Hardyal Khimta v. Devinder Thakur

dated 30.10.2014, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Jubbal, District Shimla, (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before the learned trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Sections 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (N I Act). (The 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned trial Court for convenience).

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was asserted that the complainant had sold fertilizer, Apple corrugated boxes and other goods the accused ₹7,66,084/-. The accused issued a cheque of ₹7,66,084/- to repay the money. The complainant presented the cheque to his bank, but it was dishonoured with the endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. The complainant issued a notice to the accused asking him to pay the amount within 15 days of the date of receipt; however, the accused failed to pay the amount despite the receipt of the notice. Hence, the complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court against the accused for taking action as per the law.

3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 3

4. The complainant examined himself (CW-1) and Prem Kumar (CW-2) to prove his complaint.

5. The accused, in his statement recorded under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C), denied the complainant’s case in its entirety. He stated that he was not at home, and he had replied to the notice subsequently. He stated that the complainant was his tenant, who had misused the cheque, which was misplaced in the shop. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.

6. The learned Trial Court held that the complainant had failed to prove that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability; hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the complainant has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the material on record. The complainant claimed that he had lost a signed cheque but did not produce any evidence in support of his claim. The learned Trial Court failed to apply the presumption to the present case. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be 4 allowed and the judgment passed by the learned trial Court be set aside.

8. I have heard Mr Arvind Sharma, learned counsel, for the appellant/complainant and Mr Rahul Sharma, learned Legal Aid Counsel, for the respondent/accused.

9. Mr Arvind Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant/ complainant, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The cheque carries with it a presumption that it was issued for consideration to discharge debt/liability. The learned Trial Court failed to consider this presumption. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned trial Court be set aside. He relied upon the judgment passed Ratiram Yadav vs. Gopal Sharma, along with connected matters 2025 SCC OnLine Raj 5241, in support of his submission.

10. Mr Rahul Sharma, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the complainant admitted in his cross-examination that the articles were purchased in the year 2008. The cheque was issued on 14.03.2013; therefore, the cheque was issued to discharge a time-barred debt, which could 5 not give rise to a legal liability. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11 I have given a considerable thought submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal patently perverse, misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

13. This position was reiterated in P. Somaraju v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291, wherein it was observed: 6 “12. To summarise, an Appellate Court undoubtedly has full power to review and reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. However, due to the reinforced or ‘double’ presumption of innocence after acquittal, interference must be limited. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed. Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial Court's view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Moreover, the Appellate Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own. A catena of the recent judgments of this Court has more firmly entrenched this position, including, inter alia, Mallappa v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 104, Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 2024 INSC 258, Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 320, and Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand 2025 INSC 114.”

14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

15. The complainant stated in his cross-examination that the accused used to purchase material from him for 8-10 years. He had taken the last article in the year 2008, and no transaction had taken place between him and the accused after 2008. The cheque was handed over to him in 2013. Article 14 of the Limitation Act provides a limitation of three years for the price of goods sold and delivered when no fixed period of credit is agreed upon, and the period of limitation starts running from the date of 7 delivery of the goods. Therefore, in the present case, the period to recover the money started in 2008 and expired in 2011; hence, and the cheque was issued in 2013 towards the repayment of a time-barred debt. It was laid down by this Court in Social Leasing (India) Ltd. v. Rajan Kumar Kanthwal, 2025 SCC OnLine HP 3131, that a cheque issued to discharge a time-barred debt does not constitute a legally enforceable debt. Therefore, the cheque in the present case was not issued towards the legally enforceable debt, and the learned Trial Court had rightly held it to be so. This was a reasonable view that could have been taken on the material placed before the learned Trial Court, and no interference is required with it while deciding the appeal against acquittal.

16. The judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan in Ratiram Yadav (supra) cannot be followed in view of the judgment of this Court in Social Leasing (India) Ltd.(supra), which is binding upon this Court.

17. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

18. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail 8 bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

19. A copy of the judgment, along with a record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. 17th June, 2026 (ravinder) (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge