Pugazendhi Thangaraj v. Chennai City Police & Ors.

ban on "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam" (LTTE) in a publicplace, by the exercise of his power under Section 41 of theChennai City Police Act is justified?2.The petitioner is a freelance journalist and a filmdirector. He had started an organization called"Karuthurimaikkalam", a forum for right of expression in the year2008. According to the petitioner, "Liberation Tigers of TamilEelam" (for short LTTE) was prohibited under the UnlawfulActivities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short UAPA). The petitionerfinds the said ban was repugnant to democracy and wanted to send ajoin representation to the Governor of Tamil Nadu expressing theopinion of general public. Therefore, in order to mobilise opinionof the public on the said issue, he organized a signature campaignon 19.10.2010 from 4.00 p.m. to 7.00 p.m. By the said campaign, anappeal will be made to the people who are passers by to expresstheir opinion by signing a joint memorandum. The venue was fixednear Panagal Maligai at Saidapet. 3.The petitioner gave a representation on 15.10.2010 seekingpermission to conduct the campaign. However, by the impugnedorder, the petitioner's request was denied mainly on two reasons.The first was that under Section 41, an application will have tobe made before five days of the programme for which permission wassought for. Since the petitioner's request was made only four daysbefore, the application was not in order. Not stopping with that,the respondents had also stated that any meeting, demonstration orsignature campaign in support of the banned organization is anoffence under law. Therefore, permission was refused. Challengingthe said order, the present writ petition came to be filed.4.When the matter came up on 19.10.2010, notice was directedto be given to the learned Government Pleader. Subsequently, thematter was adjourned from time to time. Finally, the respondentshave filed a counter affidavit, dated 10.1.2011. They have alsoproduced a copy of the ban order notified by the State Governmentvide G.O.Ms.No.446, Public (SC) Department, dated 17.05.2010containing the Government of India's notification, dated 14.5.2010banning the LTTE under the provisions of the Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act, 1967. 5.Since earlier the programme was scheduled to take place on19.10.2010 and that date has also expired on account of variousadjournments made in the writ petition, the counsel for thepetitioner filed a memo stating that should this court grantpermission, they are willing to have the campaign on 30.03.2011 at4.00 p.m. in the same venue. 6.Mr.S.Doraisamy, learned counsel appearing for thepetitioner submitted that the impugned order passed by therespondent police was illegal and violative of Articles 14, 19(1) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (a), 19(1)(c) and 21 of the Constitution of India. The programmeorganized by the petitioner is only to make a joint appeal to theGovernor and that the denial order stultify the democracy. Thesignature campaign was intended to reflect the voice of public atlarge and by no stretch of imagination, by the signature campaignany disturbance to the public peace will arise. The impugned orderis also contrary to various judgments of this court. 7.Reference was made to a judgment of this court inP.Nedumaran Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others reported in 1999(1) LW (Crl.) 7 and also a division bench judgment of this courtin C.J.Rajan Vs. Deputy Superintendent of Police reported in(2008) 3 MLJ 926. He also referred to a division bench judgment ofthis court made in H.C.P.No.260 of 2009, dated 17.04.2009 inS.James Peter Vs. The Government of Tamil Nadu, The Secretary toGovernment, Public (Law and Order-F) Department and another,wherein it was held that a mere support or participation in publicmeeting by itself will not attract the provisions of UnlawfulActivities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short UAPA Act). Hereferred to the following passages found in paragraphs 29 and 30,which reads as follows:29....Therefore, if there is any consequentialunlawful activity in pursuance of the speechdelivered by the detenu, the provisions of Section13(1)(b) and 13(2) are attracted. 30.....Further, it is not at all the case of therespondents that except delivering the allegedspeech, the detenu, has in any manner acted in amanner prejudicial to the sovereignty of thecountry. In the absence of any proof that any suchlaw and order problem has arisen pursuant to thespeech delivered by the detenu and in the absenceof any material to show that the detenu has takenpart in any unlawful activities or committed anyunlawful activity, so as to fall within the ambitof Section 13(1)(a) of the Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act, 1967 and further in the absenceof any material to show that the detenu hasassisted any unlawful association, so as to saythat he has committed the offence under Section 13(2) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,1967, the ingredients of Section 13(1)(a) and 13(2) are not attracted." 8.Per contra, Mr.M.Dhandapani, learned Special GovernmentPleader referred to the counter affidavit, dated 10.1.2011 filedby the second respondent, wherein a reference was made to Section13(2) of the UAP Act. He further contended that any assistance tounlawful activities of the association is an offence under theAct. Taking signature in support of the banned organization willalso amount to an offence. It is a reasonable restriction imposedon the petitioner. Hence the question of any violation of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ fundamental right of the petitioner will not arise. It is alsostated that restriction imposed is lawful. 9.In view of the above, two questions arises in the presentcase. One was that the petitioner being an Indian Citizen whetherthe right guaranteed by Part III will enure to his benefit.Secondly, whether he is entitled to express his opinion isgoverned by the provisions of the Constitution? If that is so,whether in exercise of power under the Madras City Police Act, therespondents can prohibit the campaign organized by the petitioner?10.On the context of a public protest and the invocation ofthe City Police Act, it is necessary to refer the judgment of theSupreme Court in Himat Lal K.Shah V. Police Commissioner,Ahmedabad AIR 1973 SC 87 : 1973 (1) SCC 227 rendered by aConstitution Bench of the Apex Court, wherein, the Court struckdown Rule 7 of the Rules framed under the Bombay Police Act on theground that Rule, which empowered the Commissioner of Police torefuse permission to hold meetings without giving any guidanceunder the Rule and thereby conferring an arbitrary discretion, wasan unreasonable restriction on the freedom of assembly guaranteedunder Article 19 of the Constitution. The Court also held that thework "regulating" in Section 33(1)(o) of the Bombay Police Actwould include the power to prohibit and impose the condition thatpermission should be taken a few days before the holding of themeeting on a public street. Mathew, J., dissented from the view ofthe majority and held that the power to regulate did not includethe right to prohibit and the permission sought for holding ameeting ought not be refused. The majority opinion was thatregulation is necessary to enable citizens to enjoy the variousrights in crowded Public Streets, and that the State can makeregulation in aid of the right of the assemble of each citizen andcan impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of Publicorder.11.On the question of freedom of speech, the Supreme Courtalso in S.Rangarajan V. Jagjivan Ram (1989) 2 SCC 574 : (1990) 1MLJ 17 = 1989-2-L.W. 162 held that freedom of speech under Article19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India means the right to expressone's own opinion by word of mouth, printing, picture or is anyone manner of ideas made through any and the communication ofideas made through any medium. Such right, however,was held to besubject to reasonable restrictions in the larger interest of thecommunity and the country as set out in Article 19(2) of theConstitution. Those restrictions are intended to strike a properbalance between the liberty guaranteed, and the social interestsspecified under Article 19(2). The Court emphasised that theinterest of freedom of expression and social interest cannot beragarded as of equal weight and the Court's commitment to freedomof expression demands that it cannot be suppressed unless thesituations created by allowing the freedom are pressing and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ community interest is endangered. The anticipated danger shouldnot be remote, conjectural or far fetched, but should haveproximate and direct nexus with the expression. The expression ofthought should be intrinsically dangerous to the public interests.It should be inseparably locked up with the action contemplatedlike the equivalent of a "spark in a powder keg."12.On the question of support to a banned organization, theSupreme Court very recently in State of Kerala Vs. Raneef reportedin (2011) 1 SCC 784 referred to several judgments of the USSupreme Court with approval. In paragraphs 11 to 14, it was statedas follows:"11.In Scales v. United States3, 367 U.S. 203,Harlan, J. of the US Supreme Court while dealingwith the membership clause in the McCarran Act,1950 distinguished between active “knowing”membership and passive, merely nominal membershipin a subversive organisation, and observed:“The clause does not make criminal allassociation with an organization whichhas been shown to engage in illegalactivity. A person may be foolish,deluded, or perhaps mere optimistic, buthe is not by this statute made acriminal. There must be clear proof thatthe defendant specifically intends toaccomplish the aims of the organizationby resort to violence.”12.In Elfbrandt v. Russell4, 384 US 17-19 (1966),Douglas, J. of the US Supreme Court speaking forthe majority observed: (L Ed pp.325-26)“Those who join an organization but donot share its unlawful purpose and who donot participate in its unlawfulactivities surely pose no threat, eitheras citizens or as public employees. … Alaw which applies to membership withoutthe ‘specific intent’ to further theillegal aims of the organizationinfringes unnecessarily on protectedfreedoms. It rests on the doctrine of‘guilt by association’ which has no placehere.”13.In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.McGrath5, 341 US 123 at 174 (1951) Mr.Douglas, J.of the US Supreme Court observed: (L Ed p.855)“In days of great tension when feelingsrun high, it is a temptation to takeshortcuts by borrowing from the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ totalitarian techniques of our opponents.But when we do, we set in motion asubversive influence of our own designthat destroys us from within.”14.We respectfully agree with the above decisionsof the US Supreme Court, and are of the opinionthat they apply in our country too. We are livingin a democracy, and the above observations applyto all democracies."13.Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Arup Bhuyan Vs. Stateof Assam reported in 2011 (2) Scale 210, once again referred toseveral other US Supreme Court judgments and quoted with approvalin interpreting Section 3(5) of the Terrorist and DisruptiveActivities (Prevention) Act, 1987. The following passages found inparagraphs 13 to 16 may be usefully extracted below: "13.In Clarence Brandenburg Vs. State ofOhio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) the U.S. Supreme Courtwent further and held that mere "advocacy orteaching the duty, necessity,or propriety" of violence as a means ofaccomplishing political or industrialreform, or publishing or circulatingor displaying any book or paper containing suchadvocacy, or justifying the commission of violentacts with intent to exemplify, spread or advocatethe propriety of the doctrines of criminalsyndicalism, or to voluntarily assemble with agroup formed "to teach or advocate the doctrines ofcriminal syndicalism" is not per se illegal. Itwill become illegal only if it incites to imminentlawless action. The statute under challenge washence held to be unconstitutional being violativeof the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.Constitution. 14.In United States Vs. EugeneFrank Robel, 389 U.S. 258, the U.S. SupremeCourt held that a member of acommunist organisation could not be regarded asdoing an unlawful act by merely obtainingemployment in a defence facility. 15.We respectfully agree with the abovedecisions, and are of the opinion thatthey apply to India too, asour fundamental rights are similar to the Bill ofRights in the U.S. Constitution. 16.In our opinion, Section 3(5) cannot be readliterally otherwise it will violate https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Articles 19 and 21 of theConstitution. It has to be readin the light of our observationsmade above. Hence, mere membership of a bannedorganisation will not make a person a criminalunless he resorts to violence or incites people toviolence or creates public disorder by violence orincitement to violence."14.Once again the Supreme Court in Sri Indra Das Vs. State ofAssam reported in 2011 (2) Supreme 67 quoted with approval thecase of Arup Bhuyan's case (cited supra) and made a furtherreference to certain other decisions of the Us Supreme Court. Thefollowing passages found in paragraphs 13 to 18 and 20 to 26 maybe usefully extracted below:13.In Noto vs. U.S. 367 US 290(297-298) Mr.Justice Harlan of the U.S. Supreme Court observed : ".........The mere teaching ofCommunist theory, including the teachingof the moral propriety or even moralnecessity for a resort to forceand violence, is not thesame as preparing a group for violentaction and steeling it to such action.There must be some substantialdirect or circumstantial evidence ofa call to violence now or inthe future which is bothsufficiently strong and sufficientlypervasive to lend colour to the otherwiseambiguous theoretical materialregarding Communist Party teaching."14.In Noto's case (supra) Mr. Justice Hugo Black ina concurring judgment wrote : "In 1799, the English Parliament passed alaw outlawing certain named societieson the ground that they were engagedin `a traitorous Conspiracy ...........in conjunction with the Persons from Timeto Time exercising the Powers ofGovernment in France .......' Oneof the many strong arguments madeby those who opposed the enactment of thislaw was stated by a member ofthat body, Mr. Tierney : `The remedy proposed goes to the puttingan end to all these societiestogether. I object to the system, ofwhich this is only a branch; for the Right https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Hon. gentleman has told us he intends topropose laws from time to time upon thissubject, as cases may arise torequire them. I say these attemptslead to consequences of the mosthorrible kind. I see that government areacting thus. Those whom they cannotprove to be guilty, they willpunish for their suspicion. Tosupport this system, we must have aswarm of spies and informers. They are thevery pillars of such a system ofgovernment.' The decision in thiscase, in my judgment, dramaticallyillustrates the continuing vitality ofthis observation. Theconviction of the petitioner here isbeing reversed because the Governmenthas failed to produce evidence theCourt believes sufficient to provethat the Communist Party presentlyadvocates the overthrow of theGovernment by force." (emphasissupplied) 15.In Communist Party vs. SubversiveActivities Control Board, 367 US 1 (1961)Mr. Justice Hugo Black in his dissentingjudgment observed : "The first banning of an associationbecause it advocates hated ideas -whether that association be called apolitical party or not -- marks a fatefulmoment in the history of a freecountry. That moment seems to havearrived for this country...... This wholeAct, with its pains andpenalties, embarks this country, forthe first time, on the dangerousadventure of outlawing groups thatpreach doctrines nearly all Americansdetest. When the practice of outlawingparties and various public groups begins,no one can say where it will end. In mostcountries such a practice oncebegun ends with a one party government."16.In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee vs.McGrath, 341 US 123, 174 (1951) Mr. Justice Douglas https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ in his concurring judgment observed : "In days of great tension whenfeelings run high, it is atemptation to take short cuts byborrowing from the totalitariantechniques of our opponents. Butwhen we do, we set in motiona subversive influence of our owndesign that destroys us from within." (emphasissupplied) 17.In Keyishian vs. Board of Regents of theUniversity of the State of New York, 385 US 589, 606(1967) the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a law whichauthorized the board of regents to prepare a listof subversive organizations and to denyjobs to teachers belonging to thoseorganizations. The law made membership in theCommunist Party prima facie evidence fordisqualification from employment. Mr. JusticeBrennan, speaking for the Court held that the lawwas too sweeping, penalizing "mere knowingmembership without a specific intent to further theunlawful aims."18.In Yates vs. U.S., 354 US 298 (1957), Mr.Justice Harlan of the U.S. Supreme Court observed : "In failing to distinguish between advocacyof forcible overthrow as an abstractdoctrine and advocacy of action tothat end, the District Courtappears to have been led astray bythe holding in Dennis that advocacy ofviolent action to be taken at some futuretime was enough. The DistrictCourt apparently thought that Dennisobliterated the traditional dividingline between advocacy of abstractdoctrine and advocacy of action."20.In Whitney vs. California (supra) Mr.Justice Brandeis, the celebrated Judge ofthe U.S. Supreme Court in his concurringjudgment (which really reads like a dissent) observed: "Fear of serious injury cannotalone justify suppression of free https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ speech and assembly. Men fearedwitches and burned women. It is the functionof free speech to free men fromthe bondage of irrational fears.To justify suppression of freespeech there must be reasonableground to fear that serious evilwill result if free speech ispracticed. There must be reasonableground to believe that the dangerapprehended is imminent... ..... The widedifference between advocacy andincitement, between preparation andattempt, between assembling and conspiracy,must be borne in mind." (emphasis supplied) 21.Mr. Justice Brandeis in the same judgment went onto observe : "Those who won our independence byrevolution were not cowards. Theydid not fear political change. They didnot exalt order at the cost of liberty.To courageous, self-reliant men, withconfidence in the power of freeand fearless reasoning applied through theprocesses of popular government, no dangerflowing from speech can be deemed clear andpresent, unless the incidence of the evilapprehended is so imminent that itmay befall before there is opportunity forfull discussion. If there be timeto expose through discussion thefalsehood and fallacies, to avertthe evil by the process ofeducation, the remedy to be appliedis more speech, not enforced silence." 22.In Gitlow vs. New York, 268 US 652(1925) Mr. Justice Holmes of the U.S.Supreme Court (with whom Justice Brandeisjoined) in his dissenting judgment observed : ..........."If what I think thecorrect test is applied, it ismanifest that there was no presentdanger of an attempt to overthrow thegovernment by force on the part of theadmittedly small minority who shared thedefendant's views. It is said thatthis Manifesto was more than a theory, that https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ it was an incitement. Every idea is anincitement. It offers itself for belief,and, if believed, it is acted on unless someother belief outweighs it, or somefailure of energy stifles themovement at its birth. The onlydifference between the expression ofan opinion and an incitement in thenarrower sense is the speaker'senthusiasm for the result. Eloquence my setfire to reason. But whatever may be thoughtof the redundant discourse before us, it hadno chance of starting a presentconflagration. If, in the long run,the beliefs expressed in proletariandictatorship are destined to be accepted bythe dominant forces of the community, theonly meaning of free speech is that theyshould be given their chance and have theirway. If the publication of this documenthad been laid as an attempt toinduce an uprising against government atonce, and not at some indefinite time in thefuture, it would have presented adifferent question. The object wouldhave been one with which the lawmight deal, subject to the doubtwhether there was any danger thatthe publication could produce anyresult; or, in other words, whetherit was not futile and too remotefrom possible consequences. But theindictment alleges the publication and nothingmore."23.In Terminiello vs. Chicago, 337 US 1(1949) Mr. Justice Douglas of the U.S.Supreme Court speaking for the majorityobserved : "....[A] function of free speech under oursystem of government is to invite dispute.It may indeed best serve its high purposewhen it induces a condition of unrest,creates dissatisfaction with conditions asthey are, or even stirs people to anger.Speech is often provocative and challenging.It may strike at prejudices andpreconceptions and have profound https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ unsettling effects as it presses foracceptance of an idea. That is whyfreedom of speech, though notabsolute,...is nevertheless protectedagainst censorship or punishment,unless shown likely to produce aclear and present danger of aserious substantive evil that risesfar above public inconvenience,annoyance or unrest....There is noroom under our Constitution for amore restrictive view. For thealternative would lead tostandardization of ideas either bylegislatures, courts, or dominant politicalor community groups." 24.In DeJonge vs. Oregon, 299 US 353(1937) Chief Justice Hughes of the U.S.Supreme Court wrote that the State couldnot punish a person making a lawful speech simplybecause the speech was sponsored by a subversiveorganization.25.In Abrams vs. U.S., 250 US 616 (1919) Mr.Justice Holmes of the U.S. Supreme Court in hisdissenting judgment wrote :"Persecution for the expression ofopinions seems to me perfectly logical. Ifyou have no doubt of your premises or yourpower and want a certain result with all yourheart you naturally express your wishes inlaw and sweep away all opposition.To allow opposition by speech seemsto indicate that you think the speechimpotent, as when a man says that he hassquared the circle, or that you donot care whole-heartedly for theresult, or that you doubt eitheryour power or your premises. Butwhen men have realized that time has upsetmany fighting faiths, they may come tobelieve even more then they believe the veryfoundations of their own conduct that theultimate good desired is betterreached by free trade in ideas, -- that thebest test of truth is the power ofthe thought to get itself accepted inthe competition of the market; and that truthis the only ground upon whichtheir wishes safely can be carried out. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ That, at any rate, is the theory of ourConstitution. It is an experiment, as alllife is an experiment. Every year, if notevery day, we have to wager oursalvation upon some prophecy based uponimperfect knowledge. While that experimentis part of our system I think that we shouldbe eternally vigilant against attemptsto check the expression of opinions that weloathe and believe to be fraught withdeath, unless they so imminentlythreaten immediate interference with thelawful and pressing purposes of thelaw that an immediate check is required tosave the country. I wholly disagreewith the argument of the governmentthat the 1st Amendment left thecommon law as to seditious libelin force. History seems to me againstthe notion." (emphasis supplied) 26.It has been submitted by the learnedcounsel for the Government before the TADACourt that under many laws mere membershipof an organization is illegal e.g. Section 3(5) ofTerrorists and Disruptive Activities, 1989, Section10 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention ) Act 1967,etc. In our opinion these statutory provisionscannot be read in isolation, but have to be read inconsonance with the Fundamental Rights guaranteed byour Constitution."15.After agreeing with all those opinions of the US SupremeCourt in Sri Indra Das case (cited supra), the Supreme Court heldthat the constitution being Supreme no statute can be violated. Inparagraphs 27 to 31 it was observed as follows:"27.The Constitution is the highest law of theland and no statute can violate it. If there isa statute which appears to violate it we can eitherdeclare it unconstitutional or we canread it down to make it constitutional.The first attempt of the Court should be try tosustain the validity of the statute by reading itdown. This aspect has been discussed in greatdetail by this Court in Government ofAndhra Pradesh vs. P. Laxmi Devi 2008(4) SCC 720.28. In this connection, we may refer tothe Constitution Bench decision in Kedar Nath https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Singh vs. State of Bihar AIR 1962 SC 955 wherethe Supreme Court was dealing with the challengemade to the Constitutional validity of Section 124AIPC (the law against sedition).29.In Kedar Nath Singh's case this Court observed(vide para 26): ............"If, on the other hand, wewere to hold that even without anytendency to disorder or intentionto create disturbance of law and order, bythe use of words written or spokenwhich merely create disaffection orfeelings of enmity against theGovernment, the offence ofsedition is complete, then such aninterpretation of the sectionswould make them unconstitutional inview of Article 19(1)(a) read withclause (2). It is well settled that ifcertain provisions of lawconstrued in one way would makethem consistent with theConstitution, and anotherinterpretation would render themunconstitutional, the Court wouldlean in favour of the formerconstruction. The provisions ofthesections read as a whole,along with the explanations, makeit reasonably clear that thesections aim at rendering penal only suchactivities as would be intended, or have atendency, to create disorder ordisturbance of public peace by resort toviolence."................30.Section 124A which was enacted in1870 was subsequently amended on severaloccasions. This Court observed in KedarNath's case (supra) observed that now that we havea Constitution having Fundamental Rights allstatutory provisions including Section 124A IPChave to be read in a manner so asto make them in conformity with theFundamental Rights. Although according to theliteral rule of interpretation we haveto go by the plain and simple languageof a provision while construing it, wemay have to depart from the plain meaning https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ if such plain meaning makes theprovision unconstitutional. 31.Similarly, we are of the opinion thatthe provisions in various statutes i.e. 3(5) of TADA or Section 10 of theUnlawful Activities (Prevention) which on theirplain language make mere membership of a bannedorganization criminal have to be read down and wehave to depart from the literal rule ofinterpretation in such cases, otherwise theseprovisions will become unconstitutional as violativeof Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution.It is true that ordinarily we shouldfollow the literal rule of interpretationwhile construing a statutory provision, butif the literal interpretation makes theprovision unconstitutional we can depart from it sothat the provision becomes constitutional."16.As seen from the above, the Supreme Court also dealt withSection 10 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and heldthat mere support to a banned organization will not by itself canbecome an offence. 17.In the present case, the petitioner had expressed hisintention very clear. He wants to send a petition to the Governorof Tamil Nadu. For this purpose, he wants signatures from publiccollected from a public place. The entire exercise was to expressto the Government of India through the office of the Governor ofTamil Nadu that the people in the State are opposing the ban orderimposed by the Government of India under the UAP Act. It is notclear as to how the said activity can be either illegal orunlawful, especially in the context of the constitution guaranteegiven to the citizens of India. In the counter affidavit, thestand taken by the respondents did not justify the impugned order.18.In the light of the above factual matrix and the legalprecedents set out above, the impugned order has to be necessarilyset aside on both grounds, i.e., not giving an opportunity to thepetitioner herein before issuing the rejection order as well asthe reasons adduced for rejecting his request was not valid. 19.Since the petitioner himself has filed a memo seekingpermission to conduct the signature campaign if permitted by thiscourt on 30.3.2011 between 4.00 p.m and 7.00 p.m near PanagalMaligai, Saidapet, the respondents are directed to permit thepetitioner to conduct his Signature Campaign near Panagal Maligai,Saidapet on 30.03.2011 between 4.00 p.m. and 7.00 p.m. and also toprovide sufficient protection to carry out his legitimateconstitutional guarantee.20.The writ petition will stand allowed. However, there willbe no order as to costs. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Sd/- Asst.Registrar. /true copy/ Sub Asst.Registrar.vvkTo1.The Commissioner of Police, Chennai City Police, Egmore, Chennai-600 008.2.Deputy Commissioner of Police, Intelligence Section, Greater Chennai, Egmore, Chennai-600 008.1 cc to Mr.K. Surendar, Advocate, Sr. 18246W.P.NO.23467 of 2010KSK (CO)kk 16/3