with without any scope of interference by the firstrespondent since the conduct of the first respondent as displayedbefore the learned Judge itself discloses that he had no respectfor law or discipline as an Advocate and having regard to the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ monstrosity of the conduct displayed by the first respondent, wefeel that while exercising power under Article 226 of theConstitution of India, we would be fully justified in issuingcertain further directions by which the first respondent should betemporarily stripped off his position as Member of the Bar Councilof Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry and consequently as its Chairman, inorder to enable the third respondent Bar Council of India toproceed with the disciplinary action against the first respondentwithout any interference as would have been done against any otherordinary Advocate. In fact Chapter-III of the Bar Council ofIndia Rules, paragraph 6 (1) & (2) discloses that such a debarmentcan be made in the interest of Justice by this Court.92. That apart, we feel that the power of this Court underArticle 226 of the Constitution of India is wide enough to givesuch a direction in public interest. In the celebrated decision ofthe Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 1976 (2) SCC 82 : 1996 (1)LLJ 274 (Rohtas Industries Limited and another Vs. RothasIndustries Staff Union and others) in paragraph 9 of the saiddecision, His Lordship Hon'ble Mr.Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer, as hethen was, in His Lordship's own inimitable style has explained thepower of this Court under Article 226 in more lucid terms whichreads as under:"9. The expansive and extraordinary power ofthe High Courts under Article 226 is as wide as theamplitude of the language used indicates and so canaffect any person — even a private individual — and beavailable for any (other) purpose — even one for whichanother remedy may exist. The amendment to Article 226in 1963 inserting Article 226 (1-A) reiterates thetargets of the writ power as inclusive of any personby the expressive reference to ‘the residence of suchperson’. But it is one thing to affirm thejurisdiction, another to authorise its free exerciselike a bull in a China shop. This Court has spelt outwise and clear restraints on the use of thisextraordinary remedy and High Courts will not gobeyond those wholesome inhibitions except where themonstrosity of the situation or other exceptionalcircumstances cry for timely judicial interdict ormandate. The mentor of law is justice and a potentdrug should be judiciously administered. Speaking incritical retrospect and portentous prospect, the writpower has, by and large, been the people’s sentinel onthe qui vive and to cut back on or liquidate thatpower may cast a peril to human rights. We hold thatthe award here is not beyond the legal reach ofArticle 226, although this power must be kept inseverely judicious leash." (Emphasis added)93. We are convinced that this is a case where this Courtwhile affirming its jurisdiction under Article 226 of theConstitution of India, in a situation the monstrosity of which has https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ been demonstrated in detail in the earlier paragraphs of thisorder, it has become imperative for this Court to issue suchdirections that would meet the ends of Justice. With that view, wedeem it appropriate to suspend the first respondent's status asMember and consequently as Chairman of the Bar Council of TamilNadu and Pondicherry, pending final orders to be passed by thethird respondent Bar Council of India.94. As far as the issuance of writ of Quo Warranto isconcerned, having regard to the directions which we have issued inthis order, we are of the view that there is no necessity forissuing any other order in that writ petition. For the very samereason, we also deem it unnecessary for initiating any contemptaction against the first respondent and also for the reason thatthe directions issued by us in W.P.No.17354 of 2009, wouldsufficiently safeguard the interest of the institution namely theJudiciary and would fulfil the requirements. However, it shouldnot be taken to mean that no contempt action is called for. It isone thing to say that the conduct of a person amounts to contemptof Court and another to say that a conduct as found establishedcalls for much more stringent action than by way of contemptaction. Having regard to the other order passed and directionsissued, we are not now inclined to take any proceedings forcontempt. 95. In fine, these writ petitions are disposed of with thefollowing directions to the petitioner, the Bar Council of TamilNadu and the third respondent viz.,:(a) The petitioner shall file a formalcomplaint along with a copy of this order beforethe Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry,within two weeks, from the date of receipt of acopy of this order;(b) The petitioner shall file a copy of thesaid complaint with the third respondent BarCouncil of India simultaneously;(c) The third respondent Bar Council ofIndia is directed to withdraw the complaint filedas directed before the Bar Council of Tamil Naduand Pondicherry to its file in exercise of itspower under Section 36(2) and (3) of the AdvocatesAct and dispose of the same in accordance with law;(d) The first respondent's status as Memberand consequently as Chairman of the Bar Council ofTamil Nadu and Pondicherry shall stand suspendedforthwith and he shall not be permitted by theState Bar Council to function as such pendingdisposal of the disciplinary action by the thirdrespondent Bar Council of India; https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (e) The production of a copy of this ordershall be sufficient for the respondents herein andall concerned to comply with the directionscontained in this order; and(f) The letter written by the learned Judgeshall be kept under the custody of the RegistrarGeneral of this Court in a sealed cover which shallhowever form part of the record of these two writpetitions.96. In the light of the above directions, no orders arenecessary in the connected miscellaneous petitions and the same areclosed. There will be no order as to Costs.Sd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.RegistrarkkTo1.The Chairman, Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry, High Court, Madras – 104. 2. The Registrar General, High Court of Madras, Madras – 104. 3. The Chairman, Bar Council of India, New Delhi.2 cc To Mr.Elephan G.Rajendran, Advocate, SR.87204.1 cc To Mr.R.Parthiban, Advocate, SR.87242.W.P Nos.17353 of 2009,17354 of 2009 and connected M.Ps PKB(CO)RVL 07.12.2010