Kapil Misra v. Sri Lokesh M, Chief Executive Officer New Okhla Industrial Development Authority Noida

Judgment

#1. Heard Sri J.N. Mathur, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Sunil Kumar Chaudhary and Sri Abhishek Khare, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri Anuj Kudesia, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Waseeq Uddin Ahmed, learned counsel for the respondents.

#2. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that applicant was recorded tenure holder of one of the property situated at Khata No.7, Khasra No.2, Village Rohillapur, Sector 132 NOIDA, District - Gautam Nagar measuring 10,870 sq. meters., and the said land was being acquired by the State Government and processed under the Land Acquisition Act. The said acquisition 2 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 proceeding was challenged in Writ A No.18009 of 2008 before the Hon'ble High Court and the said writ petition was allowed vide order dated 10.8.2009 and the notification under Section 4 and 6 of the Act was quashed. He further submits that applicant filed another writ petition, i.e., Writ C No.47873 of 2010 alleging that despite setting aside the land acquisition proceedings, NOIDA has started illegal encroachment over the land of applicant, in such circumstances, prayer was made that in case the removal of the encroachment over the aforesaid property is not possible then NOIDA may consider allotment of alternative land in lieu of applicant's land, thereafter, considering the facts of the said case, petition was disposed of vide judgment and order 26.11.2010 with the direction to the NOIDA to decide the representations of the applicant dated 26.6.2010 and 16.7.2010 by reasoned and speaking orders within a period of seeks weeks from the date of receipt of the order. In pursuance of the said order, a decision was taken by the NOIDA in its 171st Board meeting and resolved to execute a registered 'deed of exchange' by means of which the applicant would transfer the ownership of their land and in lieu of the same NOIDA will transfer ownership of its acquired land of the same size to the applicant situated at Village Sadarpur, Sector 45, NOIDA, Gautam Buddh Nagar. Accordingly, a deed of exchange was executed in between the applicant and NOIDA on

26.3.2011, and applicant became absolute title holder of the new 3 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 property by way of aforesaid exchange deed. Thereafter, applicant applied for sanction of map on 5.4.2021 in accordance with New Okhla Industrial Development Area Building Regulations, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as "Regulations of 2010") to the Chief Executive Officer, NOIDA alongwith the requisite fee and copy of the deed of exchange.

2.1. Submissions of learned counsel for the applicant is that on

28.7.2021, authorities informed the applicant that the proforma submitted alongwith the application was incomplete and also has not submitted the copies of the plan, accordingly, despite completing all the formalities, the competent authority did not sanction the map, therefore, a Writ Petition No.13466 of 2022 was filed, which was disposed of by means of an order dated

11.5.2022 directing the authorities to pass appropriate order on the application for sanction of map within a period of 45 days. Due to non compliance of the direction of this Court, contempt petition was filed, in which, order dated 11.9.2023 was passed for denying the permit to the applicant. Feeling aggrieved, the aforesaid order was challenged in revision under Section 41(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act read with Section 12 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 but same was also rejected by the State Government vide order dated 10.4.2024. Orders dated 11.9.2023 and 10.4.2024 4 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 were challenged before this Court in Writ C No.3944 of 2024 and after exchange of affidavits, aforesaid writ petition was allowed by this Court vide judgment and order dated 22.11.2024 by setting aside the order dated 11.9.2023 passed by the competent authority of NOIDA as well as order dated 10.4.2024 passed by the State Government directing the Chief Executive Officer, NOIDA to pass a fresh order considering the application for sanction of map on merit in light of the Regulations of 2010 treating the petitioner to be eligible for due consideration and sanction of the map, in accordance with law. It is further directed that let the fresh exercise be carried out expeditiously, but not later than 4 weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before him. The aforesaid order was duly served upon the Chief Executive Officer, NOIDA, thereafter, on the same set of fact which was adjudicated by the writ court vide order dated

22.11.2024, the application of the applicant was rejected vide order dated 24.12.2024 without complying the direction of writ court.

2.2. Learned counsel for the applicant vehemently submits that order passed by the writ court vide order dated 22.11.2024 has attained the finality as it was not challenged in higher forum, then present contempt proceeding was filed and on 4.4.2025 notice was issued to the respondent no.1 and thereafter, matter was 5 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 listed on 30.4.2025 and on the said date, order was passed for listing of the case on 20.5.2025 within top ten cases, in the

meantime, learned counsel for the NOIDA was directed to seek written instructions from the respondent that why the order of the writ court was not complied with in letter and spirit. Thereafter, on 20.5.2025, in place of filing reply, request was made for some time to file affidavit of compliance and request of learned counsel for the respondent was accepted and case was fixed on 28.5.2025 at 11:30 a.m. with further direction that by the next date of listing, the respondent no.1 shall file affidavit of compliance and the relevant record related to the compliance be also placed before this Court by some responsible officer.

2.3. Learned counsel for the applicant vehemently submits that Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 30185 of 2025 was filed by Sri Lokesh M., Chief Executive officer, NOIDA challenging the order of the writ court dated 22.11.2024 passed in Writ C No.3944 of 2024 and orders dated 4.4.2025, 30.4.2025 and

20.5.2025 passed in the present contempt application. He further submits that on 28.5.2025, Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No.30185 of 2025 was taken up before Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India, on which, contempt proceeding pending before High Court was stayed by fixing the matter on 29.7.2025 with the observation that this is a fit case where an attempt 6 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 should be made by the parties to find out an amicable solution in order to comply with the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated 22.11.2024 and by the next date of listing, parties may find out an appropriate solution and report back to this Court and the Chief Executive Officer of NOIDA was also directed to communicate to the petitioner within a period of three days calling him for a meeting within a week in order to find out a solution.

2.4. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that draft rules of New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (Erection of Buildings on Land transferred through Exchange) Regulations, 2025 was also filed before Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the aforesaid proceedings and on 28.11.2025, Hon'ble the Supreme Court expressed anguish on the approach of the NOIDA and deprecated the conduct of NOIDA and ordered for listing of the case on 15.12.2025 with the observation that it is made clear that no further time will be granted on the said date and the counsel would be at liberty to argue the matters on merits, if no final decision is placed on record. On 15.12.2025, Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.21085-21088 of 2025 filed by the Chief Executive Officer, NOIDA was dismissed with the observation that there is no merit in these matters warranting interference under Article 7 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 136 of the Constitution of India but till today, order of the writ court has not been complied with.

2.5. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that only with the intention to defy the order passed by the writ court, New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (Erection of Building on Land transferred through Exchange) Regulations, 2025 was notified vide notification no.54/77-4-26-368 CS/25 dated 5.1.2026, as the draft Regulation was also placed before Hon'ble Supreme Court but the Supreme Court denied to accept the same. He also submits that aforesaid provisions of Regulation are prospective as per the provisions of Sub Clause 2 (1) of the aforesaid Regulation.

2.6. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that on 8.1.2026, application for dismissal of the contempt application was filed enclosing the aforesaid Regulation stating therein that applicant may file a fresh application for sanction of the map in accordance with the new Regulation, 2025 and thereafter, objection was filed by petitioner the on 16.1.2026 stating therein that aforesaid Regulations are applicable prospectively as in writ petition there was a direction that case of the applicant is to be considered in accordance with the Regulations, 2010. Thereafter, respondent no.1 - Mr. Lokesh M was transferred and new incumbent, Mr. Krishna Karunesh joined as Chief Executive Officer, NOIDA, then application for amendment was filed on 28.1.2026, which was 8 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 allowed and notice was issued to the newly impleaded incumbent, i.e., respondent no.2. Respondent no.2 filed counter affidavit on

20.3.2026 and again reiterated that applicant may apply afresh under the new Regulation, 2025 and reply to the same, rejoinder affidavit is filed today annexing a letter dated 13.3.2026, which was sent to the Chief Executive Officer, NOIDA with the request that without accepting the applicability of the new Regulations in the case of applicant and without prejudice to his rights to get the sanction of plan as per the directions of the Hon'ble High Court's judgment dated 22.11.2024, if NOIDA wants to consider the application under the Clause 3.2.2 of new Regulations, 2025 then authority may issue a demand letter to the petitioner forthwith indicating therein the external and internal development fee to be payable under Clause 3.2.2 of above regulation so that the same may be paid and the map be sanctioned.

#3. Sri Anuj Kudesia, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent placed a letter dated 25.3.2026 and informs that case of the applicant is being consider as per Clause 3.2.2 of Regulations, 2025. The letter dated 25.3.2026 reads as under :- 9 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 10 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025

#4. After perusal of the record, it is evident from the record that Writ C No.3944 of 2024 filed by the applicant was allowed vide judgment and order dated 22.11.2024 directing the Chief Executive Officer, NOIDA to pass a fresh order considering the application for sanction of map on merit in light of the Regulations of 2010 treating the petitioner to be eligible for due consideration and sanction of the map, in accordance with law, it is further directed that let the fresh exercise be carried out expeditiously, but not later than 4 weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before him. Relevant portion of the order dated 22.11.2024 passed in Writ C No.3944 of 2024 reads as under :-

#27. We have heard the rival submissions at length. The dispute in the present case relates to the right of the petitioner to get the map sanctioned pertaining to the land which was given to the petitioner situated at village Sardarpur in exchange of the land purchase by the petitioner in village Rohillapur.

#28. The facts in the present case are not in dispute, inasmuch as the petitioner was the owner of the land situated at village-Rohillapur which was sought to be acquired by the State Government and given to NOIDA for development. The said acquisition proceedings were set aside, and the ownership of the land came to be vested in the petitioner alone. Despite acquisition proceedings having been set aside, it seems that detrimental activities are carried on by the NOIDA contrary to the judgement of the High Court, and therefore another writ petition was filed by the petitioner in this regard being writ petition No. 47873 of 2010, and noticing that the said land was in fact been utilised by the NOIDA authorities for development option has been given to them to give an equivalent land to the petitioner and accordingly decide the representation in this regard.

#29. The NOIDA authorities in their 171st board meeting held on 25/02/2011 resolved to execute a registered deed of exchange by which the petitioners were to transfer the ownership of the land of sector 132 NOIDA (Rohillapur) and in lieu of the same, the NOIDA were to transfer the ownership of the acquired land of the same size situated at village Sardarpur, Sector 45 NOIDA. In light of the said board resolution, a deed of exchange was executed on 26/03/2011. 11 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025

#30. The petitioners submitted an application for sanctioning of map on 05/04/2021 which was rejected on the ground that the said application did not include the lease deed which is an essential document as per the list 1-B of Appendix 1 of the Regulations of 2010. The revision before the State Government was also rejected by means of order dated 10/04/2024. It is the case of the respondents that in the present case after execution of a deed of exchange in favour of the petitioners, the status of the land of the petitioners is akin to a private holding on which no map can be sanctioned.

#31. Accordingly, the question for this Court for consideration is as to whether the map of the petitioner was wrongly rejected, or whether he fulfilled all the conditions prescribed under the U.P Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 and regulations framed so that his map can be sanctioned.

#32. To consider the aforesaid question, it has also to be considered whether the ownership documents as provided for in checklist 1-B of appendix 1 of the regulation of 2010 would include a deed of transfer, or in absence of lease deed the NOIDA would be within its competence to reject the application for sanction of map.

#33. NOIDA is an industrial development authority constituted by the State Government of Uttar Pradesh in exercise of its powers under Section 3 of U.P. Act No. 6 of 1976. Authority under this Act can be constituted for any industrial development area and such areas would be those which have been declared as such by notification by the State Government. The object of the industrial development authority, as is evident from Section 6 of the Act, is to secure planned development of the industrial development areas. Its functions include providing infrastructure for industrial, commercial or residential purposes as also to allocate and transfer either by way of sale or lease or otherwise, plots of land for the aforesaid purposes.Â

#34. To consider the rival contentions it is necessary to bear in mind that on one hand is right of an individual to make the most profitable use of his property, is a right which is protected under article 300A of the Constitution of India, and on the other hand is the claim of the development authority for a planned development and also to prevent a haphazard development and accordingly the competing rights have to be interpreted in relation to each other. The courts must make an endeavour to strike a balance between public interest on one hand and protection of constitutional rights of an individual to hold property on the other. The aspect of balancing of both the rights was duly considered by the Supreme Court in the case of T. Vijayalakshmi v. Town Planning Member, (2006) 8 SCC 502 when it was observed as under: 12 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 The law in this behalf is explicit. Right of a person to construct residential houses in the residential area is a valuable right. The said right can only be regulated in terms of a regulatory statute but unless there exists a clear provision the same cannot be taken away. It is also a trite law that the building plans are required to be dealt with in terms of the existing law. Determination of such a question cannot be postponed far less taken away. Doctrine of legitimate expectation in a case of this nature would have a role to play.

#35. Undoubtedly, where in any area the Act of 1976 comes into operation and notification ensues bringing the said area within the development area, the right of the owner to use the property stands restricted, and would be subject to the provisions of the Act of 1976 along with New Okhla Industrial Development Area Building Regulations, 2010. Whenever an interpretation is being made with regard to the provisions of an expropriatory legislation it would be subject to strict interpretation. This aspect of the matter was dealt at length of the Supreme Court in the case of  Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 705: Interpretation of the Act

#57. The Act being regulatory in nature as by reason thereof the right of an owner of property to use and develop stands restricted, requires strict construction. An owner of land ordinarily would be entitled to use or develop the same for any purpose unless there exists certain regulation in a statute or statutory rules. Regulations contained in such statute must be interpreted in such a manner so as to least interfere with the right to property of the owner of such land. Restrictions are made in larger public interest. Such restrictions, indisputably must be reasonable ones. (See Balram Kumawat v. Union of India [(2003) 7 SCC 628] ; Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Pilibhit Pantnagar Beej Ltd. [(2004) 1 SCC 391] and Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. [(2004) 2 SCC 747] ) The statutory scheme contemplates that a person and owner of land should not ordinarily be deprived from the user thereof by way of reservation or designation.

#58. Expropriatory legislation, as is well-known, must be given a strict construction.

#59. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai [(2005) 7 SCC 627] construing Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, this Court observed: (SCC pp. 634-35, para 6-7)

#6. It is not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Act confers a valuable right in favour of a person whose lands are sought to be acquired. Having regard to 13 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of â ˜eminent domainâ ™ may interfere with the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid.

#7. Indisputably, the definition of public purpose is of wide amplitude and takes within its sweep the acquisition of land for a corporation owned or controlled by the State, as envisaged under sub-clause (iv) of Clause (f) of Section 3 of the Act. But the same would not mean that the State is the sole judge therefor and no judicial review shall lie. (See Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat [1995 Supp (1) SCC 596] .)â €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the It was further stated: (SCC p. 640, para 29)

#29. The Act is an expropriatory legislation. This Court in State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma [AIR 1966 SC 1593] observed that in such a case the provisions of the statute should be strictly construed as it deprives a person of his land without consent. [See also Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1967 SC 1074] and CCE v. Orient Fabrics (P) Ltd. [(2004) 1 SCC 597] ]There cannot, therefore, be any doubt that in a case of this nature due application of mind on the part of the statutory authority was imperative. In State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata [(2005) 12 SCC 77 : JT (2005) 8 SC 171] it was opined: (SCC p. 102, para 59) I n absence of any substantive provisions contained in a parliamentary or legislative act, he cannot be refrained from dealing with his property in any manner he likes. Such statutory interdict would be opposed to one's right of property as envisaged under Article 300-A of the Constitution. In State of U.P. v. Manohar [(2005) 2 SCC 126] a Constitution Bench of this Court held: (SCC p. 129, paras 7-8)

#7. Ours is a constitutional democracy and the rights available to the citizens are declared by the Constitution. Although Article 19(1)(f) was deleted by the Forty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution, Article 300-A has been placed the Constitution, which reads as follows: ˜300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law. ”No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.

#8. This is a case where we find utter lack of legal authority for deprivation of the respondent's property by the appellants who are State authorities. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat [1995 Supp (1) SCC 596] the law is stated in the following terms: (SCC p. 622, para 34) 14 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025

#34. The right of eminent domain is the right of the sovereign State, through its regular agencies, to reassert, either temporarily or permanently, its dominion over any portion of the soil of the State including private property without its owner's consent on account of public exigency and for the public good. Eminent domain is the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the Government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity. It gives the right to resume possession of the property in the manner directed by the Constitution and the laws of the State, whenever the public interest requires it. The term expropriation is practically synonymous with term˜eminent domain It was further observed: (SCC p. 627, para 48)

#48. The word property used in Article 300-A must be understood in the context in which the sovereign power of eminent domain is exercised by the State and property expropriated. No abstract principles could be laid. Each case must be considered in the light of its own facts and setting. The phrase deprivation of the property of a person must equally be considered in the fact situation of a case. Deprivation connotes different concepts. Article 300- A gets attracted to an acquisition or taking possession of private property, by necessary implication for public purpose, in accordance with the law made by Parliament or a State Legislature, a rule or a statutory order having force of law. It is inherent in every sovereign State by exercising its power of eminent domain to expropriate private property without owner's consent. Prima facie, State would be the judge to decide whether a purpose is a public purpose. But it is not the sole judge. This will be subject to judicial review and it is the duty of the court to determine whether a particular purpose is a public purpose or not. Public interest has always been considered to be an essential ingredient of public purpose. But every public purpose does not fall under Article 300-A nor every exercise of eminent domain an acquisition or taking possession under Article 300-A. Generally speaking preservation of public health or prevention of damage to life and property are considered to be public purposes. Yet deprivation of property for any such purpose would not amount to acquisition or possession taken under Article 300-A. It would be by exercise of the police power of the State. In other words, Article 300-A only limits the powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300-A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation. Acquisition of mines, minerals and quarries is deprivation under Article 300-A. Rajendra Babu, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) in Sri Krishnapur Mutt v. N. Vijayendra Shetty [(1992) 3 Kar LJ 326] observed: (Kar LJ p. 329, 8)

#8. The restrictions imposed in the planning law though in public interest 15 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 should be strictly interpreted because they make an inroad into the rights of a private person to carry on his business by construction of a suitable building for the purpose and incidentally may affect his fundamental right if too widely interpreted.

#60. The question has also been addressed by a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Pt. Chet Ram Vashist v. Municipal Corpn. of Delh [(1995) 1 SCC 47] , wherein R.M. Sahai, J., speaking for the Bench opined: (SCC p. 54, para 6)

#6. Reserving any site for any street, open space, park, school, etc. in a layout plan is normally a public purpose as it is inherent in such reservation that it shall be used by the public in general. The effect of such reservation is that the owner ceases to be a legal owner of the land in dispute and he holds the land for the benefit of the society or the public in general. It may result in creating an obligation in nature of trust and may preclude the owner from transferring or selling his interest in it. It may be true as held by the High Court that the interest which is left in the owner is a residuary interest which may be nothing more than a right to hold this land in trust for the specific purpose specified by the coloniser in the sanctioned layout plan. But the question is, does it entitle the Corporation to claim that the land so specified should be transferred to the authority free of cost. That is not made out from any provision in the Act or on any principle of law. The Corporation by virtue of the land specified as open space may get a right as a custodian of public interest to manage it in the interest of the society in general. But the right to manage as a local body is not the same thing as to claim transfer of the property to itself. The effect of transfer of the property is that the transfer or ceases to be owner of it and the ownership stands transferred to the person in whose favour it is transferred. The resolution of the Committee to transfer land in the colony for park and school was an order for transfer without there being any sanction for the same in law.

#36. In the present case, the petitioner claims that his application for sanction of a building map has been wrongfully rejected by the respondent authority. The reason for rejection is that the petitioner is not entitled for being sanctioned the said map as per the regulations of 2010, and specially that he could not produce the lease deed which according to the respondents is mandatory condition for sanctioning of the map. There is no dispute that the petitioner is the owner of the property, the same having been transferred in his favour by the respondents by means of a deed of exchange executed between them on 26/03/2011. By the said deed of exchange the petitioners became the absolute owners of the property. The property which is transferred to the petitioner was previously acquired by 16 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 the State Government for the NOIDA, and as the original land of the petitioner was utilised by the NOIDA for its development purposes.

#37. Right to property includes right to construct on the property owned by him subject to the applicable regulations made in this regard. In T.Vijayalakshmi and others vs. Town Planning Member and another (2006) 8 SCC 502 it was held by the Apex Court that the right to property would include right to construct a building. Such a right, however, can be restricted by legislation, which must stand test of reasonableness. The right to property has also been included as human right and is part of right to development, which is in turn has been held to be right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. To enjoy property is a right which is protected under article 300-A of the constitution of India, and denial of sanction of map, is depriving an individual of his right of property, and the same can be done only with the sanction of law.

#8. To determine the legality and validity of the impugned orders passed by NOIDA as well as the State Government, the provisions of law which are applicable for sanction of the map deserves scrutiny to examine the reasons given for rejection of the map and to determine whether the same are supported by the statutory and regulatory provisions.

#39. According to section 2(f) of The U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976, transferee has been defined to mean a person (including a firm or other body of individuals whether incorporated or not to whom any land or building is transferred in any manner whatsoever, under this Act and includes his successors and assigns). Section 6 provides for the functions of the authority which include acquisition of land in the industry development area, to prepare a plan for development of the industrial area, to demarcate and develop sites for industrial, commercial and residential purpose according to the plan and sub clause (f) provides to allocate and transfer either by way of sale or lease or otherwise plots of land for industry, commercial or residential purposes.

#40. Section 7 of the Act provides for the power to the authority in respect of transfer of land according to which the authority may sell, lease or otherwise transfer, whether by auction, allotment or otherwise any land or building belonging to the authority in the industrial development area on such terms and conditions as it may, subject to any rules that may be made under the Act think fit to impose.

#41. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions indicate that the authority has been given sufficient powers and discretion to sell the land to the transferee either through a lease or by an auction, allotment any other method any land belonging to the authority in the industry area. The 17 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 arguments of the respondents that the land belonging to the authority can be transferred only by a lease deed is clearly not supported by the aforesaid statutory provisions. Section 7 is very clear in its terms which gives wide power to the authority to â œtransferâ €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the the land of the authority. The transfer of land can be effected by selling, leasing or otherwise transferring the land of the authority, through the process of auction, allotment or otherwise. Therefore on careful examination of the words is used in section 7 we do not find that they restrict the authority to transfer the land of the authority to any individual or corporate by only leasing the said land, but it can transfer the land in any other manner possible because the words â œotherwise transferâ €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the used in section 7 will have to be liberally interpreted as it unequivocally indicates the intention of the legislature which is to provides for transfer of the land by â œsell or â œleaseâ €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the . In case the intention of the legislature was to restrict the transfer of the land through â œleaseâ €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the only, as vehemently argued by Senior counsel for the respondent, then the words â œotherwise transferâ €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the would be rendered meaningless and redundant. While interpreting any statute the intention of the legislature must be gathered from all the words used in the enactment, and all the words have to be given itâ ™s due and proper €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the meaning in the context they have been used. Accordingly, the authority was within its competence to â œtransferâ €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the the land through a deed of exchange.

#42. The action of the respondents in rejecting the application for sanction of map may amount to deprivation of the right to enjoy the property which according to the petitioner is his Constitutional right as per article 300-A of the Constitution of India. In this regard it would be relevant to consider that deprivation is to be distinguished from restriction of the rights following from ownership. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Bombay Vrs. Bhanji Munji & Anr., reported in (1954) 2 SCC 386, has observed that substantial deprivation is meant the sort of deprivation that substantially robs a man of those attributes of enjoyment which normally accompany rights to, or an interest in, property. The form is unessential. It is the substance that [one] must seek, for the ready reference, paragraph-6 & 7 of the said judgment is being referred as under:- "6. In State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose [State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose, (1953) 2 SCC 688 : 1954 SCR 587] and Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd. [Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd., (1953) 2 SCC 791 : 1954 SCR 674] the majority of the Judges were agreed that Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 deal with different subjects and cover different fields. There was some disagreement about the nature and scope of the difference but all were agreed that there was no overlapping. We need not examine those differences here because it is 18 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 enough to say that Article 19(1)(f) read with clause (5) postulates the existence of property which can be enjoyed and over which rights can be exercised because otherwise the reasonable restrictions contemplated by clause (5) could not be brought into play. If there is no property which can be acquired, held or disposed of, no restriction can be placed on the exercise of the right to acquire, hold and dispose of it, and as clause (5) contemplates the placing of reasonable restrictions on the exercise of those rights it must follow that the article postulates the existence of property over which these rights can be exercised. In our opinion, this was decided in principle in Gopalan case [A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 SCC 228 : 1950 SCR 88] where it was held that the freedoms relating to the person of a citizen guaranteed by Article 19 assume the existence of a free citizen and can no longer be enjoyed if a citizen is deprived of his liberty by the law of preventive or punitive detention. In the same way, when there is a substantially total deprivation of property which is already held and enjoyed, one must turn to Article 31 to see how far that is justified.

#7. It was argued as against this that this rule can only apply when there is a total deprivation of property and Article 19(1)(f) cannot be excluded if there is the slightest vestige of a right on which the article can operate. This has also been answered in substance in Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd. [Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd., (1953) 2 SCC 791 : 1954 SCR 674] These articles deal with substantial and substantive rights and not with illusory phantoms of title. When every form of enjoyment which normally accompanies an interest in this kind of property is taken away leaving the mere husk of title, Article 19(1)(f) is not attracted. As was said by one of us in Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd. [Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd., (1953) 2 SCC 791 : 1954 SCR 674] at SCC p. 831, para 44: "44. ... By substantial deprivation [is meant] the sort of deprivation that substantially robs a man of those attributes of enjoyment which normally accompany rights to, or an interest in, property. The form is unessential. It substance [one] seek.â €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the

#43. In light of the aforesaid discussion the other question which arises for determination is as to whether a deed of exchange would be a transfer deed as provided for in checklist-1B of the regulations of 2010 as a valid document of ownership.

#44. A transfer deed has not been defined either in the Act of 1976 or in the regulations of 2010. Checklist 1-B (i) provides for submission of ownership documents which is followed by semi colon, and further provides details or lists of the instruments of ownership like copies of allotment letter, possession certificate, the lease deed (transfer deed case of transfer), and dimension plans issued by the authority which have to be submitted along 19 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 with application of sanction of map. The respondents have urged that the aforesaid provisions should be interpreted in a manner where only a lease deed would be the only relevant document pertaining to the ownership of the property which necessarily has to be submitted before consideration of the application for sanction of map. The counsel for the petitioner on the other hand has submitted that the provisions with regard to the sanction of map have to be liberally interpreted in sync with the object of the legislation which is to secure a planned development and not to deprive any individual rights property.

#45. In this regard it is necessary to take into account the judgments of the Supreme Court:-

45.1 The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Edukanti Kistamma (Dead) through LRs & Ors. Vrs. S. Venkatareddy (dead) through LRs. & Ors [(2010) 1 SCC 756], at paragraph 26 held as under: "26. ....... Interpretation of a beneficial legislation with a narrow pedantic approach is not justified. In case there is any doubt, the court should interpret a beneficial legislation in favour of the beneficiaries and not otherwise as it would be against the legislative intent. For the purpose of interpretation of a statute, the Act is to be read in its entirety. The purport and object of the Act must be given its full effect by applying the principles of purposive construction. The court must be strong against any construction which tends to reduce a statute's utility. The provisions of the statute must be construed so as to make it effective and operative and to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate the same. The court has the duty to construe the statute to promote the object of the statute and serve the purpose for which it has been enacted and should not efface its very purpose...â ¦" €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the

45.2 Similarly, the Honâ Ÿble Apex Court in the case of Executive Engineer, €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the Southern Electricity Supply Company of Orissa Limited (Southco) & Anr. Vs. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill [(2012) 2 SCC 108], at paragraph 46 and 49 has been pleased under: "46. "Purposive construction" is certainly a cardinal principle of interpretation. Equally true is that no rule of interpretation should either be overstated or overextended. Without being overextended or overstated, this rule of interpretation can be applied to the present case. It points to the conclusion that an interpretation which would attain the object and purpose of the Act has to be given precedence over any other interpretation which may not further the cause of the statute. The development of law is particularly liberated both from literal and blinkered interpretation, though to a limited extent. 20 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025

#49. Once the Court decides that it has to take a purposive construction as opposed to textual construction, then the legislative purpose sought to be achieved by such an interpretation has to be kept in mind.

#46. It is evident from the provision as contained under Article 300-A, whereby and whereunder, no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The word 'deprive' as contained therein and for the purpose of depriving a person from the property right, the same can only be authority law.

#47. In the present case, the right to occupy the premises has gone as also the right to transfer, assign, let or sub-let. What is left is but the mere husk of title in the leasehold interest : a forlorn hope that the force of this law will somehow expend itself before the lease runs out."

#48. Article 31(1) [the "Rule of law" doctrine] and not Article 31(2) [which had embodied the doctrine of Eminent Domain]. Article 300A enables the State to put restrictions on the right to property by law. That law has to be reasonable. It must comply with other provisions of the Constitution. The limitation or restriction should not be arbitrary or excessive or what is beyond what is required in public interest. The limitation or restriction must not be disproportionate to the situation or excessive. The legislation providing for deprivation of property under Article 300A must be "just, fair and reasonable" as understood in terms of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 26(b), 301, etc. Thus, in each case, courts will have to examine the scheme of the impugned Act, its object and purpose.

#49. Keeping in view the judgement of the Supreme Court, at the very outset it is noticed that The Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 by which the NOIDA has been created does not place any restriction of the nature is sought to be imposed on the petitioner. Section 8 of the said act gives the power to the authority to issue directions for the purposes of proper planning and development of the industry development area. For convenience section 8 is reproduced hereunder:- Power of issue directions in respect of creation of building

#8. (1) For the purposes of proper planning and development of the industrial development area, the authority may issue such direction as it may consider necessary, regarding. Chief Executive Officer Staff of the or Authority Function of the Authority Power to the Authority in respect of transfer of land Power of issue directions in respect of creation of building (a) architectural features of the elevation or frontage of any building; (b) the alignment of buildings on any site; 21 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 (c) the restrictions and conditions in regard to open spaces to be maintained in and around buildings and height and character of buildings; (d) the number of residential buildings that may be erected on any site; (e) Regulations of erections of shops, workshops, warehouses, factories or buildings; (f) maintenance of height and position of walls, fences, hedges or any other structure or architecture constructions; (g) maintenance of amenities; (h) restrictions of use of any site for a purpose other than that for which it has been allocated; (i) the means to be provided for proper (i) drainage of waste water (ii) disposal of industrial waste, and (iii) disposal of town refuse. (2) Every transferee shall comply with the directions issued under sub- section (1) and shall as expeditiously as possible erect and building or take such other steps as may be necessary to comply with such directions.

#50. From a bare perusal of the above it is clear that the subjects on which directions can be passed by the authority have been delineated in clause (a) to (h) which are confined to the details of the buildings proposed and the features which would be essential for such building. There is no reference in section 8 to any essential attributes pertaining to the ownership of property or the type of document which must be presented to demonstrate title. In subclause (2) it has been provided that the transferee must comply with the directions issued by the authority.

#51. Section 9 of the act of 1976 provides for injunction against the individuals from erecting or buying any building in the area in contravention of the building regulations made under subsection (2), which in turn provides for framing of the regulations by the authority with the prior approval of the State Government, and the matters on which such regulations can be made have also been provided. For ready reference section 9 is quoted hereinbelow: - Ban on erection of building in contravention of regulations 22 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025

#9. (1) No person shall erect or occupy any building in the industrial development area in contravention of any building regulation made under sub-section (2). (2) The Authority may by notification and with prior approval of the State Government make regulations to regulate the erection of buildings and such regulations may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely (a) The materials to be used for external and partition walls, roofs, floors and other parts of a buildings and their position or location or the method of construction; (b) Lay out plan of the building whether industrial, commercial or residential; (c) the height and slope of the roofs and floors of any building which is intended to be used for residential or cooking purposes; (d) the ventilation in, or the space to be left about any building or part there of to secure circulation of air or for the prevention of fire; (e) the number and height of the storeys of any building; (f) the means to be provided for the ingress and egress to and form any building; (g) the minimum dimensions of rooms intended for use as living rooms or sleeping rooms and the provisions of ventilation; (h) any other matter in furtherance of the proper regulation of erection, completion and occupation of buildings and (i) the certificates necessary and incidental to the submission of plans amended plans and completion reports.

#52. It is an exercise of powers conferred under section 9 (2) of Act of 1976 the New Okhla Industrial Development Area Building Regulations, 2010 were framed and were notified on 30/11/2010. Clause 2.4 defines an applicant to mean:-

2.4 Applicant means the person who has legal title to a land or building and includes, (i) An agent or trustee who receives the rent on behalf of the owner; (ii) An agent or trustee who receives the rent of or is entrusted with or is concerned with any building devoted to religious or charitable purposes; 23 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 (iii) A receiver, executor or administrator or a manager appointed by any Court of competent jurisdiction to have the charge, or to exercise the rights of the owner; and (iv) A mortgagee in possession

#53. The relevant provisions pertaining to layout/building permit and occupancy are provided for in clause 4.0 and 5.0 which are as follows:-

4.0 Building permit -- No person shall erect any building or a boundary wall or fencing without obtaining a prior permit thereof, from the Chief Executive Officer or an Officer authorized by the Chief Executive Officer for this purpose.

5.0 Application for building permit (1) Every person who intends to erect a building within the Industrial Development Area shall give application in the Form given at Appendix (2) The application for building permit shall be accompanied by documents as mentioned in checklist annexed to Appendix 1. (3) Such application shall not be considered until the applicant has paid the fees mentioned in Regulation no. 10.

#54. In appendix -1 contains the checklist 1-B which provides for application for buildings other than those on individual residential plots, the relevant extract follows:- CHECKLIST -1 B (For buildings other than those on individual residential plots) (i) Ownership documents; copies of allotment letter, possession certificate, the lease deed (transfer deed in case of transfer), and dimension plan issued authority.

#55. In the present case the reasons for rejection of the application of the petitioners for sanction of the map is that no lease deed has been provided by the petitioner to demonstrate his title and he has submitted a deed of exchange entered between the petitioners and the NOIDA is which demonstrates that the petitioners are in exclusive ownership of the property. This according to the respondents disentitles him from raising any construction on the disputed property.

#56. The petitioners undoubtedly would be included in the definition of applicants as per clause 2.4 of the regulations of 2010 as they have a legal title to the property in dispute, and this fact is not contested by the respondents. Once the petitioners are held to be applicants, as per 24 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 regulations of 2010, then they have a right to submit the application for sanction of the building plan. The documents which accompany the application are firstly the ownership documents as provided for in checklist 1-B of appendix 1 and apart from other documents an applicant has to submit lease deed (transfer deed in case of transfer). The petitioner has submitted a deed of exchange along with the application. It has been submitted on behalf of the respondents that the NOIDA in the usual course of business execute lease deed in favour of the allottee, and any subsequent transaction is only through a transfer deed if permitted by NOIDA.

#57. A transfer deed is a legal document that is used to transfer ownership of a property from one person to another. The NOIDA executed a deed of exchange in favour of the petitioner in exercise of power under section 6 (f) of the Act of 1976 to transfer the disputed property in favour of the petitioner in 2011. The transfer of land by through a deed of exchange is undisputed and even otherwise the NOIDA was competent to execute and transfer land as per the Act of 1976 in as much as it was within their competence to transfer either by be of sale or lease or otherwise plots of land for industrial, commercial or residential purposes. We do not find any restriction on limitation on the right of the NOIDA to transfer the land in the development area only through the lease deed and not any other transfer deed including deed of exchange. Once the land has been transferred favour of the petitioner, they become the transferee and entitled for making an application for sanction of map. We even find that as per regulation 2.4 the petitioner would be included in the definition of an â œapplicantâ €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the , and accordingly this would also entitle him to prefer an application for sanction of map. The arguments of the respondents to the contrary seeking to deny status of transferee to the petitioner, are not supported by the by statutory provisions, and accordingly rejected.

#58. While interpreting the provisions of regulations of 2010, the objective would be to make it effective and operative and to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate the same. The court has the duty to construe the statute to promote the object of the statute and serve the purpose for which it has been enacted and should not efface its very purpose. It has fairly been submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that this is the only case so far for the NOIDA where an application has been rejected only because it is not accompanied by lease deed. The regulations of 2010 contain machinery provisions which have been framed by the NOIDA for the effective discharge of duties vested under the Act of 1976, and to promote the objects delineated therein. The regulations cannot create or extinguish a substantial vested right of any individual which is not relatable to any of the matters provided for under section 9(2) of Act of 1976. Merely because 25 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 regulations can be framed to provide for the documents necessary and incidental for submission of plans as per sub clause (i) of section 9(2), cannot be interpreted or utilised to efface the vested right of an individual of his right of property to get his map sanctioned. The regulations will have to be interpreted having due consideration to the substantial provisions contained in the parent legislation, which is the Act of 1976, and in any case no interpretation can be made which runs counter to the special provisions of the parent legislation. Once we have already held that the deed of exchange was validly executed by NOIDA, though in the discretion they could have transferred it through lease deed, or a Sale deed etc., but their wisdom they resolved to execute a deed of exchange cannot be questioned. The land which was transferred to the petitioner was the acquired land, and not any land which was purchase by the petitioner from a private party. Whatever rights vest in the disputed land with the petitioner, have been granted by NOIDA. Once the land has been transferred by the NOIDA in exercise of powers under Act of 1976, then the transferee would be entitled to have a map sanctioned as per regulations of 2010. Merely because the instrument by which the land has been vested in the petitioner is not a lease deed, cannot be a ground for rejection of the application for sanction of map.

#59. The respondents have relied upon the judgement of division bench of this court in the case of Paradise Development versus Chief Town & Country planner reported in 2017 SCC online All 2744. The grievance of the petitioners in the said case was with regard to the rejection of the layout plan on the ground that the land on which the layout plan was being sought to be approved, was shown as â œindustrial and partly greenâ €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the in the master plans, and accordingly the 1st issue decided by the division bench was that even if the land has been declared to be â œabadiâ €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the still it does not in any manner permit the tenure holder to use such land for development of residential colony unless the same has been shown in a master plan as such.

#60. The land in the said case was situated in village Illabas which was shown as â œagricultureâ €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the  in the master plan â “ 2001, master plan â “ €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the 2011 and master plan â “ 2021 and accordingly the Division bench of the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the was of the view that the land falls in the agricultural land use zone as per map in which development of residential colony was not permissible and accordingly he dismiss the writ petition.

#61. The learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents has placed reliance on the observations of the Division bench in paragraph, 29 of the said judgement the Act of 1976 does not permit acquisition of land and its development straight away by a private builder. 26 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025

#62. In the case of Paradise Development, the petitioner therein had purchased land in dispute under different sale deeds during the year 1979 â “89, and submitted its layout plan in the name of Vikrant Vihar. The €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the grievance raised by the petitioners therein was with regard to the communication dated 18/04/1990 informing the petitioner that the said village has been notified to be part of NOIDA and accordingly a no objection certificate regarding the development could not be given by the Chief Town & Country planner. Subsequently the NOIDA was also directed to consider the plan submitted by the petitioner therein, which was also rejected on 17/12/2004 on the ground that the land in question was shown as â œindustrial and partly greenâ €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the in the master plan and accordingly on such a land of residential building could not be sanctioned.

#63. The other ground on which the NOIDA had rejected the application for sanction of the building plan in the said case was that by implication, the provisions of the said Act do not permit acquisition of land and its development directly by â œPrivate builder. €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the

#64. The Division bench duly considered the arguments of NOIDA and accepted its order of rejection of the application for sanction of building plan holding that the land on which the plan was sought to be sanctioned is recorded as agriculture on which no residential colony was permissible.

#65. The facts in the present case are clearly distinguishable, inasmuch as the land on which the petitioner is seeking sanction of the building plan has been shown as â œresidentialâ €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the in the Master Plan as distinguished from â œindustrial or greenbeltâ €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the in the case of paradise development where the application for sanction of map was rejected on the ground that the land use was not â œresidentialâ €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the on which no group housing scheme could be approved.

#66. The petitioner cannot be called a â œprivate developerâ €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the in as much as the land was transferred in his favour by the NOIDA. The instrument by which the land was transferred was the sole choice and prerogative of the NOIDA as per their 171st Board resolution. No reasons have been given by NOIDA for entering into a deed of exchange and not a lease deed. In any view of the matter in the present case the land has been transferred by the NOIDA into the hands of the petitioner and they have not acquired the same from any private individual. There is no dispute that for the purposes of construction/development of the plots allotted private developer, who purchase the land from NOIDA after paying premium for the land which is equivalent to the cost of the land are permitted to raise construction as per law after approval of map. We see no difference between a person who has been allotted land by NOIDA and the petitioner who has been given land through a deed of exchange for raising construction. 27 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025

#67. In the present case there is no dispute that in the master plan the land of the petitioner has been shown as land reserved for residential purposes, and therefore the facts of the instant case are clearly distinguishable from the facts in the case of Paradise Development where approval of map was sought on green belt.

#68. It was submitted on behalf of the respondents that the lease deed should provide the details of the nature of the land as to whether it is residential, commercial or green area while in the case of the petitioner there is no mention about the nature of land in the deed of exchange, and therefore, the disputed land cannot be held to be residential. Though this aspect was not dealt with or considered in the impugned order, but as it is argued by the learned Counsel for the respondents it deserves consideration. The instrument of transfer of immovable property may be lease deed or a sale deed should contain essential features and details including the purpose of the deed, the details of the parties involved in the agreement, description of property, consideration, signatures of the parties and finally the instrument is registered. We do not find that there is any mandatory or statutory requirement about there being any recital mentioning about the nature of land in the said deeds as to whether it is residential, commercial or a green area. Even the relevant Act and regulations of the respondents are silent in this regard and therefore it cannot be said that because the deed of exchange does not mention the nature of land, the petitioners cannot claim the status of the said land to be residential. The nature of land is provided in the master plan prepared for development as per Act of 1976. We do not find merit in the arguments of the respondents and is accordingly rejected.

#69. It was further argued that as only lease rent is recovered from the lessees, and the NOIDA authorities do not levy any property tax, and therefore they do not have any other source of income to maintain the NOIDA area, and therefore the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise any construction, as it would cause huge financial loss to the NOIDA in case there are directed to sanction the building map.

#70. To consider the arguments of the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondents, we have perused the provisions of U.P Industrial Area Development Act, 1976. Section 11 of the Act of 1976 which provides for levy of tax, and the authority with the previous approval of the State Government has the power of levy such taxes as it may consider necessary in respect of any site of building on the transferee or occupied thereof provided that the total incidence of such tax shall not exceed 1% of the market value of such site including the site of the building. Section 13 provides for imposition of penalty and mode of recovery of arrears of rent or 28 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 any other amount due on account of the transfer of the site of building by the authority. Therefore, sufficient powers have been vested with the NOIDA to levy tax with the prior approval of the State Government, and therefore the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent seems to be incorrect to the extent that only lease rent can be levied and collected by NOIDA. The Act of 1976 provides sufficient powers to levy taxes, and as it by the learned counsel the respondent that the only income of the authority is through realisation of the lease deed and in case they are directed to sanction the map in absence of the property having been transferred on lease they will incur huge loss, seems to be incorrect. We find the substantial powers have been vested in the authority to levy and realised tax, and in case they have not levied any other tax, is as per their discretion, but it cannot be a ground for non-consideration of an application for sanction of map that a lease deed has not been entered into by the NOIDA, and they will incur huge loss in case there are directed to sanction such a map. Accordingly, merely because NOIDA has have not entered into a lease deed with the petitioner, cannot be a ground for denial of permission to raise construction. The said reason though not recorded in the impugned order is illegal and arbitrary and contrary to provisions of Act of 1976 and therefore rejected.

#71. The functions of the authority as stated in Section 6 of the Act of 1976 are to secure a planned development of the industrial development area. To achieve planned development, they have been given the power to acquire land, prepare a plan, to demarcate and develop sites for various purposes, to provide infrastructure, to allocate and transfer the land, to regulate the erection of buildings and to lay down the purpose for which particular site of plot shall be used.

#72. The functions as provided for under Section 6 have to be carried out over the â œindustrial development areaâ €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the which has been defined under section 2(d) of the Act of 1976 to mean an area declared as such by the State Government by notification. Once the area has been notified to be an industrial development area by the State Government and the powers and functions of the NOIDA as provided in section 6 of the said Act comes into operation and it is only land in the notified area which can be acquired, and plans made for proper and planned development of the said area.

#73. To make the provisions of the Act of 1976 more effective and to secure its objects of a planned development in the development area the authority has a right to issue directions in respect of erection of buildings as provided in section 8, and further as per section 9 no person shall erect or occupy any building in the industry development area in contravention of any building regulations. Section 6A further empowers the authority to authorise 29 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 any person to provide or maintain or continue to provide or maintain any infrastructure amenities under the Act and to collect tax or fee, levied. Accordingly, they have been given the power to authorise collection of tax or fee.

#74. Therefore, the scheme of the Act indicates that the authority has been given wide powers akin to a local/municipal authority. The powers of the authority would run as per the provisions of Act of 1976 within the confines of the area notified by the State Government as â œindustrial development €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the areaâ €˜eminent domain’ may interfere with the . It is within the development area that land can be acquired by the authority and the buildings have to be constructed as per the provisions contained in the regulations made thereunder. We do not find that authority is under any obligation to acquire the entire notified industrial development area, but from the date of notification any buildings proposed or made in the development area would be subject to the building bye-laws framed by the authority under section 9 (2). Though we find substance in the arguments of the respondents to the extent that for proper development the land has to be acquired and developed according to the master plan and Zonal plan prepared by the authority. Considering the fact that land parcels owned by marginal farmer are small in size and scattered, after the acquisition they have to be consolidated and after the process of rectangulation a proper development scheme is to be framed otherwise it will lead to haphazard development, which will be contrary to regular and planned development. For the said purpose the land must be acquired by the authority, followed by the preparation of development plan, and subsequently allotted after realising the development charges and the cost of land etc. We are concerned by the fact that even after the passage of more than 4 decades the entire land in the notified area has not been acquired, and on the other hand the authority would not sanction the building plans in the areas where the land has not been acquired. In fact, the area in which the development is proposed by the authority in the notified area ought to be acquired within a reasonable period of time. During this period the authority would be justified in not sanctioning the building plans on the ground that the said areas are proposed to be developed as per the plans prepared by the authority. But in case the land in the notified area is not acquired within a reasonable period, the rejection of the building plans would clearly be illegal and arbitrary and would be violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of India.

#75. In the present case, the facts are peculiar and probably the only solitary instance, as stated by the respondents, where, by a deed of exchange, the land has been allotted to the petitioner. Prior to allotment to the petitioner, the said land was acquired by the authority, and also shown in the master plan for residential purposes. It is only after following the entire procedure, 30 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 the land was allotted, and it is on the said land that an application for sanction of the building plan was made by the petitioners. In the aforesaid circumstances, we do not find any reason for the authority not to consider the application of the petitioner for sanction of the building plan, and the reasons for rejection, as already discussed, are clearly illegal and arbitrary.

#76. Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein-above, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders dated 11.09.2023 and 10.04.2024 are quashed.

#77. The matter is remitted to respondent No.2 to pass a fresh order considering the application for sanction of map on merits in light of the Regulations of 2010 treating the petitioner to be eligible for due consideration and sanction of the map, in accordance with law. Let the fresh exercise be carried out expeditiously, but not later than 4 weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before him.

4.1. It is admitted that the order passed by the writ court was not complied with and application of the applicant was refused on the ground that as per the Regulation, 2010, only the case of lease holders are considered and in the case of the applicant, there is no lease, therefore, application is not maintainable. As the aforesaid fact has already been dealt by the writ court, then present contempt application was filed, in which, notice was issued and matter was fixed for 30.4.2025, and thereafter, on

20.5.2025. The orders dated 4.4.2025, 30.4.2025 & 20.5.2025 passed in present contempt application are as under :- 31 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025

4.4.2025

#1. Heard.

#2. Contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that despite the Writ Court vide order dated 22.11.2024 passed in Writ C No.3944 of 2024, a copy of which is Annexure-1 to the petition, having specifically remitted the matter to the respondent No.2 (sole respondent herein) to pass a fresh order considering the application for sanction of map on merits in light of the Regulations of 2010 treating the petitioner/applicant to be eligible for due consideration and sanction of the map, yet by means of the order dated

24.12.2024, a copy of which is Annexure-6 to the petition, the application has been rejected on technicalities.

#3. Contention is that order of writ court dated 22.11.2024 has attained finality consequently there cannot be any occasion for the respondents to have passed the aforesaid order and hence prima facie a case for contempt is made out.

#4. Issue notice to the respondent to show cause as to why the proceedings for contempt of the Court be not initiated against him for non-compliance of the judgment and order dated 22.11.2024 passed in Writ C No.3944 of

#5. List on the date indicated in the notice as fresh.

#6. The authorities while serving notice on the respondent-contemnor shall strictly adhere to the directions issued by this Court vide order dated

07.06.2021 in Contempt No. 670 of 2021.

30.4.2025

#1. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that property in question was given to the applicant by way of a exchange deed by New Okhla Industrial Development Authority and the area in question is identified for the purpose of residents. He further submits that as the map was not being sanctioned, therefore, Writ Petition No.13466 of 2022 was filed, which was dismissed by directing the authorities to pass appropriate orders on the application for sanction of map within a period of 45 days, subsequently due to non compliance of the order of the court, contempt application was preferred, then order dated 11.9.2023 was passed by the competent authority for refusing to grant the building permit to the applicant. He next submitted that against aforesaid order, Revision under Section 41 (3) of U.P Urban Planning & Development Act read with Section 12 of U.P. Industrial Development Area Development Act, 1976 was preferred and the said 32 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 revision was rejected on 10.4.2024, thereafter, aforesaid both the orders were challenged before this Court in Writ C No.3944 of 2024, which was allowed by setting aside the orders dated 11.9.2023 & 10.4.2024 and the matter was remitted back to the competent authority to pass a fresh order considering the application for sanction of map in the light of Regulations of 2010 treating the applicant to be eligible for due consideration and sanction of the map, in accordance with the law.

#2. Learned counsel for the applicant also submits that claim of the applicant was rejected on the ground which was already considered and rejected by the writ court as the same is discussed in para - 68.

#3. The direction passed by this Court was not considered by the respondent and rejected the application of the applicant on the ground that said area is undeveloped as per provisions of Section 6 of the UPIADA, however, the direction of this Court was treating the applicant to be eligible for due consideration and sanction of the map, which was not considered in the correct prospective, therefore, respondents be summoned and punished accordingly.

#4. List this case on 20.5.2025 within top ten cases.

#5. In the meantime, Sri Waseequddin, learned counsel for the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority shall seek written instructions from the respondent that why the order of the writ court was not complied with in letter and spirit.

#6. Let two hard & soft copy of the contempt application be provided to learned counsel for the N.O.I.D.A.

#7. Registry is also directed to show the name of Sri Wasequddin, Advocate as counsel for the N.O.I.D.A.

20.5.2025

#1. Vakalatnama filed by Shri Vinod Kumar Shahi and Shri Waseeq Uddin Ahmed, Advocates on behalf of the respondent-New Okhla Industrial Development Authority is taken on record.

#2. Learned counsel for the respondent prays for sometime to file affidavit of compliance.

#3. List this case on 28.05.2025 at 11.30 a.m.

#4. By the next date of listing, the respondent shall file affidavit of compliance. 33 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 The relevant record be also placed before this Court on the next date by some responsible Officer.

4.2. It is further evident that orders dated 4.4.2025, 30.4.2025 and 20.5.2025 passed in the present contempt application were challenged in the Special Leave Petition (Civil) Dairy No.30185 of 2025, in which, on 29.7.2025, following order was passed :- 34 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 35 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025

4.3. In pursuance of aforesaid order, contempt proceeding was deferred by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, thereafter, vide order dated 28.11.2025, Hon'ble Supreme Court expressed anguish on the conduct of officials of NOIDA and directed for listing of aforesaid S.L.P. on 15.12.2025 and on 15.12.2025, S.L.P. was dismissed. The orders dated 28.11.2025 & 15.12.2025 passed in Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.21085-21088 of 2025 are as under :- 36 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 37 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 38 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 39 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 40 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025

4.4. It is undisputed fact that draft Regulation, 2025 was also placed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court but Hon'ble Supreme Court declined to entertain the same, thereafter, application for dismissal of contempt application alongwith undated affidavit was filed by Mr. Lokesh M., Chief Executive Office, NOIDA with the averment that applicant is duly entitled to seek sanction/approval of the map in accordance with the Regulation, 2025. The first and last page of application for dismissal of contempt application alongwith undated affidavit are as under : 41 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 42 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025

4.5. Thereafter, an application for impleadment was filed by the learned counsel for the applicant on 28.1.2026 for impleading the new incumbent as respondent no.2, in which, notice was issued, then respondent no.2 filed application for dismissal of contempt application alongwith counter affidavit dated 12.3.2026 stating therein that applicant may file an application for approval of map through deed of exchange under the provisions of Regulation, 2025 and in this regard, a letter dated 12.3.2026 has already been issued to the applicant.

4.6. It is also evident from the record that to consider the case of the applicant under the provisions of Regulation, 2025, the draft rules of Regulation, 2025 was placed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court but Hon'ble the Supreme Court declined to entertain the plea of the respondents and the Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.21085-21088 of 2025 was dismissed and order of the writ court dated 22.11.2024 was upheld, therefore, undated affidavit filed in support of the application for dismissal of contempt application as well as affidavit dated 12.3.2026 filed in support of the application for dismissal of contempt application dated 20.3.2026 moved by the respondent no.1, Mr. Lokesh M., Chief Executive Officer, NOIDA are hereby rejected.

4.7. Further, it is evident from the letter dated letter dated

25.3.2026 that applicant was informed that his case is being 43 CAPL No. - 951 of 2025 considered under the provisions of Clause 3.2.2 of Regulation,

#5. List this case on 11.5.2026 within top ten cases.

#6. It is open to the applicant to apply afresh for sanction of map within a period of ten days from today.

#7. As per the letter dated 25.3.2026 issued by the Senior Manager (Planning), NOIDA, it is expected that by the next date of listing, affidavit of compliance be filed by the respondent no.2, failing which, he shall appear before this court for the purposes of framing of charge. March 26, 2026 Gaurav (Rajeev Singh,J.)