Mehboob Abdul Gafar Shaikh v. M/s Raviraj Lunkad Infracon India LLP

-WP-11314-2025.DOCIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONWRIT PETITION NO. 11314 OF 2025 Mehboob Abdul Gafar ShaikhAge- 52 years, Occ: Business,R/at: Malwadi, Hadapsar,Taluka Haveli, District-Pune....Petitioner(Org. Plaintiff)Versus1. M/s Raviraj Lunkad Infracon India LLP,A Limited Liability Partnership incorporatedUnder the provisions of the Limited LiabilityPartnership Act, 2008Having its registered office at:-Office Nos. 1 to 5, Millennium Star,Dhole Patil Road, Opp. Ruby Hall Clinic,Pune – 411 001.And formerly known as (M/s Raviraj Lunkad Infracon India Pvt Ltd)Through its Designated Partners:-Mr. Ravindra Naupatlal SaklaAge- 63 Years, Occ: Business. 2. M/s Raviraj Lunkad Infracon India Pvt Ltd,Company registered under the Companies Act,Office Nos. 1 to 5, Millennium Star,Dhole Patil Road, Opp. Ruby Hall Clinic,Pune – 411 001.3. M/s Raviraj Lunkad Infracon India Pvt Ltd,Through its Director:-Ravindra Naupatlal Sakla,Age – 63 years, Occ: Agriculture and Business,Office Nos. 1 to 5, Millennium Star,Dhole Patil Road, Opp. Ruby Hall Clinic,Pune – 411 001.…Respondents (R/1-Appellant in MCA No.138/2025)(R/2 and 3-Org.Defendants in RCSNo. 537/2025)ARS 1/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOCMr. Surel Shah, Senior Advocate, with Sandeep Phatak, for the Petitioner.Mr. Ashish Kamat, Senior Advocate, with Srushti Chalke, Parth Jain and Pallavi Pukale, i/b Drupad Patil, for the Respondents.CORAM :N. J. JAMADAR, J. RESERVED ON :28th JANUARY 2026 PRONOUNCED ON :17th FEBRUARY 2026JUDGMENT:1.Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. With the consent of thelearned Counsel for the parties heard finally.2.This Writ Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of Indiaassails the legality, propriety and correctness of a judgment and orderdated 19th June 2025 passed by the learned District Judge, Pune in MCANo. 138 of 2025, whereby the Appeal preferred by Respondent No.1-theoriginal Defendant No.1 against an order passed by the trial Court onan Application for temporary injunction (Exhibit 5) in SCS No. 537 of2025, thereby granting temporary injunction, came to be allowed bysetting aside the said order dated 24th March 2025.3.Background facts leading to this Petition can be stated in brief asunder:3.1 An Agricultural land bearing Survey No. 163/8/1A/2,admeasuring 1H 8 R, originally belonged to Anjanabai, Sopan TalekarARS 2/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOCand Balu Sopan Talekar. Upon demise of Anjanabai, Balu Talekarbecame the sole holder of the said land (“larger property”).3.2Balu Talekar executed an irrevocable Power of Attorney dated 17thAugust 2002 in favour of Shaikh Umar Latif Inamdar purportedly inconsideration of the latter delivering possession of the house premises,situated at Janta Vasahat, Malwadi, Hadapsar, Pune to Balu Talekar,3.3The Plaintiff claims the said Power of Attorney of Balu Talekarsold 48 R land out of the larger property (“the suit property”) for aconsideration of Rs. 16 Lakhs by executing a registered Sale Deed dated5th October 2010. The name of the Petitioner came to be mutated to theRecord of Rights of the suit property vide Mutation Entry No. 32102.3.4In the meanwhile, Balu Talekar, the owner of the larger property,transferred 38 R land out of the larger property under a registered SaleDeed dated 12th January 2007 in favour of Lunkad Infrastructure. Thesaid parcel of land was further transferred by Lunkad Infrastructure infavour of M/s Ashray Premises Private Limited Company (“M/s AshrayProperties”) under a registered Sale Deed dated 26th August 2010.3.5In the year 2024, the Petitioner-Plaintiff entered into negotiationswith Bhaskar Reddy to sell the suit property. On 30th November 2024,Mr Reddy, the prospective purchaser, published a public notice in thenewspapers. Defendants raised objections to the proposed transactionon multiple grounds. A copy of the Sale Deed dated 7th April 2017ARS 3/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOCwhich indicated that the Defendants had purchased 54 R land from M/sAshray Premises, was forwarded. Despite requisitions, the Defendantsdid not furnish the copies of other documents.3.6The Plaintiff claims that, in the month of February 2025, theDefendants started to cause obstruction to the peaceful possession andenjoyment of the Plaintiff over the suit property. Upon further enquiry, ittranspired that M/s Ashray Properties had obtained a purported SaleDeed dated 23rd October 2008 in respect of the 70 R land out of thelarger property from Balu Talekar and others. However, the said SaleDeed was registered on 2nd November 2011, only.3.7Asserting that the said Sale Deed is not legal, valid and does notbind the interest of the Plaintiff over the suit property, the suit came tobe instituted seeking a declaration that the Plaintiff is the owner of thesuit property and the consequential relief of injunction to restrain theDefendants from causing obstruction to the possession and enjoymentof the Plaintiff over the suit property and for compensation for thedamage caused to the tin fencing erected by the Plaintiff over the suitproperty.3.8In the said Suit an Application for temporary injunction torestrain the Defendants from causing obstruction to the possession andenjoyment of the Plaintiff over the suit property was filed.3.9The Defendants resisted the Application.ARS 4/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOC3.10It was, inter alia, contended that Balu Talekar had executed aSale Deed in favour of the M/s Ashray Properties in the year 2008 itself.Thereafter, Balu Talekar, the original owner had completely divestedhimself of any right, title and interest in the larger property. Therefore,the purported Sale Deed executed in favour of the Plaintiff by thealleged Power of Attorney of the original owner, in the year 2010, wasnon est in the eyes of law and did not confer any title on the Plaintiff. Itwas further contended that, the Plaintiff did not approach the Courtwith clean hands and suppressed the fact that the original owner hadinstituted a suit against the Plaintiff, being SCS No. 25 of 2014, seekinga declaration that the purported Sale Deed in favour of the Plaintiffdated 5th October 2010, is illegal, null and void, and that thepredecessor-in-title of the Defendants had raised objection to thetransaction between Power of Attorney holder of the original owner andthe Plaintiff in the year 2010, itself.3.11It was refuted that the Plaintiff was in possession and enjoymentof the suit property. On the contrary, the Defendants contended, thePlaintiff had attempted to cause obstruction to the possession andenjoyment of the Defendants over the suit property by employinghirelings.3.12By an order dated 24th March 2025, the learned Civil Judge,Senior Division, Pune, was persuaded to allow the Application forARS 5/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOCtemporary injunction opining inter alia that a prima facie case of thePlaintiff being in possession of the suit property, pursuant to aregistered instrument and the consequent certification of MutationEntry, was made out. The learned Civil Judge was of the view that thefailure to refer to SCS No. 25 of 2014 instituted by the original owneragainst the Plaintiff did not constitute suppression of a material fact.Thus, the trial Court restrained the Defendants from disturbing thepossession of the Plaintiff over the suit property during the pendency ofthe suit.3.13Being aggrieved, Defendant No.1 preferred an Appeal. By theimpugned judgment and order, the learned District Judge allowed theAppeal observing that though the Sale Deed in respect of the largerproperty was executed on 23rd October 2008, yet, in view of itsregistration on 2nd September 2011, the said instrument operates fromthe date of its execution. Thus, the said instrument would prevail overthe Sale Deed purportedly executed in favour of the Plaintiff on 5thOctober 2010.3.14 The learned District Judge was also of the view that under thePower of Attorney executed by the original owner in favour of ShaikhUmar Latif Inamdar, the possession of the suit property was notdelivered. Adverting to the suppression of SCS No. 25 of 2014 and thecorrespondence which had ensured before the Sale Deed came to beARS 6/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOCexecuted in favour of the Plaintiff, the learned District Judge observedthat the Plaintiff was not entitled to an equitable relief.3.15Being aggrieved, the Plaintiff has invoked the writ jurisdiction.4. I have heard Mr. Surel Shah, the learned Senior Advocate for thePetitioner/Plaintiff, and Mr. Ashish Kamat, the learned Senior Advocatefor the Respondents, at some length. The learned Senior Advocates tookthe Court through the pleadings before the trial Court and the materialon record. 5.Mr. Shah, the learned Senior Advocate for the Petitioner, took aslew of exceptions to the impugned order. Firstly, the learned DistrictJudge, according to Mr. Shah, transgressed the jurisdictional limits in anAppeal against a discretionary order. It was not open for the learnedDistrict Judge to substitute his view for the one taken by the trial Court.By no stretch of imagination, Mr. Shah submitted, it could be urged thatthe order passed by the trial Court is perverse. In the absence of theperversity in the order, the Appellate Court could not have interferedwith the discretionary order on the premise that a different view waspossible. To buttress these submissions, Mr. Shah placed a very strongreliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of RamakantAmbalal Choksi Vs Harish Ambalal Choksi and Ors.1 6.Secondly, Mr. Shah would urge, the learned District Judgecommitted a manifest error in not appreciating that the registered1 (2024) 11 SCC 351.ARS 7/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOCPower of Attorney was executed by the original owner in favour of theShaikh Umar Latif Inamdar in the year 2002 much before the executionof the instruments in favour of M/s Ashray Properties. Since the saidregistered Power of Attorney was in force, the authority of the Power ofAttorney was not diluted by execution of an unregistered Sale Deeddated 23rd October 2008 by the original owner in favour of M/s AshrayProperties. Thirdly, the learned District Judge was in error in holdingthat the subsequent registration of the said Sale Deed dated 23rdOctober 2008, pursuant to a Deed of Confirmation dated 11th May2011, made the said Sale Deed dated 23rd October 2008 valid andeffective from 23rd October 2008. It was submitted that theConfirmation Deed dated 11th May 2011 was a self-serving instrument. 7.Lastly, Mr. Shah would urge, incontrovertibly the name of thePlaintiff came to be mutated to the Record of Rights of the suit propertypursuant to a registered instrument. At no point of time any of theDefendants or their predecessor-in-title has assailed the said mutationentry. The Plaintiff has, thus, been in continuous and uninterruptedpossession of the suit property, since the year 2010. In that backdrop,the learned District Judge could not have interfered with the order ofinjunction which restrained the Defendants from causing obstruction tothe possession and enjoyment of the Plaintiff over the suit property. ARS 8/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOC8.In opposition to this, Mr. Kamat, the learned Senior Advocate forthe Respondents, would submit that, at the outset the challenge to theimpugned order, at the instance of the Petitioner cannot be entertained.The Petitioner, after the impugned order and during the pendency ofthis Petition, has sold his purported right, title and interest in the suitproperty to third parties under a registered Sale Deed dated 16thSeptember 2025. The Petitioner has not brought the said fact on recordnor the transferees have been impleaded as parties to the Petition. Sincethe Petitioner no longer holds any interest in the suit property nor canclaim to be in possession thereof, the challenge to the impugned orderat the instance of the Petitioner deserves to be rejected at the threshold. 9.Mr. Kamat would urge, the suit suffers from gross suppression offacts. Apart from the suppression of the suit instituted by Balu Talekaragainst the Plaintiff, i.e. SCS No. 25 of 2014 and the correspondencethat ensured after a public notice inviting objections to the transaction,preceding the purported sale in favour of the Plaintiff, there is noreference to the prior claims and a Consent Decree passed by the CivilJudge, Junior Division in RCS No. 1696 of 2006, under which BaluTalekar, had acknowledged the liability to execute the Sale Deed infavour of the persons at the instance of the Decree Holders therein.Pursuant to the said Consent Decree, the Sale Deed was executed byARS 9/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOCBalu Talekar in favour of M/s Ashray Properties to which the DecreeHolders were the consenting parties. 10.Mr. Kamat would further submit that the Power of Attorney dated17th August 2002 executed by Balu Talekar in favour of Shaikh UmarLatif Inamdar does not advance the case of the Plaintiff to the extentdesired. The said Power of Attorney nowhere indicates that thepossession of the suit property was delivered to the Power of Attorneythereunder. At any rate, before the said Power of Attorney could beacted upon, Balu Talekar had already executed the Sale Deed in respectof 70 R land in favour of M/s Ashray Properties and the Sale Deedremained to be registered only for the reason that the matter ofadjudication of stamp duty was pending before the authorities underthe Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. By the time the purported Sale Deedin favour of the Plaintiff came to be executed, Balu Talekar had divestedhimself of the ownership over the suit property. 11.Mr. Kamat would urge the aforesaid factors were not at alladverted to by the learned Civil Judge and, thus, the learned DistrictJudge was justified in correcting the error in the exercise of discretionby the trial Court. In these circumstances, according to Mr. Kamat, nocase for interference in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction is madeout. ARS 10/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOC12.To begin with, it is necessary to note the jurisdictional limits ofboth the Appellate Court, in an Appeal against a discretionary order,and the High Court in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction, arerequired to be kept in view. 13.The legal position is well recognized. Ordinarily, the appealCourt is not expected to interfere with the exercise of discretion in thematter of grant of injunction by the trial Court and substitute its owndiscretion for the same, except where it can be demonstrated that thediscretion has been exercised arbitrarily or perversely, or the impugnedorder is contrary to the settled principles of law. An arbitrariness in theexercise of discretion or perversity in the order passed by the trial Courtcan arise where the injunction has been granted sans material or thetrial court has declined to grant temporary injunction, despite existenceof justifiable material.14.A profitable reference in this context can be made to a threeJudge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Wander Ltd.and Anr. V/s. Antox India P. Ltd.2 wherein the following observationshave been made :“14.The appeals before the Division Bench wereagainst the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge.In such appeals, the Appellate Court will not interferewith the exercise of discretion of the court of firstinstance and substitute its own discretion except2 1990 (Supp) SCC 727.ARS 11/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOCwhere the discretion has been shown to have beenexercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely orwhere the court had ignored the settled principles oflaw regulating grant or refusal of interlocutoryinjunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion issaid to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court willnot reassess the material and seek to reach aconclusion different from the one reached by the courtbelow if the one reached by the court was reasonablypossible on the material. The appellate court wouldnormally not be justified in interfering with theexercise of discretion under appeal solely on theground that if it had considered the matter at the trialstage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. Ifthe discretion has been exercised by the Trial Courtreasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that theappellate court would have taken a different view maynot justify interference with the trial court's exercise ofdiscretion. After referring to these principlesGajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Pvt. Ltd. V/s.Pothan Joseph 3 : “... These principles are well established, but as hasbeen observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osention& Co. v. Johnston the law as to the reversal by a courtof appeal of an order made by a judge below in theexercise of his discretion is well established, and anydifficulty that arises is due only to the application ofwell settled principles in an individual case. The appellate judgment does not seem to deferto this principle.” (emphasis supplied) 3(1960) 3 SCR 713ARS 12/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOC15.Another three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case ofSkyline Education Institute (India) Pvt. Ltd. V/s. S.L.Vaswani and Anr.4after referring to the previous precedents, culled out the principleswhich govern the exercise of appellate jurisdiction against discretionaryorders, as under : “22.The ratio of the abovenoted judgments in thatonce the Court of first instance exercises its discretion togrant or refuse to grant relief of temporary injunctionand the said exercise of discretion is based uponobjective consideration of the material placed before theCourt and is supported by cogent reasons, the appellatecourt will be loath to interfere simply because on a denovo consideration of the matter it is possible for theappellate Court to form a different opinion on the issuesof prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparableinjury and equity.” (emphasis supplied )”16.In the case of Ramakant Ambalal Choksi (Supra), on whichreliance was placed by Mr. Shah, after adverting to aforesaid judgmentin the case of Wander Ltd (Supra) the Supreme Court enunciated thatthe principles of law explained by the Supreme Court in Wander Ltd(Supra) have been reiterated in a number of subsequent decisions of theSupreme Court. However, over a period of time the test laid down bythe Supreme Court as regards the scope of interference has been mademore stringent. The emphasis is now more on perversity rather than a4 (2010) 2 SCC 142ARS 13/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOCmere error of fact or law in the order granting injunction pending thefinal adjudication of the suit. It was further observed that the AppellateCourt in an Appeal from interlocutory order granting or declining togrant interim injunction is only required to adjudicate the validity ofsuch order applying the well settled principles governing the scope ofjurisdiction of the Appellate Court under Order 43 of the Code of CivilProcedure, 1908. The Appellate Court should not assume unlimitedjurisdiction and should guide its power within the contours laid down inthe Wander Ltd (Supra). 17.At this juncture, it is necessary to note that the perversity in theorder passed by the trial Court may creep in on account of non-consideration of the material which bears upon the controversy, orconsideration of the material which has no bearing on the questions theCourt is called upon to determine at an interim stage. 18.In the case of Seema Arshad Zaheer and Ors. V/s. MunicipalCorporation of Greater Mumbai and Ors.5 the Supreme Courtexpounded how the perversity may arise in the discretionary orders.The observations in paragraph 32 are material, and, hence, extractedbelow :“32.Where the lower court acts arbitrarily,capriciously or perversely in the exercise of itsdiscretion, the appellate court will interfere. Exercise ofdiscretion by granting a temporary injunction when5 (2006) 5 SCC 282ARS 14/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOCthere is 'no material', or refusing to grant a temporaryinjunction by ignoring the relevant documentsproduced, are instances of action which are termed asarbitrary, capricious or perverse. When we refer toacting on 'no material' (similar to 'no evidence'), werefer not only to cases where there are total dearth ofmaterial, but also to cases where there is no relevantmaterial or where the material, taken as a whole, is notreasonably capable of supporting the exercise ofdiscretion. In this case, there was 'no material' to makeout a prima facie case and therefore, the High Court inits appellate jurisdiction, was justified in interfering inthe matter and vacating the temporary injunctiongranted by the trial court.” (emphasis supplied) 19.The contours of writ jurisdiction were illuminatingly postulatedby a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of RajendraDiwan vs. Pradeep Kumar Ranibala and another6 as under:“85. The power of superintendence conferred by Article227 is, however, supervisory and not appellate. It issettled law that this power of judicial Superintendencemust be exercised sparingly, to keep subordinate courtsand tribunals within the limits of their authority. When aTribunal has acted within its jurisdiction, the High Courtdoes not interfere in exercise of its extraordinary writjurisdiction unless there is grave miscarriage of justice orflagrant violation of law. Jurisdiction under Article 227cannot be exercised “in the cloak of an appeal indisguise”.6 (2019) 20 SCC 143.ARS 15/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOC86. In exercise of its extraordinary power ofsuperintendence and/or judicial review under Articles226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the HighCourts restrict interference to cases of patent error of lawwhich go to the root of the decision; perversity;arbitrariness and/or unreasonableness; violation ofprinciples of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction andusurpation of powers. The High Court does not re-assessor re-analyze the evidence and/or materials on record.Whether the High Court would exercise its writjurisdiction to test a decision of the Rent ControlTribunal would depend on the facts and circumstances ofthe case. The writ jurisdiction of the High Courtcannot be converted into an alternative appellateforum, just because there is no other provision ofappeal in the eye of law.”20.On the aforesaid touchstone, reverting to the facts of the case athand, it is imperative to note that the registered Power of Attorneyexecuted by Balu Talekar in favour of Shaikh Umar Latif Inamdar isfulcrum of the Plaintiff’s case. Thus, the nature of the said instrument isrequired to be construed, albeit prima facie. The said instrument istitled, “an irrevocable Power of Attorney”. Nomenclature of document,it is trite, is not of decisive significance. The document is required to beread as a whole. Intention of the parties is required to be gathered fromthe words of the document and in the light of the attendantcircumstances. ARS 16/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOC21.From the perusal of the said Power of Attorney, it becomesabundantly clear that apart from the use of the term “irrevocable,” therecitals and covenants of the said document nowhere indicate that,under the said document, any interest in the property which forms thesubject matter of the agency was created in favour of the said agent,Shaikh Umar Latif Inamdar. The stated case of the Plaintiff that the saidPower of Attorney was executed in lieu of transfer of the house premisesby the said Power of Attorney in favour of Balu Talekar, the principal,does not find mention, even remotely, in the said Power of Attorney.22.Secondly, the factum of delivery of possession of the suit propertyto the said Power of Attorney by Balu Talekar also does not findmention in the said document. Instead, it records that the suit propertywas in the possession and enjoyment of Balu Talekar and Power ofAttorney was executed as it was not possible for the principal to obtainthe requisite permissions and manage the property. 23.A Power of Attorney is essentially an expression of contract ofagency. Section 201 of the Contract Act, 1872, contains various modesof termination of agency. The principal can terminate the contract ofagency unless such revocation is precluded by Section 202 of the Act,1872. Under Section 202, where an agent has himself an interest in theproperty, which forms subject matter of the agency, the agency cannot,in the absence of an express contract, be terminated to the prejudice ofARS 17/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOCsuch interest. Thus, Section 202 of the Contract Act, is an exception tothe general revocability of the contract of the agency by the principal.Section 207 of the Contract Act, provides that the revocation orrenunciation of agency may be expressed or may be implied in theconduct of the principal or agent, respectively. Illustration to Section207 reads as under : “A empowers B to let A’s house. Afterwards, A lets ithimself. This is an implied revocation of B’s authority.”24.Thus, to constitute an embargo on the revocability and render theagency irrevocable under Section 202 fo the Contract Act, there oughtto be a relationship of principal and agent and agent’s interest shouldhave been created in the subject matter of the agency. 25.A useful reference in this context can be made to a judgment ofthe Supreme Court in the case of M.S.Ananthamurthy and Anr. V/s. J.Manjula and Ors.7, wherein the Supreme Court enunciated that thepower of attorney is a creation of an agency by which the grantor/donor /executant authorizes the grantee/donee/holder/attorney to dothe acts specified on his behalf, which will be binding on the executantas if the acts were done by him. When POA is coupled with an interest,it metamorphosizes to an irrevocable agency unless expressly stated7 (2025) 10 SCC 596ARS 18/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOCotherwise. The observations in paragraph Nos.35 and 45 are materialand, hence, extracted below : “35. Therefore, , the essentials of Section 202 of theContract Act are, first, there shall be a relationship inthe capacity of ‘principal and agent’ between theparties and secondly, there shall be agent’s interest inthe subject-matter of the agency. If both the conditionsare fulfilled the agency becomes irrevocable andcannot be terminated unilaterally at the behest of theprincipal……..” 45.Further, a mere use of the word ‘irrevocable’ ina POA does not make the POA irrevocable. If the POAis not coupled with interest, no extraneous expressioncan make it irrevocable. At the same time, even if thereis no expression to the effect that the POA isirrevocable but the reading of the document indicatesthat it is a POA coupled with interest, it would beirrevocable……”26.In the light of aforesaid position in law, in the absence of thematerial to prima facie show that the Power of Attorney wasirrevocable, in the sense that, interest was created in favour of theagent, and the possession of the suit property was delivered to theagent, the substratum of the Plaintiff’s case that Shaikh Umar LatifInamdar had absolute authority to transfer the suit property as the saidPower of Attorney was for consideration, prima facie, falls through. ARS 19/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOC27.The material on record indicates that subsequent to the executionof the aforesaid Power of Attorney dated 17th August 2002 by BaluTalekar in favour of Shaikh Umar Latif Inamdar, a number ofinstruments were brought into existence in respect of the largerproperty. 28.It seems that on 6th November 2001, Balu Talekar had executedan Agreement for Sale in respect of the larger property in favour ofRamdas Khandve and Vikas Bhukan. The abovenamed transfereesinstituted RCS No. 1696 of 2006 for specific performance of thecontract contained in Agreement for Sale dated 6th November 2001. Inthe said suit, on 14th December 2006, Mr. Balu Talekar, the originalowner and the abovenamed transferees filed a compromise pursis andthereupon, a consent decree was passed. The consent decree recordsthat the parties settled the dispute in accordance with the agreementdated 5 December 2006. 29.Pursuant to the Agreement dated 5th December 2006 executedbetween the parties, the original owner agreed to execute a Sale Deedin respect of larger property and, also not to cause obstruction to thepossession and enjoyment of the said transferees over larger property. 30.In accordance with the terms of the Agreement dated 5thDecember 2006, initially the Sale Deed in respect of 38 R land wasexecuted by Balu Talekar and his wife and children in favour of LunkudARS 20/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOCInfrastructure on 26th December 2006; the Decree Holders in RCS No.1696 of 2006, Ramdas Khandve and Vikas Bhukan were the consentingparties thereto. 31.Subsequently, on 23 October 2008, a Sale Deed in respect of 70 Rland out of the larger property was executed in favour of M/s. AshrayPremises by Balu Talekar, his wife and children and the decree holdersin RCS No.1696 of 2006 were the consenting parties thereto. Thus,under the second Sale Deed dated 23 October 2008, Balu Talekar seemsto have divested his right, title and interest in the entire larger property.Whether the Sale deed which was subsequently registered pursuant to aDeed of Confirmation dated 11 May 2011, constitutes a revocation ofthe Power of Attorney in favour of Shaikh Umer Latif Inamdar, can besaid to be a matter for adjudication. At this stage, and in thisproceeding, it may not be appropriate to delve deep into the effect ofthe registration of the Sale Deed dated 23 October 2008 on the basis ofthe Deed of Confirmation dated 11 May 2011. However, the courtswere required to take into account the fact that, prima facie, theaforesaid two sale deeds were in pursuance of a consent decree passedin RCS No.1696 of 2006. 32.At this stage, the element of suppression of facts which have abearing upon the exercise of equitable jurisdiction assumes significance.The learned District Judge has specifically referred to the fact that theARS 21/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOCPlaintiff did not disclose the pendency of SCS No.25 of 2014 institutedby the original owner for a declaration that the sale deed dated 5October 2010 in favour of the Plaintiff was void. What furtherexacerbates the situation is the fact that, before entering into the saidtransaction and executing the sale deed dated 5 October 2010, thePlaintiff has, as noted by the learned District Judge, issued a publicnotice on 25 November 2009, inviting objections. The Defendants, atthat point of time itself, had raised objection to the transaction. Yet, thePlaintiff went ahead with the transaction and got the sale deedexecuted. 33.This factor, prima facie, demolishes the case sought to be put upby the Plaintiff regarding the knowledge of the adverse interest assertedby the Defendants and their predecessor-in-title. When such objectionwas raised, the Plaintiff can be said to have entered into the transactionat his own peril. 34.The learned Civil Judge had not appreciated the implications ofthe aforesaid suppression of facts and lightly brushed them aside asimmaterial. The learned District Judge, in the considered view of thisCourt, correctly appreciated the consequences that entailed theaforesaid suppression of facts from the point of view of grant ofequitable relief. ARS 22/23 -WP-11314-2025.DOC35.As noted above, the Petitioner – Plaintiff has also transferred hisinterest in the suit property in favour of third party, after the impugnedjudgment. 36.In the totality of the circumstances, in exercise of the supervisoryjurisdiction, this court does not find that the impugned judgment andorder suffers from either patent error of law, perversity orunreasonableness or results in grave miscarriage of justice. Therefore,no interference is warranted in the impugned order. The Writ Petition,therefore, deserves to be dismissed. 37.Hence, the following order:: O R D E R :(i) The Writ Petition stands dismissed.(ii)Rule discharged. (iii)No costs. [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]38.At this stage, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner seekscontinuation of ad-interim relief for a period of two weeks.39.Since the interim relief granted by the learned District Judge hasbeen in operation till today, the said order shall continue to operate fora period of two weeks from today.[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]ARS 23/23