STATE OF BIHAR v. RAMESH SINGH

prbna facie "'·hether the court should_ proceed with · the - trial - or not. The evidence \\·hich the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of accused even if fully accepte.d before .it is challenged in cross..examinatiM or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any,. cannot show that the accused comm:tted the offence. then there \\·ill be no sufficient ground for proceeding trial. l259H, 260A·Bl - • • - '\Vith • - If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are scme thing like even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the· case is .to end in his acquittal. But if on th~ other hand, if U So at the initial stage of making an order under s. 227 or s. 228 then in si.;b a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made. \\"j:i be one under s. 228 and not under s. 227. [260C-DJ-_- __ . ·· • Ninnal Jeet Singh Hoon v. State of JVest Bengal-(1913) 2- SCR 66 has follo'\\·ed Chandra Deo Singlr v. Prakash Chandra Bose (1964) 3 SCR 639 _M·here in ·it was laid down that the test is whether there is a sufficient ground .. for . proceeding and not, \\-'hether there is a sufficient g'round for conviction.·, "·: After setti, ng aside the orders of High Court and Sessions Collrt, the. i:6urt directed that appropriate charge or charges be framed against the resP0~1ent and trial to proceed in accordance with law. [261HJ · The Cour observed that nothing stated in the judgment is meant to preil2dice in the least the case of either party at the trial. ,l259C] :-.· _ CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No . .5 I of

#1977. - .. . . - ~-· - - . .. . ' . Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order .d~ted · 18-2-1976 of the Patna High Court in Cr!. Rev. No. 699/75. U. P. Singh and S. N. Iha, for theAppel!ant. _ B. P. Singh and A. K. Srivastava, for the Respondent. The fol!owing Judgment of the Court was delivered by .~ .· UNTWALIA, J.-The respondent in this appeal by special leave is a Professor of Economics in Munshi Singh College, Motihari in the S:a,te of Bihar. · At about 3.00 A.M; on the 26th of November, ':1973, Smt. Tara Devi. wife of the respondent, was found burning <in. the kitchen of his house. · A hulla was raised. Chandreshwar Prasad Singh, brother of Tara Devi, who is a Professor of Botany in the siid College and lives nearby came to the scene of occurrence. It i5 uid he found the respondent and his brotller standing near the bµr11ing body of Tara Devi but not taking any steps to extinguish the: fire. Tara Devi died apparently as a result of the extensive burn injuries on her person. A First Information Report was lodged by Chandf~sh­ . war Pra·sad Singh at the Police Station· charging the respondent ;for having committed the offences under sections 302 and 201 of the P<nal Code. Eventually Charge-Sheet was submitted against him br, the police and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trbl of the respondent under section 209 of the Code of Criminal Proced_CTe, 1973-hereina(ter called _the Code. · When the case was opened in the Court of the IIJ rd Additb:ml Sessions Judge at Motihari in Sessions Trial No. 66/1975 . by the Additional Public Prosecutor in accordance with section 226 of' the Code, a pka was raised on behalf of the respondent that there w~;;r;ot any sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial ag~inst him an:O he A. B c 'D E F G H • • 1 RIHAR v. RAMESH SINGH ( Untwalia, J.) 259 should be discharged in accordance with section 227. The Additional A Sessions Judge accepted the plea and di'scharged the accused by his order dated April 30, 1975. The State of Bihar-the appellant in this appeal, went in revision before the Patna High Court to assail the order aforesaid of the Sessions Court. The High Court by its order dated the 18th February, 1976 dismissed the revision. Hence this appeal. It is neither necessary nor advisable for us to meution in any great B detail the facts of the prosecution case against the respondent or refer to all the materials and the evidence which may be produced by the prosecutor when a trial proceeds in the Sessions Court. Unnecessary details in that regard have got to be avoided so that it may not pre judice either the prosecution case of the appellant or the defence of the rtiSpondent. Since for the brief reasons to be stated hereinafter we are going to set aside the orders of the Courts below and direct C the trial to proceed against the respondent, we would like to caution that nothing which may have to be said in support of our order in this judgment is meant and should be understood to prejudice in the least the case of either party at the trial. Under section 226 of the Code while opening the ca·se for the prose- tion the Prosecutor ba's got to describe the charge against the accused D and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accus- ed. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the Court to con sider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to bear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. ·The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under section 227 or section 228 of the Code. If "the Judge consider that there is lilOt sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall dis· E charge the accused and record his reasons for so doing", as enjoined by section 227. If, on the other hand, "the Judge is of opinion that thece is ground for pmmming that the accused has committed an G!felilC!! which- F (b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a char&e against the accused", as provided in section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxta position, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the ~ruth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutnr pro pose11 to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obli- ~atory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail G and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under section 22 7 or section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to 'see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the H trial is sure to end ln his conviction. Strong suspicion against accused, if the ,matter remains in the region of suspicion. cannot take the !'11ace of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the A B c D E F 260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1978) 1 S.C.R. initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to lliink that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no suffi cient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumpion of the guilt of the accused which is to he> drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prhna facie whether If the evidence which the Court should proceed with the trial or not. the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the_ defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence by one more example. of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial. then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in bis acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under section 227 or section 228, then in such a situation ordi narily and generally the order which will have to he made will be one under section 228 and not under section 227. to have laid down with In Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The Sta'te of West Bengal and an other(1)-Shelat, J. delivering the judgment on behalf of the majority fo the Court referred at page 79 of the report to the earlier decisions of this Court in Chandra Deo Singh v. Prakash Chandra Bose(') reference where this Court was sections 202 and 203 to the similar provisions contained of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 "that the test was whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there was sufficient ground for conviction, and observed that where there was· prim" f<1cie evidence, even though the person charged of an offence in the complaint might have a defence, the matter had to be left to he decided by the appropriate forum at the appropriate stage and issue of a process could not be refused." Illustratively, Shelat J, further added "Unless, therefore, the Magistrate finds that the evidence led before him is self-con(radictory, or intrinsically untrustworthy, process cannot be refued if that evidence makes out a prima facie case." . body or whether she committed suicide by herself setting fire to The fact that Tara Devi died an unnatural death and there were burn in juries on her person dGes not seem to be in doubt or dispute. The question to be decided at the trial would be whether the respon dent, as is the prosecution case, had murdered her and set fire to her This undoubtedly is a serious matter for decision at the trial. But at the stage of framing the charge, copious reference to Modi's Medi cal Jurisprndence and judging the post-mortem report of the Doctor who performed the autopsy over the dead body of the lady melicul Judge qusly was not quite justified as has been done by the Trial G H (I) [197312 S.C.R. 66.

#2. [19641 3 S.C.R. 629. BIHAR v. RAMESH SINGH ( Untwalia, J.) 261 According to the presecution case the respondent was in lo~e with A one of his girl students, named, Nupur Ghosh and this led t<> serious differences between the respondent and his wife, the unfortu- nate Tara Devi, inducing the former to clear the path of his mis ad<1enture in the manner alleged by the prosecution. On the other hand, the defence, S'1'ems to suggest that the alleged love-affair the respondent led Tara Devi to commit suicide. Whether respondent will be abk to prove. his defence at the final stage of the B trial may not be of much consequence. Surely the prosecution will have to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt. Although at the time of the alleged occurrence were present in the house of the res pondent his brother, his brother's wife, and children the prosecution does not seem to be in possession of any occular testimony of an eye witness of the occurrence. The case will 'largely, rather, wlmlly, depend upon the circumstantial evidence. A stricter proof will have C to be applied for judging the guilt of the accused with refcr<'nce the various circumstantial evidence against him. the Additional Sessions Judge was not right whon he said-"it appears that there is neither direct evidence nor any circumstantial' evidence to connect the accus~d with the alleged murder of Tara De\!i". He also ought not t6 have referred to tho varying opinions of the Circle Inspector and the Superintendent of Police, Motihari as to the mission of Charge-Sheet against the respondent. The at this sub- D Apart from some other circumstances, as it appears, the prosecu tiG.B. proposes to prove in this case, and whether it will 'succeed in prov ing them or not is a different matter, the High Court has enumerated three circumstances in its impugned order. We may just add, and that is only for the purpose of a cursory observation for deciding the E matter at this ·stage, that the story of assault on Tara Devi by the res pondent a day prior to the occurrence is perhaps sought to be proved by the evidence of Chandrcshwar Singh, the informant, and it seems, he would also try to say, rightly or wrongly, that at the time of said a>Sault the respondent had giv~n her a threat to kill her. The High Coort felt persuaded to take the view that the three circumstan- tial facts, even if proved, would not be incompatible with the inno- cence of the accused and then added "There may be strong suspicion against the opposite party, but the three circumstances which I have jui;t mentioned above, cannot be said to be incompatible with defence of the accused." The said observation of the High Court is not quite apposite in the background of the law which we enunciated above with refrrence to the provisions of sections 227 and 228 of the Code. -, G F0r the reasons stated above, we set aside the impugned orders of the High Court and the Sessions Court and direct that appropriate charge or charges will be framed ag'dinst the respondent and tri~l shall proceed further in accordance with the law. P.H.P. Appeal allowed.