V.Balakrishnan v. The Joint Director of Agriculture, Tiruvannamalai & Ors.

3.The petitioner sought for the issuance of a writ ofcertiorarified mandamus to call for the records relating to theorder of the first respondent dated Nil/6/98 issued in Ref.No.A310138/98 and to quash the same and to further direct therespondents to reinstate the applicant with all consequentialbenefits.4.The petitioner was given appointment on compassionateground on the death of his father B.Varadhan, who was serving as anAssistant Director of Agriculture and died on 5.10.1986. Thepetitioner is the third son of the said Varadhan and at the time ofhis death, the first son Gopalakrishnan was 25 years old and wasserving as Assistant Engineer in TNEB. The second sonSanthanakrishnan was working in a private limited company i.e.Western Crompton Company as a Supervisor and was doing privatebusiness and at the relevant time, he was 24 years old. Thepetitioner at the time of death of his father during the year 1986was only 14 years old and was not eligible for entering into anyGovernment service. 5.The petitioner after a period of nearly 8 years made anapplication for appointment on compassionate grounds in terms ofG.O.Ms.No.155, Labour and Employment Dept., dated 16.7.1993. Thepetitioner's claim was forwarded by the second respondent withoutverifying the family status of the petitioner and merely on the noobjection certificate given by the first and second sons. On thebasis of these documents, the petitioner was appointed as a JuniorAssistant on a temporary basis even before scrutinizing therecords. At the time when his father died, there are certain landedproperties which are also owned by the petitioner. When these factscame to the notice subsequent to the appointment of the petitioner,by an order dated Nil (June, 1998), the petitioner's temporaryservice was sought to be terminated. The petitioner filed OANo.5363 of 1998 before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal. 6.The tribunal, by order dated 6.,7.98, granted an interimstay on the ground that the petitioner was not given anyopportunity before ordering termination. The said interim ordercame to be continued until further orders. On behalf of therespondent, a miscellaneous application in MA No.1758 of 1998 wasfiled for vacating the interim order together with supportingdocuments. The Tribunal for the reasons best known to it did nottake up the said interim application. 7.On notice from the tribunal, the respondents have alsofiled a reply affidavit, dated 19.7.98. In paragraphs 3 and 4 ofthe reply, it was averred as follows:"3....Applicant's father died while inservice on 5.10.1986. There are three sons and onedaughter to the deceased Government servant. Theapplicant's first elder brother was well employedas Assistant Engineer in Tamilnadu ElectricityBoard and getting attractive salary at the time of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ his death. The applicant's second elder brotherwas also employed possessing the MechanicalEngineering diploma. Both have not got married atthe time of his death. Since they were unmarriedat the time of his death, they were expected tomaintain their own family even without theassistance of death benefits. At the time of deathof applicant's father, all the legal heirs wereliving together as joint family. Further theapplicant's first and second elder brothers havegot married only after their father's death.Applicant's first elder brother have got marriedon 4.5.1988 i.e. after one and half years afterhis father's death i.e. on 5.10.1986. Theapplicant's first elder brother got married withAssistant Lecturer in Engineering College atVellore. The very purpose of G.O.No.155 Labour andEmployment Department, dated 16.7.93 termed tosave the family from the financial crisis of thedeceased Government servant providing job to thelegal heir. Based on the facts and figuresfurnished by the applicant and other legal heirs,the postings has been ordered formally. Putting ofmere service is not the criterion for claiming re-entry.4.The post has been given to the applicantpurely on temporary basis and liable fortermination when such of contradictions areintervened."8.However, Mr.R.Muthukannu, learned counsel for thepetitioner contended that after his temporary appointment, thepetitioner had continued in service for four years and thetermination was done without notice to him. He also stated thatG.O.Ms.No.155, Labour and Employment Dept., dated 16.7.1993 permitsthe employment of persons on compassionate ground even if anymember of the family who is already employed under specialcircumstances. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the order, dated 16.7.1993 maybe usefully extracted below:"1.....Another condition introduced in theG.O. third read above is that if there is alreadyany earning member in the family of the Governmentservant who died in harness, the other dependantsof the deceased Government servant will not beeligible for compassionate appointment. ....3.In regard to the second conditionmentioned in para 1 above, it is considered that ifa member of the family is already in employment andsupports the family then the restriction may beapplied. When a dependant of the family isemployed, the factors to be ascertained are, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ whether he is regularly employed and is actuallysupporting the family. If that person was employedeven before the death of the Government servant andwas living separately without extending any help tothe family, then the case of other eligibledependants will be considered."9.He also placed reliance upon the judgment of the SupremeCourt in Union of India v. K.P. Tiwari reported in (2003) 9 SCC129 and relied upon the following passage found in paragraph 4 ofthe said order, which is as follows:4. It is unnecessary in this case to examineeither questions of law or fact arising in thematter. Suffice to say that the respondent has beenappointed now and has been in service for more thanfive years. We do not think, it would beappropriate to disturb that state of affairs bymaking any other order resulting in uprooting therespondent from his livelihood.10.It must be noted that the K.P.Tiwari's case (citedsurpa) came to be considered by the Supreme Court subsequently andthe reasoning found in that case was not followed and in fact, thereasoning found there, were explained by referring to all the otherdecisions arising out of matter relating to compassionateappointments vide decision in State of Haryana v. Ankur Guptareported in (2003) 7 SCC 704. In paragraphs 4 to 10, the SupremeCourt observed as follows:4. Learned counsel for the appellant Statesubmitted that the approach of the High Court iserroneous. When the appointment was made inviolation of the policy, and by mistake therespondent had been appointed, that does not conferany legal right upon him. In response, learnedcounsel for the respondent submitted that asrightly observed by the High Court, there was nomisrepresentation or fraud practised by therespondent in gaining employment. The respondenthas worked for more than 4 years and in view ofwhat has been stated by this Court in Union ofIndia v. K.P. Tiwari1, jurisdiction under Article136 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short“the Constitution”) should not be exercised.5. We find that the appointment, admittedly, wasnot permissible in view of the policy which cameinto force from 22-8-1996. The earlier policy waschanged in view of a decision of the High Court.The correctness of the policy decision was notunder challenge. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

6. As was observed in State of Haryana v. RaniDevi2 it need not be pointed out that the claim ofthe person concerned for appointment oncompassionate ground is based on the premise thathe was dependent on the deceased employee.Strictly, this claim cannot be upheld on thetouchstone of Article 14 or 16 of the Constitutionof India. However, such claim is considered asreasonable and permissible on the basis of suddencrisis occurring in the family of such employee whohas served the State and dies while in service.That is why it is necessary for the authorities toframe rules, regulations or to issue suchadministrative orders which can stand the test ofArticles 14 and 16. Appointment on compassionateground cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Die-in-Harness Scheme cannot be made applicable to alltypes of posts irrespective of the nature ofservice rendered by the deceased employee. In RaniDevi case2 it was held that the scheme regardingappointment on compassionate ground if extended toall types of casual or ad hoc employees includingthose who worked as apprentices cannot be justifiedon constitutional grounds. In LIC of India v. AshaRamchhandra Ambekar3 it was pointed out that theHigh Courts and Administrative Tribunals cannotconfer benediction impelled by sympatheticconsiderations to make appointments oncompassionate grounds when the regulations framedin respect thereof do not cover and contemplatesuch appointments. It was noted in Umesh KumarNagpal v. State of Haryana4 that as a rule, inpublic service appointments should be made strictlyon the basis of open invitation of applications andmerit. The appointment on compassionate ground isnot another source of recruitment but merely anexception to the aforesaid requirement taking intoconsideration the fact of the death of the employeewhile in service leaving his family without anymeans of livelihood. In such cases the object is toenable the family to get over sudden financialcrisis. But such appointments on compassionateground have to be made in accordance with therules, regulations or administrative instructionstaking into consideration the financial conditionof the family of the deceased.7. In Director of Education (Secondary) v.Pushpendra Kumar5 it was observed that in the matterof compassionate appointment there cannot beinsistence for a particular post. Out of purelyhumanitarian consideration and having regard to thefact that unless some source of livelihood isprovided the family would not be able to make both https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ ends meet, provisions are made for givingappointment to one of the dependants of thedeceased who may be eligible for appointment. Carehas, however, to be taken that provision for grant of compassionate employment which is in thenature of an exception to the general provisionsdoes not unduly interfere with the right of thoseother persons who are eligible for appointment toseek appointment against the post which would havebeen available, but for the provision enablingappointment being made on compassionate grounds ofthe dependant of the deceased employee. As it is inthe nature of exception to the general provisions,it cannot substitute the provision to which it isan exception and thereby nullify the main provisionby taking away completely the right conferred bythe main provision.8. These aspects have been highlighted by thisCourt in a recent decision in State of Manipur v.Md. Rajaodin6.9. Above being the legal position, the logic ofthe policy cannot be undermined. Coming to thequestion whether there was any fraud ormisrepresentation, we find that right from thebeginning, the officers concerned were acting in amanner contrary to the policy. When the Director ofIndustrial Training and Vocational Education,Haryana wrote to the Commissioner and Secretary,Industrial Training and Vocational EducationDepartment, Haryana Government, on 22-5-1997, itwas clearly indicated that the mother of therespondent was already in government service. Itwas also noted that according to the governmentinstructions only those dependants of the deceasedemployee/officer whose family income is up toRs2500 per month can be appointed. In the letteritself it is mentioned that the monthly salary ofthe respondent’s mother was Rs5880 and, therefore,there was no scope for appointing the respondent.Having said so, it was indicated that relaxationmay be given in his case. The High Court proceededon the basis as if there was relaxation of thestipulations. No provision could be shown to uswhereby relaxation is permissible, particularlywhen the policy in this respect was modified on thebasis of and in implementation of the decision ofthe High Court. Though the learned counsel for therespondent referred to the 1970 guidelines wherethere was scope for relaxation, the same does notassist the respondent because that was operative at https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ a point of time when the policy dated 22-8-1996notified to be in line with the High Court’sjudgment was not in operation.10. Looked at from any angle, the view of theHigh Court is indefensible. The judgment of theHigh Court is, therefore, set aside. But whileallowing the State’s appeal, it cannot be lostsight of that the respondent was in governmentservice for more than about four years. It isstated by the learned counsel for the respondentthat he has already become overaged for governmentemployment. In the peculiar circumstances, in casethe respondent applies for a job in the Governmentwithin a period of two years and is selected dehorsthe compassionate appointment scheme, the questionof his having crossed the age bar, would not standin his way and the service rendered by him shall beduly considered. The appeal is allowed subject tothe aforesaid observations. Costs made easy.11.Thereafter, the learned counsel placed reliance upon thejudgment of this Court in R.Bharathi Vs. The Secretary toGovernment and another reported in 2009 Writ L.R. 593. In thatcase, the learned Judge of this court after referring toK.P.Tiwari's case and D.M.Premakumari's case reported in 2009 (2)Supreme 271 and granted relief by setting aside the order oftermination and allowed the candidate to continue in officenotwithstanding her disentitlement to hold office. 12.It must be stated that the learned Judge did not takenote of the fact that K.P.Tiwari's case cannot be held to be a goodlaw and the Premakumari's case arose out of cancellation ofcommunity certificate and relief was granted by the Supreme Courtby its exercise of power under Article 142 as found in paragraph 16of the judgment, which is as follows:"16.In view of the above discussion andkeeping in view the peculiar facts andcircumstances of the case, we dispose of thisappeal, without going into the merits of thecase. In order to do completed justice, wedirect the respondents herein, not to dislodgethe appellant from the post of primary schoolteacher. This order of ours shall not be treatedas a precedent in any other case."13.Though the learned judge had stated that notwithstandingthe caution expressed by the Supreme Court, the same direction canbe taken to be a binding precedent for the High Courts to follow,this Court respectfully disagree with such defines of the cautionexpressed by the Supreme Court. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

14.It must be stated that directions given by the SupremeCourt by virtue of power under Article 142 of the Constitutioncannot be a binding precedent for the High Courts to follow thesame. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the power given to theSupreme Court under Article 142 is not available to the High Courtexercising power under Article 226 of the constitution.15.In this context, the following two decisions of theSupreme Court may be usefully referred to.16.The Supreme Court in Sanchalakshri v. VijayakumarRaghuvirprasad Mehta reported in (1998) 8 SCC 245 in paragraph 8observed as follows:"8.Learned counsel for Respondent 1 relyingupon the decision of this Court in Bhagat Ram v.State of H.P.2 submitted that penalty notcommensurate with the gravity of the misconduct hasto be considered as violative of Article 14. Hefurther submitted that dismissal from service beingan economic death, such a severe punishment oughtnot to have been imposed upon Respondent 1 when byhis said acts, he was not to gain any additionalfinancial benefit. Whether he was likely to gainanything or not thereby did not have much bearing onthe gravity of the misconduct. The acts committed byhim constituted not only a serious misconduct butalso a serious criminal offence. Learned counselalso relied upon the earlier-quoted observationsmade by Hansaria, J. in B.C. Chaturvedi case1.Really, they have no relevance to the facts of thiscase. This is not a case where the HighCourt/Tribunal found any difficulty in granting anappropriate relief to Respondent 1 because of sometechnicality of rules or procedure even thoughjustice demanded it. Moreover, the said observationsare no more than an expression of a personal view.What is to be noted is that Hansaria, J. agreed withwhat the other two learned Judges held as regardsthe powers of the High Court/Tribunal to interferewith the order of penalty passed by the disciplinaryauthority. Therefore, it would not be correct to saythat this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi case1 hasaccepted the view that the High Courts/Tribunalspossess the same power which this Court has underArticle 142 of the Constitution for doing completejustice, even in the absence of such a provision.17.The Supreme Court in C.M. Singh v. H.P. Krishi VishvaVidyalaya reported in (1999) 9 SCC 40 in paragraph 5 observed asfollows: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "5. The High Court quoted in its judgmentfrom the decision of this Court in the case ofRekha Chaturvedi1 but it would appear that it didnot realise the import of these sentences:“There is also no record before us to show as tohow the Selection Committee had proceeded toweigh the respective merits of the candidates andto relax minimum qualifications in favour of somein exercise of the discretionary powers vested init under the University Ordinance. If theconsiderations which weighed with the Committeein relaxing the requisite qualifications werevalid, it would result in injustice to those whohave been selected.”These sentences show that the Selection Committeethere had discretionary powers vested in it underthe University Ordinance to relax the requisitequalifications. There is nothing on record beforeus to show that the Selection Committee in theinstant case had discretionary powers to relaxthe qualifications of the candidates, or that ithad exercised them. Apart therefrom, the languageemployed by this Court in Rekha Chaturvedi case1would suggest that this Court was employing thepowers conferred on it under Article 142 to docomplete justice. The High Court does not havesuch powers. Having found on merits in favour ofthe writ petitioners we do not think that theHigh Court was justified in declining any reliefto them.18.Further, even in the matter of cancellation of communitycertificates cases, the Supreme Court expressed its strongdisapproval for grant of relief to such of those persons who haveacquired employment/degree on fake community certificates. Areference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Addl.G.M.-Human Resource, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. SureshRamkrishna Burde reported in (2007) 5 SCC 336. In paragraphs 12 to14 of the said judgment, it was observed as follows: 12. In R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala2which we have referred to earlier, the case of theemployee’s son, who got admission in an engineeringcollege against a seat reserved for Scheduled Caste,was also considered. The admission in theengineering college was obtained in 1992 and hecompleted the course in 1996 though under theinterim order of the High Court. The appeal wasdecided by this Court on 7-1-2004. Placing reliance https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ upon para 38 of the judgment in Milind1 this Courtobserved that no purpose would be served inwithholding the declaration of the result on thebasis of examination already taken by the student ordepriving him of the degree in case he passes theexamination. It was accordingly directed that thestudent’s result be declared and he be allowed totake his degree with the condition that he will notbe treated as Scheduled Caste candidate in futureeither in obtaining service or for any otherbenefits flowing from the caste certificate obtainedby him and he shall be treated to be a personbelonging to General category.13. The principle, which seems to have beenfollowed by this Court is, that, where a personsecures an appointment on the basis of a false castecertificate, he cannot be allowed to retain thebenefit of the wrong committed by him and hisservices are liable to be terminated. However, wherea person has got admission in a professional courselike engineering or MBBS and has successfullycompleted the course after studying for theprescribed period and has passed the examination,his case may, on special facts, be considered on adifferent footing. Normally, huge amount of publicmoney is spent in imparting education in aprofessional college and the student also acquiresthe necessary skill in the subjects which he hasstudied. The skill acquired by him can be gainfullyutilised by the society. In such cases theprofessional degree obtained by the student may beprotected though he may have got admission byproducing a false caste certificate. Here again nohard-and-fast rule can be laid down. If thefalsehood of the caste certificate submitted by thestudent is detected within a short period of hisgetting admission in the professional course, hisadmission would be liable to be cancelled. However,where he has completed the course and has passed allthe examinations and acquired the degree, his casemay be treated on a different footing. In such casesonly a limited relief of protection of hisprofessional degree may be granted.14. In the case in hand the respondent gotappointment on 31-5-1982 on a post, which wasreserved for a member of Scheduled Tribe. Onreceiving complaints the employer referred thematter to the District Collector, Nagpur and also tothe Scrutiny Committee in March 1991. The subsequentperiod has been spent in making enquiry and inlitigation as the respondent filed three writ https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ petitions. In view of the principle laid down bythis Court we are clearly of the opinion that hisservices were rightly terminated by the appellantand the High Court was in error in directing hisreinstatement. The order passed by the High Court,therefore, has to be set aside.19.Mr.R.Muthukannu, learned counsel for the petitionerthereupon placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in TheDistrict Collector and other Vs. J.Jagaraja and another reported in2002 Writ L.R. 446 and placed reliance upon paragraph 9 of the saidjudgment, which is as follows:"9....The Tribunal had allowed the OriginalApplication mainly on the ground of violation ofprinciples of natural justice. In the peculiarfacts and circumstances of the case, even thoughthe first respondent was a temporary governmentservant, we are of the view that before terminatinghis services on the assumption that there had beenmisrepresentation of facts, principles of naturaljustice should have been followed."20.But, it must be noted that in that case, the DivisionBench only confirmed the orders of the Tribunal on the ground thatthe Tribunal did not commit any error of law apparent on the factof the record and therefore, refused to exercise its discretionaryjurisdiction. But the principle stated in the above division benchjudgment runs diametrically opposite to the principle laid down bythe Supreme Court in a similar circumstances vide its decision inA.P. Social Welfare Residential Educational Institutions v. PindigaSridhar reported in (2007) 13 SCC 352. In paragraph 7 of the saidorder, the Supreme Court observed as follows: 7. The High Court on the basis of the erroneousview upset the well-merited judgment of thelearned Single Judge. By now, it is well-settledprinciple of law that the principles of naturaljustice cannot be applied in a straitjacketformula. Their application depends upon the factsand circumstances of each case. To sustain thecomplaint of the violation of principles ofnatural justice one must establish that he wasprejudiced for non-observance of the principles ofnatural justice. In the present case, the fact onwhich the appellant terminated the services of therespondent appointed on compassionate ground wasadmitted by the respondent himself that when heapplied for the post on compassionate ground byhis application dated 6-5-1996, his mother was inservice. So also when he secured the appointmentby an order dated 22-11-2002 his wife was inservice since 3-8-1997 as Extension Officer in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Rural Development and later on promoted as MandalParishad Development Officer at the time when hewas appointed on compassionate ground. These factsclearly disclose that the appointment oncompassionate ground was secured by playing fraud.Fraud cloaks everything. In such admitted facts,there was no necessity of issuing show-causenotice to him. The view of the High Court thattermination suffers from the non-observance of theprinciples of natural justice is, therefore,clearly erroneous. In our view, in the given factsof this case, no prejudice whatsoever has beencaused to the respondent. The respondent could nothave improved his case even if a show-cause noticewas issued to him.21.Mr.R.Muthukannu, learned counsel for the petitionersubmitted that since the petitioner had worked four years beforethe order of termination and had continued in service for the last10 years, his employment should be saved at least on grounds ofsympathetic. This Court is afraid that such a consideration do nothave a place when an appointment has been secured contrary to therules. It is therefore, necessary to refer to the decision of theSupreme Court in State of W.B. v. Banibrata Ghosh reported in(2009) 3 SCC 250. In paragraphs 31 and 32 of the said judgment, thecontention raised similar to the present case has been rejected bythe Supreme Court and hence it is necessary to reproduce thoseparagraphs:31. Shri Ghosh, learned Senior Counsel, appearingfor the respondents, at this stage, says that weshould take a compassionate view of the matter,since as a result of this judgment, the respondentwould be thrown in a state of unemployment. We areafraid, we cannot show any such misplaced sympathy,which was shown by the Division Bench. We are toldat the Bar that this Court had issued directions tomake the payment of salaries and some payments havebeen made to the respondent. We direct that suchpayments shall not be recovered from therespondent.32. Considering that the writ petition remainedpending for 10 years and thereby, the respondentmight now have become barred by age for freshemployment, we recommend that the Government mayconsider the condonation of the age bar, if any, onthe part of the respondent. We accordingly setaside the judgment of the Division Bench andrestore that of the learned Single Judge and allowthe appeal but without any order as to costs. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

22.It must be noted that in the present case at the timeof the death of the petitioner's father, he was only 14 years oldand was not eligible for any appointment on compassionate groundsas per the rules. Even otherwise, it cannot be said that his familywas under indigent circumstances due to the death of the fathersince his two of the elder brothers were comfortably employed andthey also own some landed properties. It must be noted that theemployment assistance on compassionate ground is exception toArticles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and any appointment can bemade only strictly in accordance with the scheme in existence atthe time of the death of a Government servant. The petitioner wasonly appointed on temporary grounds and by virtue of the interimorder of the tribunal, he cannot have a vested right to hold thepost. When the facts are very clear, there was a question of anynotice being given to the petitioner before dispensing with hisservice as his initial appointment itself is invalid. 23.At the time of the death of his father, the petitionerwas a minor during the year 1986 and he got the compassionateappointment only after a period of eight years from the date ofdeath of his father. Such a grant of employment defeat the verypurpose of the compassionate appointment provided by the State. Inthis context, it is necessary to refer to certain decisions of theSupreme Court which will have the bearing on this issue:24.In Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana and others[1994 (4) SCC 138 : 1995–I–LLJ 798], it was noted that as a rule inpublic service, appointment should be made strictly on the basis ofopen invitation of application and merit. The appointment oncompassionate ground is not another source of recruitment butmerely an exception to the aforesaid requirement taking intoconsideration the fact of the death of the employee while inservice leaving his family without any means livelihood. In suchcases, the object is to enable the family to get over suddenfinancial crisis. But such appointments on compassionate groundhave to be made in accordance with the rules, regulations oradministrative instructions taking into consideration the financialcondition of the family of the deceased.25.In Punjab National Bank v. Ashwini Kumar Taneja,[(2004) 7 SCC 265], the Supreme Court observed that appointment oncompassionate ground is not a source of recruitment but merely anexception to the requirement of making appointments on openinvitation of application on merits. The basic intention is thaton the death of the employee concerned his family is not deprivedof the means of livelihood. The object is to enable the family toget over sudden financial crisis. 26.In State of Haryana and others v. Rani Devi andanother [AIR 1996 SC 2445 : 1996 (5) SCC 308], the Supreme Courtobserved as follows: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ “It was also impressed that appointments oncompassionate ground cannot be made after lapse ofreasonable period which must be specified in therules because the right to such employment is not avested right which can be exercised at any time infuture.”27.In Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar and others [(2000) 7SCC 192], the Supreme Court has expressly held that there cannotbe reservation of a vacancy till such time as the applicant becomesa major after a number of years, unless there are some specificprovisions. The very basis of compassionate appointment is to seethat the family gets immediate relief. An application made afterthe period stipulated under the scheme is not maintainable, and itis not permissible to hold that such application could be madeafter attaining majority. 28.In the light of the above, the writ petition filed bythe petitioner deserves to be dismissed and accordingly, the samestands dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Butat the same time, this court will have to grant the same relief aswas done by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana case (citedsupra) (2003) 7 SCC 704 in paragraph 10, which is as follows:10....In the peculiar circumstances, in case therespondent applies for a job in the Governmentwithin a period of two years and is selected dehorsthe compassionate appointment scheme, the questionof his having crossed the age bar, would not standin his way and the service rendered by him shall beduly considered. The appeal is allowed subject tothe aforesaid observations.The Supreme Court in State of West Bengal's case (cited supra) inparagraph 32 observed as follows:32.Considering that the writ petitionremained pending for 10 years and thereby, therespondent might now have become barred by age forfresh employment, we recommend that the Governmentmay consider the condonation of the age bar, ifany, on the part of the respondent...."The petitioner also will have the benefit of the similarobservation.vvk Sd/- Asst.Registrar/True Copy/ Sub.Asst.Registrar https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ To1.The Joint Director of Agriculture, Tiruvannamalai.2.The Director of Agriculture, Chepauk, Chennai.3.The Secretary to Government, Agriculture Department, Fort St. George, Chennai.4.Agriculture Development Officer, Agriculture Extension Centre, Chetpet, Chennai.+ 1 cc to Mr.R. Muthukkannu, Advocate ST.51162.PRE DELIVERY ORDER INW.P.NO.33788 OF 2006TS(CO0Eu 13.10.2009.