R. Maringchan Maring v. State of Manipur

: :: Date of Judgment & Order :: Mr. RK Umakanta, PP

21.12.2023

22.04.2024 JUDGMENT AND ORDER (CAV)

The present criminal revision petition, instituted by R. Maringchan Maring (hereinafter referred to as Revisionist), under the provision of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as Cr.P.C.), seeks to assail the order dated 12.02.2016 rendered by the learned Sessions Judge, Thoubal, Manipur, in Sessions Trial Case No. 4/2015 arising out of Crl. Revn. Petn. No. 2 of 2017 P a g e | 2 FIR No. 34(3) 2014 Kakching Police Station under Section 306/498- A/34 IPC whereby the charges under the aforementioned sections were directed to be framed against him.

The facts, as are necessary for the adjudication of the controversy in the present case in the proper perspective are briefly encapsulated as follows : a) that admittedly, Smt. Salam Ichal Devi (hereinafter referred to as the deceased) who was the daughter of Sapam Tomba Singh (hereinafter referred to as the complainant) was married to the Revisionist in the month of December, 2013; who allegedly, received a sum of Rs. 30,000/- (rupees thirty thousand) as dowry; b) that on the 7th of March, 2014, at about 7:30 p.m., the complainant filed a petition with the O.C., PS Kakching, to the effect that, on the same day, at about 6:30 p.m., his daughter (the deceased wife of the Revisionist) had committed suicide by hanging with a rope inside her bedroom of her husband’s house at Koijam Village; Crl. Revn. Petn. No. 2 of 2017 P a g e | 3 c) that the complainant clearly and unequivocally asserted that, immediately after his son-in-law, the Revisionist, gave him the news that the deceased had died by hanging in her bedroom, he went there and inspected the same and found that his daughter had in fact died by hanging; d) the complainant thereupon, made a report to Kakching Police Station, in connection with the death of his daughter, seeking further enquiry in to the matter, as above stated; e) A U.D. Case No.

The learned trial Court having considered the material on the record, including the statements of the witnesses and having heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, framed charges for the commission of offences under Sections 306 and Crl. Revn. Petn. No. 2 of 2017 P a g e | 7 498-A IPC against the Revisionist vide the impugned order dated 12th February, 2016.

Aggrieved by the said order framing charges against the Revisionist, the latter has assailed the same before this Court as above mentioned.

Learned counsel assails the impugned order by contending that, there is no material/evidence to show a prima facie case for framing charges and proceeding further against the Revisionist; as the material attracting charges under Section 306/498-A IPC against him are conspicuous by their absence in the present case.

In support of his submissions, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Revisionist places reliance on the following decisions :- (i) R. Mohan v. State [Criminal Appeal No. 611 of 2011]; (ii) (2002) 5 SCC 371, Sohan Raj Sharma v. State of Haryana [Criminal Appeal No. 1464 of 2007] and Kishori Lal v. State of MP [Criminal Appeal No. 1115 of 1999]; (iii) Dilawa Babu Kurane v. State of Maharastra : (2002) 2 SCC 135; Crl. Revn. Petn. No. 2 of 2017 P a g e | 8 (iv) Suresh v. State of Maharastra: AIR 2001 SC 1375; (v) State of MP v. Mohanlal Soni : AIR 2000 SC 2583 (vi) Shyam Sunder Sharma v. State : 2002 CrLJ 517 (Del)

Per contra, learned PP, appearing on behalf of the State would submit that there is sufficient material/evidence for proceeding against the Revisionist, for abetting the suicide of his wife, the deceased. The learned PP would also submit that the Revisionist had treated the deceased with cruelty, immediately prior to the sad occurrence of the latter having committed suicide by hanging with a rope in her own bedroom.

In order to buttress his contentions, the learned PP has drawn attention of this Court to the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of the witnesses and particularly those of the father and mother of the deceased to the effect that, the Revisionist and the deceased quarreled frequently with each other subsequent upon the former consuming intoxicating drugs. In addition, attention is invited to the statements of the mother to assert that the deceased told the former on the morning of the fateful day that she had not eaten food the previous night and that the Revisionist also Crl. Revn. Petn. No. 2 of 2017 P a g e | 9 beat her resulting in bleeding and suspected miscarriage of their unborn child.

In addition, the statement of the mother revealed that a month after the deceased married the Revisionist, the latter consumed SP intoxicating tablets and that her in-laws ill-treated her and further said that she could not stay at her in-laws’ house.

Lastly, the statement of the mother of the deceased is relied upon to the effect that ten days after the deceased eloped with the Revisionist and married him, there was a feast and dowry was given to the latter.

The learned PP also relies upon the statement of the complainant; the father of the deceased; to asseverate that the deceased was not happy living with the Revisionist who consumed SP tablets and had taken away from the deceased two pieces of phanek (mekhala), to sell off for buying drugs. The complainant’s statement is further pressed into service to show how the Revisionist physically beat the deceased leading to profuse bleeding and termination of her pregnancy.

The PP would also rely on the statement of one S. Latanthoi Devi — a childhood friend of the deceased — to urge that she was informed in confidence repeatedly by the victim that she Crl. Revn. Petn. No. 2 of 2017 P a g e | 10 had been tortured by the Revisionist due to his habit of drug addiction and that she had suffered miscarriage because of the physical assault on her belly by the Revisionist on the fateful day.

The learned Sessions Judge having considered the materials on record and heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, observed as follows :- “7. In order to frame charge against the accused, the prosecution should establish the presence of the essential ingredients of the offence. If such materials are not present, it would be proper for the Court to discharge the accused. In Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander : (2012) 9 SCC 460, the Apex Court laid down the principles and procedures to be followed while framing of charge and held as below : “17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the ‘record of the case’ and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the Section exists, then the Court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court Crl. Revn. Petn. No. 2 of 2017 P a g e | 11 in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code.

19. At the initial stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty. All that the court has to see is that the material on record and the facts would be compatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage.

8. In Sonu Gupta vs. Deepak Gupta: (2016) 3 SCC 424, the Apex Court held as below: “9. It is also well settled that cognizance is taken of the offence and not the offender. Hence at the stage of framing of charge an individual accused may seek discharge if he or she can show that the materials are absolutely insufficient for framing of charge against that particular accused. But such exercise is required only at a later stage, as indicated above and not at the stage of taking cognizance and summoning the accused on the Crl. Revn. Petn. No. 2 of 2017 P a g e | 12 basis of prima facie case. Even at the stage of framing of charge, the sufficiency of materials for the purpose of conviction is not the requirement and a prayer for discharge can be allowed only if the court finds that the materials are wholly insufficient for the purpose of trial. It is also a settled proposition of law that even when there are materials raising strong suspicion against an accused, the court will be justified in rejecting a prayer for discharge and in granting an opportunity prosecution to bring on record the entire evidence in accordance with law so that case of both the sides may be considered appropriately on conclusion of trial.”

9. From the above case laws, it is seen that the necessary ingredients of the offences charged have to be present and only then it would be proper for the Court to proceed further by framing charge against the accused as held in the case of Amit Kapoor (supra), the materials may be even weaker than the prima face. However, presence of all ingredients is sin qua non for framing charge. Whether the materials would lead to conv cuon or not and the possibility of alternate version are to be examined minutely during the trial and not at the stage of framing of charge. In view of the above mentioned principle, framing of charge to be considered and the materials can be examined for a limited purpose.

10. In the present case, there is no …. against the accused No 2 for proceeding further except for a mere mentioning of his name by the mother of the deceased. Hence, he is discharged from all charges and his bail bonds are discharged. Crl. Revn. Petn. No. 2 of 2017 P a g e | 13

11. The statements of the witnesses specially the parents and friends of the deceased clearly suggest that the accused No.1. treated the deceased with cruelty. He would beat her often and she was compelled to leave for her matrimonial home frequently. He used to steal the cloths and other things of the deceased for her consumption for drug. It cannot be termed as mere neglect as projected by the Id. counsel for the accused. The harassment and frequent assault caused the miscarriage to the deceased and even after assuring to the parents of the deceased for treatment in hospital, the accused No.1 did not keep his words. Subsequently, the deceased committed suicide by hanging unable to bear the torture any longer. The chains of incidents are so closely related to drive the deceased for committing suicide. It would be all together a different aspect that these materials would be sufficient for conviction or not, as long as the ingredients of the offences are made out. This is principle laid down in the decisions of Amit Kapoor (supra) and Sonu Gupta (supra). As there are materials for the offences u/s 306 and 498-A IPC, charge has to be framed against the accused No.1 under these two heads. However, no materials are found for the offence u/s 498 IPC and Section 34 IPC is not attracted against single accused.

12. In result, accused No.2 is discharged from all offences and charges u/s 306/498-A IPC are to be framed against accused No.1. Announced in open court.”

In order to appreciate the submissions made on behalf of the Revisionist as well as for the effective adjudication of the Crl. Revn. Petn. No. 2 of 2017 P a g e | 14 issue that arises for consideration in the present case to the effect whether there exists a prima facie case for framing charges; it would be appropriate to refer to the case law qua the framing of charges as well as the revisional jurisdiction of the Court while dealing with the framing of charges.

In Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court whilst relying on the dictum in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh reported as (1977) 2 SCC 194, upheld the order on charges; and observed that the positive and negative facts, in conjunction with other subsidiary facts, appearing, expressly or by implication, from the materials which were before the Magistrate at that initial stage, were sufficient to show that there were grounds for presuming that the accused-respondents had committed offences under the relevant provisions of the Arms Act, 1959.

In Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court adverting to the conditions enumerated in Sections 227 and 228 of the CrPC, enunciated the following principles: "(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out Crl. Revn. Petn. No. 2 of 2017 P a g e | 15 whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. (2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. (4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. "

In State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (supra) it has been observed as follows: Crl. Revn. Petn. No. 2 of 2017 P a g e | 16 "30. In Antulay case [R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, (1986) 2 SCC 716 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 256] Bhagwati, C.J., opined, after noting the difference in the language of the three pairs of sections, that despite the difference there is no scope for doubt that at the stage at which the court is required to consider the question of framing of charge, the test of 'prima facie' case has to be applied. According to Shri Jethmalani, a prima facie case can be said to have been made out when the evidence, unless rebutted, would make the accused liable to conviction. In our view, a better and clearer statement of law would be that if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence, a court can justifiably say that a prima facie case against him exists, and so, frame a charge against him for committing that offence.

Let us note the meaning of the word 'presume'. In Black's Law Dictionary it has been defined to mean 'to believe or accept upon probable evidence'. In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary it has been mentioned that in law 'presume' means 'to take as proved until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming', Stroud's Legal Dictionary has quoted in this context a certain judgment according to which 'A presumption is a probable consequence drawn from facts (either certain, or proved by direct testimony) as to the truth of a fact alleged.' In Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar the same quotation finds place at p. 1007 of 1987 Edn.

The aforesaid shows that if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the Crl. Revn. Petn. No. 2 of 2017 P a g e | 17 charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. " (emphasis in original. Emphasis also supplied herein by underlining.) CRL.REV.P. 262/2016, CRL.REV.P. 263/2016, CRL.REV.P. 264/2016 & CRL.REV.P. 265/2016

In State of M.P. v. S.B. Johari (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered the following observations: "4. In our view, it is apparent that the entire approach of the High Court is illegal and erroneous. From the reasons recorded by the High Court, it appears that instead of considering the prima facie case, the High Court has appreciated and weighed the materials on record for coming to the conclusion that charge against the respondents could not have been framed. It is settled law that at the stage of framing the charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate the evidence and arrive at the conclusion that the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. If the court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out for proceeding further then a charge has to be framed.

6. In our view the aforesaid exercise of appreciating the materials produced by the prosecution at the stage of framing of the charge is wholly unjustified. The entire approach of the High Court appears to be as if the Court was deciding the case as to whether the accused are guilty or not. It was done without considering the allegations of conspiracy relating to the charge under Section 120-B. In most of the cases, it is only from the available circumstantial evidence an inference of conspiracy is to be drawn. Further, the High Court failed to consider that medicines are normally sold at a fixed price and in any set of circumstances, it was for the prosecution to lead necessary evidence at the time of trial to establish its case that purchase of medicines for the Cancer Hospital at Indore was at a much higher price than the prevailing market rate. Further again non-joining of the two remaining members to the Purchase Committee cannot be a ground for quashing the charge. After framing the charge and recording the evidence, if the Court finds that other members of the Purchase Committee were also involved, it is open to the Court to exercise its power under Section Crl. Revn. Petn. No. 2 of 2017 P a g e | 20 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Not only that, the Court erroneously considered the alleged statement of the manufacturing company that quotations given by M/s Allied Medicine Agency, Indore were genuine without there being any cross-examination. The High Court ignored the allegation that many of the items have not been purchased and the amount is paid on bogus vouchers. Hence, there was no justifiable reason for the High Court to quash the charge framed by the trial court. " (emphasis supplied.)

In Om Wati v. State thr. Delhi Administration (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, whilst placing reliance on the decisions in Anil Kumar Bhunja (supra), State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (supra) and Kanti Bhadra Shah (supra), upheld the order of the Trial Court for framing charges and rendered the following observations: "7. Section 227 of the Code provides that if upon consideration of record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused for which he is required to record his reasons for so doing. No reasons are required to be recorded when the charges are framed against the accused persons. This Court in Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of W.B. [(2000) 1 SCC 722 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 303] held that there is no legal requirement that the trial court should write an order showing the reasons for framing a charge. Taking note of the burden of the pending cases on the courts, Crl. Revn. Petn. No. 2 of 2017 P a g e | 21 it was held: (SCC pp. 725-26, paras 11-12) "11. Even in cases instituted otherwise than on a police report the Magistrate is required to write an order showing the reasons only if he is to discharge the accused. This is clear from Section 245. As per the first sub-section of Section 245, if a Magistrate, after taking all the evidence considers that no case against the accused has been made out which if unrebutted would warrant his conviction, he shall discharge the accused. As per sub- section (2) the Magistrate is empowered to discharge the accused at any previous stage of the case if he considers the charge to be groundless. Under both sub-sections he is obliged to record his reasons for doing so. In this context it is pertinent to point out that even in a trial before a Court of Session, the Judge is required to record reasons only if he decides to discharge the accused (vide Section 227 of the Code). But if he is to frame the charge he may do so without recording his reasons for showing why he framed the charge.

12. If there is no legal requirement that the trial court should write an order showing the reasons for framing a charge, why should the already burdened trial courts be further burdened with such an extra work. The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all roadblocks causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the snail-paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across Crl. Revn. Petn. No. 2 of 2017 P a g e | 22 interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate if such a detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings before them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at this stage, such as issuing process, remanding the accused to custody, framing of charges, passing over to next stages in the trial. It is a salutary guideline that when orders rejecting or granting bail are passed, the court should avoid expressing one way or the other on contentious issues, except in cases such as those falling within Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985."

8. At the stage of passing the order in terms of Section 227 of the Code, the court has merely to peruse the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is a sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. If upon consideration, the court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out against the accused, the Judge must proceed to frame charge in terms of Section 228 of the Code. Only in a case where it is shown that the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by defence evidence cannot show that the accused committed the crime, then and then alone the court can discharge the accused. The court is not required to enter into meticulous consideration of evidence and material placed before it at this stage. This Court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Crl. Revn. Petn. No. 2 of 2017 P a g e | 23 Dilip Nathumal Chordia [(1989) 1 SCC 715 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 285] cautioned the High Courts to be loath in interfering at the stage of framing the charges against the accused. Self-restraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule unless there is a glaring injustice staring the court in the face. The opinion on many matters can differ depending upon the person who views it. There may be as many opinions on a particular point, as there are courts but that would not justify the High Court to interdict the trial. Generally, it would be appropriate for the High Court to allow the trial to proceed.

9. Dealing with the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code and the limitations imposed upon the court at the initial stage of framing the charge, this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh [(1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533 : AIR 1977 SC 2018] held: (SCC pp. 41-42, para 4) "Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is Crl.

Revn. Petn. No. 2 of 2017 P a g e | 24 not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved.

But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, Crl. Revn. Petn. No. 2 of 2017 P a g e | 25 then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227."

10. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [(1979) 4 SCC 274 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038 : AIR 1980 SC 52] reminded the courts that at the initial stage of framing of charges, the prosecution evidence does not commence. The court has, therefore, to consider the question of framing the charges on general considerations of the material placed before it by the investigating agency. At this stage, the truth, veracity and effect of the judgment which the prosecution proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. The standard of test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding an accused guilty or otherwise is not exactly to be applied at the stage of framing the charge. Even on the basis of a strong suspicion founded on materials before it, the court can form a presumptive opinion regarding the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and in that event be justified in framing the charges against the accused in respect of the commission of the offence alleged to have been committed by them. Relying upon its earlier judgments in Ramesh