Chander Kala v. State of Himachal Pradesh and another

also threatened the informant. The police registered the FIR. The accused filed a bail petition before learned Sessions Judge, Kinnaur, at Rampur Bushehr, which was allowed vide order dated 18.10.2024. 3

#3. The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking cancellation of the bail. It is asserted that false entries were made in the daily diary by the police ofÏcials to cover their crimes. Learned Sessions Judge did not appreciate the gravity of the offence. Respondent No.2/accused threatened the petitioner and Sangveer which is a violation of the terms and conditions imposed by the learned Trial Court. The police have not completed the investigation and releasing respondent No.2 on bail would adversely affect the investigation. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the bail granted to respondent No.2 be cancelled.

#4. The petition is opposed by respondent No.1 by filing a status report, reproducing the contents of the petition. It was asserted that police found after the investigation that the CCTV footage showed that only two persons wearing black helmets rode the motorcycle towards the place of the incident. This falsified the informant’s version that a white helmet was used for the commission of a crime. He named ASI Ranjot Singh who was present in the Police Post. His call detail record also confirmed this fact. The viscera of the deceased was sent to FSL and 28.87 MG% of alcohol was found in it. The sample of blood 4 taken by the Medical OfÏcer, Regional Hospital Rekong Peo showed 201.77 MG% proof ethyl alcohol in it. The petitioner filed complaints regarding the threat to her life. It was found after the investigation that the wife of the respondent had told the petitioner and the informant that they would be taken to the local temple to determine whether they were telling the truth. Respondent No. 2 never spoke to the petitioner or the informant. The informant and the deceased were not in police custody and it was not a case of custodial death. The charge sheet was prepared and presented in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kinnaur on 23.10.2024.

#5. Respondent No.2 filed a separate reply making a preliminary submission regarding the lack of maintainability. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was asserted that the respondent was working as a daily wager. He was not re-engaged and is without any job. Respondent No.2 participated in the investigation and appeared before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate after the submission of the charge sheet. He never intimidated any witness. He did not violate the terms and conditions of the bail granted to him. The 5 present petition has been filed without any basis. Hence, it was prayed that the same be dismissed.

#6. I have heard M/s Ajay Sipahiya and Tarun Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1-State and Mr. Dinesh K. Thakur, learned counsel for respondent No.2.

#7. Mr. Ajay Sipahiya, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No.2 intimidated the petitioner after he was released on bail. His conduct adversely affected the investigation. Learned Sessions Judge ignored the gravity of the offence and erred in granting bail. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the bail granted to respondent No.2 be cancelled.

#8. Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.2 submitted that as per the investigation conducted by the police, no threat was advanced to the informant or the petitioner. The wife of the respondent only told the petitioner and the informant that they had falsely implicated her husband and she would take them to the local temple to determine the truthfulness of the allegations made by 6 the informant. This cannot constitute any intimidation. Therefore, he prayed that an appropriate order be passed.

#9. Mr. Dinesh K. Thakur, learned counsel for respondent No.2 submitted that the learned Sessions Judge had granted bail after considering the circumstances on record. There is no infirmity in the order passed by learned Sessions Judge. The present case involved a dispute between the police ofÏcials, the informant and the deceased. The charge sheet has already been filed before the competent Court of law and the plea taken by the petitioner that releasing the petitioner on bail would adversely affect the investigation is not correct. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

#10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

#11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974 that the bail, once granted, should not be cancelled mechanically however, an un- reasoned and perverse order is open to interference by the Superior Court. The bail can be cancelled if there are serious allegations against the accused. It was observed at page 783: 7 “Relevant parameters for granting bail

#26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) : 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .]

#27. It is equally well settled that bail, once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to interference by the superior court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the 8 offence or the impact on the society resulting in such an order. In P v. State of M.P. [P v. State of M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211] decided by a three-judge Bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the considerations that must weigh with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1)CrPC in the following words : (SCC p. 224, para 24) “24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349: 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]. To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail, but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.” Considerations for Setting Aside Bail Orders

#28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate court for setting aside the bail order on an application being moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may add that this list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. However, the court must be cautious that at the stage of granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined, and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that may cause prejudice 9 to the accused ought to be avoided. SufÏce it to state that the bail order should reveal the factors that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to the accused.

#29. In Jagjeet Singh [Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 560], a three-judge Bench of this Court has observed that the power to grant bail under Section 439CrPC is of wide amplitude and the High Court or a Sessions Court, as the case may be, is bestowed with considerable discretion while deciding a bail application. But this discretion is not unfettered. The order passed must reflect the due application of the judicial mind following well-established principles of law. In the ordinary course, courts would be slow to interfere with the order where bail has been granted by the courts below. But if it is found that such an order is illegal or perverse or based upon utterly irrelevant material, the appellate court would be well within its power to set aside and cancel the (Also refer: Puran v. Rambilas [Puran v. Rambilas, bail. (2001) 6 SCC 338: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1124]; Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat [Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 13 SCC 584: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 813].)

#12. Similar is the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manik Madhukar versus Vitthal Damuji Meher and Ors. 2024: INSC:636 wherein it was observed as under: - “19. Courts while granting bail, are required to consider relevant factors such as the nature of the accusation, the role ascribed to the accused concerned, possibilities/chances of tampering with the evidence and/or witnesses, antecedents, flight risk, et al. Speaking through Hima Kohli, J., the present coram in Ajwar v. Waseem, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, apropos relevant parameters for granting bail, observed: “26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the 10 nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. (Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. (2004) 7 SCC 525; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav (supra) (2004) 7 SCC 528; Masroor v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2009) 14 SCC 286; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496; Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 16 SCC 508; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2018) 12 SCC 129; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar @ Polia (supra) (2020) 2 SCC 118.

#27. It is equally well settled that bail, once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to interference by the Superior Court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a Superior Court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on the society resulting in such an order. In P v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) (2022), 15 SCR 211 decided by a three-judge bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J)] has spelt out the considerations that must be weighed with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1) of the CrPC in the following words: 11 “24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349: 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]. To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail, but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.” (emphasis supplied)

#20. In State of Haryana v. Dharamraj, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1085, speaking through one of us (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.), the Court, while setting aside an order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court granting (anticipatory) bail, discussed and reasoned: “7. A foray, albeit brief, into relevant precedents is warranted. This Court considered the factors to guide the grant of bail in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh (2002) 3 SCC 598 and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan (2004) 7 SCC 528. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496, the relevant principles were restated thus: ‘9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: 12 (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.’

#8. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar alias Polia (2020) 2 SCC 118, this Court opined as under: ‘16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court in assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand on a different footing from an assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order granting bail is tested on the anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary exercise of discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or unjustified. On the other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of the existence of supervening circumstances or violations of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has been granted. …’