T.P. Vishnu Kumar v. Canara Bank & Ors.

O R D E RThese writ petitions are directed against the order dated18.2.2008 in I.A.Nos.873 to 875 of 2007 in O.A.No.152 of 2002 on thefile of Debt Recovery Tribunal, Coimbatore whereby the applicationspreferred by the petitioner to direct the first respondent to producethe extract of accounts as well as documents relating to bankingtransactions were rejected by the Tribunal.Background Facts:-2. The factual details necessary for the disposal of the writpetitions are as under:-The first respondent M/s.Canara Bank, Tiruppur preferred OriginalApplication in O.A.No.152 of 2002 against the petitioner and tenothers before the second respondent Tribunal praying for a decreedirecting the defendants in the O.A. to pay a sum of Rs.29,68,161.93with interest at 17% per annum, being the amount on account of OpenCash Credit facilities; a sum of Rs.30,82,758/- being the amount dueon account of packing credit facilities and a sum of Rs.99,00,558/-being the amount due for Foreign Bills of Exchange facilities and fora further direction to realise the amount by way of sale of theimmovable property of the guarantor without prejudice to the right toclaim a personal decree. Original Application by the Bank:-3. In the original application in O.A.No.873 of 2007 it was thecontention of the first respondent that the third respondent in thepresent application was constituted as a partnership firm with thepetitioner and respondents 4 to 7 as partners and the petitionerbeing seventh defendant in the suit is the son of the third defendantand also the power of attorney of the first defendant firm.Initially at the request of the third respondent the Bank grantedCash Credit Facility with an outer limit of Rs.1,50,000/- onexecution of relevant loan papers as well as on hypothecation ofstocks and raw materials of hosiery garments. The said facility wassubsequently enhanced at the request of the third respondent fromtime to time and from 27.2.1996, the facility was enhanced toRs.10,00,000/-. Subsequently the third respondent requested forpacking credit facilities for export of garments to foreign countriesand those facilities were also granted for manufacture of garmentsexclusively for export and on export of garments, the foreign billsof exchange would be negotiated/discounted with the first respondentand the amount due under packing credit (PC) facilities will beadjusted from such Foreign Billsof Exchange on payment of the same.The said facility was initially granted on adhoc basis up to a https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ limit of Rs.5 lakhs on 30.12.1996 and later it was confirmed. Thefacilities were renewed by the third respondent on 15.12.1997 and theouter limit was enhanced periodically. Those facilities were grantedon the guarantee of the sixth defendant in the suit and on mortgageof immovable property of some of the defendants. Necessary mortgageswere also created in respect of the property by deposit of titledeeds. There was also an acknowledgement of debt on 24.7.1999.Subsequently the account became irregular and the payment for exportof goods were not received by the first respondent and as suchnotices were issued to the third respondent. However there was noresponse from the firm which resulted in filing the suit forrealisation of the amount due.Defence:-4. In the written statement filed by the petitioner along withother defendants, the liability was disputed and indicated theirinability to file an effective written statement on account of non-production of accounts prior to 1.7.1999. The defendants alsoreserved their right to file additional written statement uponreceipt of the entire accounts from the first respondent Bank. Thepetitioner in fact disputed the entries in the extract of accountssubmitted by the first respondent Bank and put the bank to strictproof various entries. Since the first respondent failed to producethe accounts prior to 1.7.1999 besides other relevant documents, thepetitioner preferred interlocutory applications in I.A.Nos.873 to 875of 2007 to cause production of statement of accounts besides certaindocuments as made mentioned in those applications.Interlocutory Applications:-5. In I.A.No.873 of 2007, the request of the petitioner was tocause production of the entire accounts pertaining to the account ofthe third respondent firm maintained by the Bank with effect from thedate of opening of the account and till 30.6.1999. In I.A.No.874 of2007, the petitioner prayed for production of documents pertaining tothe communication with the banker of the purchaser as well ascommunication pertaining to the promissory note received by them inrespect of two bills. Similarly in I.A.No.875 of 2007 the request wasto cause production of all the communication exchanged between thefirst respondent Bank and ECGC pertaining to the account of the thirdrespondent firm.6. In the affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.873 of 2007, itwas the case of the petitioner that originally the matter was takencare of by the father of the petitioner, who subsequently met with anaccident on 30.5.2006 and he was in coma on account of such accidentand ultimately died on 3.11.2006. According to the petitioner, the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ statement of accounts for the period prior to 30.6.1999 wasabsolutely necessary for the purpose of filing effective replystatement as the petitioner was incapacitated in filing such astatement without a copy of the accounts. Similarly, in I.A.No.874of 2007 the petitioner has challenged the factual details as allegedin the plaint in O.A.No.152 of 2002. It was his contention that thebill amounting to more than Rs.65 lakhs was returned unpaid and thefirst respondent Bank failed to protest and deliver the originalbills to the parties so as to enable the exporter to make a claimagainst the overseas purchaser. The bankers of the overseas purchaserfrom Germany had given promissory note amounting to Rs.41 lakhs assecurity for repayment of two bills out of the four bills mentionedand the first respondent did not deliver the original promissory noteand on account of the negligence of the Bank, the petitioner andother respondents could not pursue their remedy to enforce thepayment. In such circumstances, the petitioner called upon the Bankto produce the entire documents, being the communication between thefirst respondent and the overseas bank pertaining to the transactioninvolving the petitioner and more particularly with regard to thefour bills. In I.A.No.875 of 2007 the petitioner sought forproduction of the communication exchanged between ECGC and the firstrespondent and it was his apprehension that proper particulars havenot been disclosed in the plaint filed in I.A.No.875 of 2007. It wasthe further contention of the petitioner that the first respondenthas been deducting premium amount for the coverage given by ECGC andECGC having received the amount, cannot refuse to make payment and incase ECGC which had received the premium had paid the amount, thedefendants would not have fastened with the liability and in such acase, there would have been no cause of action for the firstrespondent with respect to the transaction involving ECGC. In suchcircumstances the petitioner has prayed for production of the entirecommunication between ECGC and the Bank.7. In all the three interlocutory applications, separate counteraffidavits have been filed by the first respondent. In respect ofI.A.No.874 of 2007, it was the case of the first respondent that incase there was any bonafide reason or claim for the petitioneragainst foreign buyer, they ought to have adjudicated the matterbefore Foreign Court and recovered the amount due to them under thealleged promissory notes executed by the Foreign buyer in theirfavour. The promissory notes executed by the petitioner had becometime barred as per Indian Law and as such there was no requirementfor production of those promissory notes executed in the year 1999.The Application in I.A.No.875 of 2007 was opposed by the firstrespondent on the ground that it was not open to the petitioner tosit in judgment as to whether ECGC has settled the claim and if therewas any deficiency they should have adjudicated the same by filingseparate suit against ECGC and through the present application the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ petitioner is trying to re-open the issue and thereby to reopen thecase initiated by the first respondent. It was the furthercontention of the first respondent that it was not obligatory andincumbent upon them to furnish details so as to enable the petitionerto file counter claim and in such factual situation, the firstrespondent prayed for dismissal of the application.8. The learned Debt Recovery Tribunal, Coimbatore considered theinterlocutory applications and dismissed the applications mainly onthe ground that the intention of the petitioner was only to drag onthe proceedings.Nature of disposal of the applications and reasoning:-I.A.No.873 of 2007:- The interlocutory application in I.A.No.873of 2007 was dismissed by the Tribunal on the ground that OriginalApplication was filed in the year 2002 and the reply statement wasalso filed much earlier. The Tribunal also observed that it was onlywhen the case was posted for hearing that the petitioner has comeforward with a prayer to direct the respondent Bank to furnish thestatement of accounts as well as other details. According to theTribunal, the statement of accounts prior to the claim period wasunnecessary and it would not in any way help the petitioner toprepare their defence. Accordingly, the application was dismissed.I.A.No.874 of 2007:- The Application in I.A.No.874 of 2007 wasalso dismissed mainly on the ground of delay. Incidentally, it wasalso the finding of the Tribunal that the correspondence exchangedbetween the Bank and ECGC were in no way helpful to the petitioner inhis defence.I.A.No.875 of 2007:- The application in I.A.No.875 of 2007 wasrejected on the ground that those documents are unnecessary and twopromissory notes were untraceable and also on the ground that thepetitioner ought to have taken necessary steps independently beforeor after the filing of Original Application with respect to the twopromissory notes. The learned Tribunal also found that the promissorynotes were time barred and un-enforceable and as such there was nonecessity to produce those promissory notes in the present suit.Contention:-9. Thiru Vijay Narayan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for thepetitioner contended that even in the plaint filed in O.A.No.152 of2002, the first respondent bank undertook to furnish the copy ofaccounts for the period prior to 1.7.1999 and since they failed toproduce the statement of accounts for the said period, the petitionerwas fully justified in requesting the court to cause production of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the entire accounts in respect of the third respondent firm asmaintained by the bank. With respect to the prayer as sought for inI.A.Nos.874 and 875 of 2007, the learned counsel contended that theentire correspondence exchanged between the Bank and the ECGC as wellas the promissory notes are absolutely necessary to justify the standtaken by the petitioner. Those documents are also necessary for thepurpose of filing additional written statement, liberty havingalready been taken in the written statement originally filed.According to the learned Senior Counsel, Section 22(2)(b) of theRecovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993gives jurisdiction to the Tribunal for requiring the discovery andproduction of documents and the Tribunal being a creature of theStatute, should have acted in accordance with the principles ofnatural justice and by dismissing the application, foreclosed thedefence that could have been raised by the petitioner after perusingthe statement of accounts as well as the correspondence exchangedbetween the bank and ECGC. The learned Senior Counsel also relied onthe judgement of the Apex court in M.L.SETHI v. R.P.KAPUR (AIR 1972SC 2379) in support of his contention that the documents sought to bediscovered need not be admissible in evidence in the enquiry andproceedings and it would be sufficient if the documents would berelevant for the purpose of throwing light on the matter incontroversy.10. Per contra, Mr.M.V.Chandran, learned counsel appearing onbehalf of the first respondent contended that none of the documentssought for by the petitioner were germane to the issue to be decidedin the matter and it was only an attempt to protract the proceedings.Learned counsel also submitted that there was a clear alternativeremedy available to the petitioner by filing a statutory appealbefore the appellate Tribunal as per Section 20 of Act 51 of 1993 andas such all the three writ petitions are clearly not maintainable.Learned counsel also justified the decision of the Tribunal on theground that even if the documents sought for by the petitioner wereproduced, the decision would not have been different and as such theTribunal was perfectly justified in rejecting the applications.Analysis:-11. The interlocutory applications have been preferred by thepetitioner as per Section 19(25) read with Section 22(2)(b) ofRecovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.In the affidavit filed in support of the interlocutory applicationsthe petitioner has detailed the reasons which necessitated in filingthe petition for issue of direction to cause production of documents,as according to him, the statement of accounts for the entire periodas well as some of the correspondence exchanged between the Bank andECGC were absolutely necessary for the purpose of filing effective https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ reply in the matter and in the absence of which, serious prejudicewould be caused to him as well as to the firm.12. It is found from the application in O.A.No152 of 2002 thatthe first respondent Bank had agreed to produce the copies ofaccounts prior to the period 1.7.1999 and the relevant paragraph isextracted below:-"(11) The applicant submits that though accountsare available with the applicant since 1993,copies of accounts are filed from 1.7.1999 sincethe first defendant has confirmed the balance ofamounts due by it to the applicant in theAcknowledgements of Debt and Security dated24.7.1999. The applicant undertakes to produceearlier accounts as and when required." 13. It was not the case of the first respondent that they werenot in possession of the documents sought for by the petitionerexcept the promissory notes. In fact the case of the firstrespondent was that the entire accounts relating to the thirdrespondent firm was available with the Bank since 1993 but howeverthey have produced only the accounts from 1.7.1999 as the firm hadconfirmed the balance amount due as on the said date. However thefirst respondent undertook to produce the earlier accounts as andwhen required. The original application was preferred in the year2002 and the petitioner has filed his written statement also in theyear 2002 and in the said statement the petitioner reserved his rightto file additional written statement upon receipt of the entireaccounts from the first respondent Bank. Even though the applicationwas preferred by the petitioner only in the year 2007, the factremains that the suit was only in the stage of adducing evidence onthe side of the applicant Bank. The Tribunal proceeded on the basisthat the applications were highly belated as it was filed only duringthe time of hearing. The said factual finding was disputed by thepetitioner and in the course of hearing even the learned counselappearing on behalf of the Bank submitted that the matter is in theevidence stage and the first respondent Bank has submitted theirproof affidavit and the matter is adjourned for the purpose of crossexamination, in case the petitioner and other defendants requires thewitness of the first respondent to be cross examined. Therefore itcannot be said that there was undue delay in coming up with theapplications.Application of provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure:-14. The Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial InstitutionsAct, 1993 is a self contained code. Though the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ provisions of Civil Procedure Code is not made applicable to aproceeding under the said Act in its entirety, certain powers of theCivil Courts are conferred on the Tribunal. As per Section 19(25),the Tribunal is permitted to make such orders and give suchdirections as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to itsorders or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends ofjustice. Section 22(2) provides that the Tribunal shall have, forthe purpose of discharging their functions under the Act, the samepowers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of CivilProcedure, while trying the suit, in respect of matters enumerated inthe said provision and as per sub-clause (b) of Section 22(2) theTribunal is having the power to require the discovery and productionof documents. It is true that the Tribunal under the Debt RecoveryTribunal Act is constituted as an authority to resolve the disputebetween the bank and the defaulting customer so as to enable the Bankto recover the amount due from the defaulting customers withoutapproaching the Civil Court. 15. Merely because it was provided that the Tribunal is notbound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, itcannot be said that while exercising its functions, the Tribunal isnot bound to observe the principles of natural justice. Since theTribunal is constituted to adjudicate the dispute between the bankand the defaulters, it is nothing but an adversarial litigation andas such both sides should be given reasonable opportunity to submittheir version. Nobody should have a feeling that his/her case hasnot been considered by the Tribunal and they were put in anembarrassing position on account of the undue advantage taken by oneof the contesting parties and that the Tribunal failed to givesufficient opportunity to put forward their case. Since the originalapplication has been preferred by the Bank it was obligatory on thepart of the Bank to produce the entire statement of accounts withrespect to the transaction and the bank cannot pick and choose andproduce only part of the accounts, though decree was sought for onthe basis of the entire accounts. The bank was not justified intheir contention to the effect that as the accounts were settledprior to 30.6.1999, there was no requirement to produce the accountsfrom the inception. While rejecting the application submitted by thepetitioner, the learned Tribunal failed to consider the undertakinggiven by the bank to produce the entire accounts at a later point oftime. Even without the application from the petitioner, the bankshould have produced the entire accounts as they are expected toclaim a decree only after placing the entire materials before theTribunal. The Tribunal constituted to provide speedy remedy forrecovery of debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions isrequired to give due opportunity to the defaulters also to submittheir case. When the Bank themselves filed only part of theaccounts, it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to direct the Bank toproduce the entire accounts. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

16. The merits or otherwise of the case of the petitioner is amatter to be decided during trial and it is too early on the part ofthe Tribunal to comment about the case of the petitioner at the stageof interlocutory application. Though the Tribunal is entitled to cometo a prima facie opinion about the relevancy of the documents soughtto be summoned by the petitioner, it was not the proper stage toconsider the entire documents on merits and to come to a conclusionthat the documents are not relevant for deciding the issue inquestion. In the present matter, even the trial has only justcommenced and only the proof affidavit of the Bank was before theTribunal. There was no opportunity for the Tribunal to assess themerits or otherwise of the contentions of the parties and as such itwas too pre-mature to make observation about the relative merits ofthe case of the petitioner in the interlocutory application stage.17. In case the trial courts take practical approach in mattersregarding production of documents as well as deciding theadmissibility of documents, it would save the valuable time of thecourt. In the event of the courts considering each and everyapplication like a suit and adjudicating the same on merits byconducing a mini trial or roving enquiry, substantial proceedingwould remain on file without attaining finality. Very often oneinterlocutory proceeding gives rise to many other proceedingsfurther proceedings resulting in stay of further proceedings of thesuit/original application and as such it must be the endeavour of thetrial courts to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, as otherwise,arrears would remain "arrears".Law laid down by the Supreme Court:-18. The Apex Court in Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State ofGujarat, [(2001) 3 SCC 1] indicated the procedure to be followed bythe trial-court at the stage of taking evidence when objection israised regarding admissibility of any material or any item of oralevidence in the following lines:-"13. It is an archaic practice thatduring the evidence-collecting stage,whenever any objection is raised regardingadmissibility of any material in evidencethe court does not proceed further withoutpassing order on such objection. But thefallout of the above practice is this:Suppose the trial court, in a case,upholds a particular objection andexcludes the material from being admittedin evidence and then proceeds with the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ trial and disposes of the case finally. Ifthe appellate or the revisional court,when the same question is recanvassed,could take a different view on theadmissibility of that material in suchcases the appellate court would bedeprived of the benefit of that evidence,because that was not put on record by thetrial court. In such a situation thehigher court may have to send the caseback to the trial court for recording thatevidence and then to dispose of the caseafresh. Why should the trial prolong likethat unnecessarily on account of practicescreated by ourselves. Such practices, whenrealised through the course of long periodto be hindrances which impede steady andswift progress of trial proceedings, mustbe recast or remoulded to give way forbetter substitutes which would helpacceleration of trial proceedings.14. When so recast, the practicewhich can be a better substitute is this:Whenever an objection is raised duringevidence-taking stage regarding theadmissibility of any material or item oforal evidence the trial court can make anote of such objection and mark theobjected document tentatively as anexhibit in the case (or record theobjected part of the oral evidence)subject to such objections to be decidedat the last stage in the final judgment.If the court finds at the final stage thatthe objection so raised is sustainable theJudge or Magistrate can keep such evidenceexcluded from consideration. In our viewthere is no illegality in adopting such acourse. (However, we make it clear that ifthe objection relates to deficiency ofstamp duty of a document the court has todecide the objection before proceedingfurther. For all other objections theprocedure suggested above can befollowed.) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

15. The above procedure, if followed,will have two advantages. First is thatthe time in the trial court, duringevidence-taking stage, would not be wastedon account of raising such objections andthe court can continue to examine thewitnesses. The witnesses need not wait forlong hours, if not days. Second is thatthe superior court, when the sameobjection is recanvassed and reconsideredin appeal or revision against the finaljudgment of the trial court, can determinethe correctness of the view taken by thetrial court regarding that objection,without bothering to remit the case to thetrial court again for fresh disposal. Wemay also point out that this measure wouldnot cause any prejudice to the parties tothe litigation and would not add to theirmisery or expenses.16. We, therefore, make the above asa procedure to be followed by the trialcourts whenever an objection is raisedregarding the admissibility of anymaterial or any item of oral evidence."19. The Apex Court in M.L.SETHI V. R.P.KAPUR (AIR 1972 SC 2379)in the context of an application under Order 11 Rule 12 CPC observedthat if a party wants inspection of documents in the possession ofthe opposite party, he cannot inspect them unless the other partyproduces them and as such the party wanting inspection must,therefore, call upon the opposite party to produce the document andheld thus:- "When the Court makes an order for discoveryunder the rule, the opposite party is bound tomake an affidavit of documents and if he failsto do so, he will be subject to the penaltiesspecified in Rule 21 of Order 11. An affidavitof documents shall set forth all the documentswhich are, or have been in his possession orpower relating to the matter in question in theproceedings. And as to the documents which arenot, but have been in his possession or power,he must state what has become of them and inwhose possession they are, in order that theopposite party may be enabled https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ to get production from the persons who havepossession of them (see Form No. 5 in Appendix Cof the Civil Procedure Code). After he hasdisclosed the documents by the affidavit, he maybe required to produce for inspection such ofthe documents as he is in possession of and asare relevant.........The documents sought to bediscovered need not be admissible in evidence inthe enquiry or proceedings. It is sufficient ifthe documents would be relevant for the purposeof throwing light on the matter in controversy.Every document which will throw any light on thecase is a document relating to a matter indispute in the proceedings, though it might notbe admissible in evidence. In other words, adocument might be inadmissible in evidence yetit may contain information which may eitherdirectly or indirectly enable the party seekingdiscovery either to advance his case or damagethe adversary’s case or which may lead to atrial of enquiry which may have either of thesetwo consequences."20. The learned counsel for the first respondent Bank mainlyopposed the writ petitions on the ground of alternative remedy.However in the present case, in the event of granting liberty to thepetitioner to file an appeal before the Tribunal at this stage, itwould further delay the matter and the trial has to be adjourned. Noprejudice would be caused to the first respondent Bank in producingthe documents in I.A.Nos.873 and 874 of 2007. It was only inI.A.No.875 of 2007, that the Bank pleaded their inability to producethe promissory notes, as according to the Bank the same wasmisplaced. Therefore except the promissory notes sought for inI.A.No.875 of 2007, there was no difficulty for the Bank to producethe documents as sought for in the applications. The early productionof the documents is to the advantage of the bank, as it would enablethe Tribunal to adjudicate the matter without further delay.Therefore the first respondent was not justified in contending thatthe petitioner should be directed to file a statutory appeal insteadof prosecuting the present writ petitions. Such a course may not beadvisable at this point of time as the writ petitions were pendingbefore this court for consideration.21. The Apex Court in ZOLBA v. KESHAO [2008(6) SCALE 70] whileconsidering the question of condonation of delay in filing thewritten statement observed thus: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "It cannot also be forgotten that in anadversarial system, no party should ordinarilybe denied the opportunity of participating inthe process of justice dispensation. Therefore,unless compelled by express and specificlanguage of the statute, the provisions of Order8 Rule 1 of CPC or any procedural enactmentshould not be construed in a manner, which wouldleave the Court helpless to meet extraordinarysituations in the ends of justice."22. The Honourable Supreme Court considered the procedural lawvis-a-vis substantive law in R.N.JADI & BROTHERS v. SUBHASHCHANDRA(2007(9) Scale 202) and held thus:"9. All the rules of procedure are thehandmaid of justice. The language employed bythe draftsman of processual law may be liberalor stringent, but the fact remains that theobject of prescribing procedure is to advancethe cause of justice. In an adversarial system,no party should ordinarily be denied theopportunity of participating in the process ofjustice dispensation. Unless compelled byexpress and specific language of the statute,the provisions of CPC or any other proceduralenactment ought not to be construed in a mannerwhich would leave the court helpless to meetextraordinary situations in the ends ofjustice."23. The Tribunal while rejecting the applications preferred bythe petitioner was mainly concerned about the delay in preferring theapplications. The written statement of the petitioner and otherrespondents were filed originally in the year 2002, with liberty tofile additional written statement after production of the copy ofaccounts by the first respondent. The proof affidavit in the caseappears to have been submitted by the first respondent only in theyear 2007 as submitted by the learned counsel on either side andnaturally when the petitioner found that he was incapacitated inmeeting the contention of the Bank in the absence of the accountsprior to 1.7.1999, he filed applications to cause production of thedocuments. The petitioner cannot be penalised for the failure of theBank to produce the required documents even though there was areference about the accounts prior to the said period and theundertaking given by the Bank to produce the documents as and whennecessary. Instead of dismissing the applications filed by the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ petitioner, the Tribunal should have directed the Bank to produce thecopy of the accounts as well as the other correspondences exchangedbetween the bank and ECGC. Since all the accounts as well ascorrespondences were available with the Bank even according to them,there was no difficulty for them to produce the documents and thebank opposed the prayer and the learned Tribunal also endorsed theview of the bank to reject the applications. Had the Tribunal madean attempt to consider the applications in the proper perspective andin the light of the undertaking given by the Bank to produce theentire accounts in support of their claim, the suit could have beendisposed of by now. The Tribunal also failed to take note of the factthat the first respondent has claimed a decree for the entire amountin respect of the third respondent and the same was not confined tothe transaction subsequent to 1.7.1999. The prayer as claimed clearlyshows that the decree was sought in respect of Open Cash CreditFacility, packing facility as well as foreign bill of exchangefacility and those claims were not restricted to the periodsubsequent to 1.7.1999 and as such the petitioner was fully justifiedin requesting the bank to produce the entire documents. 24. The learned counsel for the first respondent also contendedthat in case the first respondent failed to produce the accounts inspite of the undertaking given as found in para 11 of the originalApplication, the Tribunal could have drawn adverse inference againstthe Bank and as such the non production of the accounts, cannot be aground to file application for production of documents by thepetitioner. The question of adverse inference and other legalpresumption are all technical rules of evidence and no suchprovision would enable the petitioner to substantiate his defence.The affidavit filed in support of the applications clearly shows thenecessity to cause production of the documents sought for includingthe extract of accounts. It was obligatory on the part of the Bankto produce the documents in support of their claim and they cannotapply for a decree without producing the complete accounts. In fact,the Tribunal erred in accepting the original application without acopy of the entire accounts maintained by the Bank. The firstrespondent was entitled for a decree only in case they were able toprove the dues as per the statement of accounts. Therefore instead ofrelying on technicalities, the first respondent should have in allfairness, produced the entire accounts before the court and pray fora decree after contest. Unfortunately, the Tribunal also failed toconsider the prejudice that would cause to the petitioner in case thestatement of accounts were not furnished with respect to the periodprior to 1.7.1999. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Conclusion:-25. In view of the reasons aforesaid, I am of the opinion thatthe petitioner has made out a case to cause production of thedocuments in I.A.Nos.873 to 875 of 2007 except the promissory notesreported to be untraceable. The first respondent is directed toproduce the documents and extract of accounts as sought for inI.A.Nos.873 to 875 of 2007 excluding the lost promissory notesbefore the second respondent within two weeks from the date ofreceipt of a copy of this order.26. The writ petitions are allowed with the above direction.Consequently, the connected MPs are closed. No costs.Sd/-Asst. Registrar./true copy/Sub Asst. Registrar.Tr/To1. Canara Bank P.N. Road Tiruppur.2. The Debts Recovery Tribunal Coimbatore.3. M/s. Ellwin Garments rep.by its Partner, R. Radhamani No.28, N.G.R. Nagar, Anakkdu Tiruppur-641 601.+ 1 CC To Mr.Ananda Gomathy Sivakumar, Advocate SR NO.62197+ 1 CC To Mr.M.V.Chandran, Advocate SR NO.62008 order in W.P.Nos.14428 to 14430/2008 & connected Mps.GV {CO}TP/10.11.08