Durairaj v. The State

2.Additional Director General of Prisons,Office of Addl. Director General,Egmore, Chennai-8.3.The Superintendent,Central Prison, Tiruchirapalli-20. 4.The Superintendent,.. Respondents inCentral Prison, Cuddalore-4.H.C.P.No.1303/2008- - - - -PRAYER : H.C.P. No.985 of 2008 filed under Article 226of the Constitution of India seeking to issue a writof habeas corpus directing respondents 1 and 2 thereinto produce the detenu by name Durairaj, S/o. Ponnusamyand Manickam, S/o. Ramasamy, who are now confined inCentral Prison, Tiruchirapalli as life convictsconcerned in S.C. No.197/84 on the file of the IAdditional Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli, before thisCourt and release them from the Central Prison,Tiruchirapalli by passing an order of prematurerelease and set them at liberty.H.C.P. No.1283 of 2008 filed under Article 226 ofthe Constitution of India seeking to issue a writ ofhabeas corpus directing the respondents therein tocause the production of the detenu namely Balan @Balendran, S/o. Shanmugam, Nanda @ Nandakumar, S/o.Somasundaram and Sathish @ Sathish Kumar, S/o.Sabharathianm, who are now confined in Central Prison,Tiruchirapalli before this Court and set them atliberty.H.C.P. No.1303 of 2008 filed under Article 226 ofthe Constitution of India seeking to issue a writ ofhabeas corpus directing the respondents therein tocause the production of the detenu namely Premananda @Premkumar @ Ravi, S/o. Somasundaram and Kamalananda,S/o. Rasanayagam, who are now confined in CentralPrison, Cuddalore and Tiruchirapalli respectivelybefore this Court and set them at liberty.- - - - -For Petitioners : Mr. S. Shunmugavelayutham Senior Counsel forin all the HCPsMr. T. Vijaya RaghavanFor Respondents : Mr. V.R. Balasubramaniam,in all the HCPs Addl. Public Prosecutor.- - - - - https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ O R D E RPrabha Sridevan, J.The Government of Tamil Nadu passed an order of prematurerelease in respect of prisoners who are serving life sentence, inconnection with the 100th Birthday Celebrations of the formerChief Minister of Tamil Nadu, Arignar Anna. These three writpetitions have been filed seeking writ of habeas corpus, prayingto release the petitioners in the respective writ petitions interms of the said Government Order, alleging violations of theirfundamental right to life and liberty. H.C.P. Nos.1283 and 1303of 2008 stand on the same footing and H.C.P. No.985 of 2008stands on a different footing.2. We will take up H.C.P. No.985 of 2008 first. Thispetition was originally filed for consideration of thepetitioner’s case by the State Advisory Board. That relief wasgranted pending the H.C.P. Thereafter, an additional affidavithas been filed alleging discrimination. The petitioners weretried for the offences under Section 302 read with 34; Sections394 and 397 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code. They wereconvicted and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and rigorousimprisonment for seven years; the sentences were ordered to runconcurrently. The appeals were dismissed. The petitioners hadundergone approximately 17 years in prison. In the additionalaffidavit filed, they have referred to one Haja Mohideen and oneKarnan who have also been convicted under the same sections asthe petitioners and had been released prematurely. The denial ofthe same relief is a gross violation of their fundamental rights.3. Insofar as H.C.P. Nos.1283 and 1303 of 2008 areconcerned, the petitioners have been sentenced to undergo lifeimprisonment and rigorous imprisonment for seven years. Theappeals preferred by them were dismissed. The Special LeavePetition and the Review Petition was also dismissed. The detenusare now serving sentence for the last 13 years.4. In the judgment delivered by the learned Sessions Judge,a specific direction has been given as follows :"Any remission of sentence or amnesty on anyspecial occasions to be announced either by the StateGovernment or Central Government in future will notapply to the sentence of imprisonment imposed on allthe accused in this case as they are convicted forgrave offences against them. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ The period of sentence already undergone by allthe accused is directed to bet set off under Section428, Cr. P.C. against the sentence now imposed."5. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of thepetitioners submitted, in answer to the preliminary objectionraised by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor regarding themaintainability of the petitions, that when the question relatingto the fundamental rights of prisoners is raised, thennotwithstanding the fact that they are in prison serving asentence imposed in accordance with law, a habeas corpus petitionis maintainable. He relied on several judgments to support hiscase. He also submitted that the State cannot discriminatebetween prisoners similarly placed and exercise the power ofremission to some and deny it to others. As regards thepetitioners in H.C.P. Nos.1283 and 1303 of 2008, he submittedthat the Court had no power to trespass into what is exclusivelythe domain of the Executive for grant of remission, and by ajudicial order, foreclose the right of the prisoner to be setfree forever. The Learned senior counsel submitted that inAntulay’s case, the Supreme Court had categorically stated thatwhen the judicial order is without jurisdiction, then thepetitioner has no other resort but to approach the Court forrelief and for this purpose, he relied on several decisions.6. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor, on the otherhand, submitted that the writ petitions are not maintainable. Hesubmitted that the power to grant remission vests purely with theExecutive and even if the State decided to set free a certainclass of prisoners and not others, violation of Article 14 of theConstitution can not be alleged. As regards H.C.P. Nos.1283 and1303 of 2008, he submitted that in view of the order passed bythe Supreme Court, the writ petitions must be dismissed.7. Learned senior counsel relied on the following decisions.In Sunil Batra vs. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1579,the Supreme Court held as follows :"The writ is not and never has been a static,narrow formalistic remedy. Its scope has grown toachieve its purpose — the protection of individualsagainst erosion of the right to be free from wrongfulrestraints on their liberty....30. We, therefore, affirm that where the rights ofa prisoner, either under the Constitution or underother law, are violated the writ power of the court canand should run to his rescue. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ ..."The court need not adopt a 'hands off' attitude... in regard to the problem of prisonadministration. It is all the more so because aconvict is in prison under the order and direction ofthe court."Whether inside prison or outside, a person shallnot be deprived of his guaranteed freedom save bymethods “right, just and fair” – vide Maneka Gandhi(supra)....No iron curtain can be drawn between theprisoner and the Constitution.It is, therefore, the court’s concern, implicitin the power to deprive the sentences of his personalliberty, to ensure that no more and no less than iswarranted by the sentence happens. If the prisonerbreaks down because of mental torture, psychicpressure or physical infliction beyond the licitlimits of lawful imprisonment the PrisonAdministration shall be liable for the excess. On thecontrary, if an influential convict is able to buyadvantages and liberties to avoid or water down thedeprivation implied in the sentence the PrisonEstablishment will be called to order for suchadulteration or dilution of court sentences byexecutive palliation, if unwarranted by law. 8. In G.V. Godse vs. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1961 S.C.600, the Supreme Court held thus :"This is a petition under Article 32 of theConstitution for an order in the nature of habeascorpus claiming that the petitioner has justly servedhis sentence and should, therefore, be released....9. The petitioner made an impassioned appeal to usthat if such a construction be accepted, he would be atthe mercy of the appropriate Government and that thesaid Government, out of spite, might not remit thebalance of his sentence, with the result that he wouldbe deprived of the fruits of remissions earned by himfor sustained good conduct, useful service and evendonation of blood. The Constitution as well as the Codeof Criminal Procedure confer the power to remit asentence on the executive Government and it is in itsexclusive province. We cannot assume that theappropriate Government will not exercise its https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ jurisdiction in a reasonable manner."In Mohd. Munna vs. Union of India, 2006 (2) L.W. (Crl.) 569, itwas held thus :"Thus, all the contentions raised by thepetitioner fail and the petitioner is not entitled tobe released on any of the grounds urged in the writpetition so long as there is no order of remissionpassed by the appropriate government in his favour. Wemake it clear that our decision need not be taken asexpression of our view that petitioner is not entitledto any remission at all. The appropriate governmentwould be at liberty to pass any appropriate order ofremission in accordance with law."In Epuru Sudhakar vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (2006) 8S.C.C. 161, it was held thus :"65. Exercise of executive clemency is a matter ofdiscretion and yet subject to certain standards. It isnot a matter of privilege. It is a matter ofperformance of official duty. It is vested in thePresident or the Governor, as the case may be, not forthe benefit of the convict only, but for the welfare ofthe people who may insist on the performance of theduty. This discretion, therefore, has to be exercisedon public considerations alone. The President and theGovernor are the sole judges of the sufficiency offacts and of the appropriateness of granting thepardons and reprieves. However, this power is anenumerated power in the Constitution and itslimitations, if any, must be found in the Constitutionitself. Therefore, the principle of exclusivecognizance would not apply when and if the decisionimpugned is in derogation of a constitutionalprovision. This is the basic working test to be appliedwhile granting pardons, reprieves, remissions andcommutations.66. Granting of pardon is in no sense anoverturning of a judgment of conviction, but rather itis an executive action that mitigates or sets aside thepunishment for a crime. It eliminates the effect ofconviction without addressing the defendant’s guilt orinnocence. The controlling factor in determiningwhether the exercise of prerogative power is subject tojudicial review is not its source but its subject-matter. It can no longer be said that prerogative poweris ipso facto immune from judicial review. An undueexercise of this power is to be deplored.Considerations of religion, caste or political loyaltyare irrelevant and fraught with discrimination. These https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ are prohibited grounds. The Rule of Law is the basisfor evaluation of all decisions. The supreme quality ofthe Rule of Law is fairness and legal certainty. Theprinciple of legality occupies a central plan in theRule of Law. Every prerogative has to be subject to theRule of Law. That rule cannot be compromised on thegrounds of political expediency. To go by suchconsiderations would be subversive of the fundamentalprinciples of the Rule of Law and it would amount tosetting a dangerous precedent. The Rule of Lawprinciple comprises a requirement of “Governmentaccording to law”. The ethos of “Government accordingto law” requires the prerogative to be exercised in amanner which is consistent with the basic principle offairness and certainty. Therefore, the power ofexecutive clemency is not only for the benefit of theconvict, but while exercising such a power thePresident or the Governor, as the case may be, has tokeep in mind the effect of his decision on the familyof the victims, the society as a whole and theprecedent it sets for the future."9. In Haja Mohideen vs. Government of India, 1989 L.W.(Crl.) 546, a Division Bench of this Court entertained theH.C.Ps. filed by the petitioners therein because the petitionsaddressed by the death row prisoners were kept in cold storagefor too long. In G. Srinivasan vs. P. Shanmugam, 1995 (1) L.W.(Crl.) 80, this court held as follows :"16. The provisions contained in Section 428 ofthe Code state that the period of detention prior tothe date of conviction shall be set off against theterm of imprisonment imposed on an accused and theliability of the person to undergo imprisonment, shallbe restricted to the reminder, if any, of the term ofimprisonment imposed on him. It is obvious, therefore,that the statute mandates that the set off must beregarded as part of the sentence imposed upon andtherefore the set off period is also a period ofconfinement."In A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak, 1988 S.C.C. (Cri.) 372, theSupreme Court held that :"Four valuable rights, it appears to us, of theappellant have been taken away by the impugneddirections:“(i)The right to be tried by a Special Judge inaccordance with the procedure established by law andenacted by Parliament. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (ii)The right of revision to the High Court underSection 9 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act.(iii)The right of first appeal to the HighCourt under the same section.(iv)The right to move the Supreme Court underArticle 136 thereafter by way of a second appeal, ifnecessary.”and the Supreme Court intervened, to review the order passedearlier. In Som Mittal vs. Government of Karnataka, (2008) 2S.C.C. (Cri.) 1, the Supreme Court held as follows :"10. The second issue involves the recommendationsmade to the Government of U.P. and directions issued toall States and Union Territories in paras 17 to 39 ofthe concurring judgment. The appeal related to thequestion whether the complaint against the appellantdisclosed the ingredients of an offence under Section25 of the Karnataka Shops & Commercial EstablishmentsAct, 1961. The appeal did not relate to grant ofanticipatory bail nor did it relate to rights ofarrested persons. This Court has repeatedly cautionedthat while rendering judgments, courts should only dealwith the subject matter of the case and issues involvedtherein. Courts should desist from issuing directionsaffecting executive or legislative policy, or generaldirections unconnected with the subject matter of thecase. A court may express its views on a particularissue in appropriate cases only where it is relevant tothe subject matter of the case."In the above case, the Supreme Court set aside the directionsgiven by a two Judge Bench in Som Mittal vs. Government ofKarnataka, (2008) 3 S.C.C. 753.10. In State of Haryana vs. Mahender Singh, 2007 (12) SCALE669, the Supreme Court held as follows :"A. The State indisputably is entitled to take aprison policy as contra-distinguished from a sentencingpolicy. The Prisons Act, 1894 was enacted to amend thelaw relating to prisons. Sub-section (5) of Section 59thereof empowers the State Government to make rules forthe award of marks and shortening of sentences. TheState of Punjab, pursuant to the said power, framedrules.B. The Rules put the convicts into threecategories. It also defines the term 'life convicts'.Whereas a classification had been made from amongst theconvicts having regard to the gravity of the offencescommitted by them, indisputably no classification hasbeen made on the basis of the number of deaths which https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ might have taken place at the hands of the persons.The State apart from making the Statutory Rules, asnoticed hereinbefore, had been issuing executiveinstructions.C. It is true that no convict has a fundamentalright of remission or shortening of sentences. It isalso true that the State in exercise of its executivepower of remission must consider each individual casekeeping in view the relevant factors. The power of theState to issue general instructions, so that nodiscrimination is made, is also permissible in law.D. The question, however, which would inter aliaarise for consideration is as to whether new policydecision adopted by the State of Haryana will have aprospective operation.E. A right to be considered for remission, keepingin view the constitutional safeguards of a convictunder Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India,must be held to be a legal one. Such a legal rightemanates from not only the Prisons Act but also fromthe Rules framed thereunder. Although no convict canbe said to have any constitutional right for obtainingremission in his sentence, he in view of the policydecision itself must be held to have a right to beconsidered therefor. Whether by reason of a statutoryrule or otherwise if a policy decision has been laiddown, the persons who come within the purview thereofare entitled to be treated equally.F. It is now well settled that any guidelineswhich do not have any statutory flavour are merelyadvisory in nature. They cannot have the force of astatute. They are subservient to the legislative actand the statutory rules.G. Whenever, thus, a policy decision is made,persons must be treated equally in terms thereof. A'fortiori the policy decision applicable in such caseswould be which was prevailing at the time of hisconviction.H. Furthermore, if the Punjab Rules are applicablein the State of Haryana in view of the StateReorganisation Act, no executive instruction wouldprevail over the Statutory Rules. The Rules having https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ defined 'convicts' in terms whereof a 'life convict'was entitled to have his case considered within theparameters laid down therein, the same cannot be takenaway by reason of an executive instruction byredefining the term 'life convict'. It is one thing tosay that the 'life convict' has no right to obtainremission but it is another thing to say that they donot have any right to be considered at all. Right tobe considered emanates from the State's own executiveinstructions as also the Statutory Rules.I. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the HighCourt might not be correct in holding that the Statehas no power to make any classification at all. Aclassification validly made would not offend Article 14of the Constitution of India. We, thus, although donot agree with all the reasonings of the High Court,sustain the judgment for the reasons statedhereinbefore."11. In Pusparaj vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 2007 Crl L.J. 4426,the petitioner who had served 13½ years of actual sentenceclaimed that he was entitled to the benefit of G.O. Ms. No.873dated 14.9.2006, by which the Governor of Tamil Nadu remitted theunexpired portion of sentence of life imprisonment in respect of472 convicts on the occasion of the 98th Birthday of the formerChief Minister. The petitioner in that case relied on Maru Ram,Epuru Sudhakar, Kehar Singh and other decisions on this issue.The Division Bench held as follows :"15. It is fairly well settled that the exerciseor non-exercise of pardon power by the President orGovernor as the case may be is not immune from judicialreview. Limited judicial review is available as hasbeen consistently held by the Supreme Court. In MaruRam's case (1981 (1) SCCC 107, the Supreme Court cameto the conclusion that the power under Art.72 and 161can be exercised by the Central and State Governmentsand not by the President or Governor on their own. Theadvice of the appropriate Government binds the head ofthe State. The Court also came to the conclusion thatconsiderations for exercise of power under Arts.72 or161 may be myriad and their occasions protean, and areleft to the appropriate Government, but noconsideration nor occasion can be wholly irrelevant,irrational, discriminatory or mala fide. Only in thoserare cases will the Court examine the exercise. Inpara 62 of the judgment in Maru Ram case, the Court had https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ observed :"An issue of deeper import demands ourconsideration at this stage of the discussion. Wide asthe power of pardon, commutation and release (Articles72 and 161) is, it cannot run riot; for no legal powercan run unruly like John Gilpin on the horse but mustkeep sensibly to a steady course. Here, we come uponthe second constitutional fundamental which underliesthe submissions of counsel. It is that all publicpower, including constitutional power, shall never beexercisable arbitrarily or mala fide and, ordinarily,guidelines for fair and equal execution are guarantorsof the valid play of power. We proceed on the basisthat these axioms are valid in our constitutionalorder."It was further held that the power to pardon,grant remission and commutation, being of the greatestmoment for the liberty of the citizen, cannot be a lawunto itself but must be informed by the finer canons ofconstitutionalism." As regards discrimination, the Division Bench observed as follows:"20. Bearing in mind the parameters of judicialreview in relation to grant of pardon by the Governor,when we examine the present case, the order ofexclusion of petitioner from the benefits cannot besaid to be non-application of mind or mala fide. It isnoticed that the ADGP had sent letter No.24974/PS1/2006dated 8.9.2006 stating that the petitioner and co-accused were involved in sensational murder case of a13 years old innocent boy in a brutal manner andrecommended not to consider their cases for prematurerelease on en-masse release. The Government seems tohave taken note of the offence and the back ground ofthe petitioner and co-accused in not considering theircase for premature release on en-masse release andtherefore, it cannot be said to suffer fromarbitrariness. It cannot be said that the irrelevantand extraneous materials entered into the decisionmaking process in excluding the petitioner from gettingremission as per G.O. Ms. 873. The contention that thepetitioner was discriminated is unnacceptable."In that case, the Government stated that the petitioner's casewould be considered for release under the Advisory Board Scheme https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ as per Rule 341(2) of the Tamil Nadu Prison Rules, 1983.Therefore, the habeas corpus petition was disposed of directingthe petitioner to file a fresh representation to the Governmentfor remission under Sections 432 and 433 and the respondents werealso directed to consider the same in accordance with the Rulesand dispose of the same within a time stipulated therein.12. In Mohan Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1981 Cri.L.J. 147, it was held as follows :"6. The learned Deputy Advocate-General submittedthat no prisoner has a right to remission under Section432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that apetition under Article 226 of the Constitution is notmaintainable as the power to grant remission isdiscretionary. The fallacy in this argument is that thepetitioner is not invoking any right of remission underSection 432 but his fundamental rights under Articles14 and 15(1). It is well settled that convicts are notwholly denuded of their fundamental rights and there isno iron curtain between prisoners and the Constitution.(See Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1978 SC1675 at p. 1727). (1) If the State decides to grantcertain remission to prisoners of a particular caste orrace and if the State denies the same to otherprisoners on the basis of their caste and race only,the prisoners who are so denied the benefit areentitled to invoke the fundamental right under Article15. The power to grant remission under Section 432 ofthe Code is no doubt discretionary but it is subject tothe constitutional rights of prisoners and cannot beused so as to discriminate prisoners on the basis ofcaste and race only. The Deputy Advocate-General reliedupon the cases of Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State ofMaharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 600 and State of M.P. v. RatanSingh, AIR 1976 SC 1552 for the submission that powerto grant remission is discretionary. These cases haveno application here as they do not deal with the effectof Articles 14 and 15 on the exercise of the power togrant remission. It was also submitted by the learnedDeputy Advocate-General that the prisoners of theScheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes who weregranted special remissions have been released andstriking down of the special remissions allowed to themwould be wholly unjust as the prisoners released willhave to be brought back in jail and that will not bringany particular benefit to the petitioner. The answer tothis argument is simple. The petitioner does not wantthat the special remissions which have been granted tothe prisoners of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Tribes should be withdrawn. The petitioner seeks toenforce his right to equality by saying to theauthorities; "You have granted special remissions tothe prisoners of the Scheduled Castes and the ScheduledTribes on the basis of caste and race only which is notcovered by Article 15(4), therefore, treat me and otherprisoners equally and give us the same remissions whichhave been allowed to the prisoners of the ScheduledCastes and the Scheduled Tribes". In our opinion, thepetitioner's stand is fully justified."13. We will now take up H.C.P. Nos.1283 and 1303 of 2008.In this case, the learned Sessions Judge had given certaindirections, which have been extracted above. On appeal, thisCourt confirmed the findings, conviction and the sentence subjectto the modification that the imprisonment awarded to A-4, A-6 andA-7 shall be undergone by them concurrently. There was nomodification of the directions of the learned Sessions Judge.The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal preferred by thepetitioners vide the decision in 2007(1) M.L.J. (Crl.) 1527[Kamalanantha vs. State of Tamil Nadu] :"Having regard to the amplitude of the gravity ofthe offence, perpetrated in an organized and systematicmanner, the nature of the offence and its deleteriouseffects not only against the victims, but the civilizedsociety at large, needs to be curbed by a strongjudicial hand. We are inclined to confirm the sentenceand conviction as recorded by the Trial Court andconfirmed by the High Court. The order of the TrialCourt that any remission of sentence or amnesty on anyspecial occasions announced or to be announced byeither by the Central or the State Government shall notapply to the sentence and imprisonment imposed on allthe accused, is also maintained. Appeal dismissed." 14. In view of the specific confirmation of thedirections given by the learned Sessions Judge, we cannotinterfere with or set aside the same. It is to be noted thatAntulay and Som Mittal's cases are different, since they arecases where it was the Supreme Court which either modified or setaside the earlier directions of the Supreme Court. We cannotdilute or modify the directions of the Supreme Court. So, afterrecording the submissions, we must dismiss the petition.15. As regards the other petition, viz. H.C.P. No.985 of2008, we are unable to see any of the special circumstances thatwarrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. Ofcourse, the petitioner in this case has taken an additionalground of discrimination that the other prisoners similarly https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ placed have been released. However, the refusal to remit thepetitioner's sentence is admittedly according to the rules.Petitioner's grievance is that this rule has not been invoked inthe case of Karnan or Haja Mohideen. The Government Order itselfcame up for attack and subject to certain safeguards, this Courtrefused to stay the same. In Epuru Sudhakars case, which wasfiled under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the son ofthe person murdered challenged the grant of remission to therespondents in the said petition, who had been found to be guiltyof the murder of his father, on the ground that such order wasillegal and that the remission was granted without anyapplication of mind and that the recommendation for remission hadbeen made on irrelevant and extraneous materials. If the releaseof any prisoner is attacked as in the case of Epuru Sudhakar'scase, it will be decided in accordance with law. 16. In an eloquent paragraph in Maru Ram vs. Union of India,A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 2147, this is what the Supreme Court says : "65. ... The court, if it finds frequent misuse ofthis power may have to investigate the discrimination.The proper thing to do, if Government is to keep faithwith the founding fathers, is to make rules for its ownguidance in the exercise of pardon power keeping, ofcourse, a large residuary power to meet specialsituations or sudden developments. This will excludethe vice of discrimination such as may arise where twopersons have been convicted and sentenced in the samecase for the same degree of guilt but one is releasedand the other refused, for such irrelevant reasons asreligion, caste, colour or political loyalty."Therefore, we are unable to accept the arguments advanced onbehalf of the petitioners that another person has been grantedremission and hence, their case should also be considered on asimilar footing. So this petition also deserves to be dismissed.17. In G.O. Ms. No.1762, Home Department, dated 20.7.1987,the Government had accepted the recommendation of the All IndiaCommittee on Prison Reforms in paragraph 17.2, Chapter XX of itsreport and directed that the following category of prisonersshould not be considered for premature release :i) Prisoners convicted of rape, forgery, dacoity, terroristcrimes, offences against the State and prisonerssentenced under Sections 224, 376, 396 to 400, 402, 467,471, 472, 474, 489A, 489B and 489D of the Indian PenalCode;ii)Prisoners convicted of economic offences, blackmarketing, smuggling and misuse of power and authority;and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ iii) Prisoners sentenced under Prevention of CorruptionAct, Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and GirlsAct, Drugs and Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.Therefore, Rule 341 of the Tamil Nadu Prison Rules was suitablyamended to exclude the aforementioned categories of convicts frompremature release under the Advisory Board Scheme. By LetterNo.1358, Home Department, dated 10.11.1994, the Governmentdirected that prisoners falling within the scope of G.O. Ms.No.1762 will be considered by the Government under Article 161 ofthe Constitution for premature release on humanitarian grounds.The petitioners were convicted under Section 392 read with 397 ofthe Indian Penal Code and therefore, they come within the scopeof G.O. Ms. No.1762 and hence, they are not entitled as a matterof right for premature release. The Advisory Board takes intoaccount various factors while deciding cases for prematurerelease. In Mahender Singh's case (supra), the Supreme Court hadheld that the High Court was not correct in holding that theState has no power to make any classification and that aclassification validly made would not offend Article 14 of theConstitution of India. Therefore, if by virtue of statutoryrules, a classification is made of prisoners in respect of whomorders for premature release would not be made, such rules as perthe above judgment of the Supreme Court would not offend Article14 of the Constitution. The Advisory Board had been convened andon the basis of the reports obtained from the District Collectorand other authorities, had decided not to recommend the case ofthe petitioner in this case for premature release. In thesecircumstances, we are unable to sustain any of the objectionsraised on behalf of the petitioner. 18. In the result, all the habeas corpus petitions aredismissed. ab Sd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.RegistrarTo1.The Secretary, Home Department,Government of Tamil Nadu, Fort St. George, Chennai-9. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

2.The Additional Director General of Prisons,Office of Addl. Director General,Egmore, Chennai-8.3.The Superintendent,Central Prison, Tiruchirapalli-20. 4.The Superintendent,Central Prison, Cuddalore-4.5.The Public Prosecutor,High Court, Madras.+ 3 ccs to Mr. T. Vijayaraghavan, Advocate SR No.5027, 5028, 5029GV(CO)SR/9.2.2009 Order in H.C.Ps.985, 1283 & 1303/2008