Kumaresh Narendra v. Public Works Department

Acquisition At, 1894 as amended therein, in so far the landscomprised in S.Nos.402/1a, 401,402/2, 397 part, 395/3 part, 408/2part, 408/3, 409,410,415, 418 part, 413, 420, 417/1, 407/1, 407/2part, 403 part and 423 part Periammapatti village, Palani Taluk, nowDindigul District in an extent of 316.89 or thereabouts are concernedand to pay the compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 byfollowing the dicta laid down in W.P.Nos.119 and 120 of 1974, dated09.04.1979 and as confirmed in W.A.Nos.677 and 678 of 1979 dated17.09.1986 on the file of this court. Prayer amended as per order dated 16.06.2008 in M.P.No.1/07in W.P.No.42014/006 by SNJFor Petitioner: Mr.N.R.Chandran Senior counsel for Mr.V.R.RajasekaranFor Respondents : Mr.R.Raheswaran Spl.G.P (W) ORDERPetitioner, a minor, represented by his mother, informs of havingbecome entitled to extent of lands under will of his grandfatherdated 7.3.1948 and two codicils thereto dated 3.3.1950 and14.10.1950. An extent of 316.89 acres was acquired by the respondents1 and 3 even in the year 1972 under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 forthe purpose of construction of the Palar porundalar dam. Pursuant totaking of possession, the land was handed over to the Public WorksDepartment and the dam was constructed in 1972. The lands are withinthe dam water spread area. Respondents had issued notifications on29.03.1972,05.04.1972,12.04.1972,03.05.1972 and section 5 (A)enquiries were also held on 16.05.1972,06.07.1972,18.07.1972 and19.07.1972. In the meanwhile, possession had been taken and the damhad been constructed. A notification under section 18 (1) of theTamil Nadu land reforms (fixation of ceiling on land) Act 1961 hadbeen issued on 22.07.1981 and the respondents had failed to pursuethe process set upon by them under the land acquisition act.Informing that such a course had been adopted by the respondents inrespect of lands belonging to Ms Narendra Dairy Farms Private Limitedand the same had been held to be bad under orders of this court inW.P. Nos. 119 and 120 of 1974 dated 09.04.1979, that appeal againstsuch findings had been dismissed in W.A.No. 576 of 1979 under ordersdated 06.11.1985 and further appeal to the Supreme Court also stooddismissed, petitioner seeks relief as prayed for.2. In the counter affidavit of the respondents it is contendedthat the holdings of the petitioner's father attracted the provisionsof the Tamil Nadu land reforms (fixation of ceiling of land) act1961. His holdings as on 6.04.1960 were determined and a draft https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ statement under section 10 (1) of the land reforms act was preparedand published in the Tamil under Government Gazzete dated01.09.1965.The final statement under section 12 of such act waspublished in the government Gazette dated 29.03.1972. In Go.Ms.No1389 revenue dated 11.06.1981 notification under section 18 (1)of theact declaring excess an extent of 3450.231/4 ordinary acresequivalent to 1099.90 standard acres was approved and published inTamilnadu government Gazette dated 22.07.1981. Action was taken underthe provisions of the land acquisition act in respect of the sameland towards construction of the Palar Porundalar dam withoutinforming the fact thereof to the Land Reforms Department. It isinformed that the landowner i.e the petitioner's father had movedWP.No.2842/ 1992 before this court seeking a direction for deposit ofthe compensation amount for lands covered in the notification issuedunder section 4 of the land acquisition act. This court under ordersdated 24.11.1999 had observed that the notification u/s.4 (1) of LandAcquisition Act was withdrawn as a notification under section 18 (1)of the land reforms act already was published and the lands coveredby the land acquisition proceedings were declared as surplus alreadyunder such act. This court had directed the Assistant Commissioner(land reforms) Dindigul to issue notice to the landowner and afterconducting proper enquiry, fix the compensation and to pass ordersaccording to law. Enquiry under rule 45 (1) of the Tamil Nadu landreforms (fixation of ceiling on land) rules 1962 was conducted andunder orders dated 5.7. 2006 the compensation was determined at Rs.6,46 794. The orders have been served on the landowners on 8.7.2006.The draft assessment roll had been prepared and published in theTamil Nadu government Gazette dated 9.8.2006 and served on thelandowner on 1.9.2006. In answer to objections raised by the motherof the petitioner an order under section 50 (4) of the Tamil Naduland reforms (fixation of ceiling on land) act 1961 was passed on23.10.2006 and served on the landowner as also the petitioner'smother on 20.11.2006. Thereafter, the final assessment roll had beenpublished in the Tamil Nadu government Gazette on 29.11 2006 andserved on the landowner as also the petitioner's mother on26.12.2006. It is informed that owing to an order of stay granted inthe present proceedings the compensation payable under the landreforms act for the lands in question could not be determined. It iscontended that as the will in favour of the petitioner was of theyear 1950, the notification under section 18(i) of the Land ReformsAct having been issued on 22.07.1981 and the lands in question havingbeen taken over by government thereunder, the petitioner who onlycould inherit lands held by his father, could not claim aninheritance of lands that have fallen into the hands of governmentlong before his birth in 2001. It is contended that as observed bythis Court in its order W.P. 2842 of 1992 dated 24.11.1999, thenotification under section 4 of the land acquisition act stoodwithdrawn as a notification under section 18 (1) of the land reformsact had already been published. The lands in question had been foundto be surplus holdings as on 6.4.1960. Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Land Reforms Act 1961 contained a non-obstante clause, the lands wererequired for public purpose as construction of dam is also anagrarian act, the decisions of this Court in W.P.Nos.119 and 120 of1976 and connected proceedings could not serve the petitioner'spurposes and hence the writ petition is to be dismissed. 3. We have heard Mr.N.R.Chandran learned senior counsel for thepetitioner on 18.07.2012 and 23.07.2012. Despite opportunitiesprovided there have been no arguments advanced on behalf of therespondents. Informed as we were that the matter had been arguedtwice over before other judges, this court had reserved orders on02.08.2012 granting liberty to the respondents to submit theirwritten arguments. Till date, the respondents have not done so.4. Learned senior counsel for petitioner submitted that inidentical factual circumstance, the respondents had given a go by toproceedings under the land acquisition act and proceeded under theland reforms act. A learned single judge of this court under ordersin W.P.Nos.119 and 120 of 1974 dated 09.04.1979 had directed that therespondents go by the land acquisition act. This decision stoodconfirmed up to the apex court. He submitted that the lands inquestion lay submerged owing to the construction of the PalarPorundalar dam. The purpose of the land reforms act was to makeavailable land held in excess of the ceiling limit to the landlesstowards their carrying out agricultural operations thereupon. Sincesuch purpose could not be served in the instant case, the landreforms act could not be resorted to. He next contended that even ifit be taken that both the land acquisition act as also the landreforms act would apply, that which was more advantageous to the landowner ought to be applied. Learned senior counsel relied on judgementof this court reported in 2010 (1) CTC 7, The Revenue DivisionalOfficer V. Saroja Victor, to inform that if, as in the instant case,proceedings for acquisition had been initiated after possession wastaken, it would be open to the landowner, at the time of seeking areference under section 18 of the land acquisition act, to requestthe collector to include in the terms of reference the questionrelating to damages for use in occupation for the period from thedate of taking possession till date of notification under section 4of the land acquisition act. Explaining the reason for the petitionermoving the present writ petition in the year 2006 as againstpossession of lands taken in 1972, learned senior counsel submitsthat just as the petitioners, the respondents also were also underthe impression that the decision in Narendra Dairy's case appliedalso to the present case. Having caused the notification undersection 18 (1) of the Tamil Nadu land reforms (fixation of ceiling onland) act 1961 on 22.07.1981, the respondent had resorted topublishing a draft assessment roll as late as on 9.8.2006 which wasthe cause for concern leading to the filing of the present writpetition. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

5. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that thedecisions in W.P. Nos.119 and 120 of 1974 and connected W.A.Nos.677and 678 of 1979 and S.L.P. Civil Appeal Nos.1285 and 1286 of 1992,have direct bearing on the matter arising in the present proceedingswhile the contention of the respondents is that they do not. Theanswer would lie on whether such decisions merely are those arrivedon factual considerations or whether they lay down propositions oflaw. Towards arriving at a decision, it would be useful to extractrelevant portions of the judgement of the Learned single judge inW.P. Nos. 119 and 120 of 1974 :"... having regard to the purpose and objectof the Land Ceiling Act, it does not require muchto see that the first respondent cannot rely uponthe provisions of the Land Ceiling Act to acquireland needed for an irrigation project. Thisposition seems to have been fully realised byGovernment in the earlier stage of matters, andthat is why in spite of the land ceiling Act andthe amending Act having come in to force, the firsrespondent had deemed it necessary to initiateproceedings under the Land Acquisition Act toacquire a certain extent of land belonging to thepetitioners, albeit that extent constitutingsurplus land in the hands of the first petitioner.Not only were acquisition proceedings initiated,but the proceedings almost reached a stage offinality in that even declarations under section 6had been publlished. Further now possession of thedam site as well as a large extent of land forwaterspread area had also been taken over by therespondents. I have already referred to headmissions made by the respondents in theircounter in the matter of taking possession of theland. In that state of affairs, is it open to therespondent to resile from their earlier stand andcontend that all those proceedings can be given ago-by and the Government can get at the lands ofthe position are required for the irrigationproject by having resort to the provisions of theLand Ceiling Ac? I think not. This ratio laid downby the Supreme Court in Vijay Cotton and Oil millsv. State of Gujarat (1) 1969 2 SCR 60 can beappositely quoted here and usefully applied to thecases on hand. That was a case where Governmenttook possession of certain lands belonging to aparty under arrangements to give the partysubstituted lands, but subsequently, it decided toacquire the lands and issued notification undersection 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Compensation was also determined, but on a disputeregarding the quantum, a reference was made to theCivil court. At that state of matters, theGovernment went back on its stand and contendedthat there had been no notification under section4(1) of the Act and consequently, the acquisitionproceedings were null and void. This action of theGovernment was challenged and the question whichhad to be decided by the Court was whether theGovernment can take up inconsistent positions incourt at successive stages in the same litigationto the detriment of its opponent. The SupremeCourt held that the Government, having chosen toacquire the land and issued the notification undersection 6 (1) was not entitled to resile from itsstand and take up the plea that the acquisitionproceedings had not been properly initiated andtherefore, the land owner was not entitled toclaim compensation. In the instant case also, theGovernment having launched the acquisitionproceedings and taken possession of the land,cannot now go back on the stand and say that sincethe land sought to be acquired will come to bevested in it as surplus land under the LandCeiling Act, it can conveniently drop theacquisition proceedings and in that they willutilise a portion of the surplus land forimplementing tje Palar-Porundalar Project. Stateof Madras – V. Parisutha Nadar (2) (1961) IIM.L.J. 285 can also be referred to herewithadvantage. In that case, the Government initiatedacquisition proceedings to acquire a certain land,had vested in it under Section 3 of the MadrasEstates Abolition Act and therefore, it will notpay compensation to the owner of the land. ADivision Bench of this court replied thecontention of the Government and held that oncethe Government availed itself of the provisions ofthe Machinery under the land acquisition Act orcompulsory acquisition, treating the land asbelonging to others, the Government comes underthe obligation to pay compensation as providedunder the Act. Applying this principle, it has tobe held that once the Government had sought toacquire the land on the footing the land can beobtained only by means of acquisition for formingthe dam, then it cannot give up its position andsay that it will lay its hands on the land bytaking it over as surplus land under the LandCeiling Act. There is the further impediment to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the contention of the respondents. Viz., that anyextent of land taken over as surplus under theprovisions of the Land Ceiling Act cannot be madeuse of for any other purposes except fordistribution of landless persons, since that isthe solo purpose for which the land ceiling Acthas been enacted. The learned Advocate Generalargued that the Land Ceiling Act contemplatedistribution of surplus land to subserve thecommon good and therefore a land taken over assurplus can also be utilised for constructing adam or irrigation project. I am afraid thiscontention cannot be accepted because the objectsmentioned .. the Land ceiling Act clearly indicatethat land in excess of the ceiling are taken overby Government, has to be necessarily distributedto landless and other persons among the ruralpopulation and such distribution is aimed atincreasing agricultural production and promotingjustice, social and economic. To hold otherwisewill amount to the court condoning the Governmentmaking a colourable exercise of its powers underthe Land Ceiling Act. It was pointed out inMunicipal Council of Sydney V. Camobeli (3) 1925Appeal cases 338 at P. 343." A body such as the municipal council ofSydney authorised to take land compulsorily forspecified purpose will not be permitted toexercise its powers for different purposes, and ifit attempts to do so, the court will interfere."In spite of the Land Ceiling Act and mendingAct 17 of 1970 having come into force on15.02.1970, the surplus lands did notautomatically vest in the Government because asper the terms of the land ceiling Act, the surplusland will be deemed to have been acquired for apublic purpose and vestedi n the Government freefrom all encumbrances from the date of thecommencement of the Act only after the publicationof the notification under Sub-section (1) ofsection 18. In this case, the notification undersection 18 (1) had been made only at or about thetime the writ petitions were filed. The respondentcannot, therefore, contend that even at the time,the acquisition proceedings were initiated, thesurplus lands had vested with the Government." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ The second argument of the petitioner'scounsel was that the proviso to Section 6(i) hadbeen introduced to safeguard the interest of thecitizen whose land was sought to be acquired andnot to facilitate the Government making facilewithdrawal from acquisition proceedings resortedto by its earlier, on a question of technicality.In otherwords, the submission of Mr.Venugopal wasthat the proviso had been introduced only toprevent the Government from abusing its powersunder the Land Acquisition Act and making sweepingnotifications under Section 4(1) of the LandAcquisition Act in order to freeze the price ofland which Government had no immediate intentionof acquiring for public purposes. As a furtherstep in this line of agrument Mr. Venugopal arguedthat ... the interdiction contained in the provisohad been introduced only to safeguard theinterests of the citizens, it was always open tothe citizen to waive the protection afforded tohim and to ask the Government to continue theacquisition proceedings not withstanding thenotification under Section 4 (1) of the LandAcquisition Act having been made more than threeyears before the publication of the notificationunder Section 6(1) of the Act. I think there isconsiderable force in the argument ofMr.Venugopal, the proviso to section 6(1) on whichthe learned Advocate General placed reliance hasbeen introduced only to act as a check on theGovernment and not to facilitate the Government totake cover under that provision and disown itobligation to go ahead with the acquisitionproceedings, unmindful of the loss and hardshipcaused to the owner of the land. " In decision of the division bench in W.A.Nos.677 and 678 of 1979,it has been held as follows:"12. We may now advert to the effect ofinitiation of proceedings under the LandAcquisition Act, long prior to the issue of thenotification under S. 18(l) of the Land CeilingsAct. From the dates already mentioned, it isclear that the initiation of the proceedingsunder the provisions of the Land Acquisition Actwas subsequent to the commencement of the LandCeilings Act, though prior to the notificationunder S. 18(1) of the Land Ceilings Act. When thenotifications under S. 4(1) of the Land https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Acquisition Act in respect of the lands inquestion were issued, the Government resorted tothese provisions, treating the subject matter ofthe acquisition as not belonging to itself, butas belonging to the respondents herein. In Stateof Madras v. Parishdha Nadar (1961) 2 Mad LJ 285,a Division Bench of this Court considered thequestion whether it was open to a claimant toassert title to the lands acquired against theState Government which became vested in it byforce of operation of the statute, viz., TamilNadu Act 26 of 1948. The argument was that whenonce an Estate was taken over by the StateGovernment under the provisions of the Tamil NaduEstates Abolition Act, the State became theabsolute owner thereof and no claim against theGovernment can be put forward by any otherperson. That argument was repelled on the groundthat the claim of the State Government acquiringits own land and paying compensation to itselfwas ridiculous and that the State Government isnot competent to put forward its own title to theacquired property in a proceeding tinder the LandAcquisition Act as the very scheme of the LandAcquisition Act is on the basis that the landsacquired belonged to others and not to itself. Wehave not been persuaded to hold that thisprinciple is inapplicable on the facts andcircumstances of this case or that it iserroneous. Thus, even on the principle laid downin the decision referred to earlier, it followsthat the Government cannot resile now from theland acquisition proceedings already commenced.13. The question whether tile resort had bythe State to (he provisions of the Land CeilingsAct with reference to the lands in question, inrespect of which proceedings had already beeninitiated under the Land Acquisition Act, is nota colourable exercise of power, may now beconsidered. We are assuming for purposes ofconsidering this aspect that the State has thepower to acquire lands for the irrigation schemein question under both the enactments. It isobvious that if the proceedings under the LandAcquisition Act are pursued to their conclusion,the State will be obliged to pay compensation tothe respondents in respect of the acquired landsat the market value, which prevailed at or aboutthe time of the notification under S. 4(1) of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Land Acquisition Act. It is also not in disputethat the compensation payable in respect of thesurplus lands taken over under the provisions ofthe Land Ceilings Act does not bear anycomparison at all with the compensation payableunder the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.In other words, the State has a choice ofapplying two enactments with reference to thelands in question - one that would oblige it topay a higher compensation and the other, underwhich, a very meagre amount alone may becomepayable. In such a situation, it is not open tothe State to use its powers under one of the twoenactments, which will be more disadvantageous tothe citizen. Even on the assumption that it isopen to the State to resort to the acquisition ofthe lands in question under the provisions of theLand Ceilings Act for the purposes of theirrigation dam, the State cannot proceed toexercise its powers thereunder to the detrimentof the citizen, in the matter of compensation,which would not arise if proceedings invoking theprovisions of the Land Acquisition Act alreadycommenced were continued. We may usefully referin this connection to the following observationsof the Supreme Court in Jiwani Kumar Paraki. v.First Land Acq. Collector, (184) 4 S.C.C. 612:"Where one is repository of two powers thatis power of requisition as well as power ofacquisition qua the same property and if thepurpose can equally be served by one which causeslesser inconvenience and damage to the citizenconcerned unless the repository of both thepowers suffers from any insurmountabledisability, user of one which is disadvantageousto the citizen without exploring the use of theother would be bad not on the ground that theGovernment has no power but on the ground that itwill be a misuse of the power in law."We are of the view that even assuming that it isopen to the State to resort to the provisions ofLand Ceilings Act to acquire lands for theirrigation dam in question it would be a misuseof its power. We are unable to understand thedecision of the Supreme Court in M. R. Mudaliarv. State of Madras, as enabling the State to havesome kind of a choice in the matter of theacquisition of lands. The argument in that case https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ was that the proceedings under the LandAcquisition Act having been taken already, thatwould not bar the application of the provisionsof the Tamil Nadu Leaseholds (Abolition andConversion into Ryotwari) Act, Act 27 of 1963. Itwas pointed out that the provisions of the LandAcquisition Act and the Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1963operated on different fields and that the grantof a ryotwari patta under Section 9 would enablethe grantee to get compensation under the LandAcquisition Act. This decision, in our view, doesnot in any manner justify the State in its choiceof one enactment in preference to another. It hasto be remembered that even by the application ofthe provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1963, thegrantee of the patta would still have in him aninterest, which is capable of being acquiredunder the provisions of the Land Acquisition Actand it was in that context, the Supreme Courtpointed out that the two enactments operated indifferent fields. Such a situation does notobtain in this case. Whether it be under theprovisions of the Land Acquisition Act or theLand Ceilings Act, the result is the totalextinction of the interest of the owner of theland in the lands. There is therefore no scopefor the contention that both the enactments couldoperate at the same time. We are therefore of theview that the decision relied upon cannot in anymanner assist the State in justifying (heapplication of one enactment instead of theother. We therefore hold that there is misuse ofthe power by the State in applying the provisionsof the Land Ceilings Act to the lands inquestion, when proceedings had already beeninitiated under the Land Acquisition Act.14. Lastly, the learned Additional GovernmentPleader submitted that the extent of 411.04 acresdeclared as surplus may be taken over by theState pursuant to the proceedings under the LandCeilings Act part of its policy to bring aboutagrarian reforms. In this connection, learnedcounsel also relied upon the observations ofKrishna Iyer, J. in State of Kerala v. GwaliorRayonSilk Mfg. Co, (1974 (1) S.C.R. 671 at 690)tocontend that the construction of irrigationsystems would also be within the ambit ofagrarian reforms. We may briefly refer to thescope of the Land Acquisition Act as well as the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Land Ceilings Act. The object of the LandAcquisition Act is to acquire lands needed forpublic purposes and for companies and fordetermination of the amount of compensation inrespect of such acquisition. The Land CeilingsAct had been enacted to given effect to thedirective principle of the State policy in Art.39 of the Constitution. Article 39 deals with theState directing its policy towards securingownership and control of material resources ofthe community with a view to secure equitabledistribution in such a manner as to subservecommon good in order that the concentration ofwealth and means of production to commondetriment, in the hands of a few, did not result.The preamble of the Land Ceilings Act furtherindicates that the primordial purpose is toacquire lands in excess of the ceiling area inorder that such excess may be made available fordistribution amongst the landless and otherpersons in the rural areas in accordance with therules framed. Thus, the policy of the LandCeilings Act as well as the rules shows that thesurplus lands have to be allotted to the landlesspersons and not for other, purposes. It may bethat the provisions of the irrigation facilitiesare also part of agrarian reforms as stated inthe judgment of the Supreme Court relied on bythe learned Additional Government Pleader. Butagrarian reforms is not one of the avowed objectsof the Land Ceilings Act, which is intended onlyto reduce the disparity in the ownership ofagricultural lands and to secure an equitabledistribution of the surplus lands in a manner,which would subserve the common good, result inagricultural production and promote justice,social and economic. Taking into account thepurpose and object of the Land Ceilings Act, theappellants cannot rely upon its provisions toacquire lands needed for an irrigation project.Presumably, realising this, the State had thoughtit fit to initiate proceedings under the LandAcquisition Act, so as to) acquire the surpluslands belonging to the respondents. Not contentwith merely issuing a notification under S. 4(1)of the Act, the proceedings also culminated in adeclaration under Section 6 of the LandAcquisition Act, at lease with reference to amajor portion of the lands for the Dam site aswell as the water spread area and that had been https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ taken possession of. Under those circumstances,it is not open to the appellants to justify thetaking over of the surplus lands in questionunder the guise of bringing about agrarianreforms under the Land Reforms Act. No otherpoint was urged.The decision of the division bench also informs that it is the factumof possession by Government and not the mode by which it is obtainedthat is relevant for the purposes of section 48 of the landacquisition act. Once having taken possession, it will not be open tothe government to withdraw therefrom under section 48 (1) of the LandAcquisition Act. The connected appeals before the Supreme Court inC.A.Nos.1285 and 1286 of 1992 have been dismissed as infructuousrecording the fact that compensation arrived at by the LandAcquisition Collector had been received under protest and a referencebeen made under section 18 of the land acquisition act. The SupremeCourt did not find it necessary to express any opinion on thequestion of law involved in the appeals.6. Useful reference may be had to the order of this court inW.A.No.576 of 1979 dated 06.11 1985 ,wherein the learned single Judgewho had disposed of WP numbers 119 and 120 of 1974, penning thejudgement of the division bench had further explained the position asfollows:"7....... The Act has been passed forfulfilling the objectives contained in clauses(b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution ofIndia. The objective is for the State to takesteps to see that the ownership and control ofthe material resources of the community are sodistributed as best to subserve the common goodand that the operation of the economic systemdoes not result in the concentration of wealthand means of production to the common detriment.As an integral part of the scheme, the State hasbeen enjoined to remove the disparity in theownership of agricultural land leading to theconcentration of such land in the hands ofcertain persons and to enquire surplus landconcentrated in the lands of some persons anddistributed it to the landless and otherdeserving persons among the rural population. Inconfirmity with the object of the Act, the word"land" has been defined in Section 3 (22) asmeaning agricultural land, i.e., land which isused or capable of being used for agriculturalpurposes of purposes subservant thereto. Thedefinition has been made to include forest land, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ pasture land, plantation and tope, but house-siteor land used exclusively for non-agriculturalpurposes has been specifically excluded. Section5 prescribes the Ceiling area for different kindsof owners. Section 7 is the operative sectionwhich lays down that on and from the date of thecommencement of the Act, no persce will beentitled to hold land in excess of the ceilingarea. Section 8 relates to the furnishing ofreturns by persons holding land in excess of theceiling area and section 9 deals with thecollection of information. Then comes section 10which deals with the preparation and publicationof draft statement as regards land is excess ofthe ceiling area. Section 11 empowers theAuthorised Officer to decide the question oftitle in certain cases. Then comes section 12under which a publication of a final statement isto be made. The next relevant section to bementioned in Section 18 which provides for theGovernment taking over the surplus land in termsof the publication of final statement underSection 12 or 14. Section 10-A provides for theinclusion of any land which had inadvertentlyescaped the notice of the authorities from beingincluded in the extent of holdings owned by thelandowner. Section 18-B conform power ongovernment to modify the notification undersection 10(1) consequent on corrections beingmade under Section 15. Section 18-C confers poweron the Government to cancel or modifynotifications under Section 18(1) in certaincases. Sections 18-D and 18-E are consequentialprovisions which relate to divesting and veatingof land excluded or newly included, as the casemay be.8. Averting now to Section 7, which is theoperative section, it forbids any person governedby the Act to hold land in excess of the ceilingarea from the date of the commencement of theAct. Therefore, it follows that a person isentitled to hold the permitted extent of landwhich falls within the ceiling area, and suchextent of land should satisfy the definition of "land" under Section 3(22) of the Act, i.e., landwhich is actually put to agricultural use orcapable of being put to agricultural use. In thesame manner, it must be held that what can betaken over by Government as surplus can only be a https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ land falling within the definition of Section 3(22)." 7. From the above decisions, the following legal propositionsemerge:i. Resort can be had to the provisions of the Land Ceiling Actonly where the purposes of such act can be served. Unless the landsfound in excess can be placed in the hands of landless personstowards their carrying out agricultural operations thereupon, theprovisions of the land ceiling act cannot be resorted to.ii. Even where resort has been had to the provisions of the landceiling act, the surplus land would be deemed to have been acquiredfor a public purpose and would vest in Government free from allencumbrances from the date of commencement of the act only after thepublication of the notification under subsection 1 of section 18.iii. Where two enactments would apply in respect of a matter,that which is more favourable to the affected party is to be resortedto. Acting otherwise, would be a colorable exercise of power.iv. Irrespective of the manner in which possession has beentaken, once the same has been done, government cannot drop theacquisition proceedings by resort to 48 (1) of the Land AcquisitionAct.v. Having embarked upon acquisition under section 4 (1) of theland acquisition act, the government cannot take advantage of its ownwrong of not making the declaration under section 6 within two yearsthereof, since proviso to section 6 (1) of the land acquisition act 'has been introduced only to act as a check on the government and notto facilitate the government to take cover under that provision anddisown its obligation to go ahead with the acquisition proceedingsunmindful of the loss and hardship caused to the owner of the land.'8. Keeping the above principles in mind, we find that in theinstant case it would have to be held that having resorted toacquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, compensation whereunderis far greater than that which would accrue under the Land CeilingAct, it would not be open to the respondents to abandon theproceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and take recourse to theLand Ceiling Act. That the lands in question have been renderedincapable for agricultural use owing to the construction of the PalarPorundalar Dam would be an additional reason why the writ petitionsucceeds.9. On perusal of the order of this court in W.P.No.2842/1992dated 24.11.1999, we find that it has been contended by therespondent State that as notification stood issued by the Authorised https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Officer (Land Reforms) Dindigul, the proceedings under the LandAcquisition Act stood withdrawn. Thereupon, Learned Single Judge hadexpressed the view that in the circumstance the relief prayed forviz., a direction for deposit of compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- inproper securities and payment of accrued periodical interest to thethird respondent (i.e) Official Assignee High court, Madras to thecredit of the petitioner in I.P.No.72/1986 on the file of this court(Insolvency jurisdiction), was no more available at that stage. Wehave no doubt that if the earlier decisions of this Court, two ofwhich are those of Division Benches and are binding upon a SingleJudge, had been brought to the notice, the view expressed in theorder in W.P.No.2842 of 1992, dated 24.11.1999, would not have comeabout.10. Accordingly writ petition shall stand allowed as prayed for.As informed in decision of this court reported in 2010 (1) CTC 7, TheRevenue Divisional Officer v. Saroja Victor, it would be open to thepetitioner, at the time of seeking reference u/s.18 of the LandAcquisition Act, to request the Collector to include in the terms ofreference the question relating to damages for the period from thedate of taking possession till date of notification u/s. 4 of suchAct.Sd/-Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.RegistrarkprTo1.The Secretary to GovernmentPublic Works DepartmentFort St. George, Chennai-600 0092.The Secretary to GovernmentRevenue DepartmentFort St. George,Chennai-600 0093.The Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition)Palar Porundalar Scheme, Unit No.III,Palani4.The Revenue Divisional OfficerPalani https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

5.The Special Commissioner andCommissioner of Land ReformsII Floor, Ezhilagam, ChepaukChennai-600 0056.The Assistant Commissioner(Land Reforms)165D, Barathi Ula SalaiRace course colonyMadurai-625 002.1 cc to Mr. V.R.Rajasekaran, Advocate, SR.No.70056+1 cc to Government Pleader SR.70606 order inW.P.No.42014 of 2006SAI {CO}TP/10.12.2012.