State of H.P v. Smt.Lajjya Devi

deceased Smt.Sushma Devi was married to Vinod Kumar, son of accused Lajjya Devi. The marriage took place in the year 1993. It is also not disputed that on 31.3.1994 sometime in the morning, Smt.Sushma Devi caught fire and received serious burn injuries. She was taken to the Civil Hospital, Palampur at about 11.00 a.m. where she died at about 12.30 a.m (mid night) on the night intervening 1st and 2nd April, 1994. According to the post mortem report, the deceased died due to shock which was the result of extensive burns. According to the prosecution, the deceased was being ill-treated by the accused and being subjected to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. The case of the prosecution is that on

31.3.1994 the deceased had gone to the cattle shed for cleaning the same at about 6.30 a.m. She returned from the cattle shed and was washing her hands and face on the first floor of the house. Her mother-in-law, i.e., the 3 accused came there. She was carrying a container full of kerosene. The accused then poured the kerosene on the deceased Sushma and lit the same with a match stick. Thereafter, the accused went down and came up with a pitcher of water and poured water on her. A number of persons gathered at the spot. The entire case of the prosecution is based on the alleged dying declaration made by the deceased in the hospital to the Investigating Officer on 1.4.1994 at about 4.15 p.m. This dying declaration was attested by PW/2 Dr.S.K.Bhatia and PW/3 Swaran Singh, an uncle of the deceased (mother(cid:146) sister(cid:146)s husband). An FIR was registered and the investigation was carried out on the basis of the dying declaration Ext.PB and the other material collected during investigation. The accused was charged with having committed the offences detailed here-in-above. She pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. After trial, the accused has been acquitted by the learned Trial Court mainly on the ground that the dying declaration cannot be relied upon. Hence the present appeal. 4 Before considering the dying declaration, it would be pertinent to cull out the law relating to dying declarations and how such dying declarations are to be appreciated. In Varikuppal Srinivas Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2009(3), SCC 415, the Apex Court held as follows:- (cid:147)11. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused by the trial Court was the dying declarations. (cid:147)9(cid:133)(cid:133)The situation in which a person is on his deathbed, being exceedingly solemn, serene and grave, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides should the dying declaration be excluded miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eye-witness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the Court without a scrap of evidence. it will result

10. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration inspire full should be of such nature as to confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down law that the dying as an absolute rule of the sole basis of declaration cannot 5 is merely a conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule rule of requiring corroboration prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1992 SC 1817): (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. [See Munnu Raja & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1976) 2 SCR 764)]