JANTA DAL ETC. ETC. v. H.S. CHOWDHARY & Ors. ETC. ETC.

such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exer cised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the Courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 432· B or the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in Its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. [287 F·G] . 1.116. Thus, the inherent power under Section 482 can be exercised by the Hlgh Court (1) to give elJect to any order passed under the Code; or C (2) to prevent abuse or the process or any Court; or (3) otherwise to secure the ends or justice. [288-E]

1.07. This inherent power conferred by Section 482 of the Code should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court D being the highest Court or a State should normally refrain from giving a premature decision in a case wherein the entire facts are extremely incom plete and hazy, more so when the evidence bas not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved whether factual or legal are or great magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. or course, no bard and fast rule can be laid down in E regard to the cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jnrisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. [288-H, 299-A] Emperor v. Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18, 22; Lala Jai Ram Das v. Emperor, 1945 (47) Born. L.R. 634 (PC); Dr. Raghubir Sharan v. The State F of Bihar, (1964] 2 SCR 336; Ta/ab Hazi Hussain v. Madhukar Pushottam Mondkar and Another, (1958) SCR 1226; Pampapathy v. State of Mysore, (1966] Supp SCR 477; Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47- [1978) 1 SCR 749; Khushi Ram v. Hashim and Ors., AIR 1959 SC 542; State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Aggarwala, AIR 1979 SC 87· [1979) 1 G SCR 1114 and State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors., [1990] 3 Supp. SCR 256, relied on, Rattan Singh v. State of Maharashtra, 1977 Cri. L,J. 673; Mohammad v. State of Kera/a, 1982 Crl. L.J.1120 and Range Forest Officer, Sirsa and Others v. Anand Venkataraman Hegde, 1978 Crl. L.J. 1374, distinguished. H 232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. A Connelly v. D.P.P., 1964 A.C. 1254; D.P.P. v. Humphrys, 1977 A.C.I; Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18; R. V. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, (1968) 1 All E.R. 763 at 769; Jehan Singh v. Delhi Administra· tion, (1974] 3 SCR 794; Kurukshetra University and Another v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2229 = (1977) 4 SCC 451; State of Bihar and B Another v.J.A.C. Saldanha and Others, [1980) 1 SCC 554; Eastern Spinning Mills Virendra Kumar Sharda and another v. Shri Raj iv Poddar and Others, AIR 1985 SC 1668; State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, (1990) 3 Supp. SCR 259; Jasbhai Motibhai Desia v. Roshan Kumar, (1976) 3 SCR 58; Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137; State of Bihar v. V.P.Shanna, (1991) 1 Scale 539; Maneckji v. Union of India, (1980) 86 Crl. W. 258; Ram Lal C Yadav v. State of U.P., (1989) 95 Crl.LJ. 1013 (thus decision over-ruled Prashant Gaur v. State of U.P., 1988 All. W.C. 828 and Puttan Singh v. State of U.P., 1987 All W 599, referred to.

1.08. The High Court bas taken an extreme view that 'the Court can take judicial notice of any illegality being committed by any Court, with a D view to prevent the injury being caused to the known or unknown aggrieved party', even when the investigation is at its threshold. The very sentence is indicative of the fact that the learned Judge in order to protect any possible injury that might be caused either during the investigation or on the culmination of the criminal proceedings to the known or unknown aggrieved E party bas determined to take suo motu cognizance and proceed with the matter, by virtually stepping ·into the shoes of the accused partles both present and prospective. [286 B·CJ F

1.09. It shocks judicial conscience that Mr. Justice M.K. Chawla before whom no aggrieved or affected Jlllrty had come challenging the FIR, bas taken suo motu action and recorded such a categorical assertion that 'no offence' thereby meaning much/ess a cognizable offence is made out in the FIR. [295-F]

1.10. Once an Investigation by the police Is ordered by a Magistrate G under Section 156(3) of Code, the Magistrate cannot place any lhnitations or direct the officer conducting it as to how to conduct the investigation. Mr. Justice M.K. Chawla, bas overstepped bis jurisdiction and made the statement which is unwarranted and uncalled for. [295-H) Ninnaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal, (1973) 3 SCC 753, relied H on. JANTA DAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY 233

1.11. The Court agreeing with the first part of the order dated A

19.12.1990 of the High Court, quashes the later part of the impugaed order taking suo motu cognizance under Section 397, 401 read with Section 482 of the Code issuing show-cause notice to the CBI and the State.

2.01. Basically the meaning of the words 'Public Interest' is defined as the common well being also public welfare. B Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Edition, Vol. XII, Shrouds Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 4 IV Edition; Black's law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, referred to. [258-D]

2.02. The expression 'litigation' means a legal action including all C proceedings therein, initiated in ~ Court of Law with the purpose of enforcing a right or seeking a remedy. [259-B]

2.03. Lexically the expression 'PIL' means a legal action initiated in a Court of Law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest D in which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. [259·C]

2.04. The concept of PIL which has been and is being fostered by judicial activism has become an increaingly important one setting up valuable and respectable records, especially in the arena of constitutional E and legal treatment for 'the unrepresented and under-represented'. (260-B]

2.05. The definition of PIL emerged from historical context in which the commonality of the various forms of legal representation involving the basic and fundamental rights of a significant segment of the public F demanding vindication of its rights has been recogaised in various parts of the world. (260-FJ P.N. Bhagwati: "Social Action Litigation: The Indian Experience • vide 'Role of the Judiciary in Plural Societies"Published in 1987, referred to.