State of H.P. v. Daljinder Kumar

of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

#2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279,337,338 and 304-A of I.P.C. It was asserted that the informant Bhuri Singh (PW-1) had gone for a morning walk on 24.09.2006. He reached near the Punjabi Dhaba at 6.40-

6.50 a.m. The construction of the culvert was going on at the spot, and the construction material was lying on the spot. The informant stood towards the left side of the road to enable the vehicles to cross. A motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-36-8119 came to the spot. Vinay Rana (PW-3) was driving the motorcycle. Shifali (since deceased) 3( 2025:HHC:24711 ) and her mother, Babli (PW-4), were sitting as pillion riders. The motorcycle stopped at some distance from the informant. A truck bearing registration No. PB-09G-9525 came from Bharwain at high speed and hit the motorcycle. The motorcycle was dragged for some distance. Vinay Rana (PW3)and Shifali (deceased) fell. Rajesh Kumar came to the spot and carried the injured to the hospital. Shifali was declared dead. The matter was reported to the police, and entry (EX.PW10/A) was recorded in the daily diary. Naresh Kumar (PW-11), HHC Balbir Singh and other police ofÏcials were sent to verify the correctness of the information. Bhuri Singh (PW-1) made a statement (EX.PW1/A), which was sent to the Police Station, where an FIR (EX.PW8/A) was registered. An application (EX.PW11/A) was filed for conducting the medical examination. MLCs (Ext. PA to EX. PC) were obtained. HC Naresh Kumar(PW11) inspected the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext. PW11/B). The vehicle bearing registration No. PB-09G-9525 was seized along with the documents vide seizure memo (Ext.PW1/B). The photographs of the spot (Ext.P1 to Ex. P13) were taken, whose negatives are Ext.P-14 to Ext. P-26. The motorcycle 4( 2025:HHC:24711 ) bearing registration No. HP36-8119 was seized vide memo (EX.PW1/C). The documents of the motorcycle were seized vide memo (EX.PW2/A). Dev Raj (PW-7) conducted the mechanical examination of the motorcycle and the truck. He found that there was no mechanical defect in the vehicles which would have led to the accident. He issued the mechanical report (Ext. PW7/A). An inquest on the dead body was conducted, and a report (Ext.PW11/J) was prepared. Postmortem examination report (Ext.PW11/K) was issued by the Medical OfÏcer. The photographs of the dead body (Ext.P10 to Ext.P13), whose negatives (Ext.P23 to Ext.P26), were taken. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per version, and after completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

#3. The learned Trial Court found sufÏcient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304 A 5( 2025:HHC:24711 ) of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

#4. The prosecution examined 11 witnesses to prove its case. Bhuri Singh (PW-1) is the informant. Surender Kumar (PW-2) is the witness to the recovery of the motorcycle. Vinay Rana (PW-3) was driving the motorcycle. Babli Devi (PW-4) was a pillion rider. Vivek Singh (PW-5) was the owner of the motorcycle. Dharm Pal (PW-6) took the photographs of the vehicles. Dev Raj (PW-7) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicles. Tarsem Lal (PW-8) proved the FIR. Vinod Singh (PW-9) is the witness to the recovery of the motorcycle. SI Chaman Lal (PW-10) proved the entry in the daily diary. HC Naresh Kumar (PW- 11) conducted the investigation.

#5. The accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.PC admitted that he was driving a truck on

24.09.2006. He denied that the accident occurred due to his negligence. He stated that the accident occurred due to the negligence of Vinay Kumar, who had hit the motorcycle against the truck. The occupants of the motorcycle had 6( 2025:HHC:24711 ) sustained injuries, but he did not know that Shifali had succumbed to her injuries. He claimed that he was innocent and that a false case was registered against him. However, no defence was sought to be adduced by him.

#6. Learned Trial Court held that there were various contradictions in the statement of eyewitnesses, due to which the prosecution's case became suspect. As per the prosecution, the truck had hit the motorcycle from the rear, which means that the rear side of the motorcycle should have been damaged, but the mechanical expert found damage on the front side of the motorcycle. This showed that the prosecution’s version regarding the truck hitting the rear side of motorcycle was not proved, and the defence version that the motorcycle had hit the truck was probable. Therefore, the accused was acquitted.

#7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence. Bhuri Singh (PW-1), Vinay Rana 7( 2025:HHC:24711 ) (PW-3), and Babli Devi (PW-4) categorically stated that the accused was driving the truck in a rash and negligent manner, and the truck hit the motorcycle. No cogent reason was assigned to discard their testimonies. The accused failed to probablise his defence. He did not produce any evidence to prove the plea taken by him. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

#8. I have heard Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant-State and Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Karan Veer Singh Thakur, Advocate for the respondent-accused.

#9. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence in its proper perspective. The learned Trial Court had wrongly held that the testimonies of the witnesses were not reliable. It was duly proved that the motorcycle was parked, and the truck had hit the rear side of the motorcycle, which showed the negligence of the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be 8( 2025:HHC:24711 ) allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

#10. Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent, submitted that the learned Trial Court has rightly held that the prosecution's case was made doubtful by the testimony of the mechanical expert. He found damage on the front portion of the motorcycle, whereas damage should have been caused to the rear side. This falsified the prosecution's case. The mechanical expert also admitted that the accident occurred due to the leakage of the oil, which created a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution's case. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

#11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

#12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can 9( 2025:HHC:24711 ) interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence or omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court.

#39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) 10( 2025:HHC:24711 ) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufÏcient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption 11( 2025:HHC:24711 ) of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reafÏrmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” in H.D. Sundara v. State Sundara v. State of 40. Further, Karnataka [H.D. Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence.

8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;

8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 12( 2025:HHC:24711 )

8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded based on the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

#41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:

41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; is based on a 41.2. That the same misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and

41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

#12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view 13( 2025:HHC:24711 ) consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

#13. A similar view was taken in Bhupatbhai Bachubhai Chavda v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 523, wherein it was observed:- “6. It is true that while deciding an appeal against acquittal, the Appellate Court has to reappreciate the evidence. After re-appreciating the evidence, the first question that needs to be answered by the Appellate Court is whether the view taken by the Trial Court was a plausible view that could have been taken based on the evidence on record. Perusal of the impugned judgment of the High Court shows that this question has not been adverted to. The Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it is satisfied after reappreciating the evidence that the only possible conclusion was that the guilt of the accused had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal only on the ground that another view is possible. In other words, the judgment of acquittal must be found to be perverse. Unless the Appellate Court records such a finding, no interference can be made with the order of acquittal. The High Court has ignored the well-settled principle that an order of acquittal further strengthens the presumption of innocence of the accused. After having perused the judgment, we find that the High Court has not addressed itself to the main question.”

#14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14( 2025:HHC:24711 )

#15. Dev Raj (PW-7) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle. He admitted in his cross- examination that in the case of the leakage of the oil from the oil seal, the brake stops functioning. He admitted that the accident occurred due to the leakage of the oil. He was put forward as a witness to the truth by the prosecution, and his testimony is binding upon the prosecution. His statement clearly shows that the accident occurred due to the leakage of the oil seal. There is no evidence that the petitioner was responsible in any manner for this leakage. Hence, the prosecution's case regarding the negligence of the accused became doubtful by the statement of the mechanical expert.

#16. It was a specific case of the prosecution that the truck hit the motorcycle from the rear. Vinay Singh (PW-3), who was driving the motorcycle, stated that the Truck hit the motorcycle from the rear. Babli Devi (PW-4), who was a pillion rider, also stated that the Truck had hit the motorcycle from the rear. Thus, both occupants of the motorcycle have categorically stated that the Truck had hit 15( 2025:HHC:24711 ) the motorcycle from the rear. Dev Raj (PW-7) stated in his cross-examination that the headlight of the motorcycle was damaged and the motorcycle did not have any other damage. His testimony makes the prosecution's case suspect. If the truck had hit the motorcycle from the rear, damage would have been on the rear side of the motorcycle and not on the headlight, which is located towards the front side. There is no explanation for the absence of any damage to the rear side of the motorcycle and the damage caused to the headlight. The fact that the damage was not caused on the rear side of the motorcycle makes the prosecution suspect that the Truck had hit the motorcycle from the rear.

#17. It was submitted that all the witnesses stated consistently about the negligence of the accused, and the learned Trial Court erred in ignoring their statements. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 at 595 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of 16( 2025:HHC:24711 ) everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.”

#18. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), wherein it was held: “It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn on the basis of evidence led before the Court.”

#19. Therefore, the statement of the witness that the driver was negligent by itself, without anything more, does not constitute legally admissible evidence upon which a reliance can be placed by the Court of law to base its judgment.

#20. The witnesses have stated that the Truck came in a high speed and hit the motorcycle. No witness has mentioned the approximate speed of the truck. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited 17( 2025:HHC:24711 ) from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.”

#21. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, wherein it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against 18( 2025:HHC:24711 ) an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.”

#22. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: - “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.”

#23. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: “Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.” 19( 2025:HHC:24711 )

#24. Thus, the accused cannot be held liable based on the statements made by the witnesses that the truck was being driven at a high speed.

#25. Thus, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the prosecution's case was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and no interference is required with the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court.

#26. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed.

#27. Registry is directed to send the records of the learned Trial Court forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 29th July, 2025 (veena )