M. Jayaraj v. Superintendent of Police & Ors.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDATED : 22.06.2012CORAMTHE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.CHANDRUW.P.No.15425 of 2012M.Jayaraj.. Petitioner Vs.1.The Superintendent of Police, Villupuram, Villupuram District.2.The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Tindivanam, Villupuram District.3.The Sub Inspector of Police, Tindivanam Police Station, Tindivanam. .. Respondents This writ petition is preferred under Article 226 of theConstitution of India praying for the issue of a writ ofcertiorarified mandamus to call for the records of the secondrespondent relating to the order in Na.Ka.No.152/SDOC/Gen1/2012dated 30.05.2012, passed by the second respondent and quash thesame, consequently to direct the respondents to grant permissionand protection to conduct party policy propaganda scheduled to beheld on any day within a period of one month. For Petitioner : Mr.K.BaluFor Respondents : Mr.S.Shanmuga Velayutham, State Public Prosecutor assisted by Mr.V.Jaya Prakash Narayanan, Spl.G.P.ORDERThis writ petition is filed by the petitioner, who is theTown Secretary of Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) which is a registeredpolitical party. In this writ petition, the challenge is to theimpugned order passed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police,Tindivanam, dated 30.5.2012 denying permission for the petitionerto conduct a public meeting explaining the policies of the party on5.6.2012. The authority, i.e., the second respondent had deniedpermission to conduct the public meeting in the Gahdhiar Thidal,Tindivanam on the ground that Section 30(2) of the Police Act, 1861is in force and also due to law and problem. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

2.When the writ petition came up on 19.6.2012, this courtordered notice on admission. The learned Additional GovernmentPleader was directed to get instructions from the respondents.Accordingly, a counter affidavit, dated 21.6.2012 was filed by thesecond respondent. A copy of the promulgation, dated 5.6.2012 underSection 30(2) in the Tindivanam town for a period of 15 days from5.6.2012 to 19.6.2012 and also the promulgation dated 20.6.2012 fora period of 15 days from 20.6.2012 to 04.07.2012 issued by theDeputy Superintendent of Police, Tindivanam were produced, therebyimplying that in view of the promulgation order under Section 30(2), permission to hold public meetings cannot be granted.3.Heard the arguments of Mr.K.Balu, learned counselappearing for the petitioner and Mr.S.Shanmuga Velayutham, learnedState Public Prosecutor assisted by Mr.V.Jaya Prakash Narayanan,learned Special Government Pleader appearing for respondents.4.It must be noted that the petitioner's political party isregistered with the Election Commission. It has been participatingin the elections for the last several decades. They are entitled tohold public meeting in public places to explain their policy to thepublic from time to time. Unless holding of such meetings result inany disturbance of law and order, the respondents cannot denypermission on the specious ground of promulgation of Section 30(2)of the Police Act, 1861 is in force. In the counter affidavit,except by stating the existence of such a notification, no otherreasons were set out.5.The right of a citizen to conduct a demonstration iscompletely guaranteed in terms of Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) ofthe Constitution. Though such a right is subject to the reasonablerestrictions, which may be made by the State in the interests ofsovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State,friendly relations with Foreign States, public order, decency ormorality or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation orincitement to an offence.6.In this context, it is necessary to refer the judgment ofthe Supreme Court in Himat Lal K.Shah V. Police Commissioner,Ahmedabad reported in AIR 1973 SC 87 = 1973 (1) SCC 227 rendered bya Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, wherein, the Court struckdown Rule 7 of the Rules framed under the Bombay Police Act on theground that Rule, which empowered the Commissioner of Police torefuse permission to hold meetings without giving any guidanceunder the Rule and thereby conferring an arbitrary discretion, wasan unreasonable restriction on the freedom of assembly guaranteedunder Article 19 of the Constitution. The Court also held that thework “regulating” in Section 33(1)(o) of the Bombay Police Actwould include the power to prohibit and impose the condition thatpermission should be taken a few days before the holding of themeeting on a public street. Mathew, J., dissented from the view ofthe majority and held that the power to regulate did not includethe right to prohibit and the permission sought for holding ameeting ought not be refused. The majority opinion was that https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ regulation is necessary to enable citizens to enjoy the variousrights in crowded public streets, and that the State can makeregulation in aid of the right of the assemble of each citizen andcan impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of Public order.7.Further, the Supreme Court also in S.Rangarajan V.P.Jagjivan Ram reported in 1989 (2) SCC 574 held that freedom ofspeech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India meansthe right to express one's own opinion by word of mouth, printing,picture or is any one manner of ideas made through any and thecommunication of ideas made through any medium. Such right,however, was held to be subject to reasonable restrictions in thelarger interest of the community and the country as set out inArticle 19(2) of the Constitution. Those restrictions are intendedto strike a proper balance between the liberty guaranteed, and thesocial interests specified under Article 19(2). The Courtemphasised that the interest of freedom of expression and socialinterest cannot be regarded as of equal weight and the Court'scommitment to freedom of expression demands that it cannot besuppressed unless the situations created by allowing the freedomare pressing and community interest is endangered. The anticipateddanger should not be remote, conjectural or far fetched, but shouldhave proximate and direct nexus with the expression. The expressionof thought should be intrinsically dangerous to the publicinterests. It should be inseparably locked up with the actioncontemplated like the equivalent of a “spark in a powder keg.”8.Therefore, it is too late for the respondents to refusepermission to hold a meeting on a matter of public importance. Withrespect to the respondents' reliance upon Section 30(2) of thePolice Act, 1861, it can only be said that it enables therespondents to direct the control and conduct of all assemblies andprocessions on public road or in the public streets orthoroughfares and to prescribe the Rules by which and the times bywhich the processions may pass and Section 30(2) and (3) on whichreliance was placed, is extracted below:“Sec 30(2): He may also, on being satisfied that itis intended by any persons or class of persons toconvene or collect an assembly in any such road,street or thoroughfare, or to form a procession whichwould, in the judgment of the Magistrate of thedistrict, or of the sub-division of a district, ifuncontrolled, be likely to cause a breach of thepeace, require by general or special notice, that thepersons convening or collecting such assembly ordirecting or promoting such procession shall applyfor a licence.(3)On such application being made, he may issue alicence, specifying the names of the licensees anddefining the conditions on which alone such assemblyor such procession is to be permitted to take place,and otherwise giving effect to this section.” https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

9.Therefore, the said provision is only a regulatory powerand not a blanket power to trifle any democratic dissent of thecitizens by the Police.10.This court in a similar circumstance had grantedpermission to conduct demonstration vide decision inK.T.Patchaimal, District Secretary, All India Anna Dravida MunnetraKazhagam, Kanniyakumari District Vs. The Superintendent of Police,Kanyakumari District and others reported in 2009 Writ L.R. 65.Therefore, the law cannot be different when a political party wasin opposition and thereafter, when it becomes a ruling party tryingto prevent the other parties from conducting meetings as had beendone in the present case. 11.Further, a division bench of this court headed byP.K.Misra, J. (as he then was) vide its judgment in C.J.Rajan Vs.Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mayiladuthurai and anotherreported in (2008) 3 MLJ 926 also took a similar view.12.Therefore, in the light of the binding legal precedentsand the legal positions, denial of permission to the petitioner forholding a meeting on 5.6.2012 is clearly illegal. Mr.K.Balu,learned counsel for the petitioner on instructions stated thatsince the date for the meeting has already concluded, they may bepermitted to conduct the meeting on 04.07.2012. 13.Accordingly, the writ petition will stand allowed. Theimpugned order stands set aside. The respondents are herebydirected to permit the petitioner to conduct the public meeting inGahdhiyar Thidal, Tindivanam on 04.07.2012 from 05.00 P.M. for thepurpose for which originally permission was sought for. It is opento the respondents to grant appropriate police protection duringpublic meeting. However, there will be no order as to costs. Sd/ Asst.Registrar //True Copy// Sub.Asst.RegistrarvvkTo1.The Superintendent of Police, Villupuram, Villupuram District.2.The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Tindivanam, Villupuram District. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

3.The Sub Inspector of Police, Tindivanam Police Station, Tindivanam.1 cc to Mr.K.Balu, Advocate, Sr.No.35424W.P.No.15425 of 2012bky(co)pmk.25.6.2012