Ajay Kumar v. State of H.P. & Ors.
Case at a glance
Provisions considered
Key paragraphs
- Para 33. The accused, Mahender Singh, filed a bail petition before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Paonta Sahib (learned Trial Court). Learned Trial Court held that there were variations in the statement of Rakesh Kumar regarding the incident. The allegations made in the FIR were not…
- Para 44. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the State as well as the informant’s brother have filed separate petitions for cancellation of bail. The State asserted that the order is against the law and facts and is based 5 upon…
- Para 1212. Similar is the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manik Madhukar versus Vitthal Damuji Meher and Ors. 2024: INSC:636 wherein it was observed as under: - “19. Courts, while granting bail, are required to consider relevant factors such as the nature of…
Judgment
Mr. Kush Sharma, Advocate, in Cr.MMO No. 481 of 2024 and Mr.Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General, in Cr.MP(M) No. 113 of 2025. Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2-State in Cr.MMO No. 481 of 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2024 and Mr. N.S. Chandel, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Vinod Gupta, Advocate, for respondent No.3 in Cr.MMO No. 481 of 2024 and for the respondent in Cr.MP(M) No.113 of 2025. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking cancellation of the bail granted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P. vide order dated 17.5.2024 in Bail Application No. 40 of 2024, titled Mahender Singh alias Gallu Saini Vs. State of H.P.
#2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the police received an information on
24.10.2023 that one person was brought to the hospital after a quarrel. The police went to the hospital for verification of the information. Rakesh Kumar (injured) made a statement that he was going to his home on 24.10.2023 on his motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-17A-4072. He was carrying ₹3,98,000/- with him. 2-3 vehicles stopped near the Lunj factory at 9.00 PM. The petitioner, Mahender Singh, and 15-20 persons came out of the vehicles and started beating the informant. Mahender Singh inflicted blows with a Gandasi on the arms and legs of the 3 informant. The other people gave him beatings with sticks. His motorcycle was damaged. ₹3,98,000/- kept by the informant in his pocket were removed. The accused ran away from the spot after the incident. The police registered the FIR and conducted an investigation. It was found during the investigation that the money was dropped during the incident and was picked up by Ajay Kumar (the informant’s brother). The left leg of the informant was amputated at PGI on 5.11.2023. The informant was admitted to the MM Institute of Medical Sciences and Research, Mulana, Haryana, and he died during the treatment. The postmortem examination of the informant was conducted, and as per the report of the Medical OfÏcer, the cause of death was vascular degeneration of the kidney, consequent to the injury to the left leg. Accused Mahender Singh made a disclosure statement leading to the recovery of Gandasa, with which the injuries were inflicted. Accused Saravjeet Singh got recovered a stick which was used for beatings. Farman got recovered an iron pipe, which was used during the incident. Accused Mahender Singh was involved in the commission of a similar offence, and 12 FIRs were registered against him. The police had arrested other co-accused. The viscera was sent to FSL, and as per the 4 result, no poison/ethyl alcohol or drug could be detected in the viscera. Blood was not detected in the Gandasa and metallic pipe, however, blood was found in traces on the wooden stick, but it was insufÏcient for serological examination.
#3. The accused, Mahender Singh, filed a bail petition before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Paonta Sahib (learned Trial Court). Learned Trial Court held that there were variations in the statement of Rakesh Kumar regarding the incident. The allegations made in the FIR were not corroborated by the medical evidence. MM Institute of Medical Sciences and Research, wherein the informant was admitted, stated the cause of death was Dengue Shock Syndrome, Multi-Organ Dysfunction Syndrome. Therefore, in these circumstances, the further custody of the accused Mahender Singh was unjustified, and he was ordered to be released on bail in the sum of ₹50,000/- with two sureties to the like amount.
#4. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the State as well as the informant’s brother have filed separate petitions for cancellation of bail. The State asserted that the order is against the law and facts and is based 5 upon conjectures and surmises. It was wrongly held that the accused, Mahender Singh, had no intention to kill the informant. The charge sheet has been filed against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 302, 307, 147, 149, 341, 323, 325, 427 and 120-B of IPC. Doctors at MM Institute of Medical Sciences did not conduct a postmortem examination of the deceased, and they were not in a position to opine about the cause of death. The accused, Mahender Singh, was specifically named in the FIR. Eyewitness Vickey Kumar also stated about his involvement. He is a habitual offender, and many cases are pending against him. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the bail granted by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
#5. In the petition filed by the informant’s brother, it was submitted that the learned Trial Court committed a grave error in releasing the accused on regular bail. Considering the nature of allegations, the gravity of the offence and the severity of punishment, he was not entitled to bail. The learned Trial Court did not consider the seriousness of the allegations made against accused Mahender Singh and released him on bail without any justification. Eight persons are still absconding. A 6 specific role was attributed to accused Mahender Singh in the FIR. He had criminal antecedents, and 11 cases were pending against him. This aspect was not considered by the learned Trial Court. The merits of the case were wrongly appreciated. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the bail granted by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
#6. I have heard Mr. Kush Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner in Cr.MMO No. 481 of 2024 and Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the petitioner/State in Cr.MP(M) No. 113 of 2025 and for respondents No.1 and 2-State in Cr.MMO No. 481 of 2024, Mr. N.S. Chandel, Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Vinod Gupta, learned counsel for respondent No.3 in Cr.MMO No. 481 of 2024 and for the respondent in Cr.MP(M) No. 113 of 2025.
#7. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in releasing the accused, Mahender Singh, on bail. He was the main accused and was responsible for the murder of the informant. The Medical OfÏcer had categorically mentioned that the cause of death was vascular degeneration of the kidney, consequent to injury to the 7 left leg. This showed that the proximate cause of death was the injury caused by the accused. Learned Trial Court erred in relying upon the report issued by MM Institute of Medical Sciences and Research, Mulana. The offence is heinous and punishable with capital punishment. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the bail granted by the learned Trial Court be cancelled.
#8. Mr. Kush Sharma, learned counsel for the informant’s brother, submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the seriousness of the crime. Reliance was wrongly placed upon the report issued by the MM Institute of Medical Sciences and Research, Mulana. Learned Trial Court failed to consider the criminal antecedents of the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. He relied upon the judgments in Ajwar v. Waseem and another 2024 INSC 438, Rohit Bansal Vs. State and another 2017: DHC:3059, Deepak Yadav Vs. State of U.P. and another (2022) 4 SCR 1, and Gulam Nabi Vs. State of H.P. 2024:HHC:8856 in support of his submission. 8
#9. Mr. N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel for the accused Mahender Singh, submitted that the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view of the matter and this Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to cancel the bail granted by the learned Trial Court. There is no evidence that the accused, Mahender Singh, has misused the concession of bail granted to him; in the absence of which, the bail cannot be cancelled. Hence, he prayed that the present petitions be dismissed.
#10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
#11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974 that the bail, once granted, should not be cancelled mechanically; however, an unreasoned and perverse order is open to interference by the Superior Court. The bail can be cancelled if there are serious allegations against the accused. It was observed at page 783: “Relevant parameters for granting bail
#26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, 9 the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) : (2018) 12 SCC 129 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .]
#27. It is equally well settled that bail, once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse bail order is always open to interference by the superior court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on society, resulting in such an order. In P v. State of M.P. [P v. State of M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211] decided by a three-judge Bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the considerations that must weigh with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under 10 Section 439(1)CrPC in the following words : (SCC p. 224, para 24) “24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349: 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]. To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail, but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.” Considerations for Setting Aside Bail Orders
#28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate court for setting aside the bail order on an application being moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may add that this list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. However, the court must be cautious that at the stage of granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined, and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that may cause prejudice to the accused ought to be avoided. SufÏce it to state that the bail order should reveal the factors that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to the accused.
#29. In Jagjeet Singh [Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 560], a three-judge Bench of 11 this Court has observed that the power to grant bail under Section 439CrPC is of wide amplitude and the High Court or a Sessions Court, as the case may be, is bestowed with considerable discretion while deciding a bail application. But this discretion is not unfettered. The order passed must reflect the due application of the judicial mind following well-established principles of law. In the ordinary course, courts would be slow to interfere with the order where bail has been granted by the courts below. But if it is found that such an order is illegal or perverse or based upon utterly irrelevant material, the appellate court would be well within its power to set aside and cancel the (Also refer: Puran v. Rambilas [Puran v. Rambilas, bail. (2001) 6 SCC 338: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1124]; Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat [Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 13 SCC 584: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 813].)
#12. Similar is the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manik Madhukar versus Vitthal Damuji Meher and Ors. 2024: INSC:636 wherein it was observed as under: - “19. Courts, while granting bail, are required to consider relevant factors such as the nature of the accusation, the role ascribed to the accused concerned, possibilities/chances of tampering with the evidence and/or witnesses, antecedents, flight risk, et al. Speaking through Hima Kohli, J., the present coram in Ajwar v. Waseem, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, apropos relevant parameters for granting bail, observed: “26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and 12 repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. (Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. (2004) 7 SCC 525; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav (supra) (2004) 7 SCC 528; Masroor v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2009) 14 SCC 286; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496; Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 16 SCC 508; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2018) 12 SCC 129; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar @ Polia (supra) (2020) 2 SCC 118.
#27. It is equally well settled that bail, once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to interference by the Superior Court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a Superior Court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on society, resulting in such an order. In P v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) (2022), 15 SCR 211 decided by a three-judge bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J)] has spelt out the considerations that must be weighed with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1) of the CrPC in the following words: “24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat 13 Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349: 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]. To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail, but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.” (emphasis supplied)
#20. In State of Haryana v. Dharamraj, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1085, speaking through one of us (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.), the Court, while setting aside an order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court granting (anticipatory) bail, discussed and reasoned: “7. A foray, albeit brief, into relevant precedents is warranted. This Court considered the factors to guide the grant of bail in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh (2002) 3 SCC 598 and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan (2004) 7 SCC 528. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496, the relevant principles were restated thus: ‘9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; 14 (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by the grant of bail.’
#8. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar alias Polia (2020) 2 SCC 118, this Court opined as under: ‘16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court in assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand on a different footing from an assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order granting bail is tested on the anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary exercise of discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or unjustified. On the other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of the existence of supervening circumstances or violations of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has been granted. …’
Questions this judgment answers
Which statutory provisions did this judgment involve?
Indian Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s. 439(1).
Which court decided this case, and when?
Himachal Pradesh High Court, on 05 Jun 2025. The bench was RAKESH KAINTHLA.
Precedent status how later indexed judgments have treated this case
No known negative treatment found in the Courts & Cases corpus.
This is a result about the indexed corpus, not a finding that the judgment remains good law. Coverage may be incomplete.