Arun Kumar Mondal v. Hagru Gorain & Ors.

(Senior Division), Purulia in Title Suit No.76 of 2012, the defendants preferred the an appeal being Title Appeal No.58 of 2014 (147 of 14) before the Learned Additional District Judge, 1st Court, Purulia.

#11. By a judgment and order dated 26.02.2015 the Learned First Appellate Court allowed the aforesaid Title Appeal on contest against respondent no.1 and proforma respondent Nos.3 to 7, and ex parte against respondent no. 2, thereby setting aside the judgment and decree dated

26.09.2013 passed by the Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Purulia in Title Suit No.76 of 2012.

#12. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree dated 26th February, 2015 passed by the Learned Additional District Judge, 1st Court, Purulia in Title Appeal No.58 of 2014, reversing the judgment and decree dated 26th September, 2013 passed by the Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Purulia in Title Suit No.76 of 2012, the appellant preferred the instant second appeal before this Court on the grounds stated in the memorandum of appeal.

#13. Vide an order dated 02.05.2016, a Division Bench of this Court was pleased to admit the instant second appeal, being S.A.T. 172 of 2015 with CAN 606 of 2016, on the following substantial questions of law:- i. Whether the findings of the learned First Appellate Court that the description of the suit property is vague and decree for declaration of title in respect of the suit property cannot be passed due to vagueness in its description, are perverse? 8 ii. Whether the learned First Appellate Court was justified in refusing to grant decree for recovery of possession in a case where the title of the plaintiff is proved but his possession could not be proved in a suit where relief by way of confirmation of possession was sought for by the plaintiff?

#14. The Learned Advocate representing the appellant submitted as follows:- i.“Whether the Learned Judge of the Court of appeal below committed substantial error of law in not holding that record of rights, Exbt. B produced and relied upon by defendants are fabricated document on the face of it particularly in view of the fact that some portion of the said Exbt. B is handwritten thereby showing the same to be manufactured for the evil purpose of the defendants/respondents. ii. Whether the Learned Judge of the Court of appeal below committed substantial error of law in not holding the document Exbt. B produced by the defendants is a fabricated document on the face of it and as such no reliance can be placed on the same by the Court of appeal below in the absence of any specific explanation as to the portion of the said Khatian Exbt. B is hand written. iii. Whether the Learned Judge of the Court of appeal below committed substantial error of law in not holding that Exbt. 1 establishes purchase of CS Plot No. 2816 which corresponds to RS Plot No. 3057 particularly in view of the fact that C.S. Plot No. 2816 is identical in area with RS Plot No. 3057 and the reference of RS plot 3047 is nothing but a mistake appearing on the face of the record of rights. 9 iv. Whether the Learned Judge of the Court of appeal below committed substantial error of law in not taking into consideration the fact that no challenge has been thrown by and on behalf of the defendants regarding purchase of the CS Plot No. 2816 by the plaintiff from Tinkari and the area of land purchased by the plaintiff remain unchallenged by the defendants/respondents. v. Whether the Learned Judge of the Court of appeal below committed substantial error of in holding that plaintiff purchased the land comprised in Plot No. 3047 measuring only 9 decimal keeping the remaining area over and above 9 decimal owned by daughter of Tinkari, defendant/respondent no.6 which was sold by her in favour of defendants/respondents no. 1-5. vi. Whether the Learned Judge of the Court of appeal below erred in not holding that defendant/respondent no.6 daughter of Tinkari, did not possess saleable interest in respect of land over and above the 9 decimals particularly when Tinkari in effect sold total 1.40 acres out of 9.20 acre comprised in CS Dag No. 2816. vii. Whether the Learned Judge of the Court of appeal below committed substantial error of law in not holding that plaintiff in effect purchased the area mentioned in Exbt. I comprised in CS Plot 2816 when it could not be established that the area of CS Plot No. 2816 was never measuring area as mentioned in the said document Exbt.I. viii. Whether the Learned Judge of the Court of appeal below committed substantial error of law in not holding that plaintiff could 10 establish his possession of 1.40 acre land comprised in CS Plot No. 2816 by overwhelming evidence on record when on the other hand defendants miserably failed to establish their possession on the land sold by Tinkari in favour of the plaintiff by Exbt.1. ix. Whether the Learned Judge of Court of appeal below committed substantial error of law in not holding that mere error appearing in the ROR, Exbt.-B cannot affect the title of the plaintiff conveyed in his favour by Exbt.I. x. Whether the Learned Judge of Court of appeal below committed substantial error of law in not holding that mere error appearing in the ROR Exbt.-B cannot affect the title of the plaintiff conveyed in his favour by Exbt.I. xi. Whether the Learned Judge of the Court of appeal below committed substantial error of law in holding that suit is not maintainable in view of Section 34 of Specific Relief Act notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff/appellant is in possession of the property which is wrongly held otherwise. xii. Whether the Learned Judge of the Court of appeal below committed substantial error of law in not holding that retaining name of Tinkari after the sale made by him in favour of plaintiff cannot confer any right upon the heirs of Tinkari as to possession of saleable interest by them. xiii. Whether the Learned Judge of the Court of appeal below committed substantial error of law in not holding that RS Plot No. 11 804 3057 and Cs Plot No. 2816 are same and identical in area but, was otherwise shown in RS ROR and CS ROR respectively.”

#15. The Learned Advocate representing the appellant further submitted as follows:- i. “CS Plot No. 2816 measuring about 9 acres 20 decimal in Mouza- Pithati, P.S.- Arsha, District- Purulia, originally belonged Rashbehari and Durgacharan Banerjee. On 12.10.1931 a partition deed was executed between Rashbehari and Durgacharan Banerjee; Rashbehari got 8 acres 42 decimal and Durgacharan Banerjee got 78 decimal of land (Exhibit 1/B). On 27.01.1959 Rashbehari sold out 8 acres 42 decimal to Tinkari Chakraborty and his four brothers and one sister (Exhibit 1/A); all of them having equal share in the share property i.e. 1/6th share. Thus the share of Tinkari in the said C.S. plot no. 2816 was 1.40 acres only (8 acre 42 decimal / 6 = 1 acre 40 decimal approx.). In 1966 Tinkari got his name mutated in the RSROR prepared under the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953. However, there remained an error in the RROR i.e. CS Dag No. 2816 was wrongly recorded as RS Plot No. 3047, instead of 3057. Due to such erroneous RROR a dispute cropped up between Tinkari Chakraborty and the heirs of Durgacharan Banerjee for which Tinkari along with his brothers/ co-sharers instituted a title suit being Title Suit No. 32 of 1980 inter- alia praying for (a) decree of declaration of right title interest, (b) declaration that the RS record of rights is 10.03.2022 interim order 12 of status-quo dated May 2, 2016, was made absolute by this Hon'ble Court. ii. While admitting the instant appeal the Hon'ble Court formed two substantial question of law. In reply to the first substantial question of law the plaintiff/ appellant submits that it is settled principle of law that the record of rights is not a title document. So the wrong entry in record of rights does not confer any title neither to the contesting defendants no. 1-5 nor their predecessor -in -interest. Moreover, the father of the vendor of the defendants no. 1-5 namely Tinkari Chakraborty himself filed title suit inter alia praying for declaration that the RS record of rights was incorrect and not binding upon the plaintiffs and permanent injunction being T.S. No. 32 of 1980. The suit decreed in 1982. The decree of the T.S.No. 32 of 1980 is an exhibited document being Exhibit No. 2 which clearly stated that “It is further declared that entries in R.S. Record of Rights in connection with suit schedule no. 3 properties are erroneous and not binding on the plaintiffs”. The C.S. Plot No. 2816 comes under the schedule no. 3 property in T.S. No. 32 of 1980. After getting the decree the father of defendant no. 6 Tinkari sold his entire 1/6th share in the property i.e. 1 acre 40 decimal to the plaintiff/ appellant in 1983 who duly got his name recorded in the LRROR and this time the correction was made by the state authority and correct L.R Plot No. i.e. 3057 was recorded in favour of the plaintiff (Exhibit-4A). Therefore there is no vagueness in the description of the suit property, C.S plot no. 2816 wrongly recorded 13 in the RROR as plot no. 3047 instead of 3057. Such wrong entries in the RSROR was declared by the competent civil court as incorrect and not binding on the parties. Thereafter correction made in the ROR and ultimately CS Plot No. 2816 reconfigured as LR Plot No. 3057 and correct LRROR was finally published having the name of the plaintiff/ appellant in LR Plot No. 3057 to the extent of 0.1667 share with area in possession 1 acre 40 decimal (Exhibit 4A). It is also be noted that LR record of rights having had finally published the court should not have entered into the dispute in view of clear bar under Section 51C of the WBLR Act as amended. Be it also mentioned that LR plot no 3047 (Exhibit 4) is a very small plot having only 9 decimal area and such small land neither curved out from CS plot no. 2816 nor plaintiff has any claim over that said plot. iii. In this context one case reference being AIR 1967 Cal 10 is being referred here where the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta held that presumption of accuracy of the record or rights under Section 103b of the Bengal Tenancy Act and Section 44(4) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act does not apply after a civil court decision is res judicata and binding on the parties. In this case also after declaring that RROR prepared under the WBEA Act was erroneous and not binding upon the parties by the competent Civil Court, the wrong entry in the RROR is not binding upon the plaintiff/ appellant herein. iv. Moreover, Exhibit - 1 i.e. the purchase deed of the plaintiff executed in 1983 clearly mentioned CS Plot No. 2816 which means that 14 Tinkari had an intention and sold out 1 acre 40 decimal land in CS plot no. 2816 to the plaintiff. Defendant no, 1 was a witness to this deed. Therefore the factum of sale was not unknown to the defendants. But only taking aid of wrong RSROR DW-1 in cross examination dated 24.06.2013 stated that plaintiff purchased land from Tinkari. DW-1 also stated that corresponding CS plot was

#2816. After such admission in evidence there barely leaves any doubt regarding the ownership of the plaintiff in the suit plot. DW2 also confirmed the possession of the plaintiff over the suit property. v. In this context one case is being referred reported in 2021 Supreme (SC) 975 Akkamma and Ors. Vs. Vemavathi and Ors. Where the Hon'ble Apex Court held that when the trial court found that plaintiff is the owner of the suit property the court should have decreed the title of the plaintiff because there is no bar in granting standalone declaratory decree. vi. On the contrary, the defendants no. 1-5/ respondents made contradictory statements in their written statement. In paragraph no. 12 of the written statement the defendants claimed that Tinkari was the owner of 1.40 acres of land but in paragraphs no. 23 and 29 claimed that Tinkari was the owner of 2.80 acres of land. Such contrary statement was made only to establish that even after selling of 1.40 acre to the plaintiff in 1983, Tinkari had saleable interest over 1.40 acre of land in RS plot no. 3047. But Exhibit-1A i.e. the title deed of Tinkari and others and Exhibit 3 i.e. RSROR of Tinkari clearly showed that Tinkari had only undividable interest to 15 the extent of 1/6th share in the suit property which was 1.40 acre of land only and not more than that. In this context it is reiterated by the plaintiff/ appellant that RSROR since been declared erroneous and not binding upon the parties at the instance of Tinkari's civil suit, the defendants should not get any advantage by mentioning erroneous RSROR. vii. It is also to be noted that Exhibit B filed by the contesting defendants is a forged document on the face of it. Thus Exhibit B should not have been taken into consideration. Exhibit-B is the plot information belonged to Gopal Prasad Kuiri, defendant/ respondent no. 5 herein. The original printed plot information contained only 3 plots. But defendants wrote LR Dag No. 3057 in hand with red ink along with two other plots but this attempt is a great failure because other information relating to the defendant no.5's lands were also mis-matching. Such type of forged document ought not to have been admitted in evidence specially in absence of proper attestation of the issuing authority or deposition of the issuing authority as an witness to that effect. Exhibit-A i.e. the title deed of the defendants, did not contain any detail of how Parul Chakraborty, defendant no. 6 herein, got the suit property. Recital was totally silent on that point. The contents of the defendants' deed and the contents of written statement are contrary to each other. In the deed no where it is stated that Tinkari had title and possession over 2.40 acres of land in the suit plot. Therefore defendants' exhibited documents do not going to help the defendants' / respondents' case.”

#16. The Learned Advocate representing the respondents submitted as 16 follows:- i. “Maintainability of Suit:- The plaintiff's suit is fundamentally defective and liable to be dismissed for want of definite property description. The suit property, as described in Schedule 2 of the plaint, identification by boundaries, which is essential in a declaratory and injunctive relief suit involving immovable property. As held in Sheodhyan Singh v.Sanichara Kuer (AIR 1963 SC 1879), identity of property is crucial, and omission of boundaries renders the decree unenforceable. ii. Incorrect Plot Number in Deed:- The plaintiff’s title deed (Exbt. 1) cites R.S. Plot No. 3047 as the subject of sale. However, the reliefs claimed relate entirely to R.S. Plot No. 3057. There is no correction deed, amendment, rectification, or competent authority's clarification to support the plaintiff's assertion that this was a clerical error. iii. No Evidence of Plot Conversion:- The plaintiff failed to produce any certified conversion map, revenue records, or official documents demonstrating that C.S. Plot No. 2816 was ever converted to R.S. Plot No. 3057. The Revenue Records (Exbt.3 and Exbt. 4A) consistently show R.S. Plot No. 3047 as corresponding to C.S. Plot No. 2816. iv. Presumption in Favour of Official Records:- 17 Under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, certified Record of Rights entries carry a presumption of correctness. Ext. B (ROR) produced by the respondents shows their lawful ownership and possession. The plaintiff has neither challenged nor rebutted this by summoning any settlement official or adducing conclusive evidence of error. v. Failure to Establish Title:- It is trite that in a suit for declaration of title, the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of the defendant's case M/S Roy and Company and Another us. Smt. Nanibala Dey and Others (AIR 1979 Cal. 50). The plaintiff's sale deed is self-defeating as it refers to a plot different from the one in dispute. vi. Lack of Proof of Possession:- The plaintiff has not examined any independent witness to support his claim of long-standing possession. His own testimony remains uncorroborated, vague, and lacking in specifics such as actual possession date, land use, or delivery of possession post-sale. vii. Credible Evidence of Respondents' Possession:- On the other hand, D.W.2, a cultivator of the land, categorically deposed that the respondents have been in possession of R.S. Plot No.3057. He denied any possession by the plaintiff and explained that the land is used by multiple parties including the respondents. viii. Legality of Respondents' Purchase:- The respondents purchased the suit land by Regd. Deed No. 90/2012 from Smt. Parul Chakraborty, the only daughter and legal heir of 18 Late Tinkari Chakraborty. There is no material to show that Parul was divested of title or that Tinkari had exhausted his rights over R.S. Plot No. 3057. ix. No Proof of Partition:-The plaintiff claims that Tinkari became sole owner of the disputed property after a family partition. However, no partition deed, memorandum, or decree has been exhibited. Mere oral assertion of partition is insufficient, particularly post-enactment of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. x. Ambiguity in Land Area and Boundaries:- The plaintiff inconsistently refers to the land area as 8.42 acres, 9.20 acres, and 1.40 acres in different parts of the plaint and evidence. The absence of specific boundaries and the shifting area figures cast serious doubt on the identity of the suit land. xi. Suit Barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963:- The plaintiff has prayed only for declaration of title and confirmation of possession but has failed to pray for permanent injunction. The proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 mandates that no declaration shall be made if consequential relief is omitted. Hence, the suit is legally barred and that has to be considered. Injunction constitutes a further or consequential relief within the meaning provision (C_Mohammed Yunus v. Syed_Unissa_and_Ors., AIR 1961 SC 808). Consequently, the suit is barred under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. xii. No Prayer Against Proforma Defendants:- 19 Although several government officials have been impleaded as proforma defendants, no relief has been claimed against them. Further, no statutory notice under Section 80 CPC was served upon them. The suit is procedurally defective as against such parties. No leave was obtained under Section 80(2) CPC prior to filing suit against them. xiii. Failure to Corroborate Exhibits:- Exbt. 1 does not contain clear boundaries, mutation details, or confirmation of delivery of possession. Furthermore, the land area allegedly transferred is inconsistent with the plot area shown in the ROR. The deed cannot establish valid title under such circumstances. xiv. Effect of Subsequent Settlement Records:- Later records (Exbt. 4A and B) reflect respondents' names in the khatian with respect to R.S. Plot No. 3057. These are final and conclusive unless challenged through revenue or judicial proceedings, which the plaintiff has not done. xv. Admissions by Plaintiff:- In cross-examination, P.W.1 admitted that he could not state the exact area purchased or the date of possession. He also admitted that other persons were in possession of parts of R.S. Plot No. 3057. These admissions undermine his case. xvi. Trial Court's Presumption Unfounded:- The Learned Trial Court erroneously relied on a so-called "information slip" to infer that R.S. Plot No. 3057 was intended instead of 3047. 20 This is a speculative and impermissible inference not grounded in law or evidence. xvii. No Expert or Official Witness Examined:- The plaintiff did not summon any official from the Settlement or Land Records department to prove the alleged clerical error or misrecording in plot numbers. In a title suit involving land records, such omission is fatal. xviii. Respondents' Title Independent and Lawful:- Even assuming, without admitting, that the plaintiff had purchased a portion of the suit land, the respondents' title stems from a separate and lawful source - being inheritance through Parul Chakraborty, followed by registered conveyance. There is no contradiction or overlap proved. xix. No Estoppel Against Respondents:- The plaintiff has attempted to rely on alleged admissions by defendants to establish title. However, under Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, estoppel cannot override statutory title or ownership unless reliance and prejudice are proved - which is absent in this case. xx. No Substantial Question of Law:- The grounds urged in the Second Appeal pertain purely to factual appreciation of evidence, not to interpretation of any substantial question of law. As per settled law under Section 100 CPC (Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, AIR 1999 SC 2213), 21 interference by the Hon'ble High Court is not warranted in pure findings of fact. xxi. Failure to Challenge ROR Entries Judicially:- The plaintiff never initiated any proceeding under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act or any other statute in force at the relevant point of time to rectify the alleged error in the Record of Rights. A person alleging clerical error has a legal remedy but must follow due process. The plaintiff's omission to do so casts serious doubt on his claims. xxii. Absence of Boundary Map or Survey Plan:- The plaintiff has not annexed any certified survey plan or sketch map identifying the precise location of the 1.40 acres he claims. This omission is critical in a title suit, particularly when plot identity is contested. xxiii. Deed Without Delivery of Possession Is Incomplete Transfer:- Even assuming the 1983 deed refers to some land, there is no proof that possession was ever delivered. Under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, delivery of possession is an essential element unless possession is already with the transferee. xxiv. Silence from Co-Sharers of Tinkari:- The plaintiff relies on an oral partition among Tinkari and his co- sharers. Yet none of those other co-sharers have come forward to support his version. This absence undermines the alleged exclusive ownership of Tinkari over the suit land. xxv. Contradictory Area in Schedule and Evidence:- 22 The plaint refers to 1.40 acres out of 8.42 acres in Schedule 2, whereas ROR shows Plot No. 3047 contains only 9 decimals. The remaining area must belong to someone else. The plaintiff's silence on the rest of the plot and its owners exposes the vagueness of his claim. xxvi. Estoppel from Denying Parul's Title:- The plaintiff failed to challenge the registered deed executed by Parul Chakraborty in 2012 before any court of competent jurisdiction. He cannot now collaterally impeach a registered deed in a suit filed years later. xxvii. No Injunction or Possession Complaint Filed Earlier:- Despite allegedly being dispossessed in April 2012, the plaintiff did not file any complaint under Sections 144 or 145 CrPC, or any application for temporary injunction until much later. This delay raises doubt about his actual possession. xxviii. Doctrine of Laches and Acquiescence:- The plaintiff sat idle for nearly three decades after the execution of the 1983 sale deed, during which he did not assert his rights actively. His inaction attracts the doctrine of laches and acquiescence, particularly when others have taken possession in the meantime. xxix. Conduct of the Plaintiff Suggests Afterthought:- The plea that the wrong plot number was recorded is raised only after the 2012 sale by Parul to the respondents. This appears to be 23 a retaliatory or afterthought strategy, rather than a bona fide title claim. xxx. The Plaintiff's Evidence is Self-Serving:- Apart from P.W.1 (the plaintiff himself, no neutral or independent witness has been produced to corroborate title or possession. Courts routinely disbelieve self-serving and uncorroborated statements. xxxi. Principle of Finality of First Appellate Findings:- The First Appellate Court, being the final court on facts, has reversed the decree of the trial court after evaluating all evidence. Its findings are reasoned and supported by the record. There is no perversity or illegality to warrant High Court interference under Section 100 CPC. xxxii. Equity Not in Plaintiff's Favour:- The respondents have been in settled possession, having purchased the land with defined boundaries and consideration from the legal heir of the previous owner. Equitable relief like declaration or injunction cannot be granted to the detriment of bona fide purchasers in possession.”

#17. The foundational matrix of the plaintiff/appellant's claim traces its legal genesis back to a large parent estate designated as Cadastral Survey (C.S.) Plot No.2816, encompassing an area of 8.42 acres out of a total

9.20 acres, classified as danga (arid upland) land, situated within Mouza- Pithati, under Arsha Police Station in the District of Purulia. This extensive property originally reposed in the joint ownership of two co- sharers, Rashbihari Banerjee and Durgacharan Banerjee. 24

#18. The unity of possession between these co-owners was permanently and fundamentally severed on October 13, 1931, through the execution and registration of a formal deed of partition (Exhibit 1/B). By virtue of this partition, the specific 8.42-acre parcel was exclusively allotted to Rashbihari Banerjee, who entered independent possession, completely unconcerned with the residual shares of Durgacharan.

#19. Decades later, on January 27, 1959, Rashbihari Banerjee alienated his entire partitioned interest of 8.42 acres via a registered deed of sale bearing No.271 (Exhibit 1/A) in favor of Tinkari Chakraborty and his four brothers. By operation of the law governing joint family acquisitions without defined individual fractions, this purchase translated into an undivided one-sixth (1/6th) fractional interest for each of the brothers. This mathematically isolated Tinkari Chakraborty’s lawful, individual entitlement to an area computing to exactly 1.40 acres.

#20. While these brothers were in active, peaceable, and visible physical possession of their purchased land, the state’s settlement apparatus committed a clerical error during the Estates Acquisition operation in

#1966. The settlement clerks incorrectly recorded the ancestral C.S. Plot No.2816 under the nomenclature of Revisional Settlement (R.S.) Plot No.3047 instead of its geographically and mathematically accurate counterpart, R.S. Plot No.3057. Aggrieved by this erroneous revenue entry, which cast an administrative cloud over their title, Tinkari Chakraborty and his brothers instituted a civil suit, registered as Title Suit No.32 of 1980, against the heirs of Durgacharan Banerjee and the State. This prior litigation concluded in favor of the Chakraborty brothers, 25 with the competent civil court explicitly decreeing in 1982 (Exhibit 2) that the entries in the R.S. Record of Rights swapping the plot identifiers were entirely incorrect, void, and fundamentally non-binding.

#21. Following this judicial vindication, Tinkari Chakraborty and his co- sharers entered into an amicable partition to divide their landed properties, through which Tinkari was exclusively allotted the specific land identified as the Schedule-1 property. Holding absolute title, Tinkari subsequently transferred a portion of this land, designated as the Schedule-2 property (measuring 1.40 acres), to the present plaintiff by executing a registered deed of sale bearing No.2159 on February 23, 1983 (Exhibit 1). Notably, this transaction was executed in the direct presence of Defendant No. 1, who acted as an attesting witness to the deed.

#22. From the exact date of purchase, the plaintiff asserts he maintained exclusive, continuous, and independent physical possession. Later, during the Land Reforms operation, the revenue records were partially corrected to seamlessly reflect the plaintiff's name as the lawful owner under Land Reforms (L.R.) Plot No.3057 to the extent of a 0.1667 share, reflecting an area of 1 acre and 40 decimals (Exhibit 4A).

#23. The peaceable enjoyment of this property was abruptly disrupted on April 14, 2012, when the principal defendants began executing overt acts of disturbance against the plaintiff’s possession. These defendants asserted a competing right to the land, claiming they had purchased the suit property from Defendant No. 6, Parul Chakraborty – alleged to be the daughter of Tinkari Chakraborty – under a sale deed dated January 13, 2012 (Exhibit A). 26

#24. The plaintiff fiercely rejects this competing claim, branding the 2012 deed as a fraudulent, collusive paper transaction carrying no legal weight. The plaintiff argues that since Tinkari Chakraborty had already divested himself of all rights, title, and interest by selling the property to the plaintiff back in 1983, no subsequent heir could possess any residual legal authority to alienate or transfer the property a second time. Because this deceptive 2012 transaction cast a serious cloud over the plaintiff’s title, the plaintiff was forced to approach the court for comprehensive legal redress.

#25. The principal defendants emphatically challenged the maintainability of the proceedings. They contended that the suit suffered from a fatal infraction of procedural safeguards, specifically the absence of a mandatory pre-suit notice under Section 80(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure upon the State of West Bengal, which was impleaded as a proforma defendant. They argued this omission rendered the plaint liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11. Furthermore, a substantial defect of parties was articulated, highlighting that the plaintiff failed to implead other recorded tenants holding distinct interests in respect of R.S. Plot No.3057.

#26. The crux of the defence pertained to the description of the suit property, which the defendants asserted was fundamentally vague, unspecific, and legally non-est. It was their specific contention that the plaintiff allegedly purchased an undemarcated portion of land without possessing actual knowledge, authority, or physical identity over R.S. Plot No. 3057, as 27 Schedule II of the plaint was completely devoid of any specific four-corner boundary specifications.

#27. In contrast, the defendants traced what they claimed to be a legitimate trajectory of title originating from Tinkari Chakraborty, who they alleged held lawful possession over a comprehensive 1.40-acre block spanning R.S. Plot Nos.332, 350, and 3057. Upon his demise, they asserted the property devolved upon his daughter, Parul Chakraborty, who by dint of a registered sale deed with strictly defined boundaries, validly transferred the same to the answering defendants in 2012. The defendants explicitly imputed a motive of willful manipulation, alleging that the plaintiff, by executing a deed in 1983 that referred to R.S. Plot No.3047, engaged in a design to improperly insert his name into the Record of Rights during its preparation under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act.

#28. The arguments articulated by the learned Advocate for the appellant unfold a compelling and richly detailed narrative of title, meticulously structured to dismantle the findings of the courts below by demonstrating a seamless convergence of registered conveyances, prior judicial declarations, and rectified revenue records.

#29. The crux of the present litigation, as the learned Counsel elucidated did not emerge from any intrinsic defect in the root of title, but rather from a clerical aberration committed by the State’s revenue department. In the year 1966, when Tinkari Chakraborty sought to mutate his name in the Revised Survey Record of Rights (RSROR) prepared under the statutory framework of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, a structural error corrupted the State repository; the revenue authorities wrongly 28 recorded the ancestral CS Plot No.2816 as RS Plot No.3047, instead of its mathematically and geographically correct counterpart, RS Plot No.3057. Taking opportunistic advantage of this bureaucratic oversight, the heirs of Durgacharan Banerjee sparked a bitter property dispute. To clear the cloud cast upon his legitimate ownership, Tinkari Chakraborty, alongside his sibling co-sharers, instituted Title Suit No.32 of 1980 before a competent Civil Court, praying inter alia for a decree of declaration of right, title, and interest, and a specific declaration that the RS entries were erroneous. This litigation culminated in a landmark civil court decree in the year 1982 (Exhibit 2), which explicitly adjudicated that the entries in the R.S. Record of Rights concerning the suit schedule properties were entirely incorrect, void and fundamentally non-binding upon the plaintiffs.

#30. Armed with this clear, judicially vindicated title, Tinkari Chakraborty subsequently alienated his entire undivided (1/6th) share – the pristine 1 acre and 40 decimals – to the present plaintiff/appellant by executing a registered deed of purchase in the year 1983 (Exhibit 1). Following this conveyance, the appellant successfully set the machinery of the West Bengal Land Reforms (WBLR) Act in motion to permanently rectify the historical mapping error. The State Revenue Authorities, acting in consonance with the prior Civil Court decree, reconfigured the parent CS Plot No.2816 into the newly designated LR Plot No.3057. The final Land Reforms Record of Rights (LRROR) was subsequently published, officially registering the plaintiff/appellant's name under LR Plot No.3057 to the exact extent of a 0.1667 share, reflecting an area in physical possession of 29 1 acre and 40 decimals (Exhibit 4A). The learned Advocate for the appellant emphasizes this finalized LR record of rights attracts the absolute statutory bar under Section 51C of the WBLR Act, which expressly deprives civil courts of jurisdiction to entertain disputes that alter finalized revenue maps and records. To further eliminate any lingering ambiguity, Counsel clarifies that RS Plot No.3047 (Exhibit 4) is an isolated, minuscule parcel of land measuring a mere 9 decimals; it was never carved out of CS Plot No.2816, and the plaintiff sets up no claim over it whatsoever, rendering the respondents' reliance on it entirely irrelevant.

#31. The legal jurisprudence underpinning the appellant's submissions rests upon the unassailable principle that a record of rights is a mere tool for revenue collection and possesses no inherent character of a title document. Consequently, an erroneous entry within such records can neither confer a valid title upon the contesting defendants (No. 1 to 5) nor strip the rightful purchaser of his lawful estate. Invoking the classic authority of AIR 1967 Cal 10, the learned Counsel underscores the rule that any statutory presumption of correctness attached to revenue records under Section 103b of the Bengal Tenancy Act or Section 44(4) of the WBEA Act instantly evaporates the moment a competent Civil Court delivers a definitive declaration on title, establishing the civil decree as res judicata and binding upon the parties. Furthermore, drawing structural strength from the Apex Court's dictum in Akkamma and Ors. Vs. Vemavathi and Ors. (2021) Supreme (SC) 975, it is urged that when a trial court finds a plaintiff to be the true owner of the suit property, it is under 30 a judicial obligation to decree the suit, as there is no legal impediment to granting a standalone declaratory decree.

#32. In stark contrast, the defence erected by the contesting respondents is exposed as a fragile edifice compromised by profound internal contradictions and procedural manipulation. The learned Advocate reveals a fatal dichotomy within the defendants' pleadings, demonstrating that while paragraph 12 of their written statement concedes that Tinkari Chakraborty was the owner of only 1.40 acres of land, paragraphs 23 and 29 abruptly shift positions to claim that Tinkari owned 2.80 acres. This clumsy, mathematically impossible inflation was clearly manufactured to invent a fictitious residual "saleable interest" over RS Plot No.3047, in a desperate bid to argue that Tinkari still had land left to pass on to them after his 1983 transaction with the plaintiff. This defensive posture completely disintegrated during oral evidence; in a cross-examination dated June 24, 2013, Defendant Witness 1 (DW-1) explicitly admitted that the plaintiff had indeed purchased the land from Tinkari and that the corresponding cadastral plot was 2816, while defendant witness-2 (DW-2) unequivocally corroborated the plaintiff's uninterrupted physical possession over the suit property.

#33. To conclusively seal the fate of the defence, the Learned Advocate for the appellant directs this Court's attention to Exhibit B, a plot information sheet filed by respondent no.5, Gopal Prasad Kuiri, branding it a manifest forgery on its face. The original printed document generated by the state authorities contained only three plots, but the defendants fraudulently inserted "LR Dag No. 3057" by hand using red ink. Devoid of any official 31 attestation by an issuing authority, and utterly contradicted by the mismatching land descriptions of respondent no. 5's actual holdings, this tainted document ought to have been rejected out of hand. When juxtaposed against the defendants' own title deed (Exhibit A), which remains completely silent as to how defendant no. 6, Parul Chakraborty, ever legally acquired the suit property from Tinkari, the respondents’ claims are revealed to be legally impotent. In light of this exhaustive array of registered title deeds, an unassailable 1982 civil decree, and the explicit admissions elicited from the defendants' own witnesses, the Learned Counsel implores this Court to sweep aside the erroneous findings of the Courts below and decree the suit in favor of the appellant.

#34. The submissions advanced by the Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents present an exhaustive and meticulously woven tapestry of law and fact, seeking to fortify the reversing judgment of the First Appellate Court by demonstrating an absolute failure on the part of the plaintiff to satisfy the fundamental legal and evidentiary criteria governing actions for the declaration of title and recovery of possession. The respondents strenuously contend that the plaintiff’s suit is fatally hit by an irremediable vagueness in the description of the subject matter, rendering the action entirely unmaintainable. It is pointed out that the property set forth in Schedule II of the plaint is conspicuously devoid of any boundary specifications or dimensional delineations, a structural omission that directly contravenes the mandate of Order VII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Relying upon the authoritative dictum of the Supreme Court in Sheodhyan Singh v. Sanichara Kuer (AIR 1963 SC 32 1879), the respondents urge that where a claim for immovable property is contested, the boundaries must be established with definitive certainty, as an omission of boundaries inevitably renders any subsequent decree a brutum fulmen, entirely incapable of execution on the ground.

#35. The Learned Counsel further exposes a fundamental, self-defeating contradiction between the plaintiff's foundational title document and the reliefs sought in the plaint. The plaintiff's registered purchase deed of 1983, marked as Exhibit 1, explicitly and unambiguously names RS Plot No.3047 as the demised property, yet the plaintiff has sought a declaration of right, title, and interest over an entirely different parcel, namely RS Plot No.3057, without the support of any registered deed of rectification. The respondents argue that it is an axiomatic principle of the law of conveyancing that a party cannot claim title to a plot that is completely alien to the four corners of his title deed.

#36. The evidentiary structure of the plaintiff’s case is further assailed for its total reliance on unauthenticated, secondary documentation to establish the alleged transformation of plots. The respondents highlight the plaintiff has failed to produce any certified conversion map, revenue records or official layout plan prepared by the settlement authorities to show that Cadastral Survey (CS) Plot No.2816 was ever structurally reconfigured into RS Plot No. 3057. On the contrary, the revenue records exhibited by the parties consistently negative this theory. Under the provisions of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, the entries in a finally published Record of Rights enjoy a statutory presumption of correctness. The plot information sheets, including Exhibit B, stand as an un-rebutted 33 reflection of the respondents' proprietary interest. Invoking the settled principle enunciated by the Calcutta High Court in M/S Roy and Company and Another v. Smt. Nanibala Dey and Others (AIR 1979 Cal. 50), it is urged that in a suit for declaration of title, the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own title rather than the weakness of the defence, rendering the plaintiff’s reliance on a sale deed that refers to an entirely different plot inherently self-defeating.

#37. The respondents further contend the plaintiff's case founders upon the rock of actual physical possession. A critical examination of the record reveals that the plaintiff did not examine a single independent witness from the locality, such as contiguous owners or village elders, to corroborate his claim of continuous physical enjoyment or to fix the date of his alleged dispossession in April 2012. Conversely, the defence has brought forward the compelling, consistent testimony of DW-2, an actual cultivator of the soil, who categorically deposed that it is the respondents who are in settled, open, and uninterrupted physical possession of RS Plot No.3057, utilizing the land to the absolute exclusion of the plaintiff. The respondents' possessory and proprietary rights are rooted in a valid, independent legal source, specifically a registered deed of conveyance bearing No.90 of 2012, executed in their favor by Smt. Parul Chakraborty, who is admittedly the only daughter and sole legal heir of the late Tinkari Chakraborty. The plaintiff has placed no material on record to demonstrate that Smt. Parul Chakraborty was ever legally divested of her right of inheritance, or that Tinkari Chakraborty had exhausted his entire interest in the suit plot during his lifetime. While the plaintiff has argued 34 that Tinkari Chakraborty became the exclusive owner of the land by virtue of an internal family arrangement, such a claim remains a mere statement of convenience, completely unsupported by any registered partition deed or memorandum of settlement, which is an imperative requirement under the law to extinguish jointness of property, disproving the eventuality of a partition.

#38. The Learned Counsel for the respondents also invites this Court's attention to the fluid, fluctuating, and wholly inconsistent figures introduced by the plaintiff regarding the total land area in question. Throughout the pleadings and the evidence, the plaintiff oscillates between descriptions of 8 acres 42 decimals, 9 acres 20 decimals, and 1 acre 40 decimals, without producing a certified sketch map or survey report to isolate and locate the exact geographical coordinates of the 1 acre 40 decimals he claims. This ambiguity becomes fatal when the identity of the land is actively disputed. Furthermore, the suit is hit by an absolute statutory bar under the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The plaintiff has merely sought a standalone declaration of title and a confirmation of possession, but has consciously omitted to pray for the consequential relief of a permanent injunction against the respondents. Relying on the celebrated decision of the Supreme Court in C. Mohammed Yunus v. Syed Unissa and Ors. (AIR 1961 SC 808), it is urged that no declaration can be made where a mandatory consequential relief is omitted, making the suit legally barred since a suit for mere declaration without seeking further mandatory relief cannot be entertained by a court of law.

#39. The respondents further argue that the suit suffers from a fatal 35 procedural defect owing to the non-service of the mandatory statutory notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, upon the State of West Bengal and its revenue officials, who were impleaded as proforma defendants. No leave of the Court was obtained under Section 80(2) to institute the suit without such notice, thereby vitiating the entire proceedings ab initio. The respondents emphasize that during cross- examination, the plaintiff, deposing as PW-1, made catastrophic admissions that completely dismantled his own case. He explicitly admitted his inability to state the precise boundaries of the land he allegedly purchased, confessed that he could not remember the exact date on which he entered into possession, and candidly conceded that other third parties were cultivating and occupying distinct portions of RS Plot No.3057. The Trial Court's reliance upon a mere unauthenticated, loose information slip to draw a sweeping inference that RS Plot No.3047 was a clerical error for RS Plot No.3057 was an exercise in pure conjecture and an impermissible leap of logic. The plaintiff's total failure to initiate any lawful proceedings for the correction of the Record of Rights before the appropriate revenue forums over a span of nearly thirty years demonstrates a deep-seated inertia and an implicit acquiescence to the correctness of the records. It is further pointed out that while the plaintiff sets up an expansive claim over 1 acre 40 decimals, the Record of Rights shows that RS Plot No.3047 consists of a minuscule area of merely 9 decimals; yet the plaintiff has maintained a stony silence regarding the 36 remaining vast portion of the land or the identity of its co-owners, further underscoring the speculative nature of his action.

#40. The plaintiff is further precluded from collaterally impeaching the registered deed executed in favor of the respondents in the year 2012. Having failed to challenge that instrument before a court of competent jurisdiction within the statutory period of limitation, the plaintiff is now legally estopped from questioning the validity of the respondents' title or the capacity of Parul Chakraborty to execute the same. The plaintiff has attempted to build his case upon certain isolated statements made by the defendants in other proceedings, asserting them to be admissions of his title. However, under Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the doctrine of estoppel cannot override an absolute statutory title, and an admission on a question of law or a mistaken statement of fact cannot create a title where none exists. The subsequent settlement records, including Exhibit 4A and Exhibit B, which record the respondents' names in the khatian with respect to RS Plot No.3057, must be treated as final and conclusive unless set aside through due process of law. The conduct of the plaintiff speaks volumes of his lack of bona fides, having remained entirely passive for nearly three decades after his purported purchase in 1983 without setting up any visible markers of ownership. Despite his claim of a sudden, forcible dispossession in April 2012, the plaintiff did not lodge any immediate possessory complaints under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, nor did he move the Court for an ad interim temporary injunction at the earliest opportunity, which strongly indicates the theory of an erroneous plot entry is a manufactured, 37 retaliatory afterthought designed to disrupt the respondents' peaceful enjoyment.

#41. In conclusion, the respondents urge that the grounds raised in this Second Appeal do not touch upon any substantial question of law, but relate purely to the appreciation of facts and evidence. Under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and in line with the landmark dictum in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar (AIR 1999 SC 2213), it is settled position that the High Court cannot sit as a third court of facts to reverse the findings of the First Appellate Court unless those findings are demonstrated to be perverse, irrational or shocking to the judicial conscience. The First Appellate Court, as the final arbiter of facts, thoroughly analyzed the entire documentary and oral evidence, detected the foundational vulnerabilities in the plaintiff’s chain of title, and rightly dismissed the suit. Equity, law, and possessory rights reside firmly with the respondents, who are bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration, and their settled possession over a clearly identifiable piece of land cannot be disturbed at the instance of a negligent and unproved claimant.

#42. The First Appellate Court reversed the Trial Court's decree primarily on the ground that the description of the suit property in Schedule II of the plaint was vague, unspecific, and non-compliant with Order VII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908.

#43. The Principle of Identity Over Nomenclature is a well-settled canon of property law that where there is a conflict between the plot number, the area, and the boundaries, or where a clerical error creep into the plot 38 number, the identity of the property must be gathered from the totality of the transaction and the parent title.

#44. The parent estate, Cadastral Survey (CS) Plot No. 2816 (measuring 8.42 acres out of 9.20 acres after a registered partition in 1931), was sold to Tinkari Chakraborty and his brothers in 1959 via Deed No.271. When the settlement authorities committed a clerical error during the Estates Acquisition (EA) operation by recording CS Plot No.2816 as Revisional Settlement (RS) Plot No. 3047 instead of RS Plot No.3057, Tinkari and his brothers successfully filed Title Suit No.32 of 1980.The civil court in 1982 (Exhibit 2) explicitly declared that the RS entry was erroneous and void.

#45. When Tinkari sold his undivided 1/6th share (1.40 acres) to the plaintiff in 1983 via Deed No. 2159 (Exhibit 1), the deed referenced the plot number currently active in the revenue records due to the state's failure to update its maps immediately. However, the physical identity, the area (1.40 acres), and the root of the title (derived from CS Plot No.2816) remained perfectly constant. Under cross-examination, defendant witness-1 (DW-1) explicitly admitted that the plaintiff had purchased the land from Tinkari Chakraborty and that the corresponding cadastral plot was 2816. Once the identity of the land is admitted by the defence, the argument of "vagueness" evaporates. The First Appellate Court completely ignored this vital admission, rendering its finding perverse.

#46. The First Appellate Court erred in holding that because the plaintiff sought a “confirmation of possession” but the defendants alleged they were in physical possession, the suit must fail completely in the absence of a specific alternative prayer for “recovery of possession.” 39

#47. As ruled by the Supreme Court in Akkamma v. Vemavathi (2021),once a plaintiff successfully proves absolute underlying title to a property, the court is under a judicial obligation to protect that title. If the Court finds the plaintiff has title but has been subtly or forcefully dispossessed during the pendency or immediately prior to the suit, the Court can grant a decree for recovery of possession under the umbrella of a declaration of title.

#48. In view of the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the respondents argued the suit is barred because the plaintiff did not seek consequential relief. However, the plaintiff explicitly prayed for a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from disturbing his peaceable possession. A permanent injunction satisfied the requirement of "further relief" under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.

#49. Following the 1983 purchase, the plaintiff successfully moved the revenue authorities under the West Bengal Land Reforms (WBLR) Act. The visible error was permanently rectified: CS Plot No.2816 was mapped to Land Reforms (LR) Plot No.3057, and the plaintiff’s name was officially published in the Record of Rights (LRROR) for a 0.1667 share (1.40 acres) under Exhibit 4A. Under Section 51C of the WBLR Act, there is an absolute bar on civil courts altering these finalized revenue maps, and the First Appellate Court had no authority to ignore this finalized statutory presumption of ownership and possessory right.

#50. The role of the High Court in deciding a Second Appeal under civil law, specifically under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is structurally unique and limited. It does not act as a regular court of facts, 40 rather a constitutional guardian legal purity. While a First Appeal is a matter of right where the court re-evaluates both facts and law, a Second Appeal is strictly confined to the adjudication of a substantial question of law.

#51. The High Court is bound by the findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, even if those findings are arguably incorrect or poorly reasoned. The High Court cannot substitute its own opinion on facts or re-examine oral and documentary evidence to see if it can reach a different conclusion.

#52. The High Court can breach the wall of “finality of facts” only if the lower court’s findings suffer from perversity. Perversity occurs when a Trial Court or the First Appellate Court takes into consideration completely irrelevant evidence while ignoring material evidence and reaches a conclusion that is so completely irrational that no reasonable person could ever arrive at it. A finding is based on absolutely zero evidence on the record.

#53. Therefore, the High Court is bound by the following depositions of the plaintiff/appellant being uncontroverted in cross-examination and the deposition of the defendants.

#54. PW-1 being the plaintiff in his examination-in-chief inter alia stated as follows:- “… 8. That in the aforesaid manner I, the sole plaintiff came into title and possession on the suit land which is described in schedule 2 of the plaint and which is the part of schedule 1 land and the transferor Tinkari Chakraborty divested all of his right, title, interest and 41 possession on the suit land. …

#11. That in my title purchased Deed bearing No.2159 of 1983 the R.S. Plot has been mentioned as R.S. Plot No.3047 but its area and C.S. Plot No. has been rightly mentioned and I am in title and possession on the schedule 2 land as per my title deed.

#12. That it is submitted that the defendant No.1 Hagru Gorai is an attesting witness of my aforesaid title Deed and he has clear idea that I am in title and possession on the suit land described in schedule 2 of the plaint by demarcating the same by fencing.

#13. That it is submitted that at the time of L.R. Operation the suit land has been recorded in my name but the class of land wrongly mentioned as “Bahal” instead of “Danga”.

#14. That the principal defendants Nos.1 to 5 in collusion with the principal defendant No.6, the alleged daughter of Tinkari Chakraborty creating a Sale deed bearing No.90 dated 13.01.2012 in respect of my suit land and they were trying to disturb my peaceful possession on the suit land and hence this suit.

#15. That it is submitted that since purchase I am in title and possession on the suit land and the vendor Tinkari Chakraborty and or his heirs or heiress have no subsisting interest on the suit land or any portion of the schedule 2 land and the principal defendant No.6, the alleged daughter of Tinkari Chakraborty has no saleable interest or any kind of interest on the suit land. 42

#16. That by the aforesaid manufactured Sale Deed No.90 of 2012 the principal defendant Nos.1 to 5 have not acquired any right, title, interest or possession on the schedule 2 land or any portion of the same.

#17. That only to disturb my peaceful possession on the suit land, in collusion with each other the principal defendant Nos.1 to 6 created and manufactured the aforesaid sale deed which has no force in the eye of law and nothing but a mere paper transaction. …

#27. That the defendant Nos. 1 to 5 did not and could not acquired any right, title, interest or possession on the suit land by the any document executed by the alleged daughter of Tinkari Chakraborty who had no subsisting interest on the suit land.”

#55. During cross-examination of PW-1 inter alia stated as follows:- “1. The remaining land in plot no.3057 remains with the Babus at Kolkata; my deed contents both the plots nos.3057 and 3047; I cannot recollect the specific area of each of the plot I have purchased; my deed does contents boundary; I have claimed the plot no.3057; I have not gone through the deed; this plot should have a reference in my deed; the recorded tenants do possess it; I have not stated that plot no.3057 was originally 3047; …

#3. I have purchased with boundaries; I am not in position to state the possession of the owners of this plot direction wise nor the details the brothers of Tinkari Chakraborty; transfers have been made by co-share of Tinkari but not by his brothers, descendants; 1.40 acre has been 43 recorded in my name, it is in respect of Tinkari’s share; both the share will be obtained by me; I have purchased 1.40 acre;

#4. The metal road is in the middle of plot no.3057; the road was prepared not before a long time, not a fact it was made with permission from Chakrabortys; the said road runs southwards thereafter eastwards; …

#6. The possession is according to entries in the ROR;”

#56. DW-1 in his cross-examination inter alia stated as follows:- “… 2. I know Tinkari Chakraborty; they were five brothers; I also know the CS plot no.2816 measuring 9.20 acre; I do not know to whom it belonged nor hal plot 3047 corresponding to its CS plot numbers nor that of 3057; it was purchased by Tinkari Chakraborty and his other brothers but to whom is not known to me; no such CS plot does exist at all.

#3. It is fact that I have not seen the deed standing in the name of Tinkari Chakraborty but I have seen the ROR in their name; 1.40 acre stands in his name in that ROR.

#4. I do not know the area of plot no.3047”.

#57. DW-2, in his cross-examination inter alia stated as follows:- “… 2. I know Arun Kr Mandal has two other brothers; it is fact that his brothers also purchased land along with him.

#3. I do not know the kht. no. but plot no.3057; total area is 9.15 acre; we are in possession a portion of property under license of owners; the record has been prepared in our name to that eflect. 44

#4. The property originally belong Rashbihari Bannerjee and thereafter it was purchased to Tinkari Chakraborty; Rashbihari had no other brothers; I am a licensee under Durgacharan Chakraborty; Tinkari purchased all the properties of Rashbihari; I do not know the area nor the number of brothers of Tinkari; Parul Chakraborty possess the property which Rashibari possessing. …

#7. I have not found the deed standing in favour of Arun by Tinkari Chakraborty nor I have found Parul Chakraborty.

#8. I do not know the date on which the defendant purchased from Parul Chakraborty : I found Tinkari when he was in police service before his purchase”.

#58. Under the provisions of Order VII Rule 7 while deciding a second appeal, the High Court is not tethered to the rigid, imperfect remedies passed down by the First Appellant Court. If the High Court answers the formulated substantial question of law in favour of the appellant, it holds the power to completely discard the First Appellante Court’s decree and restore the Trial Court’s findings. Furthermore, under Order VII Rule 7 of the CPC, the High Court can mould the final relief to match the substantive law proved, ensuring that form does not defeat absolute justice (e.g., ordering a transformation from a prayer of “confirmation of possession” to a decree for “recovery of possession” from a trespasser.

#59. The Learned Advocate for the appellant submitted a compelling narrative of title, meticulously structured to demonstrate a seamless convergence of registered conveyances, prior judicial declarations, and rectified revenue 45 records. He argued that the parent estate, C.S. Plot No.2816, was definitively split by the 1931 partition deed, and Tinkari Chakraborty’s

1.40-acre share was an absolute, identifiable interest.

#60. Counsel heavily relied upon the 1982 civil court decree (Exhibit 2) in Title Suit No.32 of 1980, which had already adjudicated that the R.S. entries swapping Plot Nos. 3047 and 3057 were entirely incorrect and void. He urged that when Tinkari executed the 1983 sale deed (Exhibit 1) referencing the active R.S. number, the underlying identity of the land remained perfectly secure and judicially cleared.

#61. The appellant further emphasized that the state revenue authorities eventually corrected this historical mapping error during the Land Reforms operation, officially publishing the L.R. Record of Rights (Exhibit 4A) the plaintiff's name under L.R. Plot No.3057. Counsel invoked Section 51C of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, to argue that this finalized statutory entry creates an absolute bar on civil courts altering finalized revenue maps.

#62. To expose the fragility of the defense, the appellant directed this Court's attention to the cross-examination of the defence’s own witness, DW-1, who explicitly admitted that the plaintiff had purchased the land from Tinkari and that the corresponding cadastral plot was 2816. He branded the defendants’ Exhibit B as a manifest forgery, pointing out that "LR Dag No.3057" was crudely hand-written in red ink without any official attestation. He concluded that since Tinkari had divested himself of all rights in 1983, his daughter inherited nothing, rendering the 2012 deed a legal nullity. 46

#63. In opposition, the Learned Counsel for the contesting respondents presented an exhaustive argument seeking to fortify the reversing judgment of the First Appellate Court. He strenuously contended the property set forth in Schedule-II of the plaint was conspicuously devoid of any boundary specifications or dimensional delineations, a structural omission that directly contravened the mandate of Order VII Rule 3 of the CPC. Relying upon Sheodhyan Singh v. Sanichara Kuer (AIR 1963 SC 1879), he urged an omission of boundaries inevitably renders any subsequent decree a brutum fulmen, entirely incapable of execution on the ground.

#64. The respondents further argued that the plaintiff’s 1983 deed explicitly named R.S. Plot No.3047 as the demised property. In the absence of a registered deed of rectification or a civil decree modifying the contract under Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the plaintiff cannot use oral evidence to substitute one plot number for another. He invoked Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, to argue that oral narratives cannot be admitted to contradict or vary the written terms of a registered document.

#65. Counsel also asserted that the plaintiff failed to examine any independent local witnesses to corroborate continuous physical enjoyment or his alleged dispossession in April 2012. Conversely, the defense brought forward the consistent testimony of DW-2, an actual cultivator, who deposed that the respondents are in settled, open possession. He maintained that the respondents' rights are rooted in a valid, independent 47 legal source – the 2012 deed executed by Parul Chakraborty, the sole legal heir of Tinkari.

#66. Finally, he argued the suit was hit by the absolute statutory bar under the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, as the plaintiff merely sought a standalone declaration and confirmation of possession, consciously omitting a proper prayer for recovery of possession. He also highlighted the non-service of notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code upon the State, contending it vitiated the entire proceedings ab initio.

#67. The first substantial question of law requires this Court to evaluate whether the First Appellate Court’s branding of the suit property description as "vague" constitutes judicial perversity.

#68. The First Appellate Court concluded that the absolute absence of specific four-corner boundaries in Schedule II of the plaint, which mirrored the schedule of the 1983 title deed, was fatal to the suit under Order VII Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code. This finding represents a severe misconstruction of property law and conveyancing jurisprudence.

#69. The statutory mandate of Order VII Rule 3 is not that a plaint must contain boundary descriptions under all circumstances. The clear text of the rule dictates that the plaint must contain a description sufficient to identify the property. The law provides alternative, equally reliable methods of identification.

#70. It is a well-settled canon of property law that where an administrative, clerical, or typographical error creeps into a plot number during rapid settlement survey operations, the true identity of the land must be 48 gathered from the totality of its parent title and its historical lineage, rather than relying blindly on an isolated, incorrect survey identifier.

#71. The legal maxim certum est quod certum reddi potest – that is certain which can be made certain—directly applies to the facts of this case. While Schedule II lacked boundary lines, it explicitly identified the exact area of 1.40 acres tied directly to the parent tract of C.S. Plot No.2816. A government survey plot number is considered the most precise marker in land administration because it refers to a fixed, officially mapped coordinate within the state's land registry. By referencing the parent plot number and the precise acreage derived from the registered 1931 partition deed, the property description was legally complete. The plot number implicitly references fixed coordinates within the state's mapping infrastructure, meaning the boundaries are legally present by proxy.

#72. Furthermore, the historical plot identifier mismatch between R.S. Plot No.3047 and R.S. Plot No.3057 had already been fully litigated and judicially settled by a competent civil court in Title Suit No. 32 of 1980. The 1982 Civil Court decree (Exhibit 2) explicitly ruled that the Revisional Settlement entries swapping these plot identities were incorrect, void, and non-binding.

#73. When Tinkari Chakraborty sold the 1.40 acres to the plaintiff in 1983, his title had already been judicially cleared of this mapping defect. The plaintiff was not required to secure a formal deed of rectification; the 1982 civil court decree had already judicially cured the identity of the property. The First Appellate Court sat as a lower court of facts and had absolutely 49 zero legal authority to overturn or ignore the binding finality of that 1982 decree.

#74. The defence's argument of vagueness completely collapses when juxtaposed against the explicit oral admissions elicited during the trial. Under cross-examination, Defendant Witness 1 (DW-1), Gopal Prasad Kuiry, explicitly admitted that the plaintiff had indeed purchased the land from Tinkari Chakraborty and explicitly confirmed that the underlying parcel was parent Cadastral Plot No.2816.

#75. Under Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, facts admitted need not be proved. It is a severe legal contradiction for the defendants to argue that a property is completely unidentifiable while their own primary witness explicitly identifies its historical origin and boundaries during testimony.

#76. The Hon’ble High Court of Bombay, in the case of GODAWARIBAI PURUSHOTTAM BAWASKAR vs. SITARAM BHAGWAN PAITHANE AND OTHERS1, has made the following observations: - “10. In this regard the provision of Order 7, Rule 3 of Civil Procedure Code being material is quoted as under : Order 7, Rule 3: “3. Where the subject-matter of the suit is immovable property - Where the subject-matter of the suit is immovable property, the plaint shall contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it, and, in case such property can be identified by boundaries or numbers in a record of settlement or survey, the plaint shall specify such boundaries or numbers.”

#12. The very purpose of Order 7, Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code is to ensure that there is description of the suit property sufficient to identify the same, which is with the intent and purpose that in case a decree is passed, it ought to be an executable decree and does not remain a mere paper decree. 12020 SCC OnLine Bom 2043 50

#13. In Laxman Singh v. Jagannath, (2000) 1 MP LJ 79 : 1999 SCC OnLine MP 271 it has been held as under: “10. The purpose of Order 7, Rule 3 of the Code is that unless the plaintiff indicates the identity of the property claimed by him either by means of boundaries or by means of map as required by Order 7, Rule 3 of the Code, it would be difficult for the Court to find whether the plaintiff has title to the property claimed and whether any encroachment or dispossession has been made by the defendant. Thus the duty of the party is to give description sufficient to identify the property in dispute. If such decree is passed, it shall be unworkable. The Court can only pass a decree which can be executed under Order 21 of the Code”

#15. Similar position is reiterated in Zarif Ahmad (Dead) Through Legal Rep. v. Mohd. Farooq, 2015 Mah LJ OnLine (SC) 126 : (2015) 13 SCC 673, in the following words: “11. The object of the above provision is that the description of the property must be sufficient to identify it. The property can be identifiable by boundaries, or by number in a public record of settlement or survey. Even by plaint map showing the it can be location of the disputed immovable property, described.”

#17. It is trite to say that for the purpose of obtaining an effective decree which can be executable in law, the correct identifiable description of the suit property is a must, otherwise the decree remains a paper decree, unexecutable due to non-identification of the property to which it relates. ”

#78. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of ZARIF AHMAD AND ANOTHER vs. MOHD. FAROOQ2, has made the following observation: - “11. Order 7 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “CPC”), which pertains to the requirement of description of immovable property, reads as under: “3.Where the subject-matter of the suit is immovable property.—Where the subject-matter of the suit is immovable property, the plaint shall contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it, and, in case such property can be 2(2015) 13 SCC 673 51 identified by boundaries or numbers in a record of settlement or survey, the plaint shall specify such boundaries or numbers.” The object of the above provision is that the description of the property must be sufficient to identify it. The property can be identifiable by boundaries, or by number in a public record of settlement or survey. Even by plaint map showing the location of the disputed immovable property, it can be described.”

#79. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of P. CHANDRASEKHARAN AND OTHERS vs. S. KANAKARAJAN AND OTHERS3, has made the following observation: - “10. The plaintiff, before his suit is decreed, must establish the cause of action in respect of the property in question wherefor the relief for recovery of possession has been claimed. In case the suit is decreed, the executing court must be able to deliver possession thereof and thus there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the property in suit must be adequately identifiable. When such a relief is claimed the plaintiff must show what he had purchased and how the court, in the event a dispute arises, would determine the identity of the property.”

#80. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of PRATIBHA SINGH AND ANOTHER vs. SHANTI DEVI PRASAD AND ANOTHER4, has made the following observations: - “15. Order 7 Rule 3 CPC requires where the subject-matter of the suit is immovable property, the plaint shall contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it. Such description enables the court to draw a proper decree as required by Order 20 Rule 3 CPC. In case such property can be identified by boundaries or numbers in a record for settlement of survey, the plaint shall specify such boundaries or numbers.”

#77. In real estate and civil litigation, a common defense strategy is to challenge the maintainability of a suit by arguing that the property description is too vague to be identified. This argument usually relies