The Chief Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu v. The Home Secretary to Government, Fort Saint George, Chennai

was unable to surrender the lawyers as promised to the police, hegave back the FIR to the police and left that place. The learnedcounsel contended that the police ought not to have drawn so manypolicemen without the permission of the Acting Chief Justice. Byreferring to the Full Bench order dated 21.02.2009, the learnedcounsel contended that the said order made it clear that the ActingChief Justice never gave permission to the police to enter thepremises and therefore their presence was illegal. According to thelearned counsel since the police indulged in all acts of violenceduring Court hours and disrupted the proceedings on 19.02.2009 andsubsequent days, it calls for serious action of criminal contemptagainst the police.37. Mr.V.Selvaraj, learned counsel appearing for the AdditionalCommissioner of Police Mr.A.K.Viswanathan, at the outset contendedthat two questions arise for consideration viz., (i) who brought thepolice inside and (ii) who ordered lathi charge. He contended thatthe Commissioner of Police wants to escape by shifting the blame onother junior officers. According to him, the Commissioner of Policemisused the discussion that took place on 18.02.2009, in the Chambersof the Acting Chief Justice along with other officers. He alsocontended that it was the Commissioner of Police who organized thepolice force in the forenoon as well as the additional force in theafternoon. The learned counsel pointed out that after Dr.SubramaniamSwamy left at 11.30 am, the police force was shifted to B-2 PoliceStation but it was brought back to B-4 Police Station at 2.00 pm athis instance. He contended that the Additional Commissioner of PoliceMr.A.K.Viswanathan entered the High Court premises only after 3.45 pmat the instance of the Commissioner of Police and even according tothe jurisdictional Joint Commissioner of Police, the lathi charge wasordered only by the Deputy Commissioner of Police Mr.Prem AnandSinha. The learned counsel contended that when according to thelearned Advocate General that after the lathi charge, he went toRamachandra Hospital at 3.45 pm to appraise the Hon’ble the ChiefMinister about the incident, it can be safely held that the firstlathi charge commenced at 3.00 pm and went up to 3.30 pm, while theAdditional Commissioner of Police entered the High Court premisesonly at 3.45 pm. The learned counsel pointed out that while theActing Chief Justice tried to contact the Commissioner of Police from3.30 pm onwards to remove the police force from the High Courtpremises even at 4.50 pm, the Commissioner of Police was arrangingfor reinforcement of more police force. The learned counsel byreferring to a call data furnished by the BSNL pointed out that theCommissioner of Police was very much inside the High Court premisesat 16.27 hours i.e. 4.27 p.m. and that he alone was controlling theforce. He also referred to the complaint of the Inspector of PoliceJayakodi to point out that the Commissioner of Police came to B-4Police Station at 4.30 pm. The learned counsel therefore contendedthat the Commissioner of Police took charge from the AdditionalCommissioner of Police at 4.40 pm inside the High Court premises andonly thereafter the second lathi charge took place.38. Mr.P.N.Prakash, learned counsel appearing for thejurisdictional Joint Commissioner of Police Mr.M.Ramasubramani, at https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the outset stated that the said officer is extending his apologyopenly and publicly without any qualms and that he is regretting forthe incident that happened on 19.02.2009. The learned counsel alsostated that the jurisdictional Joint Commissioner admitted hispresence in the morning as well as in the afternoon, that hemobilized the police force and that he takes the responsibility. Hehowever contended that he did everything in good faith. He alsocontended that for an unlawful assembly what was required is commonobject and the place is not the determinative. The learned counselpointed out that when there was variation of things as regards thelathi charge and since the whole complaint has been referred to theCBI, it should be left to the CBI to investigate and one should notgo by the order of the Full Bench dated 19.02.2009.39. Mr.P.N.Swaminathan appearing for Mr.Sandeep Rai Rathore,Joint Commissioner of Police (Central) submitted that the JointCommissioner of Police proceeded to B-4 Police Station as directed bythe Additional Commissioner of Police on 19.02.2009 and that he wasnot commanding any one. He also claims that he was not involved inany of the incident and that he was also not consulted by any one. The Joint Commissioner of Police in his affidavit however stated thatafter the arrest of the advocates, the police ought not to haveremained in the High Court premises. He also tendered anunconditional apology for what had happened inside the High Courtpremises.40. Mr.P.S.Raman, the learned Advocate General appearing for theState including the Chief Secretary, Home Secretary and DirectorGeneral of Police prefaced his submissions by stating that he isaddressing the Court in his position as a leader of the Bar, as theAdvocate General for the State, as well as, as an yeoman party in thesuo motu Public Interest Litigation. While making his submissions,the learned Advocate General stated that the State does not want totake sides and that if the Court finds any one responsible for theunsavory incident that happened on 19.02.2009, the State will takeappropriate action against the concerned officer as directed by thisCourt. While deploring about the recent trend that is prevailingamongst the lawyers in resorting to boycott for all and sundry, thelearned Advocate General lamented that while carrying on a dignifiedprofession as lawyers such absenteeism from the Court by lawyers,whatever be the reason, would cause serious prejudice to the litigantpublic apart from causing hindrance to the course of justice. Italso to a very great extent results in degradation of the lawyers’profession in the eyes of the public at large. The learned AdvocateGeneral with heavy heart submitted that time has come where the Barassociations representing the lawyers should seriously think aboutany other method by which they can raise their protest instead ofabsenting the Courts which is not liked by the litigant public andfor that matter the public at large. 41. We fully endorse the views of the learned Advocate Generaland here and now we want to state that there is every justificationin what is stated by the learned Advocate General in the interest ofthe members of the Bar and the litigant public as well as the working https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ of the Court. Therefore time has come that the leaders of the Barshould stand up to the occasion and guide the members of the Bar notto resort to boycott of Courts which is also held to be notpermissible by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in(2003) 2 SCC 45 (Harish Uppal (Ex-Capt.) Vs. Union of India).42. As regards the presence of the police inside the Court, thelearned Advocate General contended that the High Court campus is apublic place where several Judicial Forums viz., High Court,Tribunals, Small Causes Court, City Civil Court and other judicialforums are located apart from the fact that people throng thepremises since the old light house is situated in the High Courtpremises which is one of the tourist spot for the traveling public. The learned Advocate General while drawing our attention to theDivision Bench decision reported in 2007 (2) MLJ 456 (The RegistrarGeneral, High Court of Madras Vs. State of Tamil Nadu) contended thatthe Division Bench has directed the State to provide necessarysecurity arrangement pursuant to which by G.O.Ms.No.395, dated20.03.2007, the State Government passed orders in compliance with theorders of the Division Bench. The learned Advocate General alsosubmitted that after the terrorist attack of the Parliament House, byvirtue of the directives of the Union of India, high securityarrangement was necessitated which resulted in the constitution ofthe Security Committee in the High Court itself consisting of sittingJudges of this Hon’ble Court apart from high level police officersand law officers, which Committee decided to increase the strength ofthe police personnel from the present level of 252 to 451. Thelearned Advocate General pointed out that on 19.02.2009, apart from130 police personnel, who were already present in the Court,additional strength of 292 was drawn in all 422 police personnel forsecurity purposes. The learned Advocate General therefore contendedthat by virtue of Section 149 Cr.P.C. and the above securityarrangement made, the presence of the police personnel inside theCourt campus on 19.02.2009, cannot be held to be against law. Thelearned Advocate General also contended that there is noConstitutional provision or statutory stipulations providing forimmunity from any security system or police presence to the HighCourt premises. Lastly the learned Advocate General contended thaton 19.02.2009, after the incident, he met the Hon’ble Chief Ministerwho was ailing and taking treatment in the Hospital and around 6.00pm to 7.30 pm the Hon’ble Chief Minister sent a fax message to theHon’ble Acting Chief Justice expressing his concern and regretted forwhatever that happened in the High Court premises and expressed hispreparedness to abide by whatever direction that the Court may issueto set right the disaster that had taken place. It was thereforecontended that in pursuance of such assurance extended by the Hon’blethe Chief Minister, the Chief Secretary, Home Secretary and theDirector General of Police came to the Hon’ble Acting Chief Justicechamber and agreed for whatever course of action that was directed tobe made by the Full Bench in its order dated 19.02.2009. TheAdvocate General then contended that the State Government alsoconstituted an independent Committee in G.O.Ms.No.229, dated09.03.2009, appointing Dr.N.Sundaradevan, I.A.S., to enquire into thepolice excess and fix the responsibility on the concerned police https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ officer and if he finds any one guilty, the State will take necessaryaction against the concerned persons. The learned Advocate Generaltherefore contended that the State cannot be faulted on any accountin so far as the incident that took place on 19.02.2009 is concernedand that it is prepared to abide by whatever direction that may beissued by this Court.43. We also heard Dr.Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior counsel whoappeared for 12 of the police officers other than Mr.A.K.Viswanathan,the then Additional Commissioner of Police, Mr.M.Ramasubramani,jurisdictional Joint Commissioner of Police and Mr.Sandeep RaiRathore, Joint Commissioner of Police (Central). 44. The submissions of Dr.Rajeev Dhavan was fourfold. Accordingto him the questions which are required to be considered are (i)whether the presence of the Police in the High Court can be faulted?(ii) what value one can attach to the report of Mr.JusticeB.N.Srikrishna? (iii) was there any consistency in the evidenceplaced before this Court on behalf of the lawyers, on the other handthey were contradictory in nature and (iv) was there a policeconspiracy at all? Lastly the learned counsel also made hissubmissions as to the relief that can be granted in these proceedings.45. Elaborating his submissions, the learned senior counselcontended that the entry of the police into the High Court premiseson 19.02.2009, was imminent in the light of the threat perception tomen and material. The learned senior counsel therefore contendedthat the presence of the police force inside the High Court campuscannot be decried. According to him the arrest of the lawyers wasnot at the initiative of the police but at the instance of thoselawyers themselves who came forward to surrender. 46. As far as the efficacy of the report of Mr.JusticeB.N.Srikrishna, it was pointed out to the learned senior counsel thatin as much as the whole gamut of the case with all details andparticulars having been placed before the Court, there is no need tobe guided by the report of Mr.Justice B.N.Srikrishna which is only aninterim report and therefore this Court can independently assess andanalyse the various materials and draw its own conclusion. Therefore, the learned senior counsel did not address any argumentbased on Mr.Justice B.N.Srikrishna’s report. In fact whenMr.S.Prabhakaran, representing the lawyers wanted to make commentsupon the report of Mr.Justice B.N.Srikrishna, this Court made itclear to the learned counsel that it wanted to assess the whole issueand reach its own conclusion independently and therefore, there wasno need to refer to Mr.Justice B.N.Srikrishna’s report in the courseof the submissions by any one.47. In fact the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its order dated06.03.2009, while sending the interim report of Mr.JusticeB.N.Srikrishna to the State Government as well as to this Court leftit to the discretion of this Court to deal with the said report. Dr.Rajeev Dhavan therefore did not deliberate upon the report ofMr.Justice B.N.Srikrishna in the course of his submissions. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

48. As far as the scope of any disciplinary action against anyof the police officers whom if this Court ultimately findsresponsible for the gory incident that took place on 19.02.2009, thelearned senior counsel contended that such a course of action wouldbe governed by Articles 309 to 311 of the Constitution and theholding of enquiry including suspension can be dealt with only by anappropriate disciplinary authority in accordance with theConstitutional provisions and the rules framed thereunder.49. As far as the scope of initiating any contempt actionagainst any of the officers based on the ultimate conclusion of thisCourt, the learned senior counsel contended that it would be too widea proposition, for the counsel representing the lawyers, to claimimmunity or privilege for the High Court premises in comparison withthe Parliament or the Assembly. The learned senior counsel wouldhowever state that the Court will have to analyze the issue ofcontempt by examining the same from the point of view of the “intent”of the concerned police officers but not by mere excessive action orother misdeeds.50. On the relief aspect, the learned senior counsel fairlysubmitted that whomsoever suffered any physical injury or otherdamages should be compensated by considering payment of ex gratiainstead of attempting to measure the actual suffering or damages. 51. Out of 12 police officers for whom the learned seniorcounsel made his submissions, he pointed out that MessersA.M.S.Gunaseelan, Joint Commissioner of Police (South), T.S.Anbu,Deputy Commissioner of Police (Anna Nagar) and C.Sridhar, DeputyCommissioner of Police (Adyar) arrived at the scene of occurrenceonly at 5.00 pm and therefore, by no stretch of imagination they canbe held to have had any role to play. As far as Mr.R.Thirugnanam,Deputy Commissioner of Police (Traffic-North) and Mr.K.Joshi NirmalKumar, Deputy Commissioner of Police (Traffic-South) are concerned,the learned senior counsel pointed out that they were actually incharge of traffic arrangements and therefore their presence did nothave anything to do with the incident of lathi charge, in as much asthey had no role to play on that aspect and that merely because theywere officers and they were present at the time of occurrence theycannot be roped in. The learned senior counsel also pointed out thatthere was no specific allegation against those officers as to anyspecific act of overt act on their part. According to the learnedsenior counsel, the test is as to whether any police officercommitted breach of statutory duty and even going by the stance ofthe Government, the officers whomsoever responsible alone should bepunished. 52. The learned senior counsel submitted that there wasabsolutely no basis for the allegation of conspiracy leveled againsteither the Commissioner of Police or other police officers. According to him, when the police officers carried out their dutiesout of necessity for maintaining any law and order situation andpublic tranquility they should be given full protection. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

53. The learned senior counsel by drawing the attention of thisCourt to various G.Os. and other steps taken by the Court includingarrangements made by the Security Committee headed by senior Judgesof this Court for the protection of the High Court premises and alsothe various criminal cases pending against various lawyers, numberingmore than 90 submitted that there was a real threat perception thatwas prevailing which reached its peak on 19.02.2009 and therefore thepresence of police in large number was necessitated inside thepremises. He also contended that the intelligence report alsoreminded of the serious threat perception prevailing and that thepolice acted based on such intelligence report and the same cannot befaulted on the footing that they did not obtain the prior permissionof the Registry. He also relied upon an earlier Division Benchdecision of this Court reported in (2007) 2 MLJ 1 (Madras High CourtAdvocates Association Vs State of Tamil Nadu) and the judgment of theHon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2003) 2 SCC 45 (Harish Uppal (Ex-Capt.) Vs. Union of India). He also made a reference to the incidentthat took place inside the Court Hall on 17.02.2009, when some 15advocates behaved in an unruly manner inside the Court Hall andcontend that such activities of the lawyers contributed more to thethreat perception for the police to act in the campus on 19.02.2009. By referring to the various incidents that took place in and aroundthe High Court campus at the instance of the lawyers, the learnedsenior counsel contended that the threat perception was very much inexistence for the police to act on 19.02.2009 and this Court shouldnot substitute its own opinion about the threat perception assessedby the police authorities. The learned senior counsel however cameforward to tender an unconditional apology on behalf of all thepolice officers for whatever happened on 19.02.2009. According tohim as there was no mala fide motive there would be no scope forproceeding against the police officers for contempt. He alsocontended that on a combined reading of Section 52 IPC and Section132 of Cr.P.C., it can be seen that unless there is want of goodfaith, the conduct of the police officers and other persons will notwarrant any action against them either by way of disciplinaryproceedings or by way of criminal proceedings or by way of contempt. According to him there was no reasonable ground for proceedingagainst them. The action of the police at best can be construed asan error of judgment and not an intentional onslaught unleashedagainst the lawyers as contended by the lawyers. The learned seniorcounsel strenuously contended that the attempt of the lawyers tobrand the police action on 19.02.2009, by calling it as an “OperationBlack Coat” has absolutely no basis and to call it the least it was abogus allegation. 54. The learned counsel also contended that in any event theincident that happened at 5.00 pm cannot be attributed to theCommissioner of Police and he cannot be proceeded against either byway of disciplinary action or for contempt. 55. The learned senior counsel contended that the Court canconsider payment of any ex gratia either by itself or by referring toa retired Judge of this Court to determine. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

56. The learned senior counsel strongly condemned the politicalparties attempting to use the High Court premises as their propagandaplatform and that the lawyers should not give scope for any one toenter the campus with that intent. According to him the root causefor all the problems was not the presence of the police inside thecampus but the political involvement of the lawyers and theiractivities inside the campus.57. The learned senior counsel also pointed out that the StateGovernment has taken the necessary initiative by appointing One ManCommittee headed by Dr.N.Sundaradevan, I.A.S., to enquire into thematter in order to ascertain as to any one responsible for the goryincident that took place on 19.02.2009 and that the lawyers cancooperate with the said Committee to pin down the person responsible.It was further contended that since as per the direction of thisCourt, the CBI has been entrusted with the task of investigation,this Court should permit such agency to carryout its task inaccordance with law and there cannot be any parallel enquiry by thisCourt in this proceeding. According to him what can be done by wayof judicial process cannot be done by way of pre-emptive measure,which will amount to anticipatory mala fides. The learned counseltherefore contended that there was no basis for placing the officersunder suspension and the suspension order by the Full Bench dated18.03.2009, should be withdrawn.58. The learned senior counsel submitted that if for any reasonthis Court concludes that initiation of contempt proceedings iswarranted, the same need not be ordered in as much as the respondentswhom he represent offer unconditional apology in advance and thattheir apology should be accepted and they should be relived.59. Mr.R.Muthukumarasamy, learned senior counsel representingthe High Court placed before this Court a report filed by theRegistrar General which states that due to the incident that occurredon 19.02.2009, extensive damage was caused to Court buildings andvehicles and that the Court proceedings were disrupted after 4.00 pmbecause of the gory incident, glass pieces were strewn all over thepremises and the damaged vehicles were parked in haphazard manner andtherefore the High Court and the Subordinate Courts inside the HighCourt campus remain closed initially on 20.02.2009 and thereafter on23.02.2009 and 24.02.2009. The Court campus was stated to have beensubsequently cleaned and the Courts in the State commencedfunctioning only on 25.02.2009, though the boycott by the advocatescontinued till 20.03.2009. In the said report the Registrar Generalhas also furnished the details about the compensation paid to thevehicle owners as well as for the personal injuries suffered by theadvocates and others apart from the medical expenses incurred for theinjured. Annexures 1 to 3 has also been filed along with the reportfurnishing the details of extent of damages caused to the vehiclesand the details of compensation awarded for personal injuries.60. The learned senior counsel by referring to Article 215 ofthe Constitution submitted that the power of the High Court is https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ plenary, as superior Court of Records. He also contended thatwhether or not grant of permission by the Registry is required forthe police to enter, the question is can the police exceed theirlimit inside the Court premises, which would call for any sternaction. The learned senior counsel referred to the decisions of theHon’ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1967 SC 1 (Naresh ShridharMirajkar Vs. State of Maharashtra) and AIR 1993 SC 1014(M.V.Elisabeth Vs. Harwan Investements and Trading Private Limited,Goa) in the course of his submissions.61. In their reply argument Mr.S.Prabarkaran and Mr.R.C.PaulKanagaraj contended that this Court should proceed against the policeofficers straightaway for contempt and impose punishment and nofurther opportunity should be extended to them. 62. Ms.R.Vaigai, in her reply submissions, by relying upon thedecision reported in 1898 ILR Mds 21 (Queen-Empress Vs. Subba Naikand Others) submitted that even prior to the coming into force of theConstitution, this Court has taken the view that whomsoeverparticipate in police excess either on their own volition or out oftheir official necessities, they are compositely responsible andshould be punished for their excess.63. The learned counsel pointed out that the various submissionsmade on behalf of the police officers only referred to the law andorder situation and there was no justifiable ground demonstrated forviolation of any public order in order to invoke Chapter X whichcontains Sections 129 to 136 of the Cr.P.C. warranting lathi chargeon the ground of unlawful assembly. In other words, the learnedcounsel would contend that mere law and order situation cannot be aground for ordering lathi charge and to justify lathi charge to quellthe mob, there should be public tranquility. The learned counsel byreferring to the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported inAIR 1966 SC 740 (Ram Manohar Lohia Vs. The State of Bihar) and 1970(3) SCC 746 (Madhu Limaye Vs. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr)contended that the police completely misdirected themselves in acircumstances where there was admittedly only law and order situationand not public disorder or a situation calling for such action on theground of safeguarding the sovereignty of the State. According tothe learned counsel there was total suppression of truth by thehighest functionaries of police and therefore, in order to hold aproper and fair enquiry, suspension of the police officials isimminent. According to her, the claim for ex gratia payment asclaimed in W.P.No.3705 of 2009 should be considered by this Court anddirect the State to order such payment.64. This proceedings including the various writ petitions andcriminal original petitions filed by the lawyers as well as party-in-persons, which stems from the suo motu writ petition initiated bythis Court cannot be strictly called as an adversarial litigation. Nevertheless, having regard to the magnitude of the occurrence thattook place on 19.02.2009, there were allegations and counterallegations at the instance of the lawyers on the one side and thepolice on the other side, which made the present proceeding appear as https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ though it was adversarial in nature. But in our considered opinion,this Court has to make all endeavors to actively steer for a searchin order to ascertain the truth in as much as, as against the rivalcontentions of the parties who appeared before us, this Court is ofthe view that the issue concerns the prestige/stature of theinstitution viz., judiciary and the steps to be taken in future toprotect the institution from any onslaught and thereby ensure thatthe confidence reposed in this institution by the public at large isnot in any way impaired. Therefore in our view, the whole proceedingis a blend of adversarial and inquisitorial in nature. We say so inas much as the adversarial system places a premium on the individualrights of the accused, whereas the inquisitorial system places therights of the accused secondary to the search for truth.65. With this prelude as to the approach to be made in thisproceeding, when we examine the various facts placed before us, wefind that we are obligated upon to examine the following issues forconsideration viz.,(i) Whether the premises of judicialinstitutions in particular the High Court campus iscomparable to the premises of the Parliament and theregulations providing immunity from any attack fromany quarters ?(ii) What was the root cause for the unsavoryincident that took place on 19.02.2009, inside theHigh Court campus and who was responsible for theghastly incident to take place on 19.02.2009 ?(iii) If so, who are the concerned persons tobe blamed ?(iv) If the responsibility can be fixed on anyparticular individual or officer what is theconsequential action to be taken?(v) Ghastly incident apart, what are the stepsto be taken in future to ensure that no suchincident recur again ?(vi) In the event of some one being heldresponsible for the ghastly incident that took placeon 19.02.2009, whether necessary contempt action iscalled for ?While examining the various contentions raised by the parties, as faras possible, we are taking into account the pleadings and thedocuments and other materials placed before us at the instance of theState and the Police Officers.QUESTION Nos.(i), (ii) and (iii) :- https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

66. Questions (i), (ii) & (iii) can be examined together. Forthat purpose, we have before us the affidavit of lawyers and thepolice officers. The sum and substance of the plea of the lawyers tobe briefly stated are that they were on boycott from 29.01.2009, tosupport the Sri Lankan Tamils (not the LTTE); that as part of theiragitation, they went on procession, fasting, etc., that there was anincident on 17.02.2009, inside the Court Hall No.3, in which oneDr.Subramaniam Swamy was manhandled and on whom eggs were thrown;that with reference to the said incident, a case was registeredagainst 15 advocates; that on 19.02.2009, at the instance of those 15advocates who have been arrayed as accused in a criminal caseregistered against them, Mr.Karuppan, led them to B-4 Police Stationaround 2.30 pm; that at their instance a counter case was registeredin Crime No.14 of 2009 as against Dr.Subramaniam Swamy under theScheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act;that the Advocate/Accused action who initially wanted to surrenderbefore the police on their own, later, after getting a copy of theFIR in Crime No.14 of 2009, resiled from their stand and were notinclined to surrender and subsequently, took the stand thatDr.Subramaniam Swamy should be arrested first if they were tosurrender. Mr.Karuppan expressing his inability to keep up his word,stated to have returned back the FIR copy of Crime No.14 of 2009 andwalked away.67. The VCD placed before the Court by Mr.A.K.Viswanathan,Additional Commissioner of Police, which is marked as CD-R2 revealsthat it was around 15.36 hours tense situation mounted near the B-4police station and it was at that point of time, the armed policemenwho were gathered in sufficient number at that spot pushed in someadvocates into the police van and after taking into custody of about15 lawyers, the police van left the campus. Closely thereafter,there was pelting of stones on either side which ended in a lathicharge by the police around 3.40 pm.68. Thereafter the advocates from two different directions wereposing a challenge to the police and the police repeated the lathicharge apart from beating the lawyers in single or in groups. Thevehicles parked inside the campus were also damaged by the policepersonnel. After 4.00 pm it looked as if it was a battleground in asmuch as the police were seen on a hitting spree as and when groups ofadvocates were posing a challenge to them from different directionsand in that process the police in fact entered the Small Causes Courtand the Library Section of the Law Association, Madras High CourtAdvocate Association and also the annexe building of the High Court. At one point of time such charging policemen were even seen near theHon'ble Chief Justice Chamber. 69. In the meantime, the Acting Chief Justice who was informedabout the lathi charge by the police around 3.40 pm tried to contactthe Commissioner of Police in order to remove the police personnelfrom the campus as the permission of the Court was not obtained bythe police in order to either make the arrest or take any otheraction under the guise of maintaining law and order. Though the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Commissioner of Police does not dispute the time of the Hon'bleActing Chief Justice directing him to meet him in his Chambers andstop the movement of police force inside the campus, took the standthat he was not able to meet the Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice andthat he withdrew the police only after 5.00 pm. After withdrawal ofthe police, B-4 police station was set on fire and some of theproperties were also burnt in the said fire which took place between5.00 to 5.30 pm, when the fire service personnel approached to putdown the fire, the same was resisted and once again the policeresorted to another lathi charge at 5.35 pm to quell the mob andthereafter the fire in the B-4 Police Station was put down. 70. The Commissioner of Police went to the Chambers of theHon'ble Acting Chief Justice along with the Chief Secretary, HomeSecretary and the Director General of Police. In the Chambers of theHon'ble Acting Chief Justice, a Full Bench was constituted and anorder came to be passed by initiating a suo motu writ proceedings inW.P.No.3335 of 2009. In the said order, after narrating briefly theincident and the havoc caused to the men and material, the Full Benchafter hearing the high level officers of the State namely the ChiefSecretary, the Home Secretary, the Director General of Police and theCommissioner of Police directed the matter to be entrusted with theCBI as agreed to by the Chief Secretary and the CBI was directed toregister a case treating the order passed by the Full Bench as FirstInformation Report.71. The report of the Registry disclose that in the lathi chargethat took place on 19.02.2009, as many as 95 advocates, 20 staff and24 others were injured, who suffered major as well as minor injuriesapart from the damages caused to 64 four wheelers, 67 two wheelers, 3bicycles including a Judges’ van parked inside the premises. Damageswere also caused to library books, bookracks and also a TV kept inthe Law Association of the Small Causes Court.72. When we examine the above narration of events and find outas to who ignited the spark, the direct information is available inthe affidavit of the jurisdictional Joint Commissioner of Police. Inhis affidavit dated 07.09.2009, he states that on 19.02.2009, healong with the Additional Commissioner of Police Mr.A.K.Viswanathanarranged for the bandobust in the High Court campus since there wasintelligence information that on that date Dr.Subramaniam Swamy whois scheduled to visit the High Court to attend as party-in-personbefore a Division Bench presided over by the Hon'ble Acting ChiefJustice as well as the Court presided over by Hon'ble Mr.JusticeS.Manikumar, there was likelihood of an attack on him. According tothe jurisdictional Joint Commissioner of Police, Dr.Subramaniam Swamyas scheduled came to the High Court, that the police bandobust wasneatly carried out and he also left the High Court campus by around11.30 am. The Joint Commissioner of Police is stated to havewithdrawn the additional police force to B-2 police station and wasinvolved in debriefing the force. At that point of time he wouldstate that Mr.Vijyandran one of the accused in the occurrence thattook place on 17.02.2009, in Court Hall No.3 approached him andwanted the list of names of other accused in order to enable them to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ surrender on their own. The jurisdictional Joint Commissioner ofPolice would claim that he wanted to make use of the voluntaryapproach made by that accused and furnished the list of names and toaccomplish their surrender, proceeded back to B-4 Police Stationlocated inside the High Court campus along with his force. In factthe approach was stated to have been made by Mr.Vijayendren at about12 noon. The rest of the incident about the group led by Mr.Karuppanand others was after 2.00 pm.73. When we examine those facts stated by the jurisdictionalJoint Commissioner, we feel that we should also keep in mind what wasthe stand of the jurisdictional Joint Commissioner of Police as wellas the Additional Commissioner of Police on this aspect. In theaffidavit of the Additional Commissioner of PoliceMr.A.K.Viswanathan, it is stated that he was also assigned the taskof bandobust to be provided to Dr.Subramaniam Swamy in the morningsession and that after Dr.Subramaniam Swamy left the High Courtpremises, he also left for his office at Egmore. That around 2.45 pmthe Commissioner of Police directed him to proceed to the High Courtand oversee the process of surrender of the accused involved in theoccurrence dated 17.02.2009. According to Mr.A.K.Viswanathan, he wasnot in favour of such a move of the surrender offered by theadvocates that too in the High Court premises, therefore he expressedhis viewpoint that it would not be prudent for the police to accepttheir offer of surrender at that point of time that too inside thepremises as it may ultimately result in very serious consequences. Mr.A.K.Viswanathan also stated in his affidavit that in spite of hisviewpoint expressed to the Commissioner of Police, the Commissionerof Police insisted that the process of surrender should be proceededwith and Mr.A.K.Viswanathan should remain in the High Court premisesalong with the jurisdictional Joint Commissioner. Mr.A.K.Viswanathanwould therefore state that the Commissioner of Police being hissuperior officer, he had to obey his command and therefore he waitedfor his further directions by remaining at B-2 police station andwent inside the High Campus through Esplanade entrance by around 3.45pm. He would further state that as directed by the Commissioner ofPolice, the first lathi charge took place around 3.56 pm and thesubsequent lathi charge also took place as directed by theCommissioner of Police. The jurisdictional Joint Commissioner ofPolice would state in his affidavit that after Mr.Karuppan expressedhis inability to surrender the accused advocates as promised, thepolice took into custody 15 persons without ascertaining as towhether they were the real accused in the occurrence that took placeon 17.02.2009, that since thereafter, there was a threat to the B-4police station, the police force continued to remain near the B-4police station and since the advocates mob went out of control, thejurisdictional Deputy Commissioner of Police Mr.Prem Anand Sinhaordered for lathi charge at around 3.55 pm. He would state thatsubsequently such lathi charge was repeated at 4.27 pm and it went ontill 5.00 pm, when the Commissioner of Police came to the spot andwithdrawn the police force to B-2 police station. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

74. The Commissioner of Police in his version would state thatafter receiving the information about the tension that mounted insidethe premises, he proceeded to the High Court from his Egmore Officeand that he could reach the B-2 Police Station only around 16.03hours and since he was also attending to the traffic congestion andgiving directions to other police personnel in the light of theAssembly Session in progress, he could reach the actual spot of theHigh Court only by 5.00 pm. Though he would say he was contacted bythe Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice who directed him to withdraw thepolice from the High Court campus, he could not enter the campusitself as the gates were all closed and he could enter only by 5.00pm through Esplanade gate. He would further state that after hereached the spot, he immediately gave directions to withdraw thepolice and that the lathi charge was ordered by the AdditionalCommissioner of Police Mr.A.K.Viswanathan in consultation with otherofficers viz., the Joint Commissioner of Police, the DeputyCommissioner of Police and others. 75. Apart from the above version about the incident, as far asthe necessity for mobilizing additional police force into the campuson 19.02.2009, is concerned, while the Additional Commissioner ofPolice would state that the same was necessitated initially toprovide bandobust to Dr.Subramaniam Swamy, the Commissioner of Policemobilized such additional force at different times, based on his ownassessment of the situation. 76. At this juncture, it will also be worthwhile to refer tostatutory documents namely the First Information Report (FIR) inCrime No.15 of 2009 dated 19.02.2009. The said FIR was registered at19.20 hours on 19.02.2009 and the complainant is the Inspector ofPolice of B-2 Police Station. The date of occurrence has been notedas 19.02.2009 and the duration was stated to be from 14.30 hours to18.00 hours. As per the said FIR registered with the B-4 policestation, the relevant facts that could be gathered are as under:(a) On 19.02.2009, armed police, commandoguards were drawn into the High Court campus alongwith higher officials and that the complainant wasalso present on security duty.(b) At the instance of the lawyers led byMr.Karuppan, Crime No.14 of 2009 was registeredunder Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Prevention ofAtrocity Act read with Section 506 (ii) IPC againstDr.Subramaniam Swamy and Radha Mohan.(c) After the registration and furnishing ofcopies of the FIR since the lawyers raised slogans,the police officials caught hold of 4 to 5 lawyersinvolved in the earlier case and put them in thepolice vehicle since they refused to surrender apartfrom using vulgar abuses towards the police. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (d) The lawyers who were assembled there peltedstones, shouted slogans and hurled uncultured anduncivilized abuses and retrieved those lawyers whowere put into the police van.(e) By the stone throwing of the lawyers, theSub-Inspector of Police, the Inspector of Police andmany male and female police personnel were injuredand one Police Head Constable fainted.(f) The lawyers around 150 in number continueto throw stones opposite the B-4 Police Station froma distance and caused damages to two wheelers andfour wheelers and the time was around 3.30 pm.(g) At that point of time, the DeputyCommissioner of Police (Flower Bazaar Range) aftergiving necessary warning to disperse, directed thepolice to fire teargas shells to disperse the crowdand that thereafter he also directed the lathicharge since the crowd did not disperse but continueto pelt stones.(h) Mr.Justice A.C.Arumugaperumal Adityan whocame to the spot was injured by a stone pelted bythe lawyers and he was put in a separate vehicle andsent to the hospital and the time was 4.30 pm.(i) At 4.30 pm the Commissioner of Police alsocame there and directed the policemen and higherofficials to return back to B-2 Police Station andthat he would inform the Hon’ble Chief Justice ofthe High Court about the incident. Accordingly allthe policemen went near the B-2 Esplanade PoliceStation.(j) Thereafter the lawyers who had formed anunlawful assembly set fire to the B-4 Police Stationand also to the Government properties namely twofour wheelers and five two wheelers parked in frontof the B-4 Police Station which were worth about 4to 5 lakhs. The police therefore entered the HighCourt premises once again for chasing the lawyerswith lathi and also by beating by way of selfdefence in which some of the lawyers and more than60 policemen and higher officials sustained bleedinginjuries. (k)Therefore the complainant wanted appropriateaction to be taken against Messers Karuppan,Rajanikant, Vijayendran, Pughazhendi and Jeyakumarwho were in the forefront of the disturbance as wellas the lawyers who accompanied them in the criminalact. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

77. The Commissioner of Police filed a report before the FullBench on 18.03.2009. In the said report, the Commissioner of Policehas stated that along with the jurisdictional Joint Commissioner ofPolice and the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner of Police, 147policemen including quick reaction team were mobilized in connectionwith the visit of Dr.Subramaniam Swamy; that at 11.30 am,Dr.Subramaniam Swamy left the Court premises; that after the policeforce moved to B-2 Police Station for debriefing; advocatesMr.Vijendran and Mr.Kunaraja approached the officer and asked for thelist of accused who were involved in the incident inside the CourtHall on 17.02.2009; that at 2.10 pm Messers Karuppan, Rajnikanth,Vijendran, Pughazhendi and Jayakumar along with large number ofadvocates went to the B-4 Police Station and insisted forregistration of a case against Dr.Subramaniam Swamy as a precondition for surrender; that at 2.30 pm, he had the information thattrouble was brewing, whereupon he sent the Additional Commissioner ofPolice Mr.A.K.Viswanathan along with the Joint Commissioner of Police(Central) and some other officers with reinforcement of 118 men andofficers in all 265 men and officers included special action groupwhich is part of the armed reserve police with special training. Healso stated that around 3.45 pm FIR copy was given to the advocateswho thereafter insisted for arrest of Dr.Subramaniam Swamy beforearresting them. Even Mr.Karrupan’s persuasion did not yield anyresult. Thereafter, the mob started pelting stones at the police inwhich some policemen were injured. 78. As per the report 15 advocates were apprehended and sent ina police van to Thousand Lights Police Station. In paragraph 16 ofthe said report, the Commissioner of Police would say that to protectthe life and property of the police personnel, the public and others,the Additional Commissioner of Police who was the senior most officerpresent at the spot after consulting the other senior officers took acollective decision to declare the assembly as unlawful and disperseit. Based on his directions, the Deputy Commissioner of Police(Flower Bazaar Range) took the measures to disperse the unlawfulassembly by using minimum force. This was stated to have taken placeat 4.00 pm. He also stated that some additional reinforcement alongwith Joint Commissioner of Police (South), Deputy Commissioners ofPolice from Adyar, Anna Nagar, T.Nagar and Mylapore were also rushedin to control the situation and the total strength was 291 men andofficers. He would further state that he was directed by the Hon’bleActing Chief Justice to withdraw the police and that he entered theHigh Court Police Station at around 5.00 pm and also went around theHigh Court campus to assess the situation and get first handinformation as to what happened in the High Court campus. Accordingto him, at around 5.30 pm the entire strength was withdrawn from theHigh Court premises to B-2 Esplanade Police Station.79. The Commissioner of Police in paragraph 19 of the saidreport would state that around 5.35 pm as the B-4 Police Station wasset on fire and the fire brigade was not allowed to put down thefire, as Commissioner of Police cum Additional District Magistrateand after consulting all the senior officers present on the spot, he https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ took the collective decision to disperse the unlawful assembly andafter the fire was put down, he withdrew the police force to theEsplanade Police Station. 80. He stated that he reached the Chambers of the Hon’ble ActingChief Justice at 6.40 pm along with the Director General of Police,Home Secretary and the Chief Secretary. According to him in theclash 120 police personnel including fire service personnel, oneHon’ble Judge, 77 advocates, 10 Court staff, 4 press persons, 3 lawstudents and 7 others were injured. Along with the report, theCommissioner of Police also produced the manpower chart showing thepresence of police strength in B-4 Police Station area on 19.02.2009,drawn at different times. He also produced the list of policeofficers present in the High Court between 3.00 pm and 5.00 pm.81. The Commissioner of Police addressed a letter to theRegistrar General of this Court on 17.02.2009, wherein, he afterreferring to the assault by a group of unruly advocates onDr.Subramaniam Swamy and other police personnel with eggs and handsinside the Court Hall, sought for the concurrence of the RegistrarGeneral to register a criminal case and set the criminal law inmotion, since the incident happened inside the High Court premises. In the said letter itself he has referred to a complaint already madeby the Assistant Commissioner of Police, High Court range.82. The Registrar General sent a reply dated 18.02.2009, statingas under:“I am to state that under law, the concurrenceof the Registry is required to register a criminalcase but police should do it on its own, in view ofthe fact that already a complaint is preferred byMr.M.P.R.Kader Mohideen, Asst. Commissioner ofPolice, High Court Range with the High Court PoliceStation.”There seems to be a typing mistake in the second sentence were theword ‘not’ after the expression ‘concurrence of the Registry is (not)required’ seems to have been omitted to be typed. 83. Therefore while the Commissioner of Police wanted theconcurrence to register a criminal case, the Registrar General madeit clear that the police should register the criminal case on its own.84. Keeping the above facts in mind when we find the answer forQuestion No.(ii), at the outset, we are of the view that the wholeghastly incident could have been avoided if the police personnelheaded by the Commissioner of Police had applied their prudence afterthoroughly analysing the various factors past as well as the presentthat happened upto that date. The conduct of the police personnel inhaving provided necessary bandobust in the light of appearance ofDr.Subramaniam Swamy in two different matters in the High Court on19.02.2009, cannot be faulted. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

85. It cannot be disputed that there was a high level of threatperception to Dr.Subramaniam Swamy and therefore it was the duty ofthe State police to ensure that no harm was caused to him at the timeof his visit to the High Court premises in connection with certainlitigations in which he was involved. In fact having regard to thehigh level bandobust arranged, Dr.Subramaniam Swamy could transacthis business and leave the Court campus at 11.30 am without anyhindrance. After he left, the jurisdictional Joint Commissioner ofPolice also withdrew the extra police force drawn for that purpose toB-2 Police Station for debriefing. 86. The whole trouble started when two advocates by nameMr.Vijendran and Mr.Kunaraja approached the Joint Commissioner ofPolice and stated that 15 advocates who were involved in the incidenton 17.02.2009, inside the 3rd Court Hall wanted to surrender. Thoughthe Commissioner of Police in his letter dated 17.02.2009, statedthat since the incident on 17.02.2009, happened inside the High Courtpremises, he needed the concurrence of the Registry even to registera criminal case in order to set the criminal law in motion, we wonderhow having regard to the background of the accused involved in thesaid incident dated 17.02.2009, any prudent officer at the level ofthe Commissioner of Police could have been lured by the offer ofvoluntary surrender and that too in a smooth manner making it sovery easy for the police personnel to take them into custody.Moreover, after the boycott which commenced on 29.01.2009, theadvocates started attending Courts only from 19.02.2009. In factduring the course of the boycott between 29.01.2009 and 18.02.2009,there were number of incidents which had taken place outside theCourt campus in which a Cycle shop in Broadway was looted, aTransport Corporation vehicle was hijacked and when some advocateswere arrested, hue and cry was made relating to their remand. In allthose cases, some of the accused amongst the 15 advocates who wereinvolved in the incident dated 17.02.2009, were also arrayed asaccused.87. The Commissioner of Police himself in his affidavits dated07.09.2009, 09.09.2009, 18.09.2009 and the report dated 18.03.2009,has descriptively stated the various alleged activities of group oflawyers which caused concern. In such a situation as the head of thepolice force of the city of Chennai when one of his immediatesubordinate officers namely Additional Commissioner of Police isstated to have suggested to him as has been stated in his affidavitdated 27.08.2009, that it was not prudent to arrest the advocates inthe High Court Police Station as it would create problems, it wasquite strange that the Commissioner of Police ignored such a notableadvice of an officer no less than in the position of AdditionalCommissioner of Police and proceed to state that when the advocateswanted to surrender, such surrender should be allowed to take placeby mobilizing the police strength to 291 which included special taskforce and armed police personnel. There is no reason why thestatement of the Additional Commissioner of Police that it is notadvisable to attempt the process of surrender inside the High Courtpremises should not be accepted as true. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

88. It is not the case of the Commissioner of Police that theAdditional Commissioner of Police had an axe to grind and that hewanted to let down the Commissioner of Police by spinning such astory. In fact when the Commissioner of Police directed him around14.45 hours to proceed to Esplanade Police Station and monitor thesurrender of advocates in the High Court police station, heimmediately proceeded to the Esplanade Police Station and thereafterwent to B-4 Police Station situated inside the High Court campus. The point for consideration is that when at least one of the highlevel officers could visualize the magnitude of the problem that maycrop up while allowing the surrender to take place on the date whenthe advocates have withdrawn the boycott and the advocates startedattending the Court proceedings in full strength, the Commissioner ofPolice could have ignored his view point. The claim of theAdditional Commissioner of Police that he did advise the Commissionerof Police not to go ahead with the surrender by the advocates insidethe High Court premises in the background of the situation that wasprevailing prior to 19.02.2009, would have been the proper advice ofany normal thinking person and more so in the case of a high rankingpolice officer at the level of Additional Commissioner of Police. Inthe counter affidavit filed by the Commissioner of Police himselfdated 09.09.2009, no where he has alleged any sort of animosity orany difference of opinion that existed between him and the AdditionalCommissioner of Police in order to state that with a view to wreckvengeance on the Commissioner of Police, the Additional Commissionerof Police came forward with such a version in his affidavit in orderto shirk his responsibilities and that such a suggestion neveremanated from him on the fateful day.89. A perusal of the affidavit of the Additional Commissioner ofPolice Mr.A.K.Viswanathan dated 27.08.2009, discloses that though hetold the Commissioner of Police that after the arrest of the 15advocates and taken to the Thousand Lights Police Station, it wouldatleast then be prudent to withdraw the entire police force from theHigh Court premises, the Commissioner of Police is stated to haveinsisted that the entire force should remain in the premises andprotect the B-4 Police Station. In paragraph 11 of the saidaffidavit, he has stated that apart from him, the jurisdictionalJoint Commissioner of Police and the Central Zone Joint Commissionerof Police also wanted to withdraw all the police from the High Courtcampus but at the insistence of the Commissioner of Police, theentire force had to remain inside the High Court campus. He wouldfurther state that by around 16.00 hours, the Commissioner of Policereached the Esplanade Police Station and since the trouble wasmounting in the High Court premises, the police force were chasingthe advocates and therefore he contacted the Commissioner of Policefor withdrawing the force to which also he did not agree on theground that the police station should be protected.90. According to him the Commissioner of Police came inside theHigh Court premises with additional force numbering more than 100 andthereafter as per his orders teargas was fired for the first time atabout 16.45 hours followed by a lathi charge. He would then state https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ that only at about 17.15 hours, the Commissioner of Police orderedfor withdrawal of the police force near the fire station, which isalso inside the High Court campus and thereafter at about 17.45hours, the High Court Police Station was set on fire. TheCommissioner of Police stated to have ordered fresh lathi chargeagain at that point of time. The Additional Commissioner of Policetherefore stated that the Commissioner of Police was commanding theentire operation inside the High Court premises on 19.02.2009.91. A counter affidavit was filed by the Commissioner of Policeon 09.09.2009 to the affidavit of Mr.A.K.Viswanathan. In the saidaffidavit, the Commissioner of Police was only attempting to throwthe entire blame on the Additional Commissioner of PoliceMr.A.K.Viswanathan. As far as the police presence upto the stagewhen Dr.Subramaniam Swamy left the High Court premises is concerned,there is no contradiction. The Commissioner of Police however denythe statement of Mr.A.K.Viswanathan that he was contacted at 1.00 pmor that he voiced his concern about the process of arrest of thoseadvocates who wanted to surrender. The Commissioner of Policehowever confirmed that at about 14.15 hours when he was informedabout the arrival of advocates to surrender at B-4 police station, hedirected Mr.A.K.Viswanathan to proceed to B-4 Police Station tomonitor the surrender. He was also stated to have subsequentlyinstructed Mr.A.K.Viswanathan at about 14.45 hours to ensure peacefulsurrender of advocates on account of their new demand of arrest ofDr.Subramaniam Swamy as a precondition. The Commissioner of Policetherefore would state that Mr.A.K.Viswanathan as AdditionalCommissioner of Police was in command from 15.30 hours onwards whenthe pressure mounted inside the High Court premises at B-4 PoliceStation which led to lathi charge around 16.00 hours. According tothe Commissioner of Police when the accused advocates who were to bearrested by virtue of registration of a criminal case in Crime No.13of 2009, for the eggs thrown and assault incident that took place on17.02.2009, it was well within the powers of the jurisdictional JointCommissioner of Police to accept the offer of surrender of advocatesand therefore there was nothing wrong in the police force remaininginside the High Court campus and ensure their arrest.92. When the above sequence of events narrated by theCommissioner of Police and the Additional Commissioner of Police aswell as that of the jurisdictional Joint Commissioner of Police areanalyzed, it is clear that while the Additional Commissioner ofPolice would contend that the acceptance of surrender of advocatesand their arrest inside the High Court campus was not a prudent stepand that keeping the police force in large numbers in pursuance ofsuch arrest was also an imprudent act, the tone and tenor of thestand of the Commissioner of Police in the various affidavits swornto by him does not reflect such a thinking. On the other hand thefirm stand of the Commissioner of Police right through was what comemay being an accused in a crime, when the accused advocates cameforward to surrender on their own, irrespective of other consequencethat may erupt in the High Court campus, the police should proceedwith its determination to accept their offer of surrender and nobodycan find fault with such a step. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

93. It is quite amazing to hear such a stand of the Commissionerof Police whom according to the learned senior counsel Dr.RajeevDhavan is a recipient of a gold medal in his service and that he ispresently doing his Doctorate in one of the subjects connected withpolice administration. If an immediate subordinate officer at thelevel of Additional Commissioner of Police could think in a prudentway not to entertain the surrender offered by the advocates which inhis opinion was a design to create a problem inside the High Courtpremises, we are at a loss to understand how a police officer of sucha calibre as that of the Commissioner of Police was not able torealize the game plan and succumb to such a move, which had resultedin a very costly havoc and has made an indelible black mark in thehistory of Judiciary which can never be condoned irrespective of asto whomsoever or at whose instance such a situation came to becreated. It cannot be said that an officer at the level of aCommissioner of Police could not have visualized or anticipated asituation of the magnitude to which the issue would have blown upwhen somebody offered to surrender themselves against whom there werecases pending for serious offences of even Section 307 IPC right fromthe year 2001 onwards. In fact in the documents filed at theinstance of the police as found in Respondent Volume II at pages 167to 259, the various criminal cases registered with different policestation between the years 2001 to 2009, where all cases in which theaccused were advocates. The said statement discloses that there were13 cases against Mr.Vijendran, 7 cases against Pughazhendi, 7 casesagainst Mr.R.Karuppan, 5 cases against Sengodi and 17 cases againstMr.Rajani S/o Vijayakumar. Of those cases there were cases in whichcharges were leveled under Sections 147, 323, 506 (ii) and even 307IPC. When such overwhelming documents disclose the pending criminalcases against some of the accused of 17.02.2009 incident, it isstrange that the Commissioner of Police could not even visualize oranticipate any grave consequence while accepting the offer ofsurrender by accused advocates at B-4 police station. We areconvinced that the Additional Commissioner of PoliceMr.A.K.Viswanathan's stand that he advised the Commissioner of Policenot to entertain the surrender inside the High Court Police Stationwould have been true and we have to state that at least such anadvice of his immediate junior officer should have prompted theCommissioner of Police not to venture any attempt to accede to theoffer of surrender by the accused themselves in the campus of apremier institution of the State namely the High Court. It was veryunfortunate that the Commissioner of Police, who is stated to be of avery high calibre to have taken such a foolhardy (recklessly harsh)step and thereby brought (with utmost hesitation to state) a lifelongshame to a prestigious institution namely the High Court and theJUDICIARY, which is the last resort for any common man to seekjustice.94. The Commissioner of Police relied upon the letter of theRegistrar General dated 18.02.2009, to contend that the police wasgiven a free hand to deal with the accused involved in the occurrenceinside the 3rd Court Hall on 17.02.2009. In fact what all theRegistrar General has communicated to the Commissioner of Police in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the said letter was that the concurrence of the Registry was notrequired to register a criminal case but the police should act on itsown, in as much as, a complaint has already been preferred. TheRegistrar General on behalf of the High Court never gave a free handto the Commissioner of Police to behave in the manner in which heallowed his men to ransack the whole premises and to state that hewas only carrying out his duties as a police officer in the matter ofarrest of certain accused who came forward to surrender whichopportunity the police wanted to grab, taking the letter of theRegistry as a licence to indulge in such an unpardonable exercisewhich has brought a grave disrepute to an institution which hasnurtured its reputation for over more than one and half century. 95. Considering the status and position held by the Commissionerof Police as head of the police institution of the city of Chennai,we are not impressed with the stand taken by him that though he wasduly informed of the offer of certain accused to surrender who areadvocates and who were involved in a nasty incident which occurred on17.02.2009, inside the High Court premises but yet he did not botherto handle the issue directly by making himself available on the spotand without due consultation with the Registry of this Court. 96. Going by the statement of the jurisdiction JointCommissioner of Police, by around 12.00 noon, the offer of surrendercame to be made by two of the accused advocates. If really theCommissioner of Police had real concern any one would expect him torush to the spot at the earliest point of time and deal with theissue directly without giving scope for anybody else to mishandle itand thereby not only bringing disrepute to his institution but alsoallow the course of action to result in an unsavory situation on apremier Institution viz., the HIGH COURT and making an indelible markof disrespect for an indefinite period to come. 97. In the various affidavits the Commissioner of Police himselfhas made it clear that he was cautious enough to draw more forceapart from stating that there is a customary practice for the forceto allow for wait and watch period including debriefing. It is quiteapparent that the Commissioner of Police was alive to the gravity ofthe issue and the attempt of the accused advocates in offeringthemselves to surrender but yet he would state as though thesituation could be dealt with as if it were like any other normalsituation where any accused would have offered to surrenderthemselves. It is very hard to believe such a stand taken by theCommissioner of Police whose calibre, the learned senior counselwould boast upon having regard to his bright career growth all along.Moreover the stand of the Commissioner of Police in stating thatinstead of reacting to the offer of surrender by making himselfpresent on the spot and deal with it directly, by his own conduct hehas shown that he wanted the jurisdictional Joint Commissioner ofPolice, Additional Commissioner of Police and the jurisdictionalDeputy Commissioner of Police to handle along with all other officersnumbering not less than 16, among whom there were two AdditionalCommissioner of Police, three Joint Commissioner of Police, 8 DeputyCommissioner of Police and two Additional Deputy Commissioner of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Police, who were drawn into the High Court campus and to remainpresent between 3.00 pm to 5.00 pm and as Commissioner of Policewanted to control the situation by remote control. The Commissionerof Police himself has furnished the above particulars along with hisreport dated 18.03.2009, wherein according to his own statement at9.00 am 147 policemen were brought in, which force was reinforcedwith another 118 policemen at 2.30 pm and a further reinforcement ofofficers and personnel to the tune of 26 was added at around 4.50 pm.Therefore as between 3.00 pm to 5.30 pm as many as 292 policepersonnel consisting of officers and policemen were drawn apart from130 personnel who were available on duty attached with B-4 PoliceStation, in all an unusual strength of 421 policemen were drawn intothe High Court campus solely at the instance of the Commissioner ofPolice but yet he would state that he left his office at Egmore at3.52 pm, which enabled him to reach the B-4 Police Station only at5.00 pm.98. Further in the affidavit dated 07.09.2009, in paragraph 24,the Commissioner of Police has referred to seven instances whichaccording to him were pressing issues that constrained the policepersonnel and the officers to remain in the High Court premises. Thesaid issues were:(a) The incident that took place on 04.02.2009,with arrest of some advocates resulted in group ofother advocates preventing the police from dischargingtheir duty.(b) The advocates choose to surrender when theHigh Court campus was buzzing with activities and thepolice could ill afford another violent attack byadvocates in or around the High Court campus as thethreat to the lives of huge number of other people.(c) The advocates who had attacked an AssistantCommissioner of Police and Dr.Subramaniam Swamy insidethe 3rd Court Hall would not hesitate to indulge inviolence though they were inside the High Courtcampus. (d) Some of those advocates had already assaultedthe Inspector of Police, B-4 Police Station by hittinghis leg with an iron door.(e) The advocates had already damaged a DoorFrame Metal Detector erected in the High Courtpremises as a security measure and therefore theywould not hesitate to damage any other public propertyand it was essential to ensure that the heritagestructure of the High Court remains unscathed.(f) The advocates who offered to surrenderincluded persons who had several criminal casespending against them for grave criminal offences such https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ as rioting with deadly weapons, attempt to murder,criminal intimidation, causing hurt, wrongfulrestraint, assault on public servant discharging hisduty, negligent conduct with respect to fire anddestruction of public property and therefore thepolice could not afford similar violent conduct insidethe High Court campus.99. Though everyone of the above instances stated by theCommissioner of Police and his perception in that background cannotbe belittled, it is unfortunate that instead of taking a decisionwhich would have enabled the police to achieve the objective heproceeded to take, the decision which totally destroyed the purposesought to be achieved was taken and implemented to its full extent.Moreover, it was not as if that consequence which had ultimatelyresulted due to the lathi charge could not have been anticipated atall. On the other hand, at least two of the officers namely theAdditional Commissioner of Police and the Joint Commissioner ofPolice (Central) stated to have felt that it was not prudent toaccede to the request for surrender inside the High Court campus asthat would create lot of complications. At least one amongst themnamely the Additional Commissioner of Police, Mr.A.K.Viswanathan hasstated in more than one place in his affidavit that he did cautionthe Commissioner of Police about the imprudent step being taken byaccepting the offer of surrender and proceed with the arrest whichadvice was thrown to the winds by the Commissioner of Police forreasons best known to him.100. It was a pity that while according to the Commissioner ofPolice the threat was to the lives of huge number of people and theHigh Court was bustling with activities since the advocates startedattending Courts after withdrawing the boycott on 19.02.2009, insteadof allowing such activities to remain without any disturbance, theact of the police themselves in having chosen to allow the process ofsurrender of accused to take place in a more vulnerable situationthat too by gathering nearly 421 policemen, the Commissioner ofPolice has miserably failed in his responsibilities and duty toprotect the interest of public and instead made himself responsiblefor the most imprudent act of creating a situation of lawlessnesswhich ultimately resulted in very ghastly incident to take placeinside the High Court premises and thereby creating a blot on theinstitution namely the Judiciary. We therefore hold that the rootcause for the unsavoury incident that took place on 19.02.2009, wasthe promptitude of the accused Advocates led by Mr.R.Karuppan whooffered to surrender themselves. We further hold that by theimprudent act of the police in having encouraged the offer ofsurrender to take place insider the High Court campus, the high levelpolice officers, namely, the Commissioner of Police, the AdditionalCommissioner of Police, the jurisdictional Joint Commissioner ofPolice and the jurisdiction Deputy Commissioner of Police, sowed theseed for the ghastly incident. As far as Question No.(i) isconcerned, though as claimed by Ms.R.Vaigai that the Judiciary isalso entitled for the extent of immunity i.e. Available to theParliament cannot be accepted, in the same breath, it will have to be https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ stated that Judiciary as a constitutional machinery is entitled forhigher amount of protection and safety and therefore the other wingsof the State have to display utmost restraint while carrying outtheir operations inside the premises of the institution.Consequently when such other institution like police or executivewant to deal with the said institution, they are bound to getnecessary instructions and if necessary permission for carrying outany of their activities which would otherwise cause prejudice to theinstitution. We answer the Question Nos.(i), (ii) & (iii) as above.We however hold that the allegation of the lawyers that there was aconspiracy under the brand name of "Operation Black Coat" is not madeout. QUESTION No.(iv) :-101. It will have to be made clear that while deliberating onthis issue, this Court is not really concerned with the grievance ofany particular class of people. As rightly pointed out byMs.R.Vaigai, learned counsel representing the lawyers, the onslaughton 19.02.2009, was on the institution namely the 'JUDICIARY'irrespective of whatever grievance that existed between the police onthe one side and the lawyers on the other side.102. When we examine the aftermath of the incident, the reportof the Registrar General discloses that due to the incident thatoccurred on 19.02.2009, the Court proceedings after 4.00 pm wasdisrupted and heavy debris including glass pieces found strewn allover which had to be cleaned to ensure public safety. The damagedvehicles were lying in a haphazard manner. The High Court and theSubordinate Courts in the campus remained closed on 20.02.2009 andthereafter on 23.02.2009 and 24.02.2009 and all the Courts in theState commenced functioning only from 25.02.2009. The City CivilCourt and the Court of Small Causes and the other Courts located inthose buildings started functioning only from 02.03.2009. Remandorders were passed by the respective Judicial Magistrates by visitingthe prisons as the police refused to enter the Court premises. Theinspection carried out by the Committee and the Sub-Committeeconstituted by the Full Bench revealed damages to 131 vehicles and139 persons most of whom were lawyers had suffered injuries. Thedamages caused to the High Court building, City Civil Court buildingand Court of Small Causes building is stated to be in the order ofRs.6,39,460/-. The injured persons were disbursed with a sum ofRs.20,92,768/- towards medical expenses and compensation apart from asum of Rs.10,79,497/- and Rs.1,18,330/- paid to M/s Appolo Hospitaland Life Line Hospital. A sum of Rs.10,60,333/- was stated to havebeen disbursed to the owners of 55 four wheelers and 63 two wheelersand three bicycles. 103. It can be stated with authority that in the history ofjudicial functioning, such a disruption of Court proceedings to themagnitude to which it had taken place consequent to the ghastlyincident that happened on 19.02.2009, had not occured. The factum ofnon-functioning of the whole of judicial institutions throughout theState for at least three days only mean that the judiciary wasparalyzed and was made immobile for no fault of it. Due to the non- https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ functioning of the judicial forum and thereby depriving of any commonman to have access to the judicial institutions for redressal of hisgrievance, to be stated in the most humble manner was that thejudiciary impliedly expressed its helplessness to extend its helpinghand to any one who was really in need of judicial interventionseeking justice. Therefore, when the consequence that resulted byvirtue of the occurrence that took place on 19.02.2009 is examined,there can be no two opinion that whomsoever was responsible forcreating such a situation cannot be dealt with lightly or anyleniency can be shown to such person/persons as otherwise it wouldonly give a wrong signal that one can carryout any unsavouryoperation of very high magnitude unmindful of the consequences andcan get away with it by shifting the responsibility on others or byreferring to very many circumstances as the cause for such ghastlyincident. 104. The highest judicial forum of this State in whose premisessuch a ghastly incident was allowed to take place cannot be lightlyignored or dealt with, as it will not be in the interest of public atlarge to allow any one who dealt with the INSTITUTION in such a lighthearted manner. In our considered opinion, unless very drastic anddeterrent action is taken on the persons responsible for theoccurrence that took place on 19.02.2009, the public faith on theinstitution would be totally eroded and if the institution fails todeal with such persons firmly or fails to deal with them in theappropriate manner, it would completely shake the confidence of thecommon man who seek reccour for all their other grievances in thenormal day to day life.105. In the above stated background, we are constrained to statethat this Court has no hesitation to hold that the Commissioner ofPolice Mr.K.Radhakrishnan, is primarily responsible while theresponsibility of other high ranking officers namely the AdditionalCommissioner of Police Mr.A.K.Viswanathan, the jurisdictional JointCommissioner of Police Mr.M.Ramasubramni and the jurisdictionalDeputy Commissioner of Police Mr.Prem Anand Sinha were all equallyculpable for the gory incident which gripped the High Court premiseson 19.02.2009, at least between 12.00 noon and around 6.30 pm, aswell as on the subsequent dates namely when the High Court did notfunction on 20.02.2009, 23.02.2009 and 24.02.2009 and when theSubordinate Courts inside the High Court campus did not function on20.02.2009 and 23.02.2009 to 27.02.2009.106. As far as the Additional Commissioner of PoliceMr.A.K.Viswanathan is concerned, though we are inclined to agree withhis stand that he did advise the Commissioner of Police not to acceptthe surrendering process offered by the accused advocates, as thatwould create a serious complication, as rightly pointed out by theCommissioner of Police in his counter affidavit, there was no reasonwhy he failed to stop that imprudent move to take place. In thecounter affidavit of the Commissioner of Police dated 09.09.2009,which he filed in response to the affidavit of Mr.A.K.Viswanathandated 27.08.2009, in paragraph 9 the Commissioner of Police hasstated as under https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ “9. I submit that the assertion at para-10 thatMr.A.K.Viswanathan called me over the phone andsuggested that it was “prudent” to withdraw the forceand that I insisted that the force remain, isincorrect. No such telephonic conservation tookplace. As he was the highest ranking officer of therank of Inspector General of Police and the ChiefOperating Officer of the law and order machinery (thatit why he is designated as Additional Commissioner ofPolice, Law & Order), present in the spot he couldhave withdrawn the force, if he had thought that itwas prudent to withdraw. Withdrawal of a force from aserious law and order situation is a tactical decisionwhich can be taken only by an officer present in thespot and handling the situation and no other officer,however great he may be, sitting at a different placecannot give orders through remote control. He neededno direction from anybody, as he was the best judge inthe actual field witnessing the events personally. His further assertion at para 11 that the otherofficers present also wanted to withdraw the forcewithin the premises is, as far as I know, notcorrect. Further at no point of time neitherMr.A.K.Viswanathan nor any other officer had expressedany desire for the force to withdraw, which theythemselves were competent to do so as being seniorsupervisory officers present on the spot witnessingthe events and were hence the best judges of policeaction to be taken as of on that day.” (Emphasisadded)107. We fully concur with the stand of the Commissioner ofPolice on the lines stated above as regards the power of theAdditional Commissioner of Police who was the next highest levelofficer who was actually monitoring the whole operation inside theHigh Court premises. He cannot he heard to say that when theCommissioner of Police was the highest authority and as a less higherauthority he can remain as a silent spectator when the ghastlyincident was taking place which could have been controlled and thatfearing the command of the highest officer, he allowed the ghastlyincident to develop on the ground that he is merely a subordinate tothe Commissioner of Police. Such a stand at the instance of theAdditional Commissioner of Police can never be expected of oraccepted for mere statement. We can only call such a stand of theAdditional Commissioner of Police as a feeble attempt to shirk hisresponsibility reposed in him as an officer at the level ofAdditional Commissioner of Police. We are not therefore inclined toaccept the stand of the Additional Commissioner of Police in tryingto throw the entire blame on the Commissioner of Police and therebyescape from his responsibilities. Therefore, we have no hesitationto hold that he is also equally responsible along with theCommissioner of Police. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

108. Ms.Vaigai, the learned counsel representing the lawyers referred to a decision reported in 1898 ILR (Mad) 21 (Queen-EmpressVs. Subba Naik and Others). That was a judgment of pre-independenceperiod. However, we find the ratio of the said decision applicablefor all times to come. That was a case where there was a disputebetween two co-widows about the enjoyment of certain field. Two ofthe witnesses along with their coolies went to the field in questionand started harvesting the crops on behalf of the junior widow statedto have been sown by the senior widow. After harvesting of the cropsstarted, the prisoners who were Station House Officer and constablesand a private watcher appeared on the scene armed with guns. Thefirst prisoner ordered the reapers to desist, which was resisted. The coolies however continued with the harvesting operation.Thereafter, at the instance of the first prisoner one of theconstables fired in the air. Some of the coolies ran away while therest of the coolies continued with the harvesting operation. Therewas a second order for shoot by the first prisoner, which was obeyedby the second prisoner and one Sankaralingam was mortally wounded. The other prisoner knocked down one of the witnesses with stick andstabbed him with a weapon and injuries were however not serious. Prosecution case was that the deceased attempted to persuade thecoolies not to stop the harvesting which was the reason for thesecond prisoner to shoot him. In the above stated background theCourt held as under at page 251 :”We are of the opinion that the accused policeofficers cannot shield themselves on the plea thatthey were acting in good faith, for nothing is saidto be done in good faith which is one without duecare and attention, and we are of the opinion thatneither the first nor the second accused believedthat it was necessary for the public security todisperse such an assembly by firing on them.”The Court went on to state again:“The decree of force which may be lawfully used inthe suppression of an unlawful assembly depends onthe nature of such assembly, for the force usedmust always be moderated and proportioned to thecircumstances of the case and to the end to beobtained. (Lord Bowen’s Report on the Colliers”Strikes and Riot, --1893.)”Ultimately the Court held:“We are of the opinion that the second accused isnot protected in that he obeyed the orders of hissuperior officer. The command of the headconstable cannot of itself justify his subordinatein firing if the command was illegal, for he andthe head constable had the same opportunity ofobserving what the danger was, and judging what https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ action the necessities of the case required. Weare of opinion that the order the second accusedobeyed was manifestly illegal, and the secondaccused must suffer the consequence of his illegalact…..” (Emphasis added)109. When we come to the role played by the jurisdictional JointCommissioner of Police Mr.M.Ramasubramani, who is also an IPS officerand who was really responsible for the root cause for the incident toget triggered of at 12.00 noon and to its ultimate conclusion around6.30 pm. He was on the spot right from 9.00 am onwards. It was heto whom the two advocates of whom one had already been arrayed asaccused in the 17.02.2009, incident namely Mr.Vijendran approachedand expressed the desire of 15 accused advocates to surrender and hewanted the names of all of them. It is really not understandable howan IPS officer of his experience was not able to assess the realsituation, who has been working in the field and to state that hediscussed with the advocates and furnished the list and then insteadof proceeding with the debriefing at B-2 Police Station took theentire force into the High Court campus i.e. to the B-4 PoliceStation and indulged in heated dialogue with the accused advocateswho approached under the leadership of Mr.R.Karuppan. At least whenthe situation was taking a different shape, namely that while in thebeginning, the representation of the accused advocates were that theywanted to merely surrender, at the B-4 Police Station they shiftedtheir stand by insisting for registration of a criminal case asagainst Dr.Subramaniam Swamy, it is quite strange that thejurisdictional Joint Commissioner did not even think that thesituation was slipping out of his control and having regard to thevulnerable atmosphere in which the whole incident was taking place,prudence demanded a different step and avoid any clash inside thepremises. Instead, a perusal of his affidavit discloses thataccording to him had he abstained from arresting the surrenderingadvocates, he would not only be accused of dereliction of duty butwould have invited criticism from all quarters. Such a statement hasbeen made in the affidavit after stating in unambiguous terms thattension was brewing and that oral abuses were being made against thepolice. When ultimately at the end, the jurisdictional DeputyCommissioner of Police Mr.Prem Anand Sinha declared the assembly asunlawful and ordered a lathi charge. At least in paragraph 20 of theaffidavit the Joint Commissioner of Police would state that he wasendeavoring to place before this Court the totality of the eventswhich was brought about by a minuscule group of advocates whom thepeace loving majority advocates failed to contain. It is also statedthat he was also aware of the names of all the advocates who threwstones at the police and kept on provoking the police with obscenewords and gestures, but he was not inclined to disclose their namesin order to save them from embarrassment.110. Such a statement of the jurisdictional Joint Commissionerof Police makes a poor reading of his application of his sense ofdiscretion while handling a situation, which was not conducive tocontain. In paragraph 25 of his affidavit dated 07.09.2009, he wouldstate that the act of lathi charge held on 19.02.2009, cannot be https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ examined minutely in order to find out its justification or otherwiseand that for the excesses committed by individual policemen, hecannot be vicariously held liable and that such individuals can beproceeded against in accordance with law.111. Again in paragraph 28, he would categorically state thatbeing a subordinate officer to the Additional Commissioner of Policeand Commissioner of Police in the Chennai City Police hierarchy andin the presence of senior officers, he was not in a position to takea decision on his own. As in the case of the Additional Commissionerof Police, the jurisdictional Joint Commissioner of Police was alsoattempting to wriggle out of the situation in which he is placed. 112. As stated by us earlier, first and foremost, asjurisdictional Joint Commissioner of Police, he should have thecourage to own his responsibility for whatever that happened on19.02.2009. His stand that he was subordinate to the AdditionalCommissioner of Police and Commissioner of Police cannot be accepted,in as much as, being an IPS officer and at the level of JointCommissioner of Police, it was never expected of an officer of hislevel to make any attempt to get rid of the situation by attemptingto throw the responsibility on his higher authorities. Like that ofthe Additional Commissioner of Police, as Joint Commissioner ofPolice of the concerned jurisdiction, it was his responsibility tohave appraised the Commissioner of Police and insisted for notproceeding with the arrest and avoided any mishap from taking placeinside the High Court premises. The sensitivity of which premiseswas very well known to him as could be seen from his own assessmentof the nature of activities being carried on. Therefore it is toolate in the day for the jurisdiction Joint Commissioner of PoliceMr.M.Ramasubramani to merely come forward with an offer of apology inorder to relieve him of his responsibility. Having regard to themagnitude of the havoc caused which we have elaborately stated in theprevious paragraphs and the onerous responsibilities reposed in thesaid officer as jurisdictional Joint Commissioner of Police, we holdthat he was also equally responsible for the occurrence that tookplace on 19.02.2009, as well as the subsequent events whichimmobilized the functioning of the Courts both in the High Court andthe Subordinate Courts.113. As far as the jurisdiction Deputy Commissioner of PoliceMr.Prem Anand Sinha is concerned, he is also an IPS officer like thatof the jurisdiction Joint Commissioner of Police. He was alsopresent and was participating in the occurrence right from thebeginning till its end. In fact the Commissioner of Police, theAdditional Commissioner of Police and the Joint Commissioner ofPolice have stated in unambiguous terms that it was he who declaredthe mob as unlawful assembly and also ordered for lathi charge. Whenaccording to the Commissioner of Police, Additional Commissioner ofPolice and jurisdictional Joint Commissioner of Police, his decisionto declare the mob as unlawful assembly was left with him, as aresponsible IPS officer he ought to have taken the decision on hisown instead of meekly surrendering his powers and jurisdiction to hishigher authorities and by ordering a lathi charge. Being an IPS https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ officer who occupy a very high status in the police force and beforebeing actually assigned with any field work are imparted withintensive training for considerable years, the jurisdictional DeputyCommissioner of Police ought to have assessed the situation, theplace, the consequence that would arise, the historical background ofthe parties who were involved in the offence while taking a decision.Though he may be 4th in rank in the hierarchy, after the Commissionerof Police, Additional Commissioner of Police and jurisdictional JointCommissioner of Police, he being a police officer belonging to theAll India Service, he should not have ventured to indulge in an actwhich would bring grave disrepute to a constitutional machinery whichwas not in the interest of the public at large. One cannot expect anIPS officer in the level of a Deputy Commissioner of Police to takethe stand that there was a group discussion amongst them andultimately as jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner of Police, hedeclared the mob as unlawful assembly and ordered for consequentiallathi charge. 114. Therefore we hold that the said officer is also equallyresponsible in the same proportion like that of the other officersnamely the Commissioner of Police, Additional Commissioner of Policeand the jurisdictional Joint Commissioner of Police for the unsavoryincident that happened on 19.02.2009, as well as for the subsequentconsequences which paralyzed the functioning of the judiciary throughout the State.115. While holding so, we also wish to state that even whileinvoking the power relating to unlawful assembly as prescribed underChapter X of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the variousprescriptions contained in the said provisions have been completelythrown overboard. Section 129(1) falling under the said Chapter makesit clear that any Executive Magistrate or officer in charge of apolice station or, in the absence of such officer in charge, anypolice officer, not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector, can dispersethe unlawful assembly which is likely to cause a disturbance of thepublic peace. Sub-Section (2) to Section 129 states that for thepurpose of dispersing such assembly one can even resort to arrest orconfine the persons who form part of the unlawful assembly or by useof force. Under Section 129, the use of armed force is not providedfor. Therefore, as the first step, the use of such force can by nomeans be by way of lathi charge. Without the aid of any armed forceonly the officer should attempt to disperse any such assembly. Sincearrest of unruly mob is part of Section 129(2), an attempt shouldhave been made to identify such key persons who are indulging in anyunlawful assembly and make an attempt to arrest them withoutresorting to any other measure. The paramount purpose is to preventanybody’s attempt to disturb public peace. Therefore mere law andorder cannot be a situation for invoking the provisions containedunder Chapter X.116. Use of armed force can be resorted to only by invokingSection 130 of the said Chapter. Here again, Section 130(1) makes itclear that only if such assembly cannot be otherwise dispersed andwhen it is necessary for the public security that it should be https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ dispersed and the Executive Magistrate of the highest rank who ispresent may cause it to be dispersed by the armed forces. Therefore,a reading of Sections 129 and 130(1) together makes it crystal clearthat dispersement of any unlawful assembly should be resorted towithout any scope for any untoward incident taking place. It must bestated that when any such group of persons assemble and therebyproviding scope for declaring it as an unlawful assembly, the wholeendeavor of the Executive Magistrate or any other officer of thehighest rank who is present at the spot should adopt ways and meanswhich would cause the least effect in the dispersal. It cantherefore be stated that at the very first instance, it would be theresponsibility of the police officer of the highest rank to ensurethat no such unlawful assembly is ever allowed to gather especiallywhen there was any scope for such assembly in a vulnerable place likethat of the High Court and that too on a day when the lawyers resumedtheir Court work after more than 20 days of boycott.117. Furthermore under Section 130(3), it is specificallyprescribed that even when any such officer in command of the armedforce that requisitioned the use of little force and do as littleinjury to person and property in the process of dispersal or arrestor detention of such persons.118. When we examine the implication of Section 130(3), at theoutset, it is to be pointed out that it was not disclosed before usas to who were all the officers in command of any of the armed force,which were drawn into the High Court premises on that day. If anyviolation of the prescription of Section 130(3) is to be examined, itwill be well nigh possible for any one to pin point to the concernedofficer in command who can be held responsible for any excess incarrying out the process of lathi charge by the armed forces. Thereport of the Registrar General which we have stated in detaildiscloses the extensive damages caused to the vehicles parked insidethe campus numbering more than 100 and the injuries caused toadvocates, staff and others numbering nearly 139 apart from thedamages caused to the buildings of the High Court, Small CausesCourt, City Civil Court, library sections of the Law Association andMadras High Court Advocates Association. When Section 130(3) is readalong with the Drill and Training Manual it is apparent that therecannot be an indiscriminate hitting of any person all over the bodyand wild destruction of properties. When we viewed the CD placedbefore us by the Commissioner of Police, the Additional Commissionerof Police as well as at the instance of the Advocate Associations, itwas quite visible that the armed forces which were let loose on thatday were in a hitting spree. They did not spare even a van, whichcarried the symbol, i.e. “ePjpj;Jiw (Judiciary)” the vehicle which wasprovided by the State Government for the subordinate JudicialOfficers to reach the Court and get back home. In fact one of theCourt Halls of the Small Cause Court namely the XII Court Hall wasalso damaged in the process of lathi charge. Though the policeofficers would claim that they were only trying to chase theadvocates, the same was not true. The beating of the advocates bysurrounding them as a group or any individual advocate is quietvisible in the videograph which is highly shocking. The photographs https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ placed before us discloses the extent of damage caused to the librarybooks shelves and the vehicles which only shows that as part of theprocess of lathi charge uncontrolled violence was unleashed insidethe premises and since there was no officer in command, we can onlyhold that the very same four officers namely the Commissioner ofPolice, the Additional Commissioner of Police, the jurisdictionalJoint Commissioner of Police and the jurisdictional DeputyCommissioner of Police were squarely responsible for the violation ofthe provisions contained under Sections 129 and 130 of the Cr.P.C.119. Under Section 131, also falling under Chapter X, it isstated that the use of armed force for the purpose of dispersing ofany unlawful assembly can be carried out by an officer in command. While using any armed force it should be carried out under the directsupervision of the commandant of that force and not by any otherofficer. Whereas on 19.02.2009, it is not the case of the above fourpolice officers that there was any commandant to control the armedforces. On the other hand admittedly it was the above four officerswho directly used the armed forces and thereby providing scope forsuch force to indulge in uncontrolled action of lathi charge andthereby causing extensive damages to men and material. In fact thetotal extent of compensation disbursed from the funds furnished bythe State Government was in the order of Rs.50,41,008/-, it can betherefore visualized as to the extent of damages that had been causedto men and material by the use of force.120. With that when we examine the immunity provided underSection 132 falling under Chapter X, it specifically states that noprosecution against any person for any act purporting to be doneunder Sections 129, 130 and 131 shall be instituted in any CriminalCourt. In the foremost, sub-section (2)(a) makes it clear that inorder to avail such immunity, the officer concerned should have actedunder those Sections in good faith. In fact Sections 132(2)(a) to(d) makes it clear that in order to claim protection under thesubstantive part of Section 132(1) action on good faith is paramountor such member of the armed force does any act in obedience of anyorder which he is bound to obey. Section 132 therefore makes it clearthat good faith should be the basis for an officer or a member of thearmed force to claim any benefit provided under the said Section. 121. Having regard to our conclusion in the earlier paragraphswhere we have held that the Commissioner of Police, the AdditionalCommissioner of Police, the jurisdictional Joint Commissioner ofPolice and the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner of Police weresquarely responsible for the ghastly incident, we hold that havingregard to the manner in which they exercised their power whileordering lathi charge by invoking Sections 129 to 131 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure, we have no hesitation to hold that there wasabsolutely no faith in their conduct much less good faith in order toenable them to avail the protection under Section 132(i) of the Code.122. Though we are conscious of our limitation while dealingwith Section 132 of the Code, in as much as, we are not presentlydealing with any prosecution as against those officers but yet for https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the limited purpose of finding out and identifying the officersresponsible, we have to necessarily examine the defence put forthbefore us at the instance of the above police officers by Dr.RajeevDhavan by relying upon the said provisions. In any event, anyconclusion of ours in relation to the said provision should beexclusively for the purpose of passing orders in these writpetitions, in as much as, our decision is based on the materials,which were placed before us by the respondents themselves.123. In this context, it will be worthwhile to refer to certaindecisions placed before us by Dr.Rajeev Dhavan as well asMs.R.Vaigai. 124. Dr.Rajeev Dhavan relied upon the decisions reported in 155(2008) DLT 209 (Police Commissioner Vs. Yashpal Sharma) andMANU/DE/2653/2007 (Commissioner of Police Vs. Manoj Sharma) for theproposition as to what constitutes reasonable force. In the abovereferred to decisions it was held whether the force used in aparticular case, to disperse such demonstration, is reasonable or notwould depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. As tohow much force is necessary to disperse the unlawful assembly shouldbe left to the decision of the Executive Magistrate or the policeofficer concerned to take a decision on the spot assessing thesituation and such assessment of the situation has to be left to theofficer concerned. In fact in the decision relating to Commissionerof Police Vs. Manoj Sharma (MANU/DE/2653/2007), it is held “……In a situation of maintenance of law and orderdecisions are to be taken instantly and there is notenough time for reflection. Such decisions are to betaken by the officer in-charge of the situation…….”125. The above referred to decisions will be of no assistance tothe respondent police. As held by us earlier, the fault of therespondent police is in having allowed the offer of surrender by theaccused advocates to drift to a detrimental situation and therebymade it vulnerable for the police themselves to get rid of it and inthat process, the unprecedented damage was caused to a constitutionalmachinery which was totally unwarranted and uncalled for. 126. Viewed in that respect, it was immaterial to examine thejustification for ordering lathi charge by relying upon thesituation, which prevailed. In our considered opinion, the situationitself was created by the imprudent action of the respondent policeofficers and therefore the justification of their conduct cannot bejudged based on the ultimate action but had to be necessarily judgedbased on the situation that prevailed at the very inception namely at11.30 am and thereafter when the respondent police officers paved theway for any one to create the said unpleasant situation. 127. It will be worthwhile to refer to Section 52 of the IndianPenal Code, which defines ‘good faith’. Section 52 reads as under: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ “52. Nothing is said to be done or believed in ‘goodfaith’ which is done or believed without due care andattention.”128. In this context, we can also usefully refer to the decisionof the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2001) 2 SCC 171(S.K.Sundaram In Re.), paragraph 28 and 29 of the said decision readsas under:“28. The expression “good faith” in criminaljurisprudence has a definite connotation. Its importis totally different from saying that the personconcerned has honestly believed the truth of what issaid. Good faith is defined in Section 52 of theIndian Penal Code thus:“52. Nothing is said to be done orbelieved in ‘good faith’ which is done orbelieved without due care and attention.”29. See the language of the law in this regard. Itstarts in the negative tone excluding all except whatis allowed to be within its amplitude. Insistencesought to be achieved through the commencing words ofthe definition “nothing is said to be done or believedin good faith” is that the solitary item includedwithin the purview of the expression “good faith” iswhat is done with “due care and attention”. Due caredenotes the degree of reasonableness in the caresought to be exercised. In Black’s Law Dictionary,“reasonable care” is explained as“such a degree of care, precaution, ordiligence as may fairly and properly beexpected or required, having regard to thenature of the action, or of the subject-matter and the circumstances surroundingthe transaction. It is such care as anordinary prudent person would exerciseunder the conditions existing at the timehe is called upon to act”.”129. Therefore in order to establish good faith one will have toshow his previous conduct of due care and attention. When we applythe above ratio to the facts of this case, our analysis to thedecision making process applied by the Commissioner of Police,Additional Commissioner of Police, jurisdictional Joint Commissionerof Police and the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner of Police makesit clear that there was total lack of proper care and caution takenwhile taking a decision. Since we have elaborately dealt with theirconduct right from the initial stage of offer of surrender and theultimate lathi charge ordered, we are convinced that there was totallack of due care and indiscreet decision taken unmindful of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ place, persons, time and the necessity for taking such a decision. It was not the case that the officers were totally kept in dark aboutany of the prior incidents in which the concerned persons wereinvolved or situation that was prevailing on that date namely19.02.2009, where it can be said that resort to lathi charge wasimminent and it was unavoidable at that point of time. On the otherhand our discussion lead us to hold that instead of preventing anyuntoward incident taking place inside the High Court campus, by thefoolhardy act of the police officers themselves a piquant situationwas created and in order to guard themselves and them alone; not anypublic or other innocent persons; a resort was made to the extremestep of lathi charge in such an extensive manner which can never becalled as one carried out in good faith or that there was due care orattention made in order to enable them to seek protection underSection 132(i) of the Code.130. In this context it will also be appropriate to refer toChapter XXXIX of the Police Standing Order and PSO 699(3)(a), 703(2)(h)(i)(j), 703(3) and 703(4)(e) which are relevant which reads asunder:“PSO 699. Preventive Action:(1) ***(2) ***(3) (a) All public officers shall consider ittheir duty to do everything that is possible forthe removal of causes of friction, communal orotherwise, to foster good relations and friendlyfeelings between different sections of thepublic, to take all possible precautions toprevent disorders and to spare no efforts inbringing disorders under control with the leastpossible delay. There should be no hesitationin taking disciplinary action against anyGovernment servant who is guilty of any willfulneglect of duty or who contributed openly orcovertly to the origin or the continuance of thetension.”PSO 703. Dispersal of Unlawful Assemblies:(1) ***(2) (h) If the members of the unlawful assemblydo not disperse, the Executive Magistrate or thesenior most Police Officer present in theabsence of the Executive Magistrate shall directthe Police to use force, that is necessary forthe purpose. The nature of force to be used,tear gas, lathi cane charge or water jet and themethod of quantum of force to be used should bedecided by the senior most Police Officerpresent on the spot.(i) If the crowd refuses to follow the lawfulinstructions to disperse, the riot flag shouldbe raised, the attention of the mob drawnthrough a bugle call with long blast and a clear https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ warning that force would be used to dispersethem will be given through megaphone. Theoperation will commence if the mob refuses toheed to the warning.(j) Officers commanding police parties will onevery occasion when employed in the suppressionof a riot of enforcement of the law, ensure thatthe fullest warning is given to the mob in aclear and distinct manner before any order isgiven to use tear gas or lathi/cane or fire armsand to use the most effectful means to explainbefore hand to the people opposed to them, inthe event of the Police party ordered to firethat the fire will be effective.(3) If the crowd becomes defiant tear gas shouldbe used effectively. If this becomes infructious then lathi cane charge can be made. If the crowd is still defiant resort, may be hadto the use of fire arms.(4) (3) If water jets or tear gas fail todisperse the mob, lathi cane charge should beordered. Lathi/Cane charges should not beattempted if the strength of the Police force isnot adequate to create an effect on the crowdand the crowd is likely to overwhelm the Policeparty easily. The personnel engaged in thelathi/cane charge should be under the propercontrol and the charging should cease as soon asthe desired objective is achieved. Theprocedure laid down in the Drill and TrainingManual will be followed. Care should be takento prevent the lathi/cane sections gettingseparated from the main party and theCommander.”131. Under the Tamil Nadu City Police Act, 1888 in Section 3 theexpression Commissioner is defined which means the Commissioner ofPolice for Madras referred to in Section 5. Under Section 5, it isstated that the administration of the Police of the City of Madrasshall be vested in an officer to be styled the Commissioner of Policefor Madras.132. The Joint Commissioner of Police, Deputy Commissioner ofPolice and the Assistant Commissioner of Police are appointed by theGovernment in exercise of power vested with it under Section 6 of theTamil Nadu City Police Act. Under Section 7 of the said Act, theCommissioner of Police by virtue of his office, is designated asExecutive Magistrate for the purpose of the Code of CriminalProcedure and vested with powers as an Executive Magistrate.133. On behalf of the respondent police officers Dr.RajeevDhavan in his submissions contended that the resort to lathi chargebecame imminent since the threat perception prevailing on that daynecessitated such an action. In support of the said submission, the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ learned senior counsel wanted to rely upon the various incidents ofadvocate excess in and around the High Court campus. The learnedsenior counsel referred to the listed out cases in pages 165 to 259of Respondent Vol-II. 134. According to the learned senior counsel there were as manyas 92 criminal cases booked against several advocates between theyears 2001 to 2007; the recent clash between two group of law collegestudents on 12.11.2009; the incident that took place in the Court ofthe Acting Chief Justice on 29.01.2009 and the 5th Court presided overby Mr.Justice S.Manikumar; the hijack of MTC bus by advocates on30.01.2009; the burning of the portrait of Dr.Subramaniam Swamy inthe course of the demonstration by about 50 advocates on 03.02.2009;the looting of a cycle shop (Bombay Cycle Mart) opposite to the HighCourt campus alleged to have been done by the advocates on04.02.2009; the burning of Congress Party flag and portraits ofCongress leaders in the High Court campus by about 100 advocatesheaded by one Mr.Kanakraj on 11.02.2009; the procession taken out byadvocates within the High Court campus and burning of the Congressparty banner on 12.02.2009, headed by Mr.Kanakraj and the processiontaken out by 75 advocates on the same date from the High Court andtheir attempt to lay siege to the Army Headquarters at Chennai; theincident on 13.02.2009, by two groups of advocates headed byMr.Kanakraj and Rajnikanth in the procession to picket the CentralRailway Station; burning of the photos of Ms.Sonia Gandhi and SriLankan President within the High Court campus by 20 advocates on16.02.2009 and also burning of Election Photo Identity Cards by 35advocates renunciating their Indian Citizenship apart from burningthe photos of Ms.Sonia Gandhi.135. By referring to the above, the learned senior counsel wouldcontend that when such a high amount of threat perception wasprevailing which was assessed by the police, it cannot be held thatthe situation did not warrant a lathi charge. The learned seniorcounsel also placed reliance upon (1997) 7 SCC 91 (Amitabh BachchanCorporation Ltd. Vs. Mahila Jagram Manch) for the proposition thatthe Court cannot substitute its own judgment for the subjectivesatisfaction of the police officer who was in the midst of a gravesituation and was trying to maintain law and order. With referenceto the above proposition of law there can be absolutely no quarrel,but even while applying the above principle to the facts of thiscase, we have only held that the concerned police officers miserablyfailed to thwart the incident of such a magnitude over which they hadabsolute control at the very inception namely at 11.30 am, when thethreat perception relating to the visit of Dr.Subramaniam Swamy cameto an end and the entire armed force retired to B-2 Police Stationfor debriefing. 136. In our considered opinion the conduct of the concernedpolice officers in having entertained any proposal at the instance ofthe accused advocates on 17.02.2009, was wholly an imprudent conductwhich triggered the whole ghastly incident for which they and theyalone were squarely responsible. It can never be held that thevarious past incidents which occurred between 2001 and 2008 or the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ incidents occurred between 29.01.2009 to 17.02.2009, can be construedas cause of threat perception to hold that that was the basis forordering the lathi charge. Such a submission of the learned seniorcounsel cannot be accepted in as much as the threat perception inorder to justify any lathi charge should have developed on its own atthe spot and in order to control such a perception it became imminentfor the police to resort to lathi charge. By no stretch ofimagination it can be said that all the incidents that happened priorto 19.02.2009, was brewing and was existing in an uncontrolledmanner, in order to state that on 19.02.2009 any threat perceptionwas prevailing either to the litigant public or to the otheradvocates and that the police had no other option except to resort tolathi charge on any unruly mob. On the other hand even according tothe Commissioner of Police and other police officers nothing untowardhappened when Dr.Subramaniam Swamy visited the High Court to attendtwo of the cases i.e. one before the Bench headed by the Hon’bleActing Chief Justice and the other in the 5th Court before Mr.JusticeS.Manikumar. After attending to those cases, he also peacefully leftthe High Court campus by 11.30 am and there was no incident worthmentioning even thereafter since the very fact that thejurisdictional Joint Commissioner of Police withdrew the entirepolice force to B-2 Police Station for debriefing was proof positiveto support the said conclusion.137. Any amount of assertion on the part of the Commissioner ofPolice, the Additional Commissioner of Police, the jurisdictionalJoint Commissioner of Police, or jurisdictional Deputy Commissionerof Police, in attempting to portray a picture of threat perceptionwas wholly baseless and does not merit any consideration. 138. In fact though the various cases as between 2001 and 2009have been listed out before us in Page Nos.167 to 259 of theRespondents Volume – II, we are at a loss to understand as to how andwhy the cases pertaining to the years 2001 onwards have not made anyprogress at all especially when in many of the cases, the charges arefor grave offences such as rioting with deadly weapons, attempt tomurder, criminal intimidation, causing hurt, wrongful restraint,assault on public servant discharging his duty, negligent conductwith respect to fire and destruction of public property. The argumenttherefore does not stand to any reason. 139. A perusal of the list of cases in pages 167 to 259 ofRespondent Vol-II, shows that almost all the cases were either underinvestigation or pending trial. If the police authorities were keenor alive to such criminal cases pending against the advocates whichcaused concern, it is hard to believe that a case of the year 2001was still under the investigation of the police authorities whichmeans that no final report was filed. Even in respect of those caseswhere charge sheets have been filed they are pending trial for morethan 6 to 7 years. That only shows total lack of interest shown indealing with the criminal cases launched against the advocates forreasons best known to the concerned police authorities. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

140. It is not the stand of the respondent police that therewere any other impediment or court orders in all those cases whichtied their hands from proceeding with the investigation, filing offinal report and conduct of trial. When that is the interest shownin respect of those good number of cases, we are not in a position toaccede to the submission of the learned senior counsel made on behalfof the respondent police officers that those large number of pendingcases should be construed as a threat perception in order to justifytheir conduct on 19.02.2009. Therefore, the said contention putforth on behalf of the respondent police officers cannot also beaccepted. 141. In order to justify the conduct of the respondent policeofficers in having acceded to the offer of surrender reliance wasplaced upon the decision reported in 1995 Cri.L.J. 1956 (In Re:Rajendran and others) wherein it has been held as under in paragraph69:“69. Hence it may be, that the police officialshave a right to arrest offenders, anywhere itwill even be possible in the event of surrenderby any of the offenders before Court, for, thepolice to seek police custody for the purpose ofinterrogation. It could have been, easilystated by the police officers, in the instantcase, that they were expecting, to arrest Thiru.Natarajan and a part of apprehension, afterinitial arrest, had taken place inside the Courtcampus. Police officers must have intimated tothe Senior Magistrate about the closure ofnorthern gate fully and the southern gatepartially and the purpose for which they hadclosed the gates. They must have equallyinformed the other heads of the department, inthe variety of officers situated in thatcampus. If there is an emergency, the policecan certainly act, without forwarding priorintimation, but even then they would certainlyowe a duty to inform the concerned officers ofCourt as well as other officers soon thereafterabout the closure of the gates. In a situation,emergent and the reason, that led to suchclosure.”142. Even going by the ratio laid down in the said decision, ithas been held therein that whether the arrest is taking place insidethe Court campus due intimation to the concerned officers should bemade. For an arrest in the normal course in any criminal case such apre-condition is called for even in the perception of the policeofficer when an extraordinary situation was prevailing for quite along time prior to 19.02.2009, we wonder how an unilateral decisionwas taken by the police officers to resort to arrest certain accusedwho were stated to have volunteered to surrender but did not carry https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ out their original offer but were taking a different stand atdifferent point of time but yet at no point of time the policeofficers though it fit even to intimate the Registry, leave aloneseek the permission of the Hon’ble Acting Chief Justice to resort tosuch an extraordinary step. In our view, the failure of therespondent police not to intimate and get necessary clearance fromthe Registry and the Hon’ble Acting Chief Justice was a grave blundercommitted by them which was one of the causes for the ultimate havocthat happened on that day. In fact in the order dated 19.02.2009,the Full Bench expressed its deep anguish by stating with whatauthority the police in such large number entered the campus for thepurpose of effecting an arrest and the ultimate indiscriminate lathicharge resorted to inside the campus. The stand of the respondentpolice in relying upon the letter of the Registrar General dated18.02.2009, can be of no avail in as much as the said letter nevergranted a carte blanche to act in any manner they liked in the matterof dealing with the accused advocates or for that matter against anyother accused inside the Court campus. Though the submission ofMs.R.Vaigai for a total immunity as has been provided for Parliamentfor which separate rules and regulations have been prescribed cannotbe applied for other institutions including the judiciary, it cannotbe stated that in the absence of any such provisions statutory orotherwise, a prime institution like that of a High Court which is aconstitutional machinery can be treated by the police authoritieslike any other public place and carry on with any activities whichwould bring grave disrepute to such a prime institution and that toowithout bringing it to the notice of the concerned authorities ofthat institution, leave alone without prior permission. 143. In fact when the unsavory incident took place on17.02.2009, inside Court Hall No.3, these very same officers thoughtit fit to meet the Hon’ble Acting Chief Justice and the otherofficials of the Registry even for registering a case against theconcerned accused advocates. When the very same police officers wereaware that such a step was required when it comes to the question ofcarrying out their operation relating to an incident that took placeinside the High Court campus, it is not known how everything wasgiven a go bye in respect of an incident which was gaining gravemomentum right from 12.00 noon onwards and with reference to whichnothing was brought to the notice of the Court till the whole episodewas completed at around 6.00 – 6.30 pm and whereafter theCommissioner of Police thought it fit to meet the Hon’ble ActingChief Justice.144. We are not for a moment suggesting that even if a grosscrime takes place inside the campus which warrant the interference ofpolice, the police should sit quite and seek for the permissionbefore taking up any action to prevent any such crime taking place orperpetration of any such a crime.145. In fact when reference was made to an order of this Courtin the case relating to Law College incident, that was a conversecase where the police remained a silent spectator when a ghastlycrime was being committed just in front of the police force but yet https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ none of the police personnel including an Assistant Commissioner ofPolice though it fit to interfere and prevent such a crime ofgrievous assault on one single individual by a group of individuals. On that occasion also, the police miserably failed to assess thesituation in the proper perspective while exercising their powers. The reliance placed upon the said decision therefore does not supportthe stand of the respondents.146. In this context we feel it appropriate to refer toparagraph 56 and 97 from the judgment namely 1995 Cri.L.J. 1956 (InRe: Rajendran and others) which needs to be stated, in as much as, wefeel that the unfortunate incident that occurred on 19.02.2009 andthe gravity of which is such that this Court has to necessarily takea firm view and pass appropriate orders so that the message can bemade loud and clear that no such recurrence can ever be dreamt of infuture by any one. The said paragraphs read as under:“56.Mrs.Prabha Sridevan, President, WomenLawyers’ Association, submitted that the after-noon incident had a close connection with themorning closure of gates Advocates as well aspolicemen, were important limbs, for the formerwere right protectors – while the latter werelaw enforcers. The tension, if any, between themmust be comfortably resolved. Re-orientationprogrammes must be organized.* * * * *97. We are very clear and let us transmit acertain message. We are totally conscious, thatwe have dealt with the contemners, ratherlightly, but that has been the outcome afterserious and thought provoking process and thepositive response of ours, to the fervent,sincere and responsible plea, backed up withpurposeful panorama of a possible good earahead, made by learned senior counsel, learnedAdvocate General and the Presidents of variousAssociations of Advocates. Let not any one walkout of this Court Hall with an impression, thatwhatever be the gravity of the offence, onecould always escape lightly. The instantuntoward incident, has been analysed by allconcerned, and the answer in unison was that letthis episode serve as a sure foundation or eyeopener for fostering of a better tomorrow, withan assurance that recurrence, if any, thoughchances may be bleak, will have to be gravelytaken note of and appropriate punishment metedout.”147. Dr.Rajeev Dhavan, in his submissions contended that thecounsel representing the advocates made several prayers such assuspension of police officers, production of various circulars, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ initiation of disciplinary action against officers, safety ofadvocates, investigation and prosecution by CBI, registration ofcriminal complaint against police officials, compensation for injuredadvocates, damages caused to men and material etc., and contendedthat many of those grievance including direction for investigationand prosecution by CBI have been already fulfilled. In so far as thesuspension of the police officers and initiation of disciplinaryproceedings is concerned, the learned senior counsel by making areference to Articles 309 to 311 of the Constitution of Indiacontended that there are certain well laid down principles containedin those constitutional provisions and the same cannot be given a gobye and the Court should not take upon the role of the State byordering suspension or any other action. By relying upon thedecisions reported in (1968) 1 SCR 185 (Roshan Lal Tandon Vs. Unionof India), (1997) 6 SCC 623 (Chairman, Railway Board Vs.C.R.Rangadhamaiah), (1962) 1 SCR 151 (Jagannath Prasad Sharma Vs.State of U.P.), 1958 SCR 828 (Parshotam Lal Dhingra Vs. Union ofIndia) and 1963 Supp (1) SCR 648 (State of Orissa Vs. BidyabhushanMohapatra), the learned senior counsel contended that the position ofcivil servant is one of status and is not like a contract of servicebetween master and servant and therefore it should be left to theState to decide as to what course of action it should take againstany of its erring employees. As far as the prescribed procedurecontained in Articles 309 to 311 is concerned, the same cannot bedisputed. However, we are of the view that the powers of this Courtto give appropriate directions to the State to take any actionagainst the erring officers is not taken away. For that proposition,we seek succor for that proposition in the decisions relied upon byMs.R.Vaigai reported in (1996) 4 SCC 742 (Punjab & Haryana HighCourt Bar Association Vs. State of Punjab) at para 5, (2004) 5 SCC 26(Daroga Singh Vs. B.K.Pandey) at para 49 and (1991) 4 SCC 406 (DelhiJudicial Service Assn. Vs. State of Gujarat) at para 54. It will besufficient if we make a reference to the observations of the Hon'bleSupreme Court made at paragraph 54 in the decision reported in (1991)4 SCC 406 (Delhi Judicial Service Assn. Vs. State of Gujarat) :"54.We are constrained to observe that theState Government did not immediately takeeffective steps against the erring officials. Inspite of the direction issued by this Court theerring police officers were neither arrested norplaced under suspension. It was only after thisCourt took serious view of the matter and directedthe State Government to suspend the erring policeofficers and arrest them, the State Governmentmoved in the matter. The apathy of the StateGovernment in taking effective action against theerring police officers leads to an impression thatin the State of Gujarat, police appears to haveupper hand, as the administration was hesitant intaking action against the erring police officers.If this practice and tendency is allowed to growit would result in serious erosion of the Rule ofLaw in the State. We hope and trust that the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ State Government will take effective measures toavoid reoccurrence of any such instance. TheState Government should further take immediatesteps for the review and revision of the PoliceRegulations in the light of the findings recordedby the Commission."148. With this when we deal with the submission as to thejudicial restraint to be adopted, the various decisions relied uponwere all cases where the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering thefinal order of punishment and with reference to which the scope ofinterference has been set out. We are at a stage where theconsideration is as to in what manner such of those police officerswho have been held to have acted highly detrimental to the interestof the institution and such detrimental action has caused a permanentblack mark on the institution which cannot be lightly ignored orcondoned. In such a situation while on the one hand the variousassociations of lawyers and other respective counsel would commendthis Court to direct the State Government to place the concernedofficers under suspension and take appropriate disciplinary actionagainst them, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondentpolice officers would canvass for the matter to be left to thediscretion of the State.149. In fact in the order dated 18.03.2009, the Full Bench afterthe submission of the report by the Commissioner of Police of thesame date thought it fit to place the Additional Commissioner ofPolice and the jurisdictional Joint Commissioner of Police undersuspension. The Full Bench has given its reasons in paragraph 8,which reads as under:“8. As we find that a prima facie case made outto initiate disciplinary proceeding against theconcerned officers, to ensure the StateGovernment to pass appropriate orders, we areof the view that (i) Mr.A.K.Viswanathan, IPS,Addl. Commissioner of Police (Law & Order) and(ii) Mr.M.Ramasubramani, IPS, formerly JointCommissioner of Police (North) (JurisdictionJCP), should be placed under suspension, asthey were the persons who were in the helm ofthe affairs and under whose direct supervisionthe operation was carried on.”150. Since the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the saiddirection came to be issued without hearing the AdditionalCommissioner of Police and the jurisdictional Joint Commissioner ofPolice, this Court was directed to give an opportunity to them beforepassing any further orders.151. Be that as it may, the learned Advocate General in his owninimitable style made a very fair statement to the Court that theState neither supports nor oppose the action of the police andinstead it wanted to identify the concerned officers who are https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ responsible for the ghastly incident against whom it is alwaysprepared to take appropriate action. In his submission the learnedAdvocate General stated that for that purpose the State Governmenthas appointed Dr.N.Sundaradevan, I.A.S., as One Man Committee andthat unfortunately in the enquiry held by him, none of the advocatesparticipated. He would therefore contend that in the event of theCourt finding any officer responsible, the State would carryout thedirections of this Court scrupulously. In the light of the abovestand of the learned Advocate General, we are of the consideredopinion that in the extraordinary facts placed before us, we areconvinced that the four police officers whom we have held responsiblefor the whole ghastly incident that took place on 19.02.2009, insidethe High Court campus in which severe damage was caused to men andmaterials by their imprudent act which has created an indeliblestigma on the prime institution, it would be in order for the Stateto take necessary disciplinary action against them and in order toproceed with such action without any interference, it would be inorder for the State Government even to place them under suspensionpending disciplinary action. Having regard to the solemn undertakingplaced before us through the learned Advocate General, we areconvinced that it would be suffice for the State to take note of ourabove observation in the proper perspective and leave no stoneunturned to fulfill the objective in the interest of justice. Weanswer Question No.(iv) as above.QUESTION No.(vi)152. As far as the power of this Court to initiate any contemptaction is concerned, the High Court being a Court of Record it hasgot every power to punish any one for contempt of itself. It is theconstitutional mandate as stated under Article 215 of theConstitution of India.153. As far as the contempt is concerned the various submissionsof learned counsel who appeared for the advocates is considered,Mr.R.C.Paul Kanakaraj, in his submissions pointed out that after theincident that took place in the High Court on 19.02.2009, the Courtcould not function on 20.02.2009, 23.02.2009 and 24.02.2009. As faras the City Civil Court and Court of Small Causes and other judicialforums located inside the campus was concerned, the same were able tofunction only from 02.03.2009. In fact these days were undeclaredholidays for all the above institutions.154. As stated by us earlier in the annals of the set up of theHigh Court for more than a century and half, this was the first timethat Courts were immobilized due to the incident that happened insidethe High Court campus. According to the learned counsel the saidsituation would fall within the definition of criminal contempt asdefined under Section 2(c) of the Act. The learned counsel alsosubmitted that after 11.30 am the retention of the armed forcesinside the High Court campus without any permission and without anyjustifiable cause calls for severe action. The indiscriminatebeating of the lawyers and others in which, many sustained headinjuries. One of the P.As to the Hon’ble Judge was severely beaten. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Above all a sitting Judge of this Court also sustained a lathi blow. Ms.R.Vaigai in her submissions stated that neither the State nor thepolice have realized the enormity of what happened on 19.02.2009 andtherefore to uphold the majesty of the institution namely thejudiciary, the Court alone should come for the rescue. According toher the CD produced by the police is an edited version in as much asthe time recorded therein jumps intermittently. The statement of theCommissioner of Police about his entry into the High Court premisesitself is incorrect in as much as one of the photographs disclosesthat while he was very much present inside the High Court premisesand was in the midst of police personnel the time in the watch wornby him itself display 4.45 pm, whereas he would repeatedly contendthat he entered the High Court premises only at 5.00 pm. She alsocontended that the beating of Hon’ble Mr.Justice A.C.ArumugaperumalAdityan was clearly visible in the CD produced at her instance atwhich point of time also the Commissioner of Police was very muchpresent inside the High Court campus which was around 4.15 pm. Thelearned counsel therefore contended that the Commissioner of Policewas attempting to mislead this Court by not disclosing the correctfacts relating to the incident.155. The learned counsel contended that the incident as well asits aftermath has caused grave prejudice to the institution and thatit was a loss of dignity and grace of the institution. She furthercontended that it was not as if the police officers could not haveassessed the magnitude of the issue before even venturing toentertain the plea of surrender by the accused advocates, andtherefore their failure to seek the permission of the Court toentertain the plea of such accused advocates cannot be pardoned. Theenormity of the situation was such that it was so extraordinary thepolice officers should have applied great caution before enteringupon it. Therefore according to her their failure to obtain priorpermission of the Court to carry out the exercise on that day or atleast inform the Registry before doing that was a serious conduct,which calls for serious action. The learned counsel furthercontended that when the Commissioner of Police himself admitted thathe anticipated huge trouble, it was constitutionally mandated uponhim to have taken the necessary precaution to seek the permission ofthe Hon’ble Acting Chief Justice especially when he wanted deploymentof large number of armed forces to carry out that mission. Thelearned counsel therefore contended that it calls for seriouscontempt action against the police officers.156. Mr.N.G.R.Prasad, learned counsel representing the lawyersin his submissions pointed out that it was not a mere police excessbut it is a state excess and that the attack was not only against thelawyers but against the whole institution which was not innocent. The learned counsels therefore contend that it calls for seriousaction by way of initiation of contempt. 157. As against the above submissions on contempt, Dr.RajeevDhavan in his submissions contended that in the first place thesubmission of the learned counsel for the advocates drawing ananalogy of the judiciary on par with the parliament was somewhat https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ overbroad argument. According to the learned counsel even whileacknowledging the status of judiciary in particular its independenceto be safeguarded by virtue of articles 50 and 121 of theConstitution, yet it would be too wide a proposition to be equatedwith parliamentary privileges to be extended to judicial institution.According to the learned senior counsel having regard to the verymany constitutional provisions under Articles 105, 194 and specificregulatory provisions providing for autonomous control for theParliament over its precincts especially in the matter of arrest inthe House, the enclosed vicinity and of its members, such anextraordinary privilege has not been provided for any otherinstitutions including judiciary except what has been provided underArticles 121, 211 and 124(4) of the Constitution as well as Section77 of the Indian Penal Code.158. The learned senior counsel even while making a reference toArticles 129 and 215 of the Constitution which has provided specialpowers of contempt for the Supreme Court and the High Court, wouldcontend that in exercise of such power utmost restraint need to beapplied. According to the learned senior counsel the contention ofthe learned counsel representing the lawyers allege both civil aswell as criminal contempt as can be stated as under: (a) When the civil contempt alleged relatingto the order dated 19.02.2009, in W.P.Nos.181 to183 of 2009 which directed the appellant to filereport on the events of 17.02.2009.(b) Order dated 19.02.2009 in Suo MotuW.P.No.3335 of 2009 directed release of advocatesand no further arrest to be made.(c) Order dated 18.03.2009 in Suo MotuW.P.No.3335 of 2009 directing disciplinary actionagainst Messers A.K.Viswanathan andM.Ramasubramani, and(d) Order dated 13.03.2009, in W.P.Nos.3703to 3705 of 2009 and M.P.Nos.1 to 8 of 2009 andCrl.O.P.No.4085 of 2009, directing the police toproduce the log book and telephone records of allsenior officersAs far as the criminal contempt is concerned, the learned counselwould contend that behaviour of the advocates inside the Court Hallon 17.02.2009, throwing eggs on Dr.Subramaniam Swamy, throwing ofstones by lawyers and indulging in violence on 19.02.2009, burning ofthe police station inside the High Court campus, contradictoryaffidavits of lawyers in these proceedings and the articulation ofslogans against judges on 19.02.2009 needs to be examined. He alsoreferred to the allegation of the petitioners as regards the criminalcontempt alleged against the respondent police officers, viz.,bringing in reinforcement without the consent of the Chief Justice; apre-planed attack on the High Court and its personnel; attack on the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ lawyers, judges and staff; filing wrong or misleading affidavits andinformation; and having damaged lawyers’ property and High Courtbuilding and property.159. The learned senior counsel submitted that the procedure tobe followed is generally as per the rules of the Madras High Courtdated 07.08.1975. As a matter of practice, the advice of the learnedAdvocate General is sought which is entitled to the highestconsideration and in any case it cannot be disputed that obstructionof the course of justice would enable this Court to initiate contemptof itself suo motu.160. When we consider the above submissions of the respectivecounsel at the outset we wish to state that the incident that tookplace on 17.02.2009, is being dealt with by a Full Bench andtherefore we refrain ourselves from dealing with the said issue inthis order. On contempt action, we wish to be guided by the variousdecisions on this aspect. In the decision reported in (2004) 5 SCC26 (Daroga Singh Vs. B.K.Pandey) the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt witha case where the conduct of the policemen who was also an OfficeBearer of the association of policemen at district level and whoalong with his supporters entered the chambers of First AdditionalDistrict and Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur in Bihar after assaulting theCourt peon, further assaulted the Sessions Judge himself. Due to themanhandling, the Sessions Judge felt dizziness and becameunconscious. It was due to the timely arrival of a team of Doctorshis life was saved. After assaulting the Sessions Judge and itsCourt Staff the police personnel took away certain records anddamaged the doors and grills of the gate. They also assaulted someof the lawyers and damaged their furniture and the motor vehicleparked inside the Court compound. There was a report referring thenames of the police officials who were identified by the Court staffas well as the Additional District Judge as well as the lawyers whowere assaulted. Based on the report of the District Judge, theDivision Bench of the High Court entertained a writ petition andafter hearing the President of the High Court Advocates Associationas well as the learned Advocate General, the Division Bench came tothe conclusion that prima facie case of criminal contempt has beenmade out against the contemnors. Thereafter proceedings under theContempt of Courts Act were initiated and contempt notice were issuedby the Registry to the contemnors calling upon them to show cause whysuitable action should not be taken against them for the allegedmisconduct. The State Government was also asked to report about thesteps taken relating to the incident. The Director General of Policefound the officers guilty of the alleged incident and condemned thepolice officials for their act. The State Government acting on thebasis of the report of the Director General of Police issued orderssuspending all such officials from service. A Commission of Enquirywas also set up under the provisions of the Commissions of EnquiryAct, 1952. Apart from the departmental proceedings, Criminal caseswere also lodged against them. When a request was made by thecontemnors to keep the contempt proceedings in abeyance awaiting theoutcome of the criminal prosecution as well as departmentalproceedings, the High Court declined the said prayer. In response to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the show cause notice, the contemnors condemned the incident ofassault on the Additional District Judge. Some of the contemnorstried to justify the act by stating that there was resentment amongstpolice personal for the arrest of one of their colleagues and removalof stars from his uniform in the Court. Some of them pleaded alibi. The High Court after taking due care and caution dropped theproceedings against those who were not really involved in theincident but found at least 10 of them guilty and imposed punishmentof simple imprisonment for a period of three months and for another 8contemnors to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months. It was also made clear that the discharge of rule of contempt noticeof the proceedings against the other 17 would not absolve them oftheir misconduct and guilt for their respective offences, if any. The said order of the High Court was the subject matter of challengebefore the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Several contentions were raisedand dealing with such contentions, ultimate conclusion of the Hon’bleSupreme Court are stated as under in paragraphs 26, 29, 31, 32, 33,35, 41 and 44:“26. What is made punishable under Section 228IPC is the offence of intentional insult to ajudge or interruption of court proceedings butnot as a contempt of court. The definition ofcriminal contempt is wide enough to include anyact by a person which would either scandalise thecourt or which would tend to interfere with theadministration of justice. It would also includeany act which lowers the authority of the courtor prejudices or interferes with the due courseof any judicial proceedings. It is not limited tothe offering of intentional insult to the judgeor interruption of the judicial proceedings. ThisCourt observed in Delhi Judicial Service Assn. v.State of Gujarat: (SCC pp.457-58, paras 42 & 43)The public have a vital stake in effective andorderly administration of justice. The Court hasthe duty of protecting the interest of thecommunity in the due administration of justiceand, so, it is entrusted with the power to commitfor contempt of court, not to protect the dignityof the Court against insult or injury, but, toprotect and vindicate the right of the public sothat the administration of justice is notperverted, prejudiced, obstructed or interferedwith. The power to punish for contempt is thusfor the protection of public justice, whoseinterest requires that decency and decorum ispreserved in courts of justice. Those who have todischarge duty in a court of justice areprotected by the law, and shielded in thedischarge of their duties. Any deliberateinterference with the discharge of such dutieseither in court or outside the court by attacking https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the presiding officers of the court, would amountto criminal contempt and the courts must takeserious cognisance of such conduct.*****29. We respectfully agree with the view taken inthis judgment and hold that the High Court couldinitiate proceedings on its own motion under theContempt of Courts Act against the appellants. Onthe facts of this case apart from the report sentby the Vth Additional District and Sessions Judgeof the incident, Young Lawyers’ Association hadalso filed a writ petition. The Presidents of thethree Bar Associations and the Advocate Generalwere present and heard before initiating theproceedings for criminal contempt. It has beennoted by the High Court that “all the threePresidents of the High Court Associations and theAdvocate General arrived at the conclusion that aprima facie case of criminal contempt was madeout against the contemners”. This shows that theAdvocate General of the State was also of theopinion that prima facie a case for initiation ofproceedings for criminal contempt was made outand he was a consenting party to the initiationof the proceedings. *****31. It has repeatedly been held by this Court[Vinay Chandra Mishra, In re] that the procedureprescribed either under the Code of CriminalProcedure or under the Evidence Act is notattracted to the proceedings initiated underSection 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act. TheHigh Court can deal with such matters summarilyand adopt its own procedure. The only cautionthat has to be observed by the Court inexercising this inherent power of summaryprocedure is that the procedure followed must befair and the contemners are made aware of thecharges levelled against them and given a fairand reasonable opportunity. Having regard to thefact that contempt proceedings are to be decidedexpeditiously in a summary manner the convictionshave been recorded without extending theopportunity to the contemners to cross-examinethose who had deposed against them on affidavits.Though the procedure adopted in this case wassummary but adequate safeguards were taken toprotect the contemners’ interest. The contemnerswere issued notices apprising them of thespecific allegations made against them. They weregiven an opportunity to counter the allegationsby filing their counter-affidavits andadditional counter/supplementary affidavits asper their request. They were also given https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ opportunity to file affidavits of any otherpersons which they did. They were givenopportunities to produce any other material intheir defence which they did not do. Most of thecontemners had taken the plea that at therelevant time they were on duty in theirrespective police stations though in the sametown. They also attached copies of stationdiaries and duty chart in support of their alibi.The High Court did not accept the plea of alibias all these papers had been prepared by thecontemners themselves and none of the superiorofficers had supported such a plea. The evidenceproduced by the respondents was rejected in theface of the reports made by the AdditionalDistrict and Sessions Judge, Director General ofPolice coupled with affidavits of Mr Barai, theAdditional District and Sessions Judge, two courtofficials and affidavits of some of the lawyerswho had witnessed the occurrence. 32. The contempt proceedings have to be decidedin a summary manner. The judge has to remain infull control of the hearing of the case andimmediate action is required to be taken to makeit effective and deterrent. Immediate steps arerequired to be taken to restore order as earlyand quickly as possible. Dragging the proceedingsunnecessarily would impede the speed andefficiency with which justice has to beadministered. This Court while considering allthese aspects held in Vinay Chandra Mishra, In re(the alleged contemner) that the criminalcontempt no doubt amounts to an offence but it isan offence sui generis and hence for suchoffence, the procedure adopted both under thecommon law and the statute law in the country hasalways been summary. It was observed that theneed was for taking speedy action and to put thejudge in full control of the hearing. It wasemphasised that immediate steps were required tobe taken to restore order in the courtproceedings as quickly as possible. To quote fromthe above-referred-to case: (SCC pp. 609-10,para 26)“However, the fact that the process is summarydoes not mean that the procedural requirementviz. that an opportunity of meeting the charge,is denied to the contemner. The degree ofprecision with which the charge may be stateddepends upon the circumstances. So long as thegist of the specific allegations is made clear orotherwise the contemner is aware of the specific https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ allegation, it is not always necessary toformulate the charge in a specific allegation.The consensus of opinion among the judiciary andthe jurists alike is that despite the objectionthat the judge deals with the contempt himselfand the contemner has little opportunity todefend himself, there is a residue of cases wherenot only it is justifiable to punish on the spotbut it is the only realistic way of dealing withcertain offenders. This procedure does not offendagainst the principle of natural justice viz.nemo judex in sua causa since the prosecution isnot aimed at protecting the judge personally butprotecting the administration of justice. Thethreat of immediate punishment is the mosteffective deterrent against misconduct. The judgehas to remain in full control of the hearing ofthe case and he must be able to take steps torestore order as early and quickly as possible.The time factor is crucial. Dragging out thecontempt proceedings means a lengthy interruptionto the main proceedings which paralyses the courtfor a time and indirectly impedes the speed andefficiency with which justice is administered.Instant justice can never be completelysatisfactory yet it does provide the simplest,most effective and least unsatisfactory method ofdealing with disruptive conduct in court. So longas the contemner’s interests are adequatelysafeguarded by giving him an opportunity of beingheard in his defence, even summary procedure inthe case of contempt in the face of the court iscommended and not faulted.”33. In the present case the High Court haddecided to proceed with the contempt proceedingsin a summary manner. Due opportunity was affordedto all the contemners and after verifying andcross-checking the material available before it,coming from different reliable sources the HighCourt convicted only nine persons out of twenty-six persons arrayed as contemners before it. TheHigh Court took due care to ascertain theidentity of the contemners by cross-checking withthe affidavits filed by the different persons. Itis also based on the independent reportssubmitted by the Director General of Police andSuperintendent of Police. We do not find anyfault in the procedure adopted by the High Courtin conducting the proceedings in the presentcase. For the survival of the rule of law theorders of the courts have to be obeyed andcontinue to be obeyed unless overturned, modifiedor stayed by the appellate or revisional courts. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ The court does not have any agency of its own toenforce its orders. The executive authority ofthe State has to come to the aid of the partyseeking implementation of the court orders. Themight of the State must stand behind the courtorders for the survival of the rule of the courtin the country. Incidents which undermine thedignity of the courts should be condemned anddealt with swiftly. When a judge is attacked andassaulted in his courtroom and chambers bypersons on whose shoulders lay the obligation ofmaintaining law and order and protecting thecitizen against any unlawful act, it needs to becondemned in the severest of terms. If thejudiciary has to perform its duties and functionsin a fair and free manner, the dignity and theauthority of the courts has to be respected andmaintained at all stages and by all concernedfailing which the very constitutional scheme andpublic faith in the judiciary runs the risk ofbeing lost.*****35. Plea that reasonable and adequate opportunitywas not afforded to the appellants is equallyuntenable. We find from the record that all thematerials (affidavits, show-cause notice, etc.)which were brought on record were properly servedon the learned advocates appearing for thecontemners. The reports submitted by the VthAdditional Sessions Judge, District Judge,affidavit of Shri Barai and his staff, namely, R.Das and B. Sharma and the other affidavits of theadvocates who had seen the occurrence and thereports submitted by the Director General ofPolice and the Superintendent of Police weregiven to the learned advocates who were appearingfor the contemners in the High Court. Statementsof A. Natarajan, the then SP, Harihar Choudhary,the then Deputy Superintendent of Police, RanjitPandey, the then Sergeant Major and Shashi LataSingh, the then SI were recorded by the HighCourt in the presence of all the lawyers. TheRegistry of the High Court was directed to keeptheir statements in a sealed cover. Thecontemners were permitted to file affidavits andproduce any other material in support of thesame. They were also permitted to file affidavitsof any other person supporting their version.They were all taken on record. After affordingdue opportunity of hearing to the counselappearing for the contemners, the High Courtrecorded the order of conviction. Thus theappellants were given the evidence which had comeon the record. They were given an opportunity to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ controvert the allegations made against them andproduce evidence in support thereof. Counselappearing for the contemners were satisfied withthe opportunity provided to them by the HighCourt. Plea that reasonable opportunity was notafforded to the contemners was not raised beforethe High Court. We are of the opinion that duereasonable and adequate opportunity was affordedto the appellants to defend themselves and putforth their point of view.*****41. In the constitutional scheme the judiciary isentrusted with the task of upholding theConstitution and the laws. Apart frominterpreting the Constitution and the laws, thejudiciary discharges the function of securingmaintenance of law and order by deciding thedisputes in a manner acceptable to civilised andpeace-loving society. In order to maintain thefaith of the society in the rule of law the roleof the judiciary cannot be undermined. In anumber of cases this Court has observed thatfoundation of the judiciary is the trust andconfidence of the people of the nation and whensuch foundation or trust is rudely shaken bymeans of any disrespect by the very persons whoare required to enforce the orders of the courtand maintain law and order the people’sperception of efficacy of the systems getseroded.42. The judges are — as a jurist calls them— “paper tigers”. They do not have any machineryof their own for implementing their orders.People, while approaching the court of law whichthey regard as the temple of justice, feel safeand secure whilst they are in the court. Policepersonnel are deployed in the court campus forthe purpose of maintaining order and to see thatnot only the judges can work fearlessly in acalm, cool and serene atmosphere but also to seethat anyone coming to the court too feels safeand secure thereat. Every participant in courtproceedings is either a seeker of justice or onewho comes to assist in administration of justice.So is the expectation of the members of the Barwho are treated as officers of the court. Weshudder to feel what would happen if the policepersonnel themselves, and that too in anorganised manner, are found to be responsible fordisturbing the peace and order in the courtcampus, for causing assault on the judges and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ thus sullying the temple of justice apart frombringing a bad name to an indispensable organ ofthe executive wing of the State.*****44. We have not been able to forget the policingrole of the police of the British Raj wherein anattitude of hostility between the police and thepoliced under the colonial rule wasunderstandable. It is unfortunate that in one ofthe largest constitutional democracies of theworld the police has not been able to change itsthat trait of hostility.” (Emphasis added)161. In the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in(1995) 3 SCC 767 (Dhananjay Sharma Vs. State of Haryana and Others)while dealing with a false plea made before the High Court in aHabeas Corpus petition, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under inparagraph 38 :“38. Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act,1971 (for short the Act) defines criminalcontempt as “the publication (whether by words,spoken or written or by signs or visiblerepresentation or otherwise) of any matter or thedoing of any other act whatsoever to (1)scandalise or tend to scandalise or lower or tendto lower the authority of any court; (2)prejudice or interfere or tend to interfere withthe due course of judicial proceedings or (3)interfere or tend to interfere with, or obstructor tend to obstruct the administration of justicein any other manner. Thus, any conduct which hasthe tendency to interfere with the administrationof justice or the due course of judicialproceedings amounts to the commission of criminalcontempt. The swearing of false affidavits injudicial proceedings not only has the tendency ofcausing obstruction in the due course of judicialproceedings but has also the tendency to impede,obstruct and interfere with the administration ofjustice. The filing of false affidavits injudicial proceedings in any court of law exposesthe intention of the party concerned inperverting the course of justice. The due processof law cannot be permitted to be slighted nor themajesty of law be made a mockery of by such actsor conduct on the part of the parties to thelitigation or even while appearing as witnesses.Anyone who makes an attempt to impede orundermine or obstruct the free flow of theunsoiled stream of justice by resorting to thefiling of false evidence, commits criminalcontempt of the court and renders himself liable https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ to be dealt with in accordance with the Act.Filing of false affidavits or making falsestatement on oath in courts aims at striking ablow at the rule of law and no court can ignoresuch conduct which has the tendency to shakepublic confidence in the judicial institutionsbecause the very structure of an ordered life isput at stake. It would be a great public disasterif the fountain of justice is allowed to bepoisoned by anyone resorting to filing of falseaffidavits or giving of false statements andfabricating false evidence in a court of law. Thestream of justice has to be kept clear and pureand anyone soiling its purity must be dealt withsternly so that the message percolates loud andclear that no one can be permitted to underminethe dignity of the court and interfere with thedue course of judicial proceedings or theadministration of justice. In Chandra Shashi v.Anil Kumar Verma the respondents produced a falseand fabricated certificate to defeat the claim ofthe respondent for transfer of a case. Thisaction was found to be an act amounting tointerference with the administration of justice.Brother Hansaria, J. speaking for the Benchobserved: (SCC pp.423-24, paras 1 and 2)“The stream of administration ofjustice has to remain unpolluted sothat purity of court’s atmosphere maygive vitality to all the organs of theState. Polluters of judicial firmamentare, therefore, required to be welltaken care of to maintain the sublimityof court’s environment; so also toenable it to administer justice fairlyand to the satisfaction of allconcerned.Anyone who takes recourse to frauddeflects the course of judicialproceedings; or if anything is donewith oblique motive, the sameinterferes with the administration ofjustice. Such persons are required tobe properly dealt with, not only topunish them for the wrong done, butalso to deter others from indulging insimilar acts which shake the faith ofpeople in the system of administrationof justice.” (Emphasis added)162. In the decision reported in (1996) 6 SCC 323 (Commissionerof Police, Delhi and another Vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court, NewDelhi), the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with a case where the former https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Prime Minister P.V.Narasimha Rao was summoned by the ChiefMetropolitan Magistrate/Additional Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Court. As Mr.P.V.Narasimha Rao as former Prime Minister was to be providedwith necessary security of highest degree, the Court was approachedto permit the authorities to make the entire Court campus asterilized zone. When the parties approached the Delhi High Court,seeking for change of venue and the place of trial, the High Courtdeclined their request on the administrative side. The matter wentbefore the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court whileconsidering the rejection order of the Administrative Committee ofthe High Court took note of the detailed minutes which disclosed thatthe paramount interest of the Court is the normal functioning of theregular Courts even while noting that the security personnel evenwhile providing security cover of special protection to the formerPrime Minister cannot cause any inconvenience to the functioning ofthe Courts. That decisions also makes it clear that even underextraordinary circumstance such as affording of special protectioncover to a former Prime Minister as a statutory obligation, theconcerned authorities felt the need to approach the Court for priorpermission and not take an unilateral decision.163. In the Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Courtreported in 1983 Cri.L.J. 866 (State of U.P. Vs. Deg Raj Singh), theDivision Bench held as under in paragraphs 34 and 36:“34. In the instant case both the accused viz.Surendra Singh and Ramesh Singh approached theCourt of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate inconnection with their surrender application. Thecontemners in a high handed manner deprived thecourt to dispose of their surrender applicationand thus denied the Court the power to administerjustice duly and impartially and it clearlyamounted to a gross contempt of Court. Such actand conduct of the contemners clearly amounted tointerference with the administration of justicein this case. The contemners never informed theCourt about any warrant, etc. in their possessionnor sought his permission before apprehension ofRamesh Singh and Surendra Singh and are notentitled to any protection by alleging that theaforesaid accused were local terrors andabsconders and they were duty bound to arrestthem despite the commission of contempt ofCourt. So they are held guilty of Section 2(c)of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.*****36. If apology is to dilute the gravity of the offence it should bevoluntary, unconditional and indicative of remorse and contritiontendered at the earliest opportunity. In the instant case it hasbeen found that the apology was offered by both the contemners whiledenying the act of contempt and was not sincere and so it was simplyan empty formality. Such apology which is devoid of remorse couldnot counteract or palliate the mischief that had already been done.”(Emphasis added) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

164. In the decision reported in 2007 (4) CHN 842 (Associationfor Protection of Democratic Rights Vs. State of West Bengal andOrs.) a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in a suo motu writpetition relating to the incident that took place at Nandhigram werethe West Bengal police stated to have taken some action against theagitating farmers and other villagers, the Division Bench held thatprima facie in a wholly indefensible manner innocent people were shotdown by none other than the uniformed police officers. Dealing withthe said situation in the suo motu writ petition, the Courtformulated the following questions in paragraph 76 and observed asunder in paragraph 77 and 78:“76. The action of the police would,therefore, raise some very serious questions,viz.:(a) Was it necessary to surround the area bythree thousand strong police force ?(b) Was the police action justified in virtuallyinvading the villages ?(c) Did the officers concerned have anyjurisdiction to order the police to open fireindiscriminately without identifying the targetsor the ring leaders in the huge crowd?(d) The crowd was no large by its very natureonly individuals at the front would have been thetarget of the bullets?77. The fact situation has been depicted bythe team of Advocates in their report. Mr.Mukherjee has made a reference to a diagram inthe area where the police firing took place. Hehad reiterated time and again the pleadings inwhich it is categorically stated that the policefiring that erupted on 14th of March, 2007 was inthe nature of State sponsored terrorism. Furthermore, the report submitted by the doctorswho visited the locality have actually shown theindividuals who are responsible for rape, arsonetc. In such circumstances, we are of the opinionthat the learned Senior Counsel, Mr.Mukherjee, isjustified in his submission that the High Courtought to exercise its power under Article 226/227of the Constitution of India and issue necessaryorders and directions to unearth the truth.78. We are unable to accept the submission ofthe learned Advocate General that mere gatheringof very large group of villagers would be sointimidating or awesome as to overawe the State orits authorities as required under Section 129 ofthe Cr.P.C. The very wide definition of ‘force’given in Section 349 of IPC, therefore, cannot bea justification for discriminate gun firingindulged in by the police, ostensibly disperse orcontrol the crowd.” https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ The Division Bench went on to hold as under in paragraph 106, wherethe Division Bench referred to certain principles laid down by theHon’ble Supreme Court in LLP.State Road Transport Case:“106…..There is thus no doubt that the HighCourts in India exercising their jurisdictionunder Article 226 have the power to issue a writof mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamusor to pass orders and give necessary directionswhere the Government or a public authority hasfailed to exercise or has wrongly exercised thediscretion conferred upon it by a statute or arule or a policy decision of the Government orhas exercised such discretion mala fide or onirrelevant considerations or by ignoring therelevant considerations and materials or in sucha manner as to frustrate the object of conferringsuch discretion or the policy for implementingwhich such discretion has been conferred. In allsuch cases and in any other fit and proper case aHigh Court can, in the exercise of itsjurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ ofmandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus orpass orders and give directions to compel theperformance in a proper and lawful manner of thediscretion conferred upon the Government or apublic authority, and in a proper case, in orderto prevent injustice resulting to the concernedparties, the Court may itself pass an order orgive directions which the Government or thepublic authority should have passed or given hadit properly and lawfully exercised itsdiscretion………” (Emphasis added)165. We also bestow our due consideration to the decisionsplaced before us by Dr.Rajeev Dhavan on the issue of contemptjurisdiction. In the decision reported in (1972) 1 SCC 651(R.L.Kapur Vs. State of Madras) it has been held as under inparagraph 5:“5. Article 215 declares that every High Courtshall be a Court of record and shall have allpowers of such a Court including the power topunish for contempt of itself. Whether Article215 declares the power of the High Court alreadyexisting in it by reason of its being a Court ofrecord, or whether the article confers the poweras inherent in a Court of record, thejurisdiction is a special one, not arising orderived from the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952,and therefore, not within the purview of eitherthe Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure… https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ …..In any case, so far as contempt of the HighCourt itself is concerned, as distinguished fromthat of a Court subordinate to it, theConstitution vests these rights in every HighCourt, and so on Act of a Legislature could takeaway that jurisdiction and confer it afresh byvirtue of its own authority.”166. The learned senior counsel also referred to a decisionreported in (1995) 2 SCC 584 (Vinay Chandra Mishra, In re v.) wherein paragraph 45 the Hon’ble Supreme Court took the following view:“45…..That jurisdiction is independent of thestatutory law of contempt enacted by Parliamentunder Entry 77 of List I of Seventh Schedule ofthe Constitution. The jurisdiction of this Courtunder Article 129 is sui generis. Thejurisdiction to take cognizance of the contemptas well as to award punishment for it beingconstitutional, it cannot be controlled by anystatute.”167. Dr.Rajeev Dhavan however made a fair statement that thoughin the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (1996) 11SCC 93 (Executive Director, Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam Vs.D.Nagulu Naidu) it was observed that the Hon’ble Supreme Court orHigh Court does not have a carte blanche power to exercise whateverpower it thinks fit, in the name of contempt of Court.168. The learned senior counsel referred to an earlier decisionof the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (1991) 4 SCC 406 (DelhiJudicial Service Association Vs. State of Gujarat), wherein, it hasbeen stated that the Court of Justice without power to vindicate itsown dignity, to enforce obedience to its mandates, to protect itsofficers, or to shield those who are entrusted to its care, would bean anomaly which could not be permitted to exist in any civilizedcommunity Society.169. The learned senior counsel also contended that the argumentof the learned counsel for the petitioners that there is rigid rulewhereby the judiciary is insulated with an iron like curtain, whereit is wholly impermissible for the police to arrest any criminal oreven its presence is overbroad submission and should not be accepted.170. According to the learned senior counsel when based onGovernment of India guidelines considering the threat perception ofthe Supreme Court and the High Court in the Country, specifiedsecurity arrangements was directed to be made and such securitysystem was introduced to this Court on and from 29.01.2009, thepresence of the police cannot be frowned upon and the action of thepolice in their genuine attempt to control the law and ordersituation cannot be found fault with. The learned senior counseltherefore contended that the police officers having come forward toexpress their unconditional apology for whatever happened on19.02.2009 and in respect of the Commissioner of Police whose career https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ growth by virtue of his personal excellence in the field of policeadministration, initiation of either disciplinary or contemptproceedings would seriously impinge upon/spoil his career andtherefore this Court should not countenance the claim of thepetitioners.171. Having been fortunate enough to hear the enlightened anddispassionate submissions of Dr.Rajeev Dhavan and the anxioussubmissions made by Ms.R.Vaigai and other learned counselrepresenting the lawyers, we proceed to consider this question withutmost care and caution.172. As rightly contended by Dr.Rajeev Dhavan, we do agree thatthere cannot be total immunity, as has been claimed on behalf of thepetitioners from other wings of the State in particular by thepolice. The non-availability of any statutory or other regulationsapart, we must state in the present day context the judiciary plays apivotal role in rendering its yeomen service to the citizens of thiscountry. Time and again, it is being repeatedly stated from everyquarters that for every man’s redressal the last resort is thejudiciary. De hors and despite several constraints and criticism,there can be no two opinion that even today the judiciary is theinstitution which commends high amount of reputation and respect fromamong the members of the society and the right thinking persons. Theinstitution, which is rendering service to the common man, is lookedupon by every one with high amount of confidence and hope that pittedagainst any onslaught or at extreme situation where one seeks succor,this institution has not failed to come for one’s rescue and take allendeavor to remedy the wrong or prevent an evil from taking place orredress the grievance to the extent to which one is entitled/possibleand thus proved its existence all these years and thereby keeping itsmettle high in everyone’s esteem and expectation.173. If the scheme of the Constitutional provisions are lookedinto, the institution of the Parliament and the Legislative Assemblyon the one hand and the other wing of the State namely the Executiveincluding the Police force and armed forces are dealt withdifferently. Special privileges are accorded to the institution ofParliament and the Legislative Assembly. Under Article 105 of theConstitution, such principles have been spelt out in so far as theHouses of Parliament and all its members and the Committees thereof.Under Article 194 of the Constitution such privileges have beenextended to the State Legislature, its members and Committeesthereof. The services of those under the State are concerned, thesame is dealt with under Chapter IV of Part XIV of the Constitutionconsisting of Articles 308 to 314. 174. As compared to such regulations contained in such Chapterin so far as the the services of the Courts, we find that underChapter VI which contains Articles 233 to 237 of the Constitution ofIndia, the whole of the regulatory measures on the subordinate courtsare vested with the High Court apart from the power ofsuperintendence over all Courts subordinate to it by the High Courtunder Article 227 of the Constitution. When we make a glimpse of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ provisions contained under Article 124 relating to the establishmentand constitution of the Supreme Court falling under Chapter IV andArticles 217 and 218 relating to the appointment and condition ofoffice of a Judge of a High Court falling under Chapter V, theprovisions have been couched in such a manner that the framers of theConstitution bestowed their utmost concern to ensure that the processof judicial institution is kept aloof from the reach of any otherwing of the State and thereby ensure confidence in the minds of thecommon man that though the expenditure of the judiciary is also metfrom the State Exchequer but yet the wing of the judiciary wouldencompass any situation and any person or body when it comes to thequestion of rendering justice irrespective of caste, creed, colour orstatus.175. Keeping the above lofty ideas which weighed with theconstitutional framers, while providing a special status to thejudiciary in the hierarchy of public service, we are convinced thatany attempt from any quarters either deliberately or subvertly ornegligently or recklessly or in any other allied manner to cause adent to the institution should be seriously dealt with in order toensure that the greatness of the institution is not undermined by anyone to the detriment of the public at large. To put it differently,unless as pointed out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decisionreported in (1991) 4 SCC 406 (Delhi Judicial Service Association Vs.State of Gujarat), wherein, it has been stated with authority andconfidence that the Court of Justice without power to vindicate itsown dignity, to enforce obedience to its mandates, to protect itsofficers, or to shield those who are entrusted to its care, in ourconsidered opinion there would only be anarchy everywhere else in asmuch as it will be the starting point for shaking the insurmountablepillar of the institution providing scope for anybody else to attemptto play a dirty game with the institution by designing their own formof evil schemes. 176. Keeping the above perception in mind about the status ofthe institution and its obligation to the society at large, when weanalyze the issue and questions posed before us, at the very outsetwe are constrained to state that what happened on 19.02.2009, was anextreme and extraordinary situation which calls for an extraordinaryaction. In fact that is the principle stated by the Hon’ble SupremeCourt in the decision reported in (2003) 6 SCC 581 (T.K.RangarajanVs. Government of Tamil Nadu).177. The enormity and extraordinary nature of the situation canbe focused by listing out the following circumstances namely:(i) The Head of the Council of Ministers ofthe State namely the Hon’ble the Chief Ministerin his spontaneous response, forwarded a faxmessage to the then Hon’ble Acting Chief Justiceon 19.02.2009, described the happening in theHigh Court as:“Unprecedented violence has takenplace…..” He concluded the said fax message by saying” https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ “…..I am expecting your valuablesuggestions to contain this violence andto ensure justice is done and peace isrestored. Though I am in the hospital,if you wish to see me, I will come andmeet you even in an Ambulance.”(ii) There was bloodshed inside the campusto a very large extent which the campus neverever witnessed from the date of its inception.(iii) Such bloodshed was of the lawyers(mostly innocent), Staff members, some of thepolicemen as well as litigant public.(iv) There were instances of lathi charge bythe policemen who indulged in such lathi chargein an uncontrollable manner and as could be seenfrom the CD, such lathi charge was indiscriminateand was not in consonance with the manner inwhich it was set out in the Drill and TrainingManual.(v) The officers concerned who wereresponsible for ordering such lathi charge hadabsolutely no control over their own men. (vi) In the process of such lathi charge,there was extensive damage caused to the vehiclesnumbering more than 100 both four wheelers andtwo wheelers as well as bicycles which was notpermissible in law.(vii) Physical injury was caused to asitting Judge of this Court who attempted toprevent such incidents from taking place. Thescene of attack of the learned Judge as displayedin the CD was extremely pathetic. (viii) The policemen found in the process oflathi charge were seen entering into thebuildings of the Court premises, which wastotally unwarranted and impermissible. (ix) There were even damages caused to thefurnitures inside the Court Hall of the XIIJudge, Court of Small Causes.(x) Extensive damages were caused to thebuildings of the City Civil Court, Small CausesCourt including the High Court and to repair suchdamages, it costed not less than Rs.7,00,000/-for the Public Works Department. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (xi) The injuries sustained were severe andsome of the injured sustained head injuries andthe cost of treatment for all those injuredpersons was in the order of Rs.32,97,595/- andodd. (xii) The charging policemen did not spareeven a van which was meant for transporting thejudicial officers, in spite of the fact thatthere was a clear indication on the side of thevan where it was written “ePjpj;Jiw (Judiciary)”.(xiii) Apart from Hon’ble Mr.JusticeA.C.Arumugaperumal Adityan, though the Hon’bleActing Chief Justice himself along with some ofthe Hon’ble Judges rushed to the starting pointof the lathi charge, they were forced to withdrawsince they were cautioned that the mood of thepolicemen was such that anything may happen evento the Hon’ble Judges.(xiv) Though the solitary victim was Hon’bleMr.Justice A.C.Arumugaperumal Adityan, while theHon’ble Acting Chief Justice, Hon’ble Mr.JusticeR.Sudhakar and Hon’ble Mr.Justice R.Regupathi hada narrow escape.(xv) The charging policemen entered into thelibrary section of the Law Association as well asMadras High Court Advocates Association andcaused extensive damages to the Bookshelves aswell as to the books kept therein.(xvi) Some of the clippings disclose thateven while taking the injured advocates to theambulance before allowing them to enter into theambulance van, severe beating was meted out tosuch injured advocates without any mercy.(xvii) Though the severity of the situationindisputably commenced after 2.00 pm and ended byaround 6.30 pm none of the concerned policeofficers namely the Commissioner of Police,Additional Commissioner of Police, jurisdictionalJoint Commissioner of Police and jurisdictionalDeputy Commissioner of Police either on their ownor at the instance of the Hon’ble Acting ChiefJustice were prepared to meet him and apprise himof the seriousness of the situation.(xviii) the order dated 19.02.2009, passedby the Full Bench headed by the Hon’ble ActingChief Justice himself, disclose that the HighCourt was totally unaware of the game plan of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ police headed by the Commissioner of Police tilla report was filed by the Commissioner of Policethat too after repeated persistence on18.03.2009.(xix) The situation which developed after12.00 noon was not a spontaneous one posing athreat perception for the police to act but wasone which was developed and fuelled by the policethemselves which went out of control and theconsequence was a piquant situation in which thepolice themselves were placed.(xx) The beating of lawyers was notrestricted to the High Court campus alone, it wascarried beyond the campus and the video clippingsdisclose that the policemen were chasing thelawyers in some of the streets opposite to theHigh Court premises on the northern side wheremany of the lawyers have got their own chambers.(xxi) All the top officers namely the ChiefSecretary, Home Secretary, Director General ofPolice, Additional Director General of Police andthe Commissioner of Police assembled in theActing Chief Justice Chambers where a Full Benchwas constituted on 19.02.2009 at around 6.40 pm,that is, after the extensive damage was done tothe personnel and the premises of the High Court.(xxii) realizing the enormity of thesituation, the team of top officials referred toabove who were given a personal hearing by theFull Bench came forward to straight away agreefor an enquiry of the whole incident by the CBI.(xxiii) The injured advocates, staff andothers numbering more than 130 were all givenfirst aid in the Government Hospital and werelater admitted in private hospitals for which theState had to shell out a sum of Rs.32,97,595/-.(xxiv) Similarly for the damaged vehiclescompensation to the tune of Rs.10,63,953/- has sofar been disbursed through the High Court fromthe funds provided by the State Government.(xxv) the aftermath of the incident on19.02.2009, was still worse, in as much as, theHigh Court did not function on the next day i.e.on 20.02.2009 which was a Friday and also on23.02.2009 and 24.02.2009, i.e. the followingMonday and Tuesday. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (xxvi) Though the advocates who were onboycott from 29.01.2009 for the cause ofSrilankan Tamils withdrew their boycott andstarted attending Courts on 19.02.2009, in thelight of the occurrence on 19.02.2009, theycontinued their boycott subsequently also whichcould be brought to an end only on and from23.03.2009.(xxvii) City Civil Court and the Court ofSmall Causes as well as the subordinate Courtsalso did not work from 20.02.2009 upto27.02.2009. Further the City Civil Court and theCourt of Small Causes could resume their workonly from 02.03.2009.(xxviii) Because of the unprecedentedoccurrence on 19.02.2009, the animosity betweenthe police and the advocates also got aggravatedand consequently the policemen were reluctant toaccompany the remand prisoners to the Court andconsequently the Judicial Magistrate’s had to goto the concerned Jail or sub-jail to pass ordersof remand. Such a situation was prevailing formore than a month.(xxix) in and around the High Court campussince the lawyers were protesting against theaction of the police, the normal traffic gotdisrupted on the NSC Bose Road and the publicwere put to great inconvenience.(xxx) Such a situation also created gravetension till the advocates resumed their work onand from 23.03.2009.(xxxi) on 19.02.2009, itself the B-4 PoliceStation located inside the High Court campus wasset on fire and extensive damage was caused toits property.(xxxii) on 20.02.2009, a vehicle belongingto the fire service was set on fire and thevehicle was completely burnt into ashes.178. A consideration of the prevalence of the abovecircumstances cannot be treated in a light-hearted manner. In otherwords, by virtue of the unprecedented unsavory incident that occurredon 19.02.2009, the institution namely the Judiciary in the State ofTamil Nadu from the top to bottom was totally paralyzed for whichwhomsoever was responsible is bound to answer and face the necessaryconsequences. As stated by us earlier, the enormity of the situationwas something extraordinary which cannot be dealt with lightly. We https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ say so because the occurrence must be an eye opener for everyone boththe lawyers as well as the police in future and under nocircumstances, either this institution namely the Judiciary or anyother constitutional machinery or for that matter other limbs of theState could afford to face such a situation by shifting theresponsibilities or fault on somebody else or any group of persons. The Court will be failing in its duty if appropriate measures are nottaken to protect its status, glory and dignity and thereby instilconfidence in the minds of everyone that the Judiciary will upholdits authority and status at times when people cry for justice and itwill not leave any stone unturned in order to achieve that goal.179. With the above point of view in mind when we consider someof the decisions cited by the members of the bar we find that thedecision reported in (2004) 5 SCC 26 (Daroga Singh Vs. B.K.Pandey)was more or less identical to the case on hand. That was also a casewhere for one single individual who was a policeman a group ofpolicemen indulged in vandalism under the direct supervision of thehigher officials which necessitated the Court to initiate appropriatecontempt action and out of 26 police personnel who were issued withshow cause notice for contempt, 18 of them were imposed withpunishment which was also upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Itwill be sufficient to make a reference to the extracted part of thatdecision in the earlier part of this order.180. While considering the submissions of Dr.Rajeev Dhavan thatthe police have got every authority to remain in the premises, thatthe immunity as has been provided to the Parliament and its memberscannot be applied to the Courts and Judiciary are concerned, we doagree with the said submission of the learned senior counsel. But wehave spelt out our own reasons as to why we were not in a position toaccept his submission that threat perception of this Court warrantednot only their mere presence but also indulging in certain seriousactions such as lathi charge etc., in order to hold that no furtherdirection need be necessary. With great respect to the learnedsenior counsel, we hold that the various factors which has weighedwith this Court and referred to above constraints, this Court to holdthat the action of the police who were under the command of four highlevel police officers namely the Commissioner of PoliceMr.K.Radhakrishnan, Additional Commissioner of PoliceMr.A.K.Viswanathan, jurisdictional Joint Commissioner of PoliceMr.M.Ramasubramani and the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner ofPolice Mr.Prem Anand Sinha are squarely responsible and consequentlythey are bound to answer to this Court as to why action for contemptshould not be taken against them for having deranged the prestigiousinstitution namely the Judiciary of the State by paralyzing itsactivities due to unprecedented and uncontrolled act ofindiscriminate lathi charge and consequential extensive damagescaused to men and material inside the High Court campus between 2.00pm and 6.30 pm on 19.02.2009. The plea of Dr.Rajeev Dhavan that theact of the police was not intentionally done cannot therefore beaccepted. Therefore, any amount of apology offered does not deserveany merit for acceptance. Question No.(vi) is thus answered as above. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ QUESTION No.(v):-181. Though one may feel what remains after the above order asagainst the police, we feel that as the highest Court of this State,some of the naked truth about the conduct of the lawyers also callsfor reformation. We are fully conscious of the status of a lawyer inthe society and by calling for a reformation, we do not mean anydisrespect to the profession. With all the responsibilitiesinstilled in this Court while at the same time being part of thelegal fraternity, we will be failing in our duty if some of thefactors which have developed in the recent past are not brought tolight and the lawyer’s community is directed to focus their attentionmore towards their greater assistance in the implementation of lawand service to the society instead of providing any scope forunscrupulous elements to take advantage of enormous wealth andstrength of power inbuilt in the legal profession for achieving theirunlawful objectives. 182. In this context, we are obliged to refer to the untrammeledsubmission of Mr.R.C.Paul Kanakaraj, learned counsel representing thelawyers and who is also the President of the Madras High CourtAdvocates Association, in the course of his submissions when he madeit clear that their agitation which commenced on 29.01.2009, in thecourse of which whatever methods adopted by them was only for thecause of the Sri Lankan Tamil citizens who were treated harshly inthe neighbouring country namely Sri Lanka. The learned counsel alsosubmitted that whomsoever indulged in any other criminal activitiesagainst whom criminal cases were launched is not supported by theassociation of lawyers and the police will be at liberty to proceedagainst them in the manner known to law and the association or itsmembers did not and will not support any such alleged criminalactivities indulged in by any of the accused in those incidents.183. While appreciating the fair statement made by the Presidentof the Madras High Court Advocates Association, we are bound to pointout that the abstaining of Courts by the lawyers for whatever reasonit may be does not behove well. There are umpty number of variousother methodologies by which without causing hurt to any one orwithout causing damage to any one and without disrupting thefunctioning of the Courts, the lawyers who belong to a nobleprofession can display their protest which would draw the attentionof the concerned authorities with much more care and concern. It isnot for this Court to suggest as to what those other peacefulmethodology that can be resorted to.184. At this juncture it will not be out of place to remindourselves of the fact that the Father of our Nation the great MahatmaGandhi, who fought for the Independence of this Country was himself amember of the legal fraternity. Every one of the other leadersnamely Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Dr.Ambedkar,Dr.Rajaji, Dr.Jaykar, Alladi Krishnasamy Iyer and very many othergreat personalities who constituted the Constitution Assembly wereall lawyers. In other words, the Magna Carta of this Country, namely https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the Constitution was framed by those great personalities who allbelonged to the Lawyers community by exerting and toiling their mind,body and soul for nearly three long years i.e between 1947 and 1950and that ultimately the Constitution was dedicated to the Nation on26.01.1950. 185. It was for these reasons that the legal profession wasalways placed in a high esteem by every other member of this Societyand such confidence is still reposed in this profession as it has nowbecome a settled position that it is the lawyers who can lead thisCountry in every other pursuit, also by virtue of the wealth ofknowledge and know-how, learnt and retained by them. When that be thecredibility of the profession, the time has now come for everyone whois part of this institution namely the legal fraternity to stand upand question to thyself whether we are proceeding in the rightdirection. For the sake of immediate attention we also wish to listout certain statistics relating to boycott of Courts at the instanceof the lawyers. The following are the details of boycott by lawyersin each district of Tamil Nadu during the years 2006, 2007, 2008 and2009:TOTAL NUMBER OF DAYS OF BOYCOTT BY LAWYERSIN EACH DISTRICT IN TAMIL NADU DURINGTHE YEARS 2006, 2007, 2008 & 2009DETAILS FURNISHED BY THE PRINCIPAL DISTRICT JUDGES1. COIMBATORE DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Coimbatore City1143156b)Tiruppur232436c)Pollachi572836d)Udumalpet432836e)Valparai54636f)Mettupalayam310442g)Palladam542436h)Avinashi4428362. CUDDALORE DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Cuddalore1413408b)Panruti20307518c)Chidambaram2020147d)Neyveli2616417e)Portonovo9251917 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09f)Tittangudi792617g)Katumannarkovil14373h)Virudhachalam236638233. DHARMAPURI DISTRICT: District Court constituted on 17.02.2008PLACE20082009 upto31.08.09a)Dharmapuri4776b)Harur2546c)Pennagaram2713d)Pappireddypatti1517e)Palacode1254. DINDUGULPLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Dindugul30213753b)Palani3655-19c)Kodaikanal422417NoResolutionReceived bythe DistrictCourtd)Nilakottai16532562e)Vedasandur19333129f)Natham221-47g)Oddanchatram--24215. ERODE DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Combined court building, Erode,472523 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09b)Addl District Court, FTC IV,Bhavani71630c)Sub-Court, Bhavani61537d)I Addl District Munsif Court,Bhavani81530e)Judicial Magistrate, Bhavani6143034f)Fast Track Court No.III, Gobi6351g)Sub-Court, Gobi6351h)District Munsif Court, Gobi6351i)Judicial Magistrate No.I, Gobi6351j)Judicial Magistrate No.II, Gobi635131k)Judicial Magistrate,Satyamangalam34821l)District Munsif Court, Kangeyam44120m)Fast Track Court No.III,Dharapuram126431n)Sub-Court, Dharapuram126431o)District Munsif Court,Perundurai12611p)DM-cum-JM, PerunduraiNilNil621q)DM-cum-JM, Kodumudi8225286. KANCHEEPURAM DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Kancheepuram3888Entire periodfrom 01.01.09to 31.08.09b)Pallipattu2---c)Tambaram621318d)Thirukalikundram211017e)Maduantakam132423f)Uthiramerur15313g)Alandur15421h)Chengalpattu111519i)Sriperumbudur---1 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

7. KANNIYAKUMARI DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Nagercoilb)Bhoothapandyc)Padmanabhapuramd)Eraniele)Kuzhithurai41675882696969698. KARUR DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Karur453254b)Kulithalai253946479. KRISHNAGIRI DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Krishnagirib)Hosurc)Denkanikottaid)Uthangaraie)Pochampalli538236222726232410. MADRAS DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09MADRASNIL 8832 11. MADURAI DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09Madurai58614744 12. NAGAPATTINAM DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Nagapattinam1051818b)Mayiladuthurai1592923 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09c)Sirkali1191824d)Thiruvarur33830e)Thiruthuraipoondi661314f)Mannargudi652416g)Nannilam1251234h)Vedaranyam--2513. NAMAKKAL DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Namakkalb)Tiruchengodec)Rasipuramd)Paramathy2366823943384414. NILGIRI DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Ooctacamund455064b)Gudalur3199c)Coonoor24NILd)KothagiriNil3Nil5215. PERAMBALUR DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Perambalurb)Ariyalurc)Jayankondam2738751393716. PUDUCHERRY DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Puducherry193070b)Karaikal212048 ½c)Mahe---d)Yanam52-47 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

17. PUDUKOTTAI DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09Pudukottai3146682518. RAMANATHAPURAM DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Ramanathapuram526845b)Parmakudi425544c)Mudukalathur645538d)Kamuthi492946e)Thiruvadanai234033f)Rameswaram6955334619. SALEM DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Salemb)Athurc)Sankagirid)Mettur1625194141435220. SIVAGANGAI DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)District Court, Sivagangai614659b)CJM Court, Sivagangai614659c)Sub Court, Sivagangai614659d)DT. Munsif Court Sivagangai614659e)JM Court No.I, Sivagangai614659f)JM Court No.II, Sivagangai61465938g)Sub Court, Devakottai401941h)DT. Munsif Court, Devakottai401941i)JM Court, Devakottai40194144j)PDM Cum JM Court, Karaikudi50503540 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09k)Addl.DM Court, Manamadurai505035l)PDM cum DM Court,Manamadurai403046m)Addl. DM cum JM Court,Manamadurai40304648n)DM cum JM Court, Tirupathur25114238o)DM cum JM Court, Illyangudi2049244221. THANJAVUR DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09Thanjavur3434394622. THENI DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Theni46204426b)Periyakulam49209426c)Uthamapalayam27156622d)Bodinayackanur35614330e)Andipatti5432433323. TIRUCHIRAPALLI DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Tiruchirapallib)Manapparaic)Thuraiyurd)Musirie)Lalgudi111642633635418324. THOOTHUKUDI DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Thoothukudi41476140b)Kovilpatti35515068c)Srivaikuntam61236341 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09d)Sathankulam44516145e)Tiruchendur16237839f)Vilathikulam3640604225. TIRUNELVELI DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Tirunelveli3774555e)Ambasamudram35345480b)Cheramahadevi25163075c)Tenkasi21523842d)Shencottah20443144f)Sankarankovil28385448g)Sivagiri19375447h)Nanguneri28333150i)Valliyoor4359356626. TIRUVALLUR DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Tiruvallur1+3135645b)Poonamallee1+88121c)Ponneri1422d)ThiruvottriyurNil2723e)Tiruttani13141627. THIRUVANNAMALAI DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Thiruvannamalai16252923b)Polur3-2822c)Cheyyar632821d)Arni3172112e)Chengam372832f)Vandavasi22233431 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

28. TIRUVARUR DISTRICT: District Court constituted on 20.09.2008PLACE20082009 upto31.08.09a)Tiruvarur430b)Mannargudi516c)Nannilam113429. VELLORE DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Vellore50395043b)Arcot--3940c)Wallajah-393237d)Ranipet33332640e)Solinghur5159335f)Tirupattur52213448g)Ambur19101335 1/2g)Vaniyambadi71411833i)Arakkonam339524j)Gudiyatham6452794030. VILLUPURAM DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Villupuramb)Tindivanamc)Gingeed)Kallakurichie)Ulundurpetf)Vanurg)Tirukoilurh)Sankarapuram254268445353393229215 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

31. VIRUDHUNAGAR DISTRICT:PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09a)Virudhunagar385923b)Srivilluputhur252545c)Rajapalayam1258d)Sivakasi314838e)Sattur515948f)Aruppukottai44253962TOTAL NUMBER OF DAYS OF BOYCOTT BY LAWYERS INTHE PRINCIPAL SEAT OF MADRAS HIGH COURT& MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURTDURING THE YEARS 2006, 2007, 2008 & 2009.PLACE2006200720082009 upto31.08.09Madras High CourtParticulars notavailable35Madurai Bench of Madras HighCourtParticulars notavailable37Boycott Particulars received from the Madras High Court Advocates' Association for the year 2009 Sl.NoDateReasonNo. ofdays129.01.2009to09.02.2009Condemning the Sri Lankan Governmentperpetrating genocide against Tamilians inSri Lanka.8211.02.2009to12.02.2009After one day's work, MHAA continued theboycott2317.02.2009to23.03.2009Opposing the amendments made to Cr.P.C.including the 19.02.2009 clash betwen thepolice and the advocates.234'06.07.2009Condemning the Government of Tamil Nadufor not complying with the Hon'ble HighCourt's Order dated 18.03.2009 in respectof 19.02.2009 attach on lawyers.1531.07.2009As per the call given by the Federation ofDistrict and Subordinate Courts AdvocatesAssociation and to take action against theofficers who committed offence on19.02.2009.1 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

186. A cursory glance of the above particulars shows that verymany man-days of the Courts were lost. Since there is hue and cryeverywhere that delayed justice is denied justice, it is imperativethat the boycott of Courts by lawyers is stopped once and for all. 187. In fact on days of boycott, when out of necessity some ofthe parties appear before us, however much, the Court exhibit itsanxiety to go for the rescue and render justice, it should be statedthat due to inexperience and over anxiety of the parties they areeither not in a position to place the facts in full before the Courtand thereby disable the Court to render full justice and in manycases, the parties because of their inability to express theirgrievance remain as silent sufferers. 188. In this context, the submission of the learned AdvocateGeneral that the image of the lawyers in the opinion of the commonman is highly eroded though may appear to be bit harsh is the realfact which has to be accepted with a pinch of salt. There is no gainsaying that as lawyers belong to a very high clan and as suchentitled for certain privileges in the Society, while at the sametime when they fail to fulfill the obligations arising out of suchstatus which the lawyers community is obliged to reciprocativelydisplay to the Society at large, the same would certainly gain animpression adverse to their interest. In this context, the furtherfact remains as to, of the whole lot of the lawyers how many of themare really interested in abstaining from Courts. Therefore, it ishigh time that the Associations take a very pragmatic approach andtake a firm decision to resort to any other passive method by whichthey can exhibit their protest in a subtle way instead of resortingto Boycott of Courts. 189. Apart from resorting to boycott, in the recent past thesituation has become so vulnerable that certain other personality inthe Society wanted to take advantage of the lawyers unity to achievetheir other goals. In fact in the decision reported in (2007) 2 MLJ1 (Madras High Court Advocates Association Vs State of Tamil Nadu)the Division Bench of this Court has taken pains to analyze thevarious factors relating to boycott being resorted to by the membersof the Bar where this Court has noted that because of such frequentagitation either at district level or at the state level they werebeing treated shabbily by the police in the Society. This Court alsopointed out that as a sequel to the frequent boycott of Courts, thework in the Courts suffer to a very large extent and that it may evenparalyze the functioning of the judiciary which will be totallyagainst public interest. The Division Bench has expressed its anguishin the following words in paragraph 18 of its order:“18. We are constrained to observe that whilegoing through the norms fixed for the SubordinateCourts and when remarks have been received frommany of the Subordinate Courts that the normshave not been able to be achieved because of theprolonged strike by the advocates. This is aserious issue and if it is allowed to proceed, itmay even paralyse the functioning of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ judiciary, which is not in public interest.”(Emphasis added)The Division Bench ultimately though it fit to constitute a Committeeat the State Level as stated in paragraph 22.1 of its order whichreads as under:“22.1. The lessons learnt from the agitationsleading to the ordering of a Commission ofInquiry indicates certain things. One preciousjudicial time was wasted due to the lawyersagitations. The decision to go on Court boycottwas rather emotional than based on reason,because both the Commissions found in all thethree incidents referred to them were that theincidents complained of was either exaggerated orthat the lawyers for whom the Bar went on strikewere themselves were on the wrong. The otherlesson was that the stake (sis State) was notresponding to the issue of Court boycott withutmost seriousness and was procrastinating infinding a proper solution. In the ultimateanalysis the issue arising out of the directaction of the Bar requires an urgent andappropriate intervention. The need of the houris to evolve a suitable mechanism which canquickly find a solution to any unpleasant stand-off between the Bar and Police in future. Ultimately this alone will prevent a situationleading to catastrophy. Appointment ofCommissions of Inquiry are not only timeconsuming but with enormous cost energies arewasted. Further, in a probe by an independentauthority the Police is not the losers and theyneed not apprehend any partisan probe. In bothCommissions, the report was balanced and theCommissioners found that in a surchargedatmosphere the truth was the casualty.”Again in paragraph 23, the Division Bench issued certain directionsas to how the working of the Committee should be made more purposefulwhich is as follows:“23. It goes without saying that the constitutionof the Committee is the need of the hour and theCourt cannot afford to lose its precious judicialtime due to the frequent Court boycotts indulgedby the advocates and, therefore, we direct theState of Tamil Nadu (first respondent herein) toimmediately issue the administrative G.O.constituting the Committee, in any event, withina period of two weeks’ from the date of receiptof a copy of this order. In view of theconstitution of the Committee with the highestdignitaries of the State, it is expected that themembers of the Bar, respective Bar Associations https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ including their Federations and the Tamil NaduState Bar Council will hereafter maintain utmostrestraint in giving a call for any Court boycottand as agreed to by them, despite anyprovocation. They are expected to approach theState Level Co-ordination Committee formed with aview to resolve any accusation made against thePolice regarding their misbehaviour towards themembers of the Bar and abide by the decision ofthe Committee in this regard.”190. In an earlier decision of this Court reported in 1995Cri.L.J. 1956 (In Re: Rajendran and others), the Division Bench heldas under in paragraph 56 and 97:“56. Mrs.Prabha Sridevan, President, WomenLawyers’ Association, submitted that the after-noon incident had a close connection with themorning closure of gates Advocates as well aspolicemen, were important limbs, for the formerwere right protectors – while the latter were lawenforcers. The tension, if any, between themmust be comfortably resolved. Re-orientationprogrammes must be organized.* * * * *97. We are very clear and let us transmit acertain message. We are totally conscious, thatwe have dealt with the contemners, ratherlightly, but that has been the outcome afterserious and thought provoking process and thepositive response of ours, to the fervent,sincere and responsible plea, backed up withpurposeful panorama of a possible good ear ahead,made by learned senior counsel, learned AdvocateGeneral and the Presidents of variousAssociations of Advocates. Let not any one walkout of this Court Hall with an impression, thatwhatever be the gravity of the offence, one couldalways escape lightly. The instant untowardincident, has been analysed by all concerned, andthe answer in unison was that let this episodeserve as a sure foundation or eye opener forfostering of a better tomorrow, with an assurancethat recurrence, if any, though chances may bebleak, will have to be gravely taken note of andappropriate punishment meted out.”191. In this context it will be worthwhile to refer to some ofthe decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2001) 1 SCC118 (Ramon Services (P) Ltd. Vs. Subhash Kapoor), (2003) 2 SCC 45(Harish Uppal (Ex-Capt.) Vs. Union of India) and (2006) 9 SCC 295(Common Cause, A Registered Society Vs. Union of India). https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

192. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has extensively dealt with thevarious pit falls in the boycott resorted to by the Advocates andhave held as under in paragraph 35 in the decision reported in (2003)2 SCC 45 (Harish Uppal (Ex-Capt.) Vs. Union of India)“35. In conclusion, it is held that lawyers haveno right to go on strike or give a call forboycott, not even on a token strike. The protest,if any is required, can only be by giving pressstatements, TV interviews, carrying out of courtpremises banners and/or placards, wearing blackor white or any colour armbands, peaceful protestmarches outside and away from court premises,going on dharnas or relay fasts etc. It is heldthat lawyers holding vakalats on behalf of theirclients cannot refuse to attend courts inpursuance of a call for strike or boycott. Alllawyers must boldly refuse to abide by any callfor strike or boycott. No lawyer can be visitedwith any adverse consequences by the Associationor the Council and no threat or coercion of anynature including that of expulsion can be heldout. It is held that no Bar Council or BarAssociation can permit calling of a meeting forpurposes of considering a call for strike orboycott and requisition, if any, for such meetingmust be ignored. It is held that only in therarest of rare cases where the dignity, integrityand independence of the Bar and/or the Bench areat stake, courts may ignore (turn a blind eye) toa protest abstention from work for not more thanone day. It is being clarified that it will befor the court to decide whether or not the issueinvolves dignity or integrity or independence ofthe Bar and/or the Bench. Therefore in such casesthe President of the Bar must first consult theChief Justice or the District Judge beforeadvocates decide to absent themselves from court.The decision of the Chief Justice or the DistrictJudge would be final and have to be abided by theBar. It is held that courts are under noobligation to adjourn matters because lawyers areon strike. On the contrary, it is the duty of allcourts to go on with matters on their boards evenin the absence of lawyers. In other words, courtsmust not be privy to strikes or calls forboycotts. It is held that if a lawyer, holding avakalat of a client, abstains from attendingcourt due to a strike call, he shall bepersonally liable to pay costs which shall be inaddition to damages which he might have to payhis client for loss suffered by him.” (Emphasisadded) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

193. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under in paragraph 4of the decision reported in (2006) 9 SCC 295 (Common Cause, ARegistered Society Vs. Union of India)“4. The Constitution Bench has, in Ex Capt. HarishUppal case culled out the law in the followingterms: (SCC pp.64 & 71-74, paras 20-21 & 34-36)“20. Thus the law is already well settled. Itis the duty of every advocate who has accepteda brief to attend trial, even though it may goon day to day and for a prolonged period. Itis also settled law that a lawyer who hasaccepted a brief cannot refuse to attend courtbecause a boycott call is given by the BarAssociation. It is settled law that it isunprofessional as well as unbecoming for alawyer who has accepted a brief to refuse toattend court even in pursuance of a call forstrike or boycott by the Bar Association orthe Bar Council. It is settled law that courtsare under an obligation to hear and decidecases brought before them and cannot adjournmatters merely because lawyers are on strike.The law is that it is the duty and obligationof courts to go on with matters or otherwiseit would tantamount to becoming a privy to thestrike. It is also settled law that if aresolution is passed by Bar Associationsexpressing want of confidence in judicialofficers, it would amount to scandalising thecourts to undermine its authority and therebythe advocates will have committed contempt ofcourt. Lawyers have known, at least sinceMahabir Singh case that if they participate ina boycott or a strike, their action is exfacie bad in view of the declaration of law bythis Court. A lawyer’s duty is to boldlyignore a call for strike or boycott of court(s). Lawyers have also known, at least sinceRamon Services case, that the advocates wouldbe answerable for the consequences suffered bytheir clients if the non-appearance was solelyon grounds of a strike call.21. It must also be remembered that anadvocate is an officer of the court and enjoysspecial status in society. Advocates haveobligations and duties to ensure smoothfunctioning of the court. They owe a duty totheir clients. Strikes interfere withadministration of justice. They cannot thusdisrupt court proceedings and put interest oftheir clients in jeopardy. ***** https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

34. One last thing which must be mentioned isthat the right of appearance in courts isstill within the control and jurisdiction ofcourts. Section 30 of the Advocates Act hasnot been brought into force and rightly so.Control of conduct in court can only be withinthe domain of courts. Thus Article 145 of theConstitution of India gives to the SupremeCourt and Section 34 of the Advocates Actgives to the High Court power to frame rulesincluding rules regarding condition on which aperson (including an advocate) can practise inthe Supreme Court and/or in the High Court andcourts subordinate thereto. Many courts haveframed rules in this behalf. Such a rule wouldbe valid and binding on all. Let the Bar takenote that unless self-restraint is exercised,courts may now have to consider framingspecific rules debarring advocates guilty ofcontempt and/or unprofessional or unbecomingconduct, from appearing before the courts.Such a rule if framed would not have anythingto do with the disciplinary jurisdiction ofthe Bar Councils. It would be concerning thedignity and orderly functioning of the courts.The right of the advocate to practise envelopsa lot of acts to be performed by him indischarge of his professional duties. Apartfrom appearing in the courts he can beconsulted by his clients, he can give hislegal opinion whenever sought for, he candraft instruments, pleadings, affidavits orany other documents, he can participate in anyconference involving legal discussions, he canwork in any office or firm as a legal officer,he can appear for clients before an arbitratoror arbitrators etc. Such a rule would havenothing to do with all the acts done by anadvocate during his practice. He may even filevakalat on behalf of a client even though hisappearance inside the court is not permitted.Conduct in court is a matter concerning thecourt and hence the Bar Council cannot claimthat what should happen inside the court couldalso be regulated by them in exercise of theirdisciplinary powers. The right to practise, nodoubt, is the genus of which the right toappear and conduct cases in the court may be aspecie. But the right to appear and conductcases in the court is a matter on which thecourt must and does have major supervisory andcontrolling power. Hence courts cannot be andare not divested of control or supervision of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ conduct in court merely because it may involvethe right of an advocate. A rule can stipulatethat a person who has committed contempt ofcourt or has behaved unprofessionally and inan unbecoming manner will not have the rightto continue to appear and plead and conductcases in courts. The Bar Councils cannotoverrule such a regulation concerning theorderly conduct of court proceedings. On thecontrary, it will be their duty to see thatsuch a rule is strictly abided by. Courts oflaw are structured in such a design as toevoke respect and reverence to the majesty oflaw and justice. The machinery fordispensation of justice according to law isoperated by the court. Proceedings inside thecourts are always expected to be held in adignified and orderly manner. The very sightof an advocate, who is guilty of contempt ofcourt or of unbecoming or unprofessionalconduct, standing in the court would erode thedignity of the court and even corrode itsmajesty besides impairing the confidence ofthe public in the efficacy of the institutionof the courts. The power to frame such rulesshould not be confused with the right topractise law. While the Bar Council canexercise control over the latter, the courtsare in control of the former. This distinctionis clearly brought out by the difference inlanguage in Section 49 of the Advocates Act onthe one hand and Article 145 of theConstitution of India and Section 34(1) of theAdvocates Act on the other. Section 49 merelyempowers the Bar Council to frame rules layingdown conditions subject to which an advocateshall have a right to practise i.e. do all theother acts set out above. However, Article 145of the Constitution of India empowers theSupreme Court to make rules for regulatingthis practice and procedure of the courtincluding inter alia rules as to personspractising before this Court. SimilarlySection 34 of the Advocates Act empowers HighCourts to frame rules, inter alia to lay downconditions on which an advocate shall bepermitted to practise in courts. Article 145of the Constitution of India and Section 34 ofthe Advocates Act clearly show that there isno absolute right to an advocate to appear ina court. An advocate appears in a courtsubject to such conditions as are laid down bythe court. It must be remembered that Section30 has not been brought into force, and this https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ also shows that there is no absolute right toappear in a court. Even if Section 30 were tobe brought into force control of proceedingsin court will always remain with the court.Thus even then the right to appear in courtwill be subject to complying with conditionslaid down by courts just as practice outsidecourts would be subject to conditions laiddown by Bar Council of India. There is thus noconflict or clash between other provisions ofthe Advocates Act on the one hand and Section34 or Article 145 of the Constitution of Indiaon the other.35. In conclusion, it is held that lawyershave no right to go on strike or give a callfor boycott, not even on a token strike. Theprotest, if any is required, can only be bygiving press statements, TV interviews,carrying out of court premises banners and/orplacards, wearing black or white or any colourarmbands, peaceful protect marches outside andaway from court premises, going on dharnas orrelay fasts, etc. It is held that lawyersholding vakalats on behalf of their clientscannot refuse to attend courts in pursuance ofa call for strike or boycott. All lawyers mustboldly refuse to abide by any call for strikeor boycott. No lawyer can be visited with anyadverse consequences by the Association or theCouncil and no threat or coercion of anynature including that of expulsion can be heldout. It is held that no Bar Council or BarAssociation can permit calling of a meetingfor purposes of considering a call for strikeor boycott and requisition, if any, for suchmeeting must be ignored. It is held that onlyin the rarest of rare cases where the dignity,integrity and independence of the Bar and/orthe Bench are at stake, courts may ignore(turn a blind eye) to a protest, abstentionfrom work for not more than one day. It isbeing clarified that it will be for the courtto decide whether or not the issue involvesdignity or integrity or independence of theBar and/or the Bench. Therefore in such casesthe President of the Bar must first consultthe Chief Justice or the District Judge beforeadvocates decide to absent themselves fromcourt. The decision of the Chief Justice orthe District Judge would be final and have tobe abided by the Bar. It is held that courtsare under no obligation to adjourn mattersbecause lawyers are on strike. On the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ contrary, it is the duty of all courts to goon with matters on their boards even in theabsence of lawyers. In other words, courtsmust not be privy to strikes or calls forboycotts. It is held that if a lawyer, holdinga vakalat of a client, abstains from attendingcourt due to a strike call, he shall bepersonally liable to pay costs which shall bein addition to damages which he might have topay his client for loss suffered by him.36. It is now hoped that with the aboveclarifications, there will be no strikesand/or calls for boycott. It is hoped thatbetter sense will prevail and self-restraintwill be exercised. The petitions standdisposed of accordingly.”The Court also dealt with the role of BarCouncils on the following terms: (SCC pp. 66-68, paras 25-26) “25. In the case of Supreme Court Bar Assn.v. Union of India it has been held thatprofessional misconduct may also amount tocontempt of court (para 21). It has furtherbeen held as follows: (SCC pp.444-46, paras79-80)‘79. An advocate who is found guilty ofcontempt of court may also, as alreadynoticed, be guilty of professionalmisconduct in a given case but it is for theBar Council of the State or Bar Council ofIndia to punish that advocate by eitherdebarring him from practice or suspendinghis licence, as may be warranted, in thefacts and circumstances of each case. Thelearned Solicitor General informed us thatthere have been cases where the Bar Councilof India taking note of the contumacious andobjectionable conduct of an advocate, hadinitiated disciplinary proceedings againsthim and even punished him for “professionalmisconduct”, on the basis of his having beenfound guilty of committing contempt ofcourt. We do not entertain any doubt thatthe Bar Council of the State or Bar Councilof India, as the case may be, when apprisedof the established contumacious conduct ofan advocate by the High Court or by thisCourt, would rise to the occasion, and takeappropriate action against such an advocate.Under Article 144 of the Constitution “allauthorities, civil and judicial, in the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ territory of India shall act in aid of theSupreme Court”. The Bar Council whichperforms a public duty and is charged withthe obligation to protect the dignity of theprofession and maintain professionalstandards and etiquette is also obliged toact “in aid of the Supreme Court”. It must,whenever facts warrant, rise to the occasionand discharge its duties uninfluenced by theposition of the contemnor advocate. It mustact in accordance with the prescribedprocedure, whenever its attention is drawnby this Court to the contumacious andunbecoming conduct of an advocate which hasthe tendency to interfere with dueadministration of justice. It is possiblefor the High Courts also to draw theattention of the Bar Council of the State toa case of professional misconduct of acontemnor advocate to enable the State BarCouncil to proceed in the manner prescribedby the Act and the rules framed thereunder.There is no justification to assume that theBar Councils would not rise to the occasion,as they are equally responsible to upholdthe dignity of the courts and the majesty oflaw and prevent any interference in theadministration of justice. Learned counselfor the parties present before us do notdispute and rightly so that whenever a courtof record records its findings about theconduct of an advocate while finding himguilty of committing contempt of court anddesires or refers the matter to beconsidered by the Bar Council concerned,appropriate action should be initiated bythe Bar Council concerned in accordance withlaw with a view to maintain the dignity ofthe courts and to uphold the majesty of lawand professional standards and etiquette.Nothing is more destructive of publicconfidence in the administration of justicethan incivility, rudeness or disrespectfulconduct on the part of a counsel towards thecourt or disregard by the court of theprivileges of the Bar. In case the BarCouncil, even after receiving “reference”from the Court, fails to take action againstthe advocate concerned, this Court mightconsider invoking its powers under Section38 of the Act by sending for the record ofthe proceedings from the Bar Council andpassing appropriate orders. Of course, theappellate powers under Section 38 would be https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ available to this Court only and not to theHigh Courts. We, however, hope that such asituation would not arise.80. In a given case it may be possible, forthis Court or the High Court, to prevent thecontemnor advocate to appear before it tillhe purges himself of the contempt but thatis much different from suspending orrevoking his licence or debarring him topractise as an advocate. In a case ofcontemptuous, contumacious, unbecoming orblameworthy conduct of an Advocate-on-Record, this Court possesses jurisdiction,under the Supreme Court Rules itself, towithdraw his privilege to practise as anAdvocate-on-Record because that privilege isconferred by this Court and the power togrant the privilege includes the power torevoke or suspend it. The withdrawal of thatprivilege, however, does not amount tosuspending or revoking his licence topractise as an advocate in other courts ortribunals.’Thus a Constitution Bench of this Court hasheld that the Bar Councils are expected torise to the occasion as they are responsibleto uphold the dignity of courts and majestyof law and to prevent interference inadministration of justice. In our view it isthe duty of the Bar Councils to ensure thatthere is no unprofessional and/or unbecomingconduct. This being their duty no BarCouncil can even consider giving a call forstrike or a call for boycott. It followsthat the Bar Councils and even BarAssociations can never consider or takeseriously any requisition calling for ameeting to consider a call for a strike or acall for boycott. Such requisitions shouldbe consigned to the place where they belongviz. the waste-paper basket. In case anyAssociation calls for a strike or a call forboycott, the State Bar Council concerned andon its failure the Bar Council of India mustimmediately take disciplinary action againstthe advocates who give a call for strike andif the committee members permit calling of ameeting for such purpose, against thecommittee members. Further, it is the dutyof every advocate to boldly ignore a callfor strike or boycott.26. It must also be noted that courts arenot powerless or helpless. Section 38 of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Advocates Act provides that even indisciplinary matters the final AppellateAuthority is the Supreme Court. Thus even ifthe Bar Councils do not rise to the occasionand perform their duties by takingdisciplinary action on a complaint from aclient against an advocate for non-appearance by reason of a call for strike orboycott, on an appeal the Supreme Court canand will. Apart from this, as set out inRamon Services case every court now shouldand must mulct advocates who hold vakalatsbut still refrain from attending courts inpursuance of a strike call, with costs. Suchcosts would be in addition to the damageswhich the advocate may have to pay for theloss suffered by his client by reason of hisnon-appearance.”Apart from reiterating the above law, we do notpropose to take any further action. The contemptnotices stand discharged.” (Emphasis added)194. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under in paragraphs22, 23 and 25 in the decision reported in (2001) 1 SCC 118 (RamonServices (P) Ltd. Vs. Subhash Kapoor)“22. Generally strikes are antithesis of progress,prosperity and development. Strikes by theprofessionals including the advocates cannot beequated with strikes undertaken by the industrialworkers in accordance with the statutory provisions.The services rendered by the advocates to theirclients are regulated by a contract between the twobesides statutory limitations, restrictions andguidelines incorporated in the Advocates Act, therules made thereunder and rules of procedure adoptedby the Supreme Court and the High Courts. Abstainingfrom the courts by the advocates, by and large, doesnot only affect the persons belonging to the legalprofession but also hampers the process of justicesometimes urgently needed by the consumers ofjustice, the litigants. Legal profession isessentially a service-oriented profession. Therelationship between the lawyer and his client isone of trust and confidence.23. With the strike by the lawyers, the process ofcourt intended to secure justice is obstructed whichis unwarranted under the provisions of the AdvocatesAct. Law is no trade and briefs of the litigants notmerchandise. This Court in Bar Council ofMaharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar placed on record itsexpectations from the Bar and observed: (SCC pp.301-02, para 24) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ “24. We wish to put beyond cavil the newcall to the lawyer in the economic order. Inthe days ahead, legal aid to the poor andthe weak, public interest litigation andother rule-of-law responsibilities willdemand a whole new range of responses fromthe Bar or organised social groups withlawyer members. Indeed, the hope ofdemocracy is the dynamism of the newfrontiersmen of the law in this developingarea and what we have observed againstsolicitation and alleged profit-making vicesare distant from such free service to thecommunity in the jural sector as part of theprofession’s tryst with the people of India.”*****25. This Court in Tahil Ram Issardas Sadarangani v.Ramchand Issardas Sadarangani while deprecating thedecreasing trend of service element and increasingtrend of commercialisation of legal profession,pointed out that it was for the Members of the Barto act and take positive steps to remove such animpression before it is too late. By striking work,the lawyers fail in their contractual andprofessional duty to conduct the cases for whichthey are engaged and paid. In Common Cause, A Regd.Society v. Union of India it was observed: (SCC p.558, para 1) “Since litigants have a fundamental right tospeedy justice as observed in HussainaraKhatoon (I) v. Home Secy., State of Bihar itis essential that cases must proceed whenthey appear on board and should notordinarily be adjourned on account of theabsence of the lawyers unless there arecogent reasons to do so. If cases getadjourned time and again due to cessation ofwork by lawyers it will in the end result inerosion of faith in the justice deliverysystem which will harm the image and dignityof the court as well.”195. Taking a clue and guided by the above decisions we statethat time has now come for this Court to put things straight and makethe message loud and clear that hereafter under the guise of boycottof Courts no hindrance should be caused to the litigant public or theworking of the Court.196. As far as the guidelines issued by the Government of Indiafor preserving the security of this institution is concerned as perthe direction contained in the relevant letter No.VI.23014/79/2005-VS, dated 31.05.2007 and the subsequent order dated 17.11.2008 and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the steps taken by the Madras High Court Security Committee revisingthe Security arrangement system as was implemented from 28.01.2009,should be restored forthwith.197. The imposition of ban ordered by the Division Bench in thedecision reported in (2007) 2 MLJ 1 (Madras High Court AdvocatesAssociation Vs State of Tamil Nadu) should be strictly enforced.198. The ban imposed (W.P.No.7646 of 2006 dated 20.06.2006) forany one to hold meeting inside the High Court campus other thanregular meetings of the Association or any special meetings in theirassociation premises shall be strictly adhered and no political partyaffiliation shall be permitted inside the High Court campus and otherCourt premises throughout the State for holding any meeting ordemonstration or any other form of agitation inside the premises. 199. In this context, the recent order of the Hon’ble SupremeCourt in this case itself dated 26.02.2009, namely that the advocatesshould not cause any disturbance to the Court proceedings and shouldnot shout slogans inside the Court premises as well as no meetingshould be held in the Court premises without the permission of theChief Justice except other meetings in their Association premisesshall be implemented forthwith by the Registry.200. Having expressed our grave concern of the litigant publicand the emergent need of this institution to come up to theexpectations of the public at large, we hold that by implementing thesevere security measures approved by the Security Committee of thisCourt in the interest of the institution, the implementation of itwill be unscrupulously followed and it will be the responsibility ofthe members of the Bar to extend their cooperation in itsimplementation. Question No.(v) is answered in the above terms.201. As far as the various criminal cases listed out in betweenpages 167 and 243 of the Respondents Volume-I is concerned, if thereis no other impediment by way of Court orders or otherwise there isno reason why the police should fail to prosecute those proceedingswithout any further delay. 202. Having thus answered the various questions posed forconsideration and having regard to our consensual conclusion onvarious issues, we deem it appropriate to give our common conclusionsand directions contained in paragraph Nos. 602 to 607. * * * * *R.BANUMATHI, J.203. I had the benefit of going through the Order of my learnedBrother Justice F.M.Ibrahim Kalifullah,J. I fully agree with theviews of my learned Brother. While concurring with conclusions anddirections, I wish to express my views on the various issues andcontentious points raised. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

204. In respect of unfortunate incident on 19.2.2009 in the HighCourt campus, on 19.2.2009 the Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice hadpassed suo-moto order which was taken up in W.P.No.3335/2009.W.P.Nos.3703, 3704, 3705 and 3910/2009 came to be filed by variousLawyers Association praying to initiate appropriate proceedingsagainst those Officers responsible for the brutal attack on theAdvocates in the High Court campus on 19.02.2009.205. Since all the Writ Petitions and Crl.O.Ps. arise out of thesame facts and the issue and question of law involved are one and thesame, all the Writ Petitions and Crl.O.Ps. were taken up together anddisposed by this Common Order. For the sake of convenience, theparties (particularly the Respondents) are referred to, as per theirarray in W.P.No.3705/2009.206. Events prior to 19.02.2009:-For quite some time, the lawyers practising in Madras High Courtand the Subordinate Courts owing allegiance and sympathizing withthe cause of Sri Lankan Tamils resorted to organising meetings anddemonstrations in and around High Court premises. Condemninggenocide of Tamils in Sri Lanka, lawyers decided to boycott theCourts from 29.01.2009 in support of innocent Tamil population in SriLanka. The function of the Courts were paralysed by the Advocates onstrike and those Advocates who were discharging their professionalduty were forced to come out of the Court Halls.207. On 17.2.2009, Writ Appeal Nos.181 to 183/2009 relating totaking over of the administration of Chidambaram Natarajar Templewere listed for hearing in the Court of Justice P.K.Misra andK.Chandru, JJ. At about 10.00 A.M. Dr. Subramaniam Swamy, Presidentof Janata Party who has been given 'Z' category protection by theGovernment came to Court Hall No.III and was waiting in the Court toargue his case to implead himself in the said pending Writ Appeals.At about 11.45 A.M., 20 Advocates, who were allegedly agitating insupport of Sri Lankan Tamils came to the Court shouting sloganscondemning the Central and State Governments and the Police.Shouting slogans against Dr. Subramaniam Swamy, the group ofagitating lawyers attacked Dr. Subramaniam Swamy and also the Policewho tried to intervene. The slogans shouted by the lawyers in Tamilwere recorded by the Division Bench of this Court in its order as"Brahmin dog down down, and Rajiv Gandhi killer go away". The orderfurther states that the crowd had shouted many other filthy slogansand such unruly behaviour continued for about 15 minutes despitewarnings given by the learned Judges. The learned Judges directedthe Registry to place the said order before the Hon'ble ACJ and alsodirected to forward a copy of order to the Hon'ble The Chief Justiceof India.208. Regarding the incident in Court Hall No.III, complaint wasalso lodged on 17.2.2009 with the Inspector of B4-High Court PoliceStation by Mr.Khader Moideen, Asst. Commr of Police who was alsoinjured. After obtaining written concurrence from the Registrar-General of High Court [12th Respondent] on 18.2.2009, a case was https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ registered in Crime No.13/2009 under Sec.147, 451, 355, 332, 506(ii)294(b) and 153-A IPC.209. On 18.2.2009, Advocate Gini Leo Immanuel who was an accusedin Crime No.13/2009 on the file of B4-High Court Police Stationregistered in connection with the assault on Dr. Subramaniam Swamy on17.2.2009 was arrested on 18.2.2009. He was produced before theGeorge Town Court and remanded to judicial custody.210. Occurrence on 19.2.2009: Pleadings and Averments in Petitions:On 19.2.2009 Dr. Subramaniam Swamy appeared in connectionwith the same Natarajar Temple case and also in another Court.Extensive security cover was given by the Police and personallysupervised by the 10th Respondent- Mr.Viswanathan, AdditionalCommissioner of Police, Law and Order [Addl. CoP] and JCP (North)Mr.Ramasubramani and Dr. Subramaniam Swamy's visit passed offpeacefully. After departure of Dr. Subramaniam Swamy, 11th Respondent,Joint Commissioner of Police [JCP] - Mr.Ramasubramani and DeputyCommissioner of Police (DCP), Flower Bazaar [12th respondent inW.P.No. 3910/2009] – Mr.Prem Anand Sinha and DCP, Puliyanthope (13thRespondent in W.P.No.3910/2009) - Mr.Panneerselvam and Police partywent to B2-Esplanade Police Station for a debriefing and also to giveinstructions on the security measures to be taken during the nexthearing date on 26.2.2009 when Dr. Subramaniam Swamy will againappear in the High Court. At about 12.00 noon Mr.Vijayendran,advocate went to B2-Esplanade Police Station asking for list ofadvocates shown as accused in Crime No.13/2009. At about 2.00 P.M.,large number of Advocates including Advocates Tvl. Karuppan,Rajinikanth, Vijayendran, Pugazhenthi and Jayakumar went to B4-HighCourt Police station located inside the High Court campus [just nearCity Civil Court, Chennai] volunteering to surrender in CrimeNo.13/2009. They also shouted slogans demanding registration of caseagainst Dr. Subramaniam Swamy as pre-condition to surrender.211. On the instructions of DCP- Mr.Prem Anand Sinha,Mr.Sethuraman, Inspector of Police attached to B4-High Court PoliceStation, on the complaint given by Mr.Rajinikanth, Advocateregistered a case in Crime No.14/2009 u/s.3(1)(x) SC/ST [Preventionof Atrocities Act] Act and under Sec.506(ii) IPC against Dr.Subramaniam Swamy and Radha Mohan and furnished copy of FIR to theAdvocates. Around 2.18 – 2.30 P.M., crowd of Advocates shoutedslogans demanding arrest of Dr. Subramaniam Swamy. After receivingcopy of FIR, Advocates are said to have shouted slogans that Policeshould immediately arrest Dr. Subramaniam Swamy and Advocates refusedto surrender. 212. Hearing those developments, on the direction from the 7thRespondent-CoP, 10th Respondent Mr.Viswanathan-Addl. CoP [L&O], Mr.Sandeep Rai Rathore-JCP [Central Zone] [9th Respondent inW.P.No.3910/2009], Mr.Sarangan-DCP, Kilpauk [11th Respondent inW.P.No.3910/2009] came to the High Court Police Station to arrest theAdvocates present there so as to maintain Law and Order. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

213. At about 3.00 P.M., Addl. CoP [L&O] and JCP [Central Zone],2 Deputy Commissioner of Police, 9 Assistant Commissioner of Police,11 Inspectors, 4 Sub-Inspector of Police and 90 TSP men (in all 118)came as an additional strength. Mr.Ramasubramani, JCP (North Zone)[11th Respondent] tried to speak to few of the lawyers for surrenderbut without result.214. On seeing the Advocates gathering, 11th Respondent – JCP(North)-Mr.Ramasubramani instructed the police party to apprehend theAdvocates involved in 17.2.2009 incident and at 3.45 P.M. few of themwere apprehended and also those who obstructed the arrest were madeto board into the Police van for effecting arrest. Even when theAdvocates were arrested, the other Advocates have abused the Policeand indulged in violent activities by throwing stones on thePolicemen. The arrested Advocates were taken to Thousand LightsPolice Station.215. After the Advocates were arrested and taken, there werepelting of stones by both sides. According to the Police, afterwarnings and on seeing the continued violent activities, 10thRespondent -Addl. CoP (L&O) [Mr.Viswanathan] who was the senior mostofficer present in the spot consulted with other senior officers andtook collective decision to declare the assembly as 'unlawful' and todisperse it. Further, according to the Police, even after suchwarnings, the unruly mob continued their violent activities. DCP-Mr.Prem Anand Sinha, ordered to fire teargas shells and accordinglyteargas shells were fired. Police ordered lathicharge to dispersethe unlawful assembly. Thereafter, there were continued stonepelting by both sides. Lawyers, litigant public, Police Officers andJustice Arumuga Perumal Adhityan who came to pacify both groupssustained injuries. It is alleged that at about 5.30 P.M., a mob ofAdvocates have set fire to the said Police Station. When firetender vehicle was brought to douse the fire, the unruly mob ofAdvocates are said to have thrown stones on the fire tender vehicle.Since the violent activities continued, 7th Respondent-CoP afterdiscussing with the other senior officers present in the spot orderedlathicharge again. Fire was extinguished. Regarding the incidents,Inspector of B2-Esplanade Police Station gave a report to theAssistant Commissioner of High Court Police Station and based on thereport a case was registered in Crime No.15/2009 under Sec.147, 353,332, 450, 436 and 307 IPC read with Sec.3(1)(x) of SC/ST [Preventionof Atrocities] Act and Sec.3(i) TNP(PDL) Act against the lawyers.216. Having learnt about the grave situation, the ACJ remainedin contact with the Officers, viz., Chief Secretary, Government ofTamil Nadu, Commissioner of Police, Chennai and Home Secretary.Bench comprising of ACJ held the sitting at 7.40 P.M. The FirstBench directed the 7th Respondent-CoP and 11th Respondent-JCP [North]to file a report on the following issues:-(a) " ...... under whose authority the Policeentered the High Court premises to arrest certainaccused from the High Court campus;(b) at whose instance the order was issued for https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ lathicharge by the police and swift action force;(c) who are the Police Officers/Police Personnelresponsible for the Police excess within the Courtcampus;First Bench also directed the CBI to investigate into the incidents.First Bench also directed the State Government to file status report.217. Three teams headed by Registrars were constituted to takevideographs with regard to the damages caused within the High Courtpremises and also in the Court buildings. Committee of Judges wasalso constituted to report as to the damages caused in the premises.218. Tense situation prevailed on 20th February 2009 andsubsequently. On the administrative side, in order to restore thenormal working condition and to safeguard the court properties and toenable collection of materials and evidence by the Investigatingagency regarding the incidents that took place on 19th February 2009,Full Court has taken a decision that Principal Seat of Madras HighCourt and Madurai Bench of Madras High Court and all SubordinateCourts and Tribunals under the supervision of Madras High Courtsituated within the State of Tamil Nadu and Union Territory ofPondicherry to be closed on 20.2.2009, 23.2.2009 and 24.2.2009. Inview of extensive damages caused, City Civil Court and Small CausesCourt, Chennai remained closed till 27.2.2009 and re-opened only on02.3.2009.219. By the order dated 26.2.2009 in W.P.No.94/2009, the Hon'bleSupreme Court requested Mr. Justice B.N.Srikrishna, former Judge,Supreme Court of India to inquire into the incident which happened on19th February 2009 and the terms of reference to the Committee to begiven by the Hon'ble ACJ of Madras High Court. The Supreme Courtinter alia issued direction to assess the damages caused to thevehicles as well as Court buildings/furnitures and directed the StateGovernment to place a sum of Rs.25 lakhs at the disposal ofRegistrar-General for the immediate relief and repair work.220. By the order dated 18.3.2009, Full Bench of this Courtdirected the State Government to initiate disciplinary proceedingsagainst 10th Respondent – Mr.Viswanathan-Addl. CoP and 11th Respondent– Mr.Ramasubramani-JCP (North) as they were the persons who were inthe helm of affairs under whose supervision the operation was carriedon and that they should be placed under suspension. Aggrieved by thesaid Order, both the Officers approached the Supreme Court in S.L.P.(Civil) No.7540/2009. By the Order dated 14.7.2009, the matter wasagain sent back to this Court for giving an opportunity of beingheard. After the matter was remanded to this Court, Mr.Viswanathan-Addl. CoP was represented by learned counsel Mr.V.Selvaraj, whereasMr.Ramasubramani-JCP (North) was represented by Mr. P.N.Prakash. CoPand other Police officers were represented by the Senior CounselDr.Rajeev Dhavan. Mr.Sandeep Rai Rathore-JCP (Central) wasrepresented by Senior Counsel Mr.I.Subramaniam. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

221. By G.O.Ms.No.229 Public (Law & Order B) dated 09.3.2009,Mr.N.Sundaradevan, IAS, Principal Secretary/Commissioner of RevenueAdministration, Chepauk, Chennai was appointed as One Man Commissionto inquire into the Police action and fix responsibility for thealleged excesses committed during Law and Order incidents whichoccurred in the campus of High Court, Madras on 19.2.2009.222. Averments in the counter-affidavits:-Public and Rehabilitation Secretary Mr. P.Jothi Jagarajan [2nd Respondent] who is also holding additional charge of Secretary,Home Department [3rd Respondent] filed counter stating that the Policepersonnel, if found to be responsible for excesses committed would besuitably punished through departmental action based on the report ofOne Man Committee. The Secretary had also referred to various stepstaken by the State Government to fix the responsibility and thatRs.61 lakhs was placed at the disposal of the Registrar-General toreimburse the medical expenses incurred by the Advocates and to paycompensation to the damages caused to their vehicles.223. Terming it as a serious Law and Order problem, 7thRespondent-CoP [Mr.Radhakrishnan] filed counter denying avermentsthat Police had deliberately violated the human rights of lawyers.CoP averred that Police had used only minimum force to chase away theAdvocates and the Advocates relentlessly continued their unrulyactivities. The situation and circumstances were such that thePolice had to resort to lathicharge; but for which, the life andsafety of the public and the Policemen would have been in peril. CoPhas further averred that it was the collective decision taken by thesenior officers to lathicharge to bring the situation under control.224. The then Addl. CoP Mr.Viswanathan [10th Respondent] filedcounter stating that CoP informed him that arrest of lawyers wasalready cleared by the ACJ and obeying the orders of the CoP, theOfficers present at the High Court Police Station have arrested theAdvocates. It is further averred that he and other Police Officerswanted withdrawal of Police from the High Court campus and in view ofthe order of CoP, they remained inside the High Court campus.According to Mr.Viswanathan-Addl. CoP, the CoP himself reached B2-Esplanade Police Station at about 4.00 P.M. and at about 4.30 P.M.,the CoP came to the High Court Police Station with additionalreinforcement of Armed Police and only on the orders of CoP teargasshells was fired at 4.45 P.M. and it was followed by lathicharge.225. In response to the counter-affidavit filed byMr.Viswanathan-Addl. CoP, 7th Respondent – CoP [Mr.Radhakrishnan]filed reply counter-affidavit stating that there was no occasion forany apprehension since accused Advocates themselves contacted theconcerned senior officers proposing to surrender. 7th Respondent –CoP denied that Addl. CoP had raised concern over arresting of thosewho wanted to surrender in connection with the incident in Court HallNo.III on 17.2.2009 when Dr. Subramaniam Swamy was attacked. CoP hadalso denied Mr.Viswanathan's averments that CoP arrived at the HighCourt Police Station at 4.30 P.M. with more than 100 Armed Police https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ personnel and ordered teargas shells to be lobbed at 4.45 P.M.followed by lathicharge. According to CoP ordering lathicharge wasthe collective decision taken by him and other senior police officerspresent to handle the grave situation.226. Referring to the happenings on 17.2.2009 and the meetingheld by the ACJ on 18.2.2009, 11th Respondent Mr.Ramasubramani-JCP hasfiled counter stating that after safe passing of Dr. SubramaniamSwamy, the Police party assembled at B2 Police Station fordebriefing. At that time Advocate Mr.Vijayendran came there askinglist of Advocates shown as accused in Crime No.13/2009 of B4-HighCourt Police Station to enable them to surrender and because of turnof events, the Officers and men did not disperse but stayed back inB2-Esplanade Police Station waiting for the surrender of wantedAdvocates. It is further averred that at around 2.00 P.M., AdvocatesMr.R.Karuppan and Mr.Rajinikanth and others along with number ofAdvocates came to B4-High Court Police Station and those Advocatesvolunteered to surrender in connection with the incident in CourtHall No.III on 17.2.2009 and insisted for registration of caseagainst Dr.Subramaniam Swamy. On receiving information,Mr.Ramasubramani - JCP (North) rushed to B4-High Court PoliceStation. Referring to registration of case in Crime No. 14/2009u/s.3(1)(x) SC/ST [Prevention of Atrocities Act] Act and underSec.506(ii) IPC against Dr. Subramaniam Swamy and Ms.Radha Mohan, JCP(North) has averred that Advocates involved in the occurrence on17.2.2009 and others resisting the arrest were taken to custody andwere taken to Thousand Lights Police Station. It is further averredthat the situation was so tense, Mr.Prem Anand Sinha-DCP, FlowerBazaar Police Station declared the assembly as 'unlawful' and orderedlathicharge. It is further averred that the situation was so chaoticand he had no occasion to keep track of the exact time of arrival ofCoP.227. Mr.Prem Anand Sinha, jurisdictional DCP [12th Respondent inW.P.No.3910/2009] filed counter referring to the bandobustarrangements in connection with Dr. Subramaniam Swamy's appearance on19.2.2009. It is averred that after safe passage of Dr. SubramaniamSwamy, all of them gathered in B2-Esplanade Police Station fordebriefing. On hearing about the gathering of Advocates in B4-HighCourt Police Station, Mr.Ramasubramani-JCP (North) and jurisdictionalDCP Mr.Prem Anand Sinha and other Officers went to B4-High CourtPolice Station. It is further averred that on the insistence fromAdvocate Mr.R.Karuppan and other Advocates, a case in CrimeNo.14/2009 was registered against Dr.Subramaniam Swamy under Sec.3(1)(x) SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and under Sec.506(ii) IPC.It is further averred that thereafter the Advocates shouted slogansseeking for immediate arrest of Dr. Subramaniam Swamy. According toMr.Prem Anand Sinha, at about 3.00 P.M., the Addl. CoP (L&O) and JCP(Central Zone), 2 DCPs, 9 ACs, 11 Inspectors, 4 Sub-Inspectors and 90TSP men (in all 118) came as an additional strength. According toMr. Prem Anand Sinha, on the orders of Addl. CoP (L&O), the gatheringwas declared as "unlawful assembly" and after so declaring, Mr. PremAnand Sinha ordered to fire teargas shells. Since, lawyers continuedwith stone pelting, in consultation with the Addl. CoP and JCP https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (North), lathicharge was ordered. At 5.00 P.M, CoP came to the HighCourt premises and directed withdrawal of Police force and return toB2-Esplanade Police Station. It is further averred that at 5.30P.M., two wheelers and B4-High Court Police Station were set on fireand there was further lathicharge.228. Mr.Sandeep Rai Rathore-JCP (Central Zone) [9th Respondent inW.P.No.3910/2009] has filed counter stating that on the instructionsof Addl. CoP (L&O), he came to the High Court premises at 3.00 – 3.15P.M. Reiterating the averments in the counter-affidavit of Mr.PremAnand Sinha-DCP, Mr.Sandeep Rai Rathore-JCP (Central Zone) hasfurther averred that he is not the jurisdictional officer and notdirectly involved in the decision making and ordering lathicharge andtherefore, he is not responsible.229. Mr.Sarangan-DCP [11th Respondent in W.P.No.3910/2009] hasfiled counter-affidavit stating that he has sustained injuries on hisleft shoulder, fore-arm and chest.230. The other Officers viz., Mr.Anup Jaiswal-Addl. DGP (Int);Mr.Sunil Kumar-Addl. CoP (Traffic); Mr.Gunaseelan-JCP (SouthChennai); Mr.Panneerselvam-DCP; Mr.Anbu-DCP; Mr.Sridhar-DCP; Mr.JoshiNirmal Kumar-DCP; Mr.Thirugnanam-DCP (Traffic-North) [RespondentNo.4,7,10,13 to 17 in W.P.No.3910/2009 respectively] and Jayakodi,Inspector of Police, B2-Esplanade Police Station [3rd Respondent inW.P.No.3703/2009] have also filed counter-affidavits stating that totackle the situation, it was necessary to use the minimum force todisperse mob of advocates involved in the violent activities. It isfurther averred that only on the orders of the superior officers,they went to the High Court premises. According to these officers,they are not the jurisdictional officers and not responsible for theincident.231. CONTENTIONS OF LAWYERS Contending that it was a pre-planned attack, Mr.S.Prabakaran,President, Tamil Nadu Advocates Association has submitted that whenit was natural for the Advocates to assemble in the Court, there wasno justification for terming the gathering as "unlawful assembly".He further contended that Police were chasing the Advocates andransacked their offices at NSC Bose Road, Thambu Chetty street andother areas which would indicate that Police were venting their angeragainst the Advocates. Taking us through the individual affidavitsand pointing out the contradictions thereon, he would further submitthat in view of the discrepancy in the claims whether actualclearance was given by the Hon'ble ACJ, it is necessary for the Benchto issue notice to the then Hon'ble ACJ for clarifying thecontradictions. Mr. S.Prabakaran further submitted that an'invisible' hand directed the operation and the same 'invisible' handis now protecting all the personnel involved in the violence fromcriminal prosecution. He would further submit that inspite of theinjuries inflicted upon many Advocates, vehicles damaged and CourtHalls were ransacked by the Police force, so far not even a singlecase has been registered against even one constable. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

232. Submitting that act of lawyers cannot be equated with anyother unruly mob, the learned counsel Ms. R.Vaigai made elaboratesubmissions inter alia raising the following contentions:-➢Excess was committed by the Police personnel withimpunity and the then CoP cannot avoid theresponsibility;➢Before accepting the alleged voluntary surrender,Police must have foreseen the consequences ofdeployment of force on 19.2.2009;➢Police impelled by animosity against the lawyersmercilessly beaten them and rampaging Police ransackedthe Court premises which disrupted functioning of theCourt which would amount to criminal contempt ofcourt;➢In so far as initial reaction of lawyers, on seeingthat their fellow lawyers being taken to custody, itwas natural reaction on the part of the lawyers toprotest. Gathering and any other natural reaction oflawyers cannot be termed as 'unlawful assembly'warranting deployment of more personnel andlathicharge.;➢Procedure of Police Standing Order 703 to disperse thecrowds was not followed;➢Contrary to the stand of CoP, he was well present inthe campus even around 4.30 P.M., the then CoP is tobe squarely held responsible.233. Ms. Vaigai further submitted that for deployment of Policeforce prior permission of Registrar-General ought to have beenobtained and that the precincts of High Court is a protected area andthat permission ought to have been obtained before arresting thelawyers. In support of her contention, Ms. Vaigai placed relianceupon (1980) 2 SCC 559 [Niranjan Singh and another v. PrabhakarRajaram Kharote and others]; 1983 Crl LJ 1866 [State of UP v. Deg RajSingh and others]; (1987) 3 SCC 434 [State of UP v. Niyamat andothers]; (1994) 6 SCC 442 [Mohd. Aslam @ Bhure Acchan Rizvi v. UoIand others]; (1995) 3 SCC 757 [Dhananjay Sharma v. State of Haryanaand others]; 1995 Supp (3) SCC 736 [Secretary, Hailakandi BarAssociation v. State of Assam and another]; (1996) 4 SCC 742 [Punjab& Haryana High Court Bar Association v. State of Punjab and others];(1997) 1 SCC 416 [D.K.Basu v. State of WB]; AIR 2000 Delhi 266[Dr.B.L.Wadehra v. State (NCT of Delhi) and others]; (2000) 2 SCC 465[Chairman, Railway Board and others v. Chandrima Das and others];(2004) 5 SCC 26 [Daroga Singh and others v. B.K.Pandey]; 2004 (5) CTC612 [Devan, formerly the Inspector of Police, Needamangalam PoliceStation, Needamangalam, Tiruvarur District] and (1996) 6 SCC 323[Commissioner of Police, Delhi and another v. Registrar, Delhi HighCourt, New Delhi].234. In her reply submissions, learned counsel Ms. Vaigai placedreliance upon 1992 Cri LJ 634 [State of Karnataka v. B.PadmanabhaBeliya and others]; AIR 1956 Raj 179 [Rajasthan Bar Council v. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Nathuram and another]; AIR 1966 SC 740 [Ram Manohar Lohia v. State ofBihar]; 1970 (3) SCC 746 [Madhu Limaye v. Sub Divisional Magistrate,Monghyr]; 1984 (3) SCC 14 [Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar];2003 (7) SCC 749 [Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan v. Vasant Raghunath Dhobleand another]; 2005 (10) SCC 97 [Union of India and another v. ChayaGhoshal and another]; 2007 (2) MLJ 1 [Madras High Court AdvocateAssociation v. State of Tamil Nadu]; 2007 (4) SCC 474 [Destruction ofPublic and Private Properties, In Re:]; 2007 (4) CHN 842 [Associationfor Protection of Democratic Rights v. State of West Bengal andothers]; 2008 (4) MLJ 763 [Coimbatore Bar Association v. State ofTamil Nadu]; 2008 (5) SCC 89 [Pulin Das @ Panna Koch v. State ofAssam]; 2009 Cri LJ 854 [Chairman, Bar Council of TN v. State ofTamil Nadu and others] and 1898 ILR MDS (21) 249 [Queen Empress v.Subba Naik]. 235. Contending that Respondents have not answered the questionraised by the Court under what authority Police entered the premises,Mr. R.C.Paul Kanagaraj, President, Madras High Court AdvocatesAssociation [MHAA] has submitted that when lawyers were forciblytaken to the custody, the other lawyers gathered to rescue thelawyers and such reaction and gathering of lawyers cannot be termedas 'unlawful assembly'. He would further submit that all the rulesof Police Standing Orders to disperse the crowds was given a go byeand without following the procedure, lathicharge was ordered. Mr.R.C.Paul Kanagaraj would further contend that dispersal of gatheringof lawyers by use of force was with a deliberation and violation ofSec.129 Cr.P.C. and the Police Standing Orders. He would furthersubmit that the higher Police officials and also Police personnel areto be proceeded with for contempt of court for disrupting the Courtactivities and closure of High Court and other Courts in the premisesfor three days and six days respectively.236. Senior Counsel Mr. R.Krishnamurthy, President Madras BarAssociation for themselves and onbehalf of Women Lawyers' Associationsubmitted that Police officers who ordered lathicharge should beidentified and action should be taken against them and other higherofficers should be collectively held responsible. Drawing ourattention to the inconsistencies in the counter-affidavits, Mr.R.Krishnamurthy, learned Senior Counsel would submit that thecounter-affidavits are contradictory to each other and theresponsible Police officers ought to have come to the Court withclear averments. Questioning the propriety of Mr. N.SundaradevenOne Man Committee, learned Senior Counsel would further submit thatMr. N.Sundaradeven One Man Committee cannot be expected to be fairand that it would not reflect the correct statement and the One ManCommittee might not deliberate upon the misdeeds of higher officials.In support of his contention learned Senior Counsel placed relianceupon 1980 (2) SCC 559 [Niranjan Singh and another v. PrabhakarRajaram Kharote and others].237. Mr. T.V.Ramanujam, learned Senior Counsel submitted thatthe Police attack on the lawyers was an onslaught upon theInstitution and deterrent orders has to be passed against them. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

238. Mr. N.G.R.Prasad, learned counsel has submitted thatlawyers agitation on the Sri Lankan Tamils issue was causingembarrassment to the Government and, the attack on lawyers was not a'Mere police excess' but was a 'State excess' violating human rights.239. Mr. V.Raghavachari, learned counsel has submitted that lawenforcing agencies have no right to arrest the lawyers within theHigh Court premises. He would further submit that Advocates are theOfficers of the Court and any attack on the Advocates would amount tointerference with the administration of justice. In support of hiscontention, Mr. V.Raghavachari placed reliance upon AIR 1954 Mad 249[Public Prosecutor v. K.G.Sivaswamy and another]; 2007 (4) CHN 842[Association for Protection of Democratic Rights v. State of WB andothers]; 1996 Crl.LJ 1956 [In Re: Rajendran and others]; ILR (1992) 1Delhi 498 [P.V.Kapoor and another v. UoI and another]; AIR 1999Gujarat 316 [State of Gujarat v. Govindbhai Jakhubai and another];AIR 2002 Jharkhand 47 [M/s.Gray Hound Transport Co., v. UoI andothers]; AIR 1970 SC 2015 [E.M.Sankaran Namboodripad v. T.NarayananNambiar]; 1992(240 DRJ 221A [State v. J.P.Singh]; AIR 2002 SC 1375[In Re: Arundhati Roy]; AIR 1964 Calcutta 572 [The State v. DebabrataBandopadhyay, District Magistrate, Nadia and another]; 2001 SCC (Cri)1048 [T.T.Antony v. State of Kerala and others]; AIR 2000 Delhi 266[B.L.Wadehra v. State (NCT of Delhi) and others]; 2009 Crl.LJ 1677[Court on its own motion v. State and others]; (1994) 4 SCC 260[Joginder Kumar v. State of UP and others]; Queen Bench DivisionVol.I (1875) 75 [Smith v. Cook]; 1970 Court of Appeal 114 [Morris andothers v. Crown Office]; 1994 (6) SCC 205 [N.Nagendra Rao and Co., v.The State of Andhra Pradesh]; (2007) Queens Bench 399 [Regina (W) v.Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and another] and MANU/DE/1477/ 2008 [Police Commissioner and others v. Yash Pal Sharma].240. We have also heard Mr. R.Karuppan who filed affidavit andalso made submissions regarding voluntary surrender of Advocates inconnection with Crime No.13/2009 of B4-High Court Police Stationunder Sec.147, 451, 355, 332, 506(ii) 294(b) and 153-A IPC on thefile of B4-High Court Police Station.241. Onbehalf of the State expressing regret over the situation,Mr. P.S.Raman, learned Advocate-General has submitted that Governmentof Tamil Nadu has the highest regard to the Institution and that anyPolice Officer found guilty in the incident by One Man Commissionwould be strictly dealt with. The learned Advocate General submittedthat if the Court finds anyone responsible for the incident on19.2.2009, the State will take appropriate action against theconcerned officers. Learned Advocate-General has taken us throughthe then existing security arrangements to the High Court. LearnedAdvocate-General has also enumerated the steps taken by the StateGovernment and that pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Court,State Government has appointed One Man Committee. Learned Advocate-General has also submitted that Rs.61 lakhs was sanctioned by theGovernment and placed at the disposal of the Registrar-General forpayment of compensation to the injured Advocates and for the damagescaused to the vehicles and the Court buildings for repair. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Elaborating upon various steps taken in protecting the Heritagebuilding, learned Advocate-General interalia appealed to us to usethis opportunity to build a "bridge" between the Bar and Police.242. Taking us through the affidavits and contradictingaverments in the common counter-affidavit, Mr.V.Selvaraj, learnedcounsel for Mr.Viswanathan, Addl CoP [10th Respondent] submitted thatso far as Metropolitan cities are concerned, CoP is incharge of thesame and only at the instance of CoP, Mr.Viswanathan [10th Respondent]came to the High Court campus. Taking us through the call log of thecellphones, learned counsel would further submit that CoP himselfcame to the riot area at about 4.45 P.M. with additional re-enforcement of Police, CoP cannot avoid responsibility by throwingblame upon other persons. Arguing onbehalf of Addl CoP, learnedcounsel further submitted that only between 3.50 – 4.30 P.M., AddlCoP was incharge and during which time, he did not declare any'unlawful assembly' and while so, it was highly improper for the CoPto file report before the Court fixing the responsibility upon AddlCoP.243. Onbehalf of JCP (North) Mr.M.Ramasubramani, expressingsincere apology over unsavoury incident on 19.2.2009,Mr.P.N.Prakash, learned counsel submitted that as jurisdictional JCP,he was present both in the morning and in the afternoon on 19.2.2009.It was submitted that because of the incident on 17.2.2009, there wasa need for mobilising the Police force and the situation was volatilewhich necessitated mobilisation of force in the morning.244. It was further argued that Dr.Subramaniam Swamy who is in'Z' category has to appear the Court on 19.2.2009 and having regardto the happenings on 17.2.2009, Mr.Ramasubramani had taken bonafidedecision in good faith to move the Police force which gathered in B2-Esplanade Police Station for debriefing. Placing reliance upon 1995(II) LW Crl 723 (Rajendran & 23 others/contemnors/Respondents/Police officers/ Advocates of Saidapet Bar) and that inview of the source of power under Sec.41 Cr.P.C., there was no barfor the Police to arrest the Advocates in the Court campus. Takingus through the Typed set of papers, learned counsel would submit thatthere is no consistent version regarding the time and therefore, thetime stated in the order dated 19.2.2009 cannot be taken asconclusive.245. Appearing onbehalf of Mr.Sandeep Rai Rathore, JCP (CentralZone) [9th Respondent in W.P.No.3910/2009], Mr.P.N.Swaminathan,learned counsel submitted that on the direction from the Addl. CoP[Mr.Viswanathan], Mr.Sandeep Rai Rathore, JCP (Central Zone) arrivedin High Court at 3.00 – 3.15 P.M. and reported before the JCP(North). Learned counsel would further submit that Mr.Sandeep RaiRathore was not a jurisdictional officer and no specific command wasassigned to him and therefore, he cannot be held responsible for theincident on 19.2.2009. Learned counsel would further submit thatMr.Sandeep Rai Rathore was not part of decision making ordering https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ lathicharge. Without prejudice to the above contentions, onbehalf ofMr.Sandeep Rai Rathore, an unconditional apology was also expressedfor the incident on 19.2.2009.246. Drawing our attention to long list of incidents ofmisbehaviour by the Advocates and number of Criminal cases registeredagainst the Advocates, Dr.Rajeev Dhavan, learned Senior Counselsubmitted that there was a serious threat perception which justifiedmobilisation of Police force. Learned Senior Counsel would furthersubmit that the attack on Dr.Subramaniam Swamy on 17.2.2009contributed to the threat perception and therefore, mobilisation ofPolice force was only a precautionary measure. Learned SeniorCounsel made persuasive submissions interalia raising the followingcontentions:-(i)Whether presence of Police on the Court premises wasuninvited and what was the level of threat perception;(ii)Difficult and complicated questions of facts areinvolved; reliability and acceptability of evidence andmaterials available cannot be gone into exercisingjurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution ofIndia;(iii)Because of continuous boycott of Advocates and theirdefiant acts in the past, there was serious threatperception which necessitated use of reasonable force;Court cannot comprehend what would have been theanticipated threat;(iv)Since Police officers are Civil Servants entitled toprotection under Article 311 of Constitution, Courtstraightaway cannot order suspension/impose punishmentwithout due process of law by initiation of disciplinaryproceedings; rights available to the Officers for actingbonafide;(v)Absolutely, there was no malafide intention or pre-planned attack to invoke contempt jurisdiction; and (vi)Moulding relief – balance to be adopted and how thereliefs could be moulded, keeping in view of interest ofboth lawyers and Police.247. Pitched battle of lawyers with Police in the Court premiseson 19.2.2009 was the most unfortunate incident; a situation whichshould never happen in future anywhere. Lawyers and the Police aretwo wings of the law-enforcement machinery. They complement eachother in the task of maintaining law and order. It is deplorablethat their relationship has been strained to the extent of indulgingin a pitched battle. The relationship between the lawyers and thepolice has never been particularly good. What happened in the HighCourt was the culmination of such long-standing differences. Thegross impropriety committed by the police on the Court premisesresulted indiscriminate attack on everyone – lawyers, litigants,staff and one High Court Judge. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

248. An unbiased examination of facts would reveal that cultureof boycott of Courts by the lawyers developed in the State in therecent past and provocation of handful of lawyers on 17.2.2009 and19.2.2009 led to this unprecedented incident. Though, we are mainlyconcerned with the developments during and aftermath of 19.2.2009, atthe outset, it is apposite to highlight the high standards fixed forthe lawyers and decadence of values in the legal profession.249. Legal profession – Necessity for maintaining high level of morality and standards:-Because of the good work and services rendered by theprofessionals, they are accorded status and autonomy in the society.It is relevant to quote the following passage from the book HowardGardner's Five Minds for the Future – Chapter 6 – The Ethical Mind –Page 128 [Published by Harvard Business School Press, Boston,Massachusetts]:"We conceptualize a profession as a highly trainedgroup of workers who perform an important service forsociety. In return for serving in an impartial mannerand exercising prudent judgment under complexcircumstances, professionals are accorded status andautonomy." "Work may be good in the sense of being excellent inquality – in our terms, it is highly disciplined.Such work may be good in the sense of beingresponsible – it regularly takes into account itsimplications for the wider community within which itis situated. And such work may be good in the senseof feeling good – it is engaging and meaningful, andprovides sustenance even under challenging conditions......" 250. In AIR 1993 SC 1535 : 1993 (2) SCC 562 [J.S.Jadhav v.Mustafa Haji Mohamed Yusuf], the Supreme Court observed that thelegal profession is regarded to be a noble one. In the inauguraladdress at the Bar Council of India Seminar, Justice Sundara Aiyar,former Judge, Madras High Court spoke that the profession of anadvocate has always been regarded as one of the noblest profession.[See AIR 1961 (15th April) Journal Section]. There is noprofession/class which has done more to develop and defend the humanrights.251. It will be apposite to quote a passage from a celebrateddecision of the Supreme Court in Sanjiv Datta's case (1995) 3 SCC 619- "The legal profession is a solemn and serious occupation. It isa noble calling and all those who belong to are its honourablemembers. Although entry to the profession can be had by acquiringmerely the qualification of technical competence, honour as a conductboth in and outside the court." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

252. The legal profession is most honourable profession, withhigh traditions and with the potentialities for great good in theprogress of orderely society and maintenance of law and order.Lawyers have been in the vanguard of a country's progress and havealways zealously guarded human liberties and the rule of law. For anambitious young man of keen intellect and capacity to work hard, thelegal profession holds unlimited prizes. It gives him an insightinto the character of his fellow-men, into all their weaknesses andall their strength, and an opportunity to do real good by helping inthe proper administration of justice and maintenance of judicialstandards.253. The profession of the advocate is a permanent institutionin the world's justice, coming down through the ages, and garneringtraditions and wisdom from generation to generation for theedification of present and future ones. Client and counsellor,advocate, jury, and judge - their ways and their needs and theirnotions were known and studied in Athens, Rome, England and America.The world's business and its laws may change, but human nature'smotives and foibles have formed a constant element. The psychologyof a law suit is still the great problem for the lawyer; andQuintilian, Scarlett and Choate here come together on common ground[Passage quoted from Page No.6 of P.Ramanatha Aiyer's – Legal andProfessional Ethics – Third Edition, 2003].254. There is a nobility of purpose involved in the professionof the law. There is a chivalry of action. It may be called intoplay any day. It involves the idea that a man can stand forward andbecome the advocate of some person who cannot speak for himself, whowill have the courage and boldness to defend liberty from an assaultupon her citizens, who will have the strength of character todenounce a wrong and who after all will remember that while he owes agreat duty to his profession, he is called upon to give acorresponding duty to his country [Passage quoted from Page No.12 ofP.Ramanatha Aiyer's – Legal and Professional Ethics – Third Edition,2003].255. The American Tycoon Mr. IACOCCA who achieved fame as oneof America's leading Captain of industry was asked to address a groupof prominent lawyers. He said to his captive audience: "As lawyers you are little more equal than the restof us. You are trained to use the freedoms grantedby the Constitution. We all have them, of course,but you know better than the rest of us how to usethem. That is your job. Advocacy is yourprofession. And it is an hon'ble one. TheConstitution might tell us that our rights aresacred, but some times they are not worth a dimeunless people like you, skilled in the law, are able https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ to push them and protect them for us". "In ourdemocracy, the final judges will always be laymenlike me, and all the millions like me, who do notread the Constitution regularly and who may not evenunderstand everything it says. We are the judges ofthe effectiveness of the Constitution and the wisdomof the laws written under it and the integrity of thelegal profession. There is a lawyer in the UnitedStates called Roger Bridges who is engaged inunearthing legal cases in which Abraham Lincolnappeared and argued – this ambitious research projectundertaken by Bridges and his team is called the'Lincoln Legals'. They came across Abraham Lincoln'snotes for a law lecture in 1850. In it he said:"Resolve to be honest at all events; andif in your judgment you cannot be anhonest lawyer, resolve to be honestwithout being a lawyer. Choose some otheroccupation rather than one in the chosingof which you do, in advance, consent to bea knave." "[Passage quoted from Gururaja Chari's Advocacy and ProfessionalEthics – Page No.644 of first Edition, Wadwa and Company].256. As held by the Supreme Court in 1994 (2) LW 187 : (1994) 2SCC 204 (State of U.P. and others v. U.P. State Law OfficersAssociation and others), legal profession is essentially a serviceoriented profession. Lawyers should remember, that service is thekeynote of profession and should not consider it as a mere means oflivelihood. They have great responsibility to protect and promotethe democratic institutions in the country by striving to upholdrule of law.257. Lawyer an Officer of Court – Duties and responsibilities:-The United States has somewhat dubious distinction of havingworld's largest population of lawyers. India comes second in havingworld's largest population of lawyers. No free nation can ignore orforget the judiciary as part of democracy.258. Indian society is multifaceted, multi-racial, multi-religious, and multi-lingual. The greatness, glory and distinctionof this Country lies in unity in diversity. The very fact that weare surviving as a democratic country having a Rule of Law and anindependent judiciary itself is significant. The constitution mighttell that our rights are sacred. But sometimes they are not worth adime unless lawyers skilled in the law are able to push them andprotect them for the citizen.259. No free nation can ignore or forget the importance of Lawof Judiciary. If the Rule of Law has been a success and is evenprogressing in this country, the lawyers and judges are to becredited for their contribution to what is Rule of Law. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

260. The profession of law is a public institution and lawyerdischarges his public duty in so far as he assists in theadministration of justice. The preamble of the chapter on Standardsof professional conduct and Etiquette prescribed by the Bar Councilof India reads as follows:"An advocate shall, at all times, comport himself ina manner befitting his status as an officer of theCourt, a privileged member of the community, and agentleman, bearing in mind that what may be lawfuland moral for a person who is not a member of theBar, or for a member of the Bar in his non-professional capacity may still be improper for anadvocate."261. It takes great intellectual gifts to make a great advocate.No man wins a height at a bar, without a struggle and withoutintellectual power. Here no deception is possible, as in othercases. Not like the clergyman with his ex parte case behind thepulpit; not like the physician with his prescription in the dark; thelawyer's work is done in the broad light of open day, confronted atevery step by able opposition and argument, with the entire publiclooking on. To meet such a test requires the greatest and keenestpowers. The vulgar notion of advocacy that sees nothing in it higherthan an effort to 'before the jury' is a great mistake. Rather it isoften the business of the true advocate to clear and dispel by theelectric heat and lightning of his genius, the fog-bank that hasalready settled there [See from 60 Mich. Reports, Page 1, Eulogy onHon. Chas Stuart, a great Advocate; May on Advocates cited inDonovan's skill in Trials, Page 145].262. Genius indeed will leave its mark in whatever sphere it maymove. But learning, industry and integrity or essential traits inthe profession. Fidelity to the Court, fidelity to the client,fidelity to the claims of truth and honour: these are the matterscomprised in the oath of office of a lawyer.263. There are pitfalls and mantraps at every step, and the mereyouth at the very outset of his career, needs often the prudence andself-denial, as well as the moral courage, which belong commonly toriper years. High moral principle is his only safe guide; the onlytorch to light his way amidst darkness and obstruction. [Passagequoted from Page No.12 of P.Ramanatha Aiyer's – Legal andProfessional Ethics – Third Edition, 2003].264. In (1995) 1 SCC 732 [Indian Council of Legal Aid and Advicev. Bar Council of India], Para (3) the Supreme Court held asfollows:- https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "3. ....... It is generally believed that members ofthe legal profession have certain socialobligations. e.g. to render "pro bono publico"service to the poor and the underprivileged. Sincethe duty of a lawyer is to assist the Court in theadministration of justice, the practice of law has apublic utility flavour and, therefore, he muststrictly and scrupulously abide by the Code ofConduct behoving the noble profession and must notindulge in any activity which may tend to lower theimage of the profession in society. That is why thefunctions of the Bar Council include the laying downof standards of professional conduct and etiquettewhich advocates must follow to maintain the dignityand purity of the profession."265. Observing that the legal profession is a solemn and seriousoccupation, in (1995) 3 SCC 619 : 1995 AIR SCW 2203 [In Re: SanjeevDatta], Para (20), the Supreme Court has stated as follows:-"20. The legal profession is a solemn and seriousoccupation. It is a noble calling and all those whobelong to it are its honourable members. Althoughthe entry to the profession can be had by acquiringmerely the qualification of technical competence,the honour as a professional has to be maintained byits members by their exemplary conduct both in andoutside the Court. The legal profession isdifferent from other professions in that what thelawyers do, affects not only an individual but theadministration of justice which is the foundation ofthe civilised society. Both as a leading member ofthe intelligentsia of the society and as aresponsible citizen, the lawyer has to conducthimself as a model for others both in hisprofessional and in his private and public life.The society has a right to expect of him such idealbehaviour. It must not be forgotten that the legalprofession has always been held in high esteem andits members have played an enviable role in publiclife. The regard for the legal and judicial systemsin this country is in no small measure due to thetireless role played by the stalwarts in theprofession to strengthen them. They took theirprofession seriously and practised it with dignity,deference and devotion. If the profession is tosurvive, the judicial system has to be vitalised.No service will be too small in making the systemefficient, effective and credible." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

266. On the Conduct of Lawyers: As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramon Services (P)Ltd. v. Subhash Kapoor (2001 1 SCC 118), persons belonging to thelegal profession are concededly the elite of the society. Thelawyers, who have been acknowledged as being sober, task-oriented,professionally-responsible stratum of the population, are furtherobliged to utilise their skills for socio-political modernisation ofthe country. The lawyers are a force for the preservance andstrengthening of constitutional government as they are guardians ofthe modern legal system.267. As soon as a lawyer is enrolled as an advocate, he issubject to:- a) the professional code of advocates; andb) disciplinary proceedings for misconduct.268. Section 35(1) of the Advocates Act reads as follows:"35. Punishment of advocates for misconduct:- (1)Where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a StateBar Council has reason to believe that any advocateon its roll has been guilty of professional or othermisconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal toits disciplinary committee".It will be seen that the emphasis is on both the professional andother misconduct.269. Likewise, the Bar Council of India Rules has laid down'Rules governing Advocates, in part IV of the said Rules. Inparticular, Chapter II of that part lays down"Standard of Professional Conduct andEtiquette" The preamble of these Standards states:"An Advocate shall, at all times, comport himself ina manner befitting his status as an officer of thecourt, a privileged member in the community; and agentleman, bearing in mind that what may be lawfuland a moral for a person who is not a member of theBar, or for a member of the Bar in his non-professional capacity may still be improper for anadvocate. Without prejudice to the generality of theforegoing obligation, an advocate shall fearlesslyuphold the interests of his client, and in hisconduct conform to the rules hereinafter mentionedboth in letter and in spirit. The rules hereinaftermentioned contain canons of conduct and etiquetteadopted as general guides; yet the specific mentionthereof shall not be construed as a denial of theexistence of other equally imperative though notspecifically mentioned." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

270. Dilution of Professional Standards:- The moral decadence that has crept into society has notspared the advocates. It is important to underscore that beingrecognised as a member of a profession is not the same acting like aprofessional. Some lawyers fail to honour the central precepts andstrictures of their of calling and nobility of profession. It mustbe remembered that advocate pursues the profession not only for hispersonal enrichment but primarily to help the court in adjudicating adispute according to law. (Emphasis supplied) The law should not bestultified by sanctifying little omissions as fatal flaws. Some ofthe defects may be attributed to the lack of inservice training. Weonly wish that in future Leadership in Bar would endeavour to impartinservice training to new entrants. 271. The ever-growing numerical strength of the advocates andthe ever-shrinking litigation scope have certainly had their impact.Mediocrity, indifference and incompetence on the part of the membersof the profession can seriously vitiate the cause of justice andundermine public confidence in the system.272. Dilution of professional standards and the consequentweakening of the administration of justice have reached disturbingproportions. Professional competence has been eroded to an alarmingextent. A lack of professional discipline and poor standard ofethical conduct pervade the system. The effect is felt in the systemand on its credibility among the people.273. An increasing number of entrants are ill-equipped, poorlytrained with little sense of social accountability. Considerationsof professional competence have been jettisoned to an alarmingextent, leading society to question the very ability of theprofession to correct the distortions and to serve public interest.Ignorance of common man and depravity in the system have led to theunfair and indifferent delivery of legal service.274. Expressing deep concern over the falling standards in thelegal profession, Professor (Dr.) N.R.Madhava Menon, has emphasisedneed for meaningful reforms in the legal profession. We quote -"With unprecedented changes induced by technologyand globalisation, all professions are forced to re-think their methods of management and delivery ofservices. Accountability systems are being mademore transparent and participatory with the objectof controlling commercialisation and improving thequality of services. Even the code of ethics andmethods of disciplining erring members are beingreworked across professions. It is in this context https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ that the Indian legal profession is to be looked atfor seeking reforms."[Article by Professor (Dr.) N.R.Madhava Menon,former Director of National Law School, NationalUniversity of Juridical Sciences and NationalJudicial Academy - Reforming the legalprofession:some ideas – Hindu dated 20th February2008 -].275. In his popular work "The World is Flat" Thomasfriedman hasdetailed on how the progress of globalisation has resulted in a 'flatplaying field'. In the era of globalisation foreign law firms aremaking endeavours to make entry in India. Despite the resistance totheir entry, we understand foreign law firms have tie-ups andassociate offices in India with whom they continue to work. Wheneverywhere there is competence and thriving to excel inprofessionalism, lawyers cannot afford to lag behind.276. Lawyers should not forget that they have glorioustraditions left behind them while the previous generations they haveto maintain those traditions of love and service to the society.Advocates must have exemplary traits of sincerity of purpose. Re-appraisal of professional obligations, decency and decorum should beplaced high on the agenda to check the debasement of advocacy. BarAssociations/Council's need to adopt strategies to improve the imageof the profession. As a whole, lawyers need to elaborate Codes ofEthics even for their fundamental values remain the same. Lawyersneed to take steps to raise their collective consciousness againstunethical practices or violation of professional responsibility. 277. Boycott of Courts by Lawyers:- It must be remembered that Advocate is an Officer of theCourt. Lawyers have obligation and duties to ensure smoothfunctioning of the Court. They owe a duty towards their clients andCourt and society at large. Strikes interfere with theadministration of justice.278. In Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal's case, Supreme Court held thatby very nature of their calling to assist in the dispensation ofjustice, lawyers should not resort to strike. Observing thatAdvocates owe a duty towards clients, in AIR 2001 SC 207 [RamonServices Pvt. Ltd. v. Subhash Kapoor and others] in Para (5), theSupreme Court held as follows:-"5. ... When the advocate who was engaged by a partywas on strike there is no obligation on the part ofthe Court either to wait or to adjourn the case onthat account. Time and again this Court has saidthat an advocate has no right to stall the Courtproceedings on the ground that advocates havedecided to strike or to boycott the Courts or evenboycott any particular Court. Vide U.P.Sales Tax https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Service Association v. Taxation Bar Association,Agra (1995) 5 SCC 716: (1995 AIR SCW 3759 : AIR 1996SC 98 : 1995 All LJ 2052), K.John Koshy v. Dr.Tarakeshwar Prasad Shaw (1998) 8 SCC 624; MahabirPrasad Singh v. Jacks Aviation (1999) 1 SCC 37 :(1998 AIR SCW 3806 : AIR 1999 SC 287); andKolittumottil Razak v. State of Kerala (2000) 4 SCC465.279. While it is true that lawyers have contributed largely inthe fields of human rights, environmental law, socio-economic rights,there are very few professions that have been criticised as legalprofession. Of late, boycotting of Courts has become order of theday. Advocates strike and boycott the Courts at the slightestprovocation overlooking the harm caused to the judicial system ingeneral and the litigant public in particular and to themselves inthe estimate of the general public.280. Observing that striking lawyers failed in their contractualand professional duty and conduct, in AIR 2001 SC 207 [Ramon ServicesPvt. Ltd., v. Subhash Kapoor and others], Para (26) the Supreme Courtheld as under:-"26. Noting casual and indifferent attitude of someof the lawyers and expecting improvement in qualityof service this Court in In Re : Sanjiv Datta,Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Information andBroadcasting, New Delhi (1995) 3 SCC 619 : (1995 AIRSCW 2203 : 1995 Cri LJ 2910) held (para 12 of AIRSCW and Cri LJ):"Of late, we have been coming across severalinstances which can only be described as unfortunateboth for the legal profession and the administrationof justice. It becomes, therefore, our duty tobring it to the notice of the members of theprofession that it is in their hands to improve thequality of the service they render both to thelitigant-public and to the Courts, and to brightentheir image in the society. Some members of theprofession have been adopting perceptibly casualapproach to the practice of the profession as isevident from their absence when the matters arecalled out, the filing of incomplete and inaccuratepleadings – many time even illegible and withoutpersonal check and verification, the non-payment ofCourt-fees and process fees, the failure to removeoffice objections, the failure to take steps toserve the parties, et al. They do not realise theseriousness of these acts and omissions. They notonly amount to the contempt of the Court but dopositive disservice to the litigants and createembarrassing situation in the Court leading toavoidable unpleasantness and delay in the disposalof matters. This augurs ill for the health of ourjudicial system. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ The legal profession is a solemn and seriousoccupation. It is a noble calling and all those whobelong to it are its honourable members. Althoughthe entry to the profession can be had by acquiringmerely the qualification of technical competence,the honour as a professional has to be maintained byits members by their exemplary conduct both in andoutside the Court. The legal profession isdifferent from other professions in that what thelawyers do, affects not only an individual but theadministration of justice which is the foundation ofthe civilised society. Both as a leading member ofthe intelligentsia of the society and as aresponsible citizen, the lawyer has to conducthimself as a model for others both in hisprofessional and in his private and public life. Thesociety has a right to expect of him such idealbehaviour. It must not be forgotten that the legalprofession has always been held in high esteem andits members have played an enviable role in publiclife. The regard for the legal and judicial systemsin this country is in no small measure due to thetireless role played by the stalwarts in theprofession to strengthen them. They took theirprofession seriously and practised it with dignity,deference and devotion. If the profession is tosurvive, the judicial system has to be vitalised.No service will be too small in making the systemefficient, effective and credible. The casualnessand indifference with which some members practisethe profession are certainly not calculated toachieve that purpose or to enhance the prestigeeither of the profession or of the institution theyare serving. If people lose confidence in theprofession on account of the deviant ways of some ofits members, it is not only the profession whichwill suffer but also the administration of justiceas a whole. The present trend unless checked islikely to lead to a stage when the system will befound wrecked from within before it is wrecked fromoutside. It is for the members of the profession tointrospect and take the corrective steps in time andalso spare the Courts the unpleasant duty. We sayno more."In Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of U.P., 1953SCR 1169 : (AIR 1954 SC 10 : 1954 Cri LJ 238) aConstitution Bench of this Court held that aresolution passed by the Bar Association expressingwant of confidence in the judicial officers amountedto scandalising the Court to undermine its authoritywhich amounted to contempt of Court. In TariniMohan Barari, Re : AIR 1923 Cal 212 the Full Benchof the High Court held that pleaders deliberatelyabstaining from attending the Court and taking part https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ in a concerted movement to boycott the Court, was acourse of conduct held not justified. The pleadershad duties and obligations to their clients inrespect of matters entrusted to them which werepending in the Courts. They had duty and obligationto co-operate with the Court in the orderlyadministration of justice. Boycotting the Court washeld to be high-handed and unjustified. In Pleader,Re : AIR 1924 Rangoon 320 a Division Bench of theHigh Court held that a pleader abstaining fromappearing in the Court without obtaining hisclient's consent and leaving him undefended,amounted to unprofessional conduct. In U.P. SalesTax Service Association v. Taxation Bar Association,Agra (1995) 5 SCC 716 : (1995 AIR SCW 3759 : AIR1996SC 98 : 1995 All LJ 2052) this Court observed (paras15 and 16 of AIR SCW, AIR and All LJ):"It has been a frequent notice in the recent past towitness that advocates strike work and boycott theCourts at the slightest provocation overlooking theharm caused to the judicial system in general andthe litigant public in particular and to themselvesin the estimate of the general public. An advocateis an officer of the Court and enjoys a specialstatus in the society. The workers in furtheranceof collective bargaining organise strike as per theprovisions of the Industrial Disputes Act as a lastresort to compel the management to concede theirlegitimate demands. ......."281. Question of lawyers going on strike has been the subject innumber of decisions of the Supreme Court. Most of those decisionshave been referred to in the decision of the Constitution Bench ofSupreme Court in AIR 2003 SC 739 [Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union ofIndia and another] in Paras (27) to (31), it has been held asfollows:-"27. In the case of B.L.Wadehra v. State (NCT ofDelhi) and others reported in AIR (2000) Delhi 266,one of the questions was whether a direction shouldbe issued to the lawyers to call off a strike. TheDelhi High Court noted certain observations of thisCourt which are worth reproducing:"In Indian Council of Legal Aid and Advice v. BarCouncil of India, reported in (1995) 1 SCC 732 :(AIR 1995 SC 691), the Supreme Court observed thus:"It is generally believed that members of the legalprofession have certain social obligations. e.g. torender "pro bono publico" service to the poor andthe underprivileged. Since the duty of a lawyer isto assist the Court in the administration ofjustice, the practice of law has a public utilityflavour and, therefore, he must strictly andscrupulously abide by the Code of Conduct behovingthe noble profession and must not indulge in any https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ activity which may tend to lower the image of theprofession in society. That is why the functions ofthe Bar Council include the laying down of standardsof professional conduct and etiquette whichadvocates must follow to maintain the dignity andpurity of the profession."............The Delhi High Court then considered various otherauthorities of this Court, including some set outabove, and concluded as follows:-"30. In the light of the above-mentioned viewsexpressed by the Supreme Court, lawyers have noright to strike i.e. to abstain from appearing inCourt in cases in which they hold vakalat for theparties, even if it is in response to or incompliance with a decision of any association orbody of lawyers. In our view, in exercise of theright to protest, a lawyer may refuse to accept newengagements and may even refuse to appear in a casein which he had already been engaged, if he has beenduly discharged from the case. But so long as alawyer holds the vakalat for his client and has notbeen duly discharged, he has no right to abstainfrom appearing in Court even on the ground of astrike called by the Bar Association or any otherbody of lawyers. If he so abstains, he commits aprofessional misconduct, a breach of professionalduty, a breach of contract and also a breach oftrust and he will be liable to suffer all theconsequences thereof. There is no fundamentalright, either under Article 19 or under Article 21of the Constitution, which permits or authorises alawyer to abstain from appearing in Court in a casein which he holds the vakalat for a party in thatcase. On the other hand a litigant has afundamental right for speedy trial of his case,because, speedy trial, as held by the Supreme Courtin Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State ofBihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81 : (AIR 1979 SC 1360) is anintegral and essential part of the fundamental rightto life and liberty enshrined in article 21 of theConstitution. Strike by lawyers will infringe theabove-mentioned fundamental right of the litigantsand such infringement cannot be permitted. Assumingthat the lawyers are trying to convey their feelingsor sentiments and ideas through the strike inexercise of their fundamental right to freedom ofspeech and expression guaranteed by Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution. We are of the view thatthe exercise of the right under Article 19(1)(a)will come to an end when such exercise threatens toinfringe the fundamental right of another. Such alimitation is inherent in the exercise of the right https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ under Article 19(1)(a). Hence the lawyers cannot goon strike infringing the fundamental right of thelitigants for speedy trial. The right to practiseany profession or to carry on any occupationguaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) may include theright to discontinue such profession or occupationbut it will not include any right to abstain fromappearing in Court while holding a vakalat in thecase. Similarly, the exercise of the right toprotest by the lawyers cannot be allowed to infractthe litigant's fundamental right for speedy trial orto interfere with the administration of justice.The lawyer has a duty and obligation to co-operatewith the Court in the orderly and pureadministration of justice.Members of the legal profession have certain socialobligations also and the practice of law has apublic utility flavour.According to the Bar Council of India Rules, 1975"an Advocate shall, at all times, comport himself ina manner befitting his status as an officer of theCourt, a privileged member of the community and agentleman, bearing in mind that what may be lawfuland moral for a person who is not a member of theBar or for a member of the Bar in his non-professional capacity, may still be improper for anAdvocate". It is below the dignity, honour andstatus of the members of the noble profession of lawto organize and participate in strike. It isunprofessional and unethical to do so. In view ofthe nobility and tradition of the legal profession,the status of the lawyer as an officer of the courtand the fiduciary character of the relationshipbetween a lawyer and his client and since strikeinterferes with the administration of justice andinfringes the fundamental right of litigants forspeedy trial of their cases, strike by lawyerscannot be approved as an acceptable mode of protest,irrespective of the gravity of the provocation andthe genuineness of the cause. Lawyers should adoptother modes of protest which will not interrupt ordisrupt court proceedings or adversely affect theinterest of the litigant. Thereby lawyers can alsoset an example to other sections of the society inthe matter of protest and agitations.31. Every Court has a solemn duty to proceed withthe judicial business during Court hours and theCourt is not obliged to adjourn a case because of astrike call. The Court is under an obligation tohear and decide cases brought before it and itcannot shirk that obligation on the ground that theadvocates are on strike. If the counsel or/and theparty does not appear, the necessary consequences https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ contemplated in law should follow. The Court shouldnot become privy to the strike by adjourning thecase on the ground that lawyers are on strike. Evenin the Common Cause case the Supreme Court had askedthe members of the legal profession to be alive tothe possibility of Judges refusing adjournmentsmerely on the ground of there being a strike calland insisting on proceeding with the cases. Strikeinfringes the litigant's fundamental right forspeedy trial and the Court cannot remain a mutespectator or throw up its hands in helplessness onthe face of such continued violation of thefundamental right.32. Either in the name of a strike or otherwise, nolawyer has any right to obstruct or prevent anotherlawyer from discharging his professional duty ofappearing in Court. In any one does it, he commitsa criminal offence and interferes with theadministration of justice and commits contempt ofCourt and he is liable to be proceeded against onall these counts.33. In the light of the above discussion we are ofthe view that the present strike by lawyers isillegal and unethical. Whatever might have been thecompelling circumstances earlier, now there isabsolutely no justification for the continuance ofthe strike in view of the appointment of theCommission of Inquiry and the directions beingissued in this case."28. In our view the conclusions reached areabsolutely correct and the same need to be and arehereby approved.29. Thereafter in the case of Ramon Services Pvt.Ltd. v. Subhash Kapoor reported in (2001) 1 SCC 118= 2001 -1 -L.W. 61, the question was whether alitigant should suffer a penalty because hisadvocate had boycotted the Court pursuant to astrike call made by the Association of which theadvocate was a member. In answer to this questionit has been held that when an advocate engaged by aparty is on strike there is no obligation on thepart of the Court to either wait or adjourn the caseon that account. It was held that this Court hastime and again set out that an advocate has no rightto stall court proceedings on the ground that theyhave decided to go on a strike. In this case it wasnoted that in Mahabir Prasad's case (supra), it hasbeen held that strikes and boycotts are illegal.That the lawyers and the Bar understood that theycould not resort to strikes is clear from statementof Senior Counsel Shri. Krishnamani which this Courtrecorded. The state is as follows: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "13. Shri Krishnamani, however, made the presentposition as unambiguously clear in the followingwords:"Today, if a lawyer participates in a BarAssociation's boycott of a particular court that isex facie bad in view of the clear declaration of lawby this Hon'ble Court. Now, even if there isboycott call, a lawyer can boldly ignore the same inview of the ruling of this Hon'ble Court in MahabirPrasad Singh (1999) 1 SCC 37."30. Thus the law is already well settled. It is theduty of every Advocate who has accepted a brief toattend trial, even though it may go on day to dayand for a prolonged period. It is also settled lawthat a lawyer who has accepted a brief cannot refuseto attend Court because a boycott call is given bythe Bar Association. It is settled law that it isunprofessional as well as unbecoming for a lawyerwho has accepted a brief to refuse to attend Courteven in pursuance of a call for strike or boycott bythe Bar Association or the Bar Council. It issettled law that Courts are under an obligation tohear and decide cases brought before it and cannotadjourn matters merely because lawyers are onstrike. The law is that it is the duty andobligation of the Courts to go on with matters orotherwise it would tantamount to becoming a privy tothe strike. It is also settled law that if aresolution is passed by Bar Associations expressingwant of confidence in judicial officers it wouldamount to scandalising the Courts to undermine itsauthority and thereby the Advocates will havecommitted contempt of Court. Lawyers have known, atleast since Mahabir Singh's case (supra) that ifthey participate in a boycott or a strike, theiraction is ex-facie bad in view of the declaration oflaw by this Court. A lawyer's duty is to boldlyignore a call for strike or boycott of Court/s.Lawyers have also known, at least since RomanServices' case, that the Advocates would beanswerable for the consequences suffered by theirclients if the non-appearance was solely on groundsof a strike call.31. It must also be remembered that an Advocate isan officer of the Court and enjoys special status insociety. Advocates have obligations and duties toensure smooth functioning of the Court. They owe aduty to their client. Strikes interfere withadministration of justice. They cannot thus disruptCourt proceedings and put interest of their clientsin jeopardy. ......"282. Despite such positive direction by the Supreme Court, inthe State of Tamil Nadu, there are any number of lawyers' strike and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ boycott of Courts. Not a single day passes without strike by lawyersin some part of the State. We have lost very many Court working hoursas seen from the number of days of boycott of various Courts in theState of Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry from 2006 till 31.8.2009. Thenumber of days of boycott of Courts is really shocking. It may benoticed that there is an increasing trend of strike by lawyers andmore Court working hours are lost because of lawyers strike.283. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer the followingpassage of Shri P.P.Rao, Senior Advocate – Strikes by Professionals,extracted in Gururaja Chari's Advocacy and Professional Ethics –First Edition, 2000 [page 553]:"A strike is an extreme form of protest. It losesits efficiency if it is resorted to frequently.During the struggle for Independence Mahatma Gandhigave a call to boycott the British rule and manylawyers responded by giving up their lucrativepractice and joining the freedom movement. Is itwise to use this weapon in free India overrelatively insignificant issues? No everyprovocation by the police or the Governmentwarrants a strike, there are strikes and strikes.In the year 1986 when Mr. Justice T.P.S. Chawla,the senior most Judge was not appointed as theChief Justice of the Delhi High Court although hewas entitled to the office even according to thedeclared policy of the Government, the entire Barin Delhi went on strike. The Supreme Court Bar toojoined the strike. It was successful. TheGovernment had to yield to the demand, as the causewas just and had wide public support. The strikewas over a basic issue affecting the independenceof the judiciary which is a matter of overridingimportance to the public at large. Can the samething be said in respect of a strike overalteration of pecuniary jurisdiction of a HighCourt or setting up of a new Bench of a High Courtor opening new District Courts?284. So far as, Principal Bench of Madras High Court isconcerned, there was vigorous boycott of Courts from 1st July 2004protesting against formation of Madurai Bench of Madras High Courtand also inclusion of certain Districts within the jurisdiction ofMadurai Bench. There were clashes between two groups of Advocatesand number of cases came to be registered from March 2004 to August2004. There were also demonstration, protest, forming human chain,fast unto death demonstrations inside the Court campus and processionin the Court corridors. At that stage, the Code of Conduct forAdvocates was notified. Protesting the notification of Code ofConduct, the Advocates in George Town/Egmore/Saidapet/Tiruvotriyuralso joined in the protest. Lawyers' strike percolated to theDistricts also. Later the Code of conduct was withdrawn. What wenotice is that there is an ever increasing trend of boycott of Courtsboth in High Court as well as in the Districts. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

285. Another disturbing feature is that the strikes are of longduration. It is a matter of common experience that during thestrike periods, no one is allowed to appear before the Court. Moreoften, there will be demonstrations and procession inside the Courtpremises particularly in the verandah. Of course, now theprocessions in the Court verandah have been stopped after thedirection of the Supreme Court in S.L.P. (Civil) No.7540/2009 dated14.7.2009 directing that there shall be no procession in the Courtverandah.286. Yet another disturbing feature of strikes is that they tendto divide the Bar and at times they lead to scuffle amongst lawyers.Democratic functioning of the Bar becomes impossible. Litigants arenot the only sufferers. The non-affluent sections of the Bar toosuffer silently. The Judges are handicapped in disposing of caseswithout the assistance of lawyers.287. We must admit that judiciary has not strongly reacted thelawyers' boycott calls. Pointing out adopting of soft approachtowards continuance of strikes in AIR 2001 SC 207 [Ramon ServicesPvt. Ltd. v. Subhash Kapoor and others], Para (28), the Supreme Courtobserved as under:-"28. Though a matter of regret, yet it is a fact,that the Courts in the country have beencontributory to the continuance of the strikes onaccount of their action of sympathising with the Barand failing to discharge their legal obligationsobviously under the threat of public frenzy andharassment by the striking advocates. I find myselfin agreement with the submission of Sh.M.N.Krishnamani, Senior Advocate that the Courtswere sympathising with the Bar by not agreeing todismiss the cases for default of appearance of thestriking advocates. I have my reservations with theobservations of Thomas, J. That the Courts had notbeen sympathising with the Bar during the strikes orboycotts. Some Courts might have conducted thecases even during the strike or boycott periods oradjourned due to helplessness for not being in aposition to decide the lis in the absence of thecounsel but majority of the Courts in the countryhave been impliedly sympathisers by not rising tothe occasion by taking positive stand for thepreservation of the high traditions of law and forcontinued restoration of the confidence of thecommon man in the institution of judiciary. ......."288. During boycott calls, most of the times no adverse orderswould be passed and thereby a convenient ground was created for thelawyers again and again to give boycott call even on 'non-legalissue'. As a result, as noted earlier, Courts have lost number ofworking days. Hitherto, number of steps have been taken to ensuresmooth/cordial relationship between the Bar and Police by forming https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ committees at Districts level. After initial euphoria not much couldbe deliberated upon them and the committees are no longer functional.289. Pendency of Cases:There is staggering arrears of nearly three crore cases arepending at every stage in different Courts of India. In the country,Madras High Court has the second largest pendency of cases i.e.4,62,009 [Source – Court News - Supreme Court of India – Vol.IV,Issue No.2 – April & June 2009]. Subordinate Courts in the State ofTamil Nadu have pendency of 10,57,141 [Source – Court News - SupremeCourt of India – Vol.IV, Issue No.2 – April & June 2009]. Disposalof pending cases in a time bound manner and also dealing with newlyfiled cases is a daunting challenge before the judiciary.290.Expressing concern as to how lawyer's boycott affectedSubordinate Judiciary making it difficult in reaching the norms in2007 2 MLJ page 1[Madras High Court Advocates' Association V. Stateof T.N] First bench of this Court has held as under:-"18. We are constrained to observe that while goingthrough the norms fixed for the Subordinate Courtsand when remarks have been received from many ofthe Subordinate Courts that the norms have not beenable to be achieved because of the prolonged strikeby the advocates. This is a serious issue and if itis allowed to proceed, it may even paralyse thefunctioning of the judiciary, which is not inpublic interest."291. Any judicial reform will have to go hand in hand withadministrative reforms as well as co-operation from the Bar,otherwise speedy disposal of cases would surely then become a farce.We wish and hope that lawyers in the State of Tamil Nadu would riseup to the occasion rendering hands of co-operation and refrainingfrom Courts' boycott.292. Observing that lawyers have no right to strike and issuingdirections to Courts for framing specific rules/Code of conduct oflawyers in Court, in Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal's case [AIR 2003 SC 739],the Supreme Court held as under:-"44. One last thing which must be mentioned is thatthe right of appearance in Courts is till within thecontrol and jurisdiction of Courts. Section 30 ofthe Advocates Act has not been brought into forceand rightly so.Control of conduct in Court can only be withinthe domain of Courts. Thus Article 145 of theConstitution of India gives to the Supreme Court andSection 34 of the Advocates Act gives to the HighCourt power to frame rules including rules regardingcondition on which a person (including an Advocate)can practice in the Supreme Court and/or in the HighCourt and Courts subordinate thereto. Many Courtshave framed rules in this behalf. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Such a rule would be valid and binding on all.Let all the Bar take note that unless self restraintis exercised, Courts may now have to considerframing specific rules debarring Advocates, guiltyof contempt and/or unprofessional or unbecomingconduct, from appearing before the Courts. Such arule if framed would not have anything to do withthe disciplinary jurisdiction of Bar Councils. Itwould be concerning the dignity and orderlyfunctioning of the Courts...............The Bar Councils cannot overrule such aregulation concerning the orderly conduct of Courtproceedings. On the contrary it will be their dutyto see that such a rule is strictly abided by.Courts of law are structured in such a design as toevoke respect and reverence to the majesty of lawand justice. The machinery for dispensation ofjustice according to law is operated by the Court.Proceedings inside the Courts are always expected tobe held in a dignified and orderly manner. The verysight of an advocate, who is guilty of contempt ofCourt or of unbecoming or unprofessional conduct,standing in the court would erode the dignity of theCourt and even corrode the majesty of it besidesimpairing the confidence of the public in theefficacy of the institution of the Courts. Thepower to frame such rules should not be confusedwith the right to practise law.While the Bar Council can exercise control overthe latter, the Courts are in control of the former.This distinction is clearly brought out by thedifference in language in Section 49 of theAdvocates Act on the one hand and Article 145 of theConstitution of India and Section 34(1) of theAdvocates Act on the other. Section 49 merelyempowers the Bar Council to frame rules laying downconditions subject to which an Advocate shall have aright to practise i.e. do all the other acts set outabove.However, Article 145 of the Constitution ofIndia empowers the Supreme Court to make rules forregulating this practice and procedure of the Courtincluding inter-alia rules as to persons practisingbefore this Court. Similarly Section 34 of theAdvocates Act empowers High Courts to frame rules,inter-alia to lay down conditions on which anAdvocate shall be permitted to practice in Courts.Article 145 of the Constitution of India andSection 34 of the Advocates Act clearly show that https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ there is no absolute right to an Advocate to appearin a Court. An Advocate appears in a Court subjectto such conditions as are laid down by the Court.It must be remembered that Section 30 has not beenbrought into force and this also shows that there isno absolute right to appear in a Court. Even ifSection 30 were to be brought into force control ofproceedings in Court will always remain with theCourt.Thus even then the right to appear in Courtwill be subject to complying with conditions laiddown by Courts just as practice outside Courts wouldbe subject to conditions laid down by Bar Council ofIndia. There is thus no conflict or clash betweenother provisions of the Advocates Act on the onehand and Section 34 or Article 145 of theConstitution of India on the other.45. In conclusion it is held that lawyers have noright to do on strike or give a call for boycott,not even on a token strike.The protest, if any is required, can only be bygiving press statements, TV interviews, carrying outof Court premises banners and/or placards, wearingblack or white or any colour arm bands, peacefulprotect marches outside and away from Courtpremises, going on dharnas or relay fasts etc. Itis held that lawyers holding Vakalats on behalf oftheir clients cannot not attend Courts' in pursuanceto a call for strike or boycott.All lawyers must boldly refuse to abide by anycall for strike or boycott. No lawyer can bevisited with any adverse consequences by theAssociation or the Council and no threat or coercionof any nature including that of expulsion can beheld out. It is held that no Bar Council or BarAssociation can permit calling of a meeting forpurposes of considering a call for strike or boycottand requisition, if any, for such meeting must beignored. It is held that only in the rarest of ratecases where the dignity, integrity and independenceof the Bar and/or the Bench are at stake, Courts mayignore (turn a blind eye) to a protest abstentionfrom work for not more than one day. It is beingclarified that it will be for the Courts to decidewhether or not the issue involves dignity orintegrity or independence of the Bar and/or theBench.Therefore in such cases the President of theBar must first consult the Chief Justice or theDistrict Judge before Advocates decide to absent https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ themselves from Court. The decision of the ChiefJustice or the District Judge would be final andhave to be abided by the Bar. It is held thatCourts are under no obligation to adjourn mattersbecause lawyers are on strike. On the contrary, itis the duty of all Courts to go on with matters ontheir boards even in the absence of lawyers. Inother words, Courts must not be privy to strikes orcalls for boycotts. It is held that if a lawyer,holding a Vakalat of a client, abstains fromattending Court due to a strike call, he shall bepersonally liable to pay costs which shall beaddition to damages which he might have to pay hisclient for loss suffered by him.46. It is now hoped that with the aboveclarifications, there will be no strikes and/orcalls for boycott. It is hoped that better sensewill prevail and self restraint will be exercised.The Petitions stand disposed of accordingly."(underlining added by us for emphasis)293. As held by the Supreme Court in Ramon Services Pvt. Ltdcase "majority of the Courts in the country have been impliedlysympathisers by not rising to the occasion by taking positive standfor the preservation of the high traditions of law and for continuedrestoration of the confidence of the common man in the institution ofjudiciary. The Supreme Court further held that it is not too lateeven now for the Courts in the country to rise from the slumber andperform their duties without fear or favour particularly after theJudgment of the Supreme Court in Mahabir Singh's case [AIR 1999 SC287]. Inaction will surely contribute to the erosion of ethics andvalues in the legal profession. The defaulting Courts may also becontributory to the contempt of Court.294. Role of Bar Council and its Responsibilities: The Advocates Act 1961 gave autonomy to a Bar Council of aState or Bar Council of India and Section 6(1) empowers them to makesuch action deemed necessary to set their house in order, to preventfall in professional conduct and to punish the incorrigible as notbefitting the noble profession apart from admission of the advocateson its roll. Section 6(1) (c) and rules made in that behalf. Themembers of the judiciary are drawn primarily and invariably from theBar at different levels. The high moral, ethical and professionalstandards among the members of the Bar are preconditions even forhigh ethical standards of the Bench. Degeneration thereof inevitablyhas its eruption and tends to reflect the other side of the coin. TheBar Council, therefore, is enjoined by the Advocates Act to maintainhigh moral, ethical and professional standards which of late is farfrom satisfactory.295. The Bar Council acts as the sentinel of professional codeof conduct and is vitally interested in the rights and privileges ofthe advocates as well as the purity and dignity of the profession. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ The Bar Council acts as the custodian of the high traditions of thenoble profession.296. Observing that Bar Councils are expected to rise to theoccasion as they are responsible to uphold the dignity of courts andmajesty of law and to prevent interference in the Administration ofJustice, in the case of Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union ofIndia reported in ( (1998) 4 SCC 408) Constitution Bench of theHon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:"79. An advocate who is found guilty of Contempt ofCourt may also, as already noticed, be guilty ofprofessional misconduct in a given case but it isfor the Bar Council of the State or Bar Council ofIndia to punish that advocate by either debarringhim from practice or suspending his licence, as maybe warranted, in the facts and circumstances ofeach case. The learned Solicitor General informedus that there have been cases where the Bar Councilof India taking note of the contumacious andobjectionable conduct of an advocate, had initiateddisciplinary proceedings against him and evenpunished him for 'professional misconduct", on thebasis of his having been found guilty of committingContempt of Court. We do not entertain any doubtthat the Bar Council of the State or Bar Council ofIndia, as the case may be, when apprised of theestablished contumacious conduct of an advocate bythe High Court or by this Court, would rise to theoccasion, and take appropriate action against suchan advocate. Under Article 144 of the Constitutionall authorities, civil and judicial, in theterritory of India shall act in the aid of theSupreme Court. The Bar council which performs apublic duty and is charged with the obligation toprotect the dignity of the profession and maintainprofessional standards and etiquette is alsoobliged to the act "in aid of the Supreme Court".It must, whenever facts warrant, rise to theoccasion and discharge its duties uninfluenced bythe position of the contemner advocate. It must actin accordance with the prescribed procedure,whenever its attention is drawn by this court tothe contumacious and unbecoming conduct of anadvocate which has the tendency to interfere withdue administration of justice. It is possible forthe High Courts also to draw the attention of theBar Council of the State to a case of professionalmisconduct of a contemner advocate to enable theState Bar council to proceed in the mannerprescribed by the Act and the Rules framedthereunder. There is no justification to assumethat the Bar Council to proceed in the mannerprescribed by the Act and the Rules framed https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ thereunder. There is no justification to assumethat the Bar Councils would not rise to theoccasion, as they are equally responsible to upholdthe dignity of the Courts and the majesty of lawand prevent any interference in the administrationjustice. Learned counsel for the parties presentbefore us do not dispute and rightly so thewhenever a Court of record records its findingsabout the conduct of an advocate while finding himguilty of committing Contempt of court and desiresor refers the matter to be considered by the BarCouncil concerned, appropriate action should beinitiated by the Bar council concerned inaccordance with law with a view to maintain thedignity of the Courts and to uphold the majesty oflaw and professional standards and etiquette.Nothing is more destructive of public confidence inthe administration of justice than incivility,rudeness of disrespectful conduct on the part of acounsel towards the Court or disregard by the Courtof the privileges of the Bar. In case the BarCouncil, even after receiving "reference" from theCourt, fails to take action against the advocateconcerned, this Court might consider invoking itspowers under Section 38 of the Act by sending forthe record of the proceedings from the Bar Counciland passing appropriate orders. Of course, theappellate powers under Section 38 would beavailable to this Court only and not to the HighCourts. We, however, hope that such a situationwould not arise.80. In a given case it may be possible, for thisCourt of the High Court, to prevent the contemneradvocate before it till he purges himself of thecontempt but that is much different from suspendingor revoking his licence or debarring him topractise as an advocate. In a case of contemptuous,contumacious, unbecoming or blameworthy conduct ofan Advocate on Record, this Court possessesjurisdiction, under the supreme Court Rules itself,to withdraw his privilege to practice as anAdvocate on Record because that privilege isconferred by this court and the power to grant theprivilege includes the power to revoke or suspendit. The withdrawal of that privilege, however, doesnot amount to suspending or revoking his licence topractice as an advocate in other courts ofTribunals."297. Reiterating roles and responsibilities of Bar Council,decision on the Ex.Capt. Harish Uppal's case the Hon'ble SupremeCourt has held as under: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "35. ...... Thus a Constitution Bench of this Courthas held that the Bar Councils are expected to riseto the occasion as they are responsible to upholdthe dignity of the Courts and majesty of law and toprevent interference in administration of justice.In our view it is the duty of the Bar Councils toensure that there is no unprofessional and/orunbecoming conduct. This being their duty no BarCouncil can even consider giving a call for strikeor a call for boycott. It follows that the BarCouncils and eve Bar Associations can never consideror take seriously any requisition calling for ameeting to consider a call for a strike or a callfor boycott. Such requisitions should be consignedto the place where they belong viz. the waste paperbasket. In case any Association call for a strike ora call for boycott the concerned State Bar Counciland on their failure the Bar Council of India mustimmediately take disciplinary action against theAdvocates who give a call for strike and if theCommittee Members permit calling of a meeting forsuch purpose against the Committee Members. Furtherit is the duty of every Advocate to bodily ignore acall for strike or boycott." (underlining added byus for emphasis).We hope that Tamil Nadu State Bar Council would rise to the occasionto comply with directions of the Supreme Court in dealing with theconduct of advocates boycott calls and take serious view of the same.298. In Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal's case directed the Constitutionof Grievance Redressal Committees in the level of High Court andDistrict Courts level to ventilate grievances:- (i) Local issues (ii)Issues relating to one section of the Bar and another section (iii)Issues involving dignity, integrity, independence of the Bar andJudiciary (iv) Legislation without consultation with the BarCouncils. (v) National issues and Regional issues affecting thePublic at large/ the insensitivity of all concerned.299. Expressing concern over prolonged strikes an account ofrift between Police and Lawyers in W.P.No.24445/2006 reported in 20072 MLJ Page 1 [Madras High Court Advocates' Association v. The Stateof Tamil Nadu and others], First Bench of this Court proposedconstitution of the State Level Co-ordination Committee to examineany complaint or illtreatment of any Advocate at the hands of thePolice officials and to redress the grievance and thereby to maintaincordial relationship between Police and lawyers. 300. As directed by the First Bench, in G.O.Ms. No.1249 HomePolice IX Department dated 28.12.2006 to maintain cordialrelationship between the Police and lawyers, State Level Co-ordination Committee has been constituted. As per the G.O.,composition of State Level Co-ordination Committee is as under:- https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

1. Two Hon'ble Judges of the High Court, ..... Chairperson/Member Madras to be nominated by The Hon'ble The Chief Justice. The Hon'ble Senior Judge shall be the Chairperson and the other Hon'ble Judges shall be the Member 2. The Advocate-General, Government of .....Member Tamil Nadu3. The Chief Secretary, Government of .....Member Tamil Nadu4. The Principal Secretary, Home Department, .....Member Government of Tamil Nadu5. The Additional Director General of Police/ .....Member Inspector-General of Police (Law and Order) 6. The Chairman, Bar Council of Tamil Nadu .....Member7. The President, Madras High Court Advocates' .....Member Association8. The Chairperson, Federation of District and .....Member Subordinate Courts' Bar Association of Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry, 17 Law Chambers, Sampath Nagar, Erode.Any accusation made against the Police regarding their misbehaviourtowards members of Bar are to be brought to the notice of State LevelCo-ordination committee to sort out disputes. We take thisopportunity to reiterate the directions in W.P.No.24445/2006. 301. After the incident on 19.02.2009, public opinion is verymuch against lawyers. Lawyers need to dispel the impression that theyare "Law Unto themselves". We fully endorse the submissions oflearned Advocate General Mr.P.S.Raman that advocates should be 'modelcitizens' and lawyers must rise up to restore the glory and theirpublic image. Mere saying that they would go by the rules may not besufficient. On the other hand "Self conscious engagement" on the partof the lawyers individually and also collectively is required.302. As observed by the Supreme Court in Ex. Capt. HarishUppal's case, we hope that in future there will be no strikes and/orcalls for boycott. It is hoped that better sense will prevail uponlawyers and self restraint will be exercised.303. Lawyers' strike call from 29.01.2009:-Madras High Court Advocates Association (MHAA) announcedindefinite boycott of Courts in Tamil Nadu demanding an end to thewar in Sri Lanka. Lawyers took out a rally shouting slogans insidethe Court premises against genocide to Tamils in Sri Lanka. Theystopped MTC Bus and took it to Kilpauk Medical College Hospital topay homage to Muthukumar, who had committed self-immolation earlierin the day over the Sri Lankan war. They are alleged to have causeddamage to the Bank of Ceylon, E.V.R. Periyar Salai, Kilpauk and also https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ caused damage to the car belonging to the Bank Manager. In thisregard, a case was registered in Veppery Police Station Cr.No.80/2009under Section 143, 144, 149 & 336 IPC of Section 3 (1) of TNP(PDL)Act.304. On 30.01.2009 a large group of lawyers entered into theCourt Halls poohing Judges, dragged the Advocates includingGovernment Law Officers present in the Court. During the period ofboycott, Advocates shouted slogans, took out procession in theCorridors of Court Halls using Megaphone. Senior Advocate Mr.A.E.Chelliah, was pulled out from the First Court Hall and was man-handled by some Advocates in the presence of his wife, who is also anAdvocate.305. Dragging out of the learned Senior Counsel Mr. A.E.Chelliahfrom the Court was most unfortunate. The Advocates dared to enterCourt Hall No.1 and dragged the Senior Advocate Mr.A.E.Chelliah andhis wife just for the reason that they were arguing the case in theCourt. In our considered view, it was clearly an attempt to interferewith the administration of justice. The Principle is that those whohave duties to discharge in a Court of Justice are protected by thelaw and shielded by the law to discharge their duties. The advocatesin turn have duty to protect the Courts and act in furtherance ofadministration of Justice.306. The lawyers strike continued from 02.02.2009 to 09.02.2009.MHAA continued the boycott demanding end to the war in Sri Lanka.They took out procession in the High Court Corridors using Megaphonesand also organised demonstrations and also conducted meetings insideand outside the Court premises. The Advocates who willinglyparticipated in the Court proceedings were prevented from attendingthe Court by the striking lawyers.307. On 04.02.2009, the striking Lawyers are said to have causeddamage to several shops in Paris during the Bandh in support of theSri Lankan Tamils. A complaint was also lodged by the owner of theshops. In this connection three cases were registered in B2-EsplanadePolice Station in Crime No. 73/2009 u/s 147, 143, 188, 286 IPC r/w 3(1) of TNPPDL Act, Crime No.74/2009 u/s 147, 148, 341, 324, 307 and506(ii) IPC r/w 3(1) of TNPPDL Act and Crime No.75/2009 u/s 147, 332,353, 354 and 506(ii) IPC r/w 3(1) of TNPPDL Act.308. At about 2.30 A.M. (05.02.2009) about 40 Advocates are saidto have scaled over the compound wall of the High Court premises anddamaged the temporary shelter put up in connection with securitymeasures, Frisking Cubicle installed at the entrance of the HighCourt. In this connection a case was registered in B4-High CourtPolice Station Crime No.8/2009 u/s 147, 294(b), 427 506(ii) r/w 3(1)of TNPPDL Act. On 05.02.2009 forenoon, MHAA convened a meeting at theLibrary building and resolved to continue the boycott. 309. Some of the Advocates, who were involved in the occurrencewere arrested. The arrested Advocates were taken to the quarters ofthe VII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet in a police vehicle. It is https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ alleged that number of offenders gathered and raised slogans againstthe Police which resulted in a scuffle between the Advocates andPolice. To reduce the tension, the advocates were taken toRajarathinam Stadium, Egmore and the Additional MetropolitanMagistrate had gone to the Stadium. Additional MetropolitanMagistrate remanded the advocates to judicial custody and immediatelyreleased them on bail on personal bonds.310. The boycott continued till 09.02.2009. On 10.02.2009advocates resumed the work. After one day's work, again on 11.02.2009MHAA continued the boycott by taking out procession and raisingslogans in the Court Corridors.311. For days together lawyers have been boycotting the courtsand taking out procession and demonstrations demanding that the SriLanka Government to announce cease fire operation against LTTE. SriLankan issue was of no direct concern to the legal fraternity whichis clearly a political issue. Lawyers were responsible for theprotests and demonstrations and raising slogans in the Court Corridorand preventing the advocates who wanted to attend the Courtproceedings and thereby creating tense situation in the Courtpremises during the strike period.312. In W.P.No.7646/2006, first Bench of this Court directedthat no political activity is to take place within the High Courtcampus. In the said order, the Registrar-General and the concernedAsst. Commr. of Police were directed to remove all the politicalhoardings, cut-outs and advertisements inside the premises of theHigh Court or on the compound wall of the premises.313. Order in W.P.No.7646/2006 dated 20.6.2006 reads as under:"(1) The Registrar General, High Court, Madras andthe concerned Assistant Commissioner of Police, HighCourt, Madras, are directed to ensure that nopolitical activity of any manner including displayof political cutouts, banners, posters or organizingdharnas and meetings or birthday celebration of anyparty leaders takes place within the premises of theHigh Court.(2) The Registrar General and the concernedAssistant Commissioner of Police are directed toremove forthwith all the political hoardings,cutouts, advertisements, photographs etc, placedinside the premises of the High Court or on thecompound wall of the premises.(3) In case of any violation of the order of thisCourt, the Registrar General/the concerned AssistantCommissioner of Police is directed to report thenames of the lawyers or persons indulging in suchactivities to the Chief Justice. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (4) The advocates of the various Associations ofthis court are also requested to co-operate with theRegistrar General/Assistant Commissioner of Policeto maintain the decorum and dignity of this Court.314. The lawyers' boycott sympathising with Sri Lankan TamilPopulation and organising demonstrations and protest inside HighCourt premises was in clear violation of this Court's order inW.P.No.7646/2006. Unfortunately, the above direction was neverimplemented nor any show cause notice was issued to the protestingadvocates. We are of the view, had the directions in W.P.No.7646/2006been strictly implemented the events would not have taken an uglyturn on 17.02.2009 and on 19.02.2009.315. The directions in W.P.No.7646/2006 Mutatis Muntandisshall apply to the District courts and Moffusil courts. In so far asDistrict courts and Moffussil courts in the place of RegistrarGeneral the District Judges and in the place of Asst. Commr. ofPolice, the concerned Superintendent of Police are directed to ensurecompliance of the directions in W.P.No.7646/2006.316. We direct the Registrar General to send copy of the orderin W.P.No.7646/2006 dated 20.06.2006 to the Bar Council, all the BarAssociations in the Principal Bench and to Madurai Bench and to theDistrict Judges for being circulated to all the Bar Associations andBar Councils in the District courts and in the Moffussil courts.317. We further direct as per the directions of the SupremeCourt in SLP (Civil) No. 7540 of 2009 dated 14.7.2009, there shall beno procession in the Court verandah or in any part of the courtpremises except within their Association Halls, that too in apeaceful manner. 318. Occurrence on 17.02.2009:- Dr.Subramaniam Swamy,President/Janata Party appeared in Court Hall No.III on 17.2.2009before the Bench comprising the Hon'ble Justice P.K.Misra and theHon'ble Justice K.Chandru to implead himself in connection withChidambaram Natarajar Temple's case. When the hearing of the case wasin progress, at about 11.45 A.M., a group of advocates entered intothe Court Hall and assaulted Dr.Subramaniam Swamy and threw eggs onhim. The lawyers are also said to have attacked Mr.Kadher Mohideen,Assistant Commissioner of Police who went inside the Court Hall tocontrol the lawyers by disrupting the Court proceedings. Inspite ofthe warning, the attack continued for 15 minutes. The Bench hasrecorded the incident and directed the Registry to place the orderbefore the Hon'ble The Acting Chief Justice and also forwarded a copyof the order to the Hon'ble The Chief Justice of India. Based on thecomplaint lodged by Mr.Kadher Mohideen, ACP, a case was registered inB4-High Court Police Station Crime No.13/2009 u/s 147, 451, 355,332,506(ii), 294(B) and 153A IPC r/w Section 3(1) of TNPPDL Act. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

319. By the order dated 19.2.2009, Bench directed that theincident on 17.2.2009 be treated as PIL and directed that PIL to beheard by five member of Judges to go into the attack onDr.Subramaniam Swamy in W.P.No.3498/2009. The incident on 17.02.2009has trigged the whole incident. It is on the said complaint lodged,handful of advocates who attacked Dr.Subramaniam Swamy went to B4-High Court Police Station volunteering to surrender which led to theunsavoury incident on 19.2.2009.320. Observing that it is the solemn duty of every Court toproceed with the Judicial business during Court hours and that noCourt should yield to pressure tactics or boycott calls or any kindof browbeating in Mahabir Prasad Singh's case (1999) 1 SCC 37 : (1998AIR SCW 3806: AIR 1999 SC 287), the Supreme Court held as under:-"2. Judicial function cannot and should not bepermitted to be stonewalled by browbeating orbullying methodology, whether it is by litigants orby counsel. Judicial process must run its evencourse unbridled by any boycott call of the Bar, ortactics of filibuster adopted by any member thereof.High Courts are duty bound to insulate judicialfunctionaries within their territory from beingdemoralised due to such onslaughts by giving fullprotection to them to discharge their duties withoutfear. But unfortunately this case reflects apathy onthe part of the High Court in affording suchprotection to a judicial functionary who resisted,through legal means, a pressure strategy slammed onhim in open Court."In para (16) it was further held as under:-"16. If any counsel does not want to appear in aparticular Court, that too for justifiable reasons,professional decorum and etiquett require him togive up his engagement in that Court so that theparty can engage another counsel. But retaining thebrief of his client and at the same time abstainingfrom appearing in that Court, that too not on anyparticular day on account of some personalinconvenience of the counsel but as a permanentfeature, is unprofessional as also unbecoming ofthe status of an advocate. No Court is obliged toadjourn a cause because of the strike call given byany association of advocates or a decision toboycott the Courts either in general or anyparticular Court. It is the solemn duty of everyCourt to proceed with the judicial business duringCourt hours. No Court should yield to pressuretactics or boycott calls or any kind orbrowbeating." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

321. The incident on 17.02.2009 and voluntary surrender ofadvocates in Cr.No.13/2009 has trigged the sordid episode on19.02.2009. The learned Senior Counsel Mr.R.Krishnamoorthy submittedthat the occurrence at Court Hall No.III on 17.02.2009 might be anoffence under Section 175, 179, 180 IPC and all of which are onlynon-cognizable offence and therefore, advocates could not havevolunteered to surrender on 19.02.2009. It was further submitted thatas per the procedure contemplated under Section 345 Cr.P.C., arrestis totally inapplicable to the occurrence on 17.02.2009. Since,larger Bench has seized up the matter, we do not propose to expressany opinion on the above submissions.322. Suffice it to note that Mr.R.Karuppan, has categoricallystated that they have gone to B4-High Court Police Station tovoluntarily surrender in connection with B4-High Court Police StationCr.No.13/2009. As pointed out earlier, on 19.02.2009 Court hasordered that five member Judges would hear the W.P.(PIL) No.3498/2009to go into the attack on Dr.Subramaniam Swamy. After having knownthat PIL was ordered to be heard by a larger Bench quite possibly,lawyers have gone to B4-High Court Police Station to surrenderthemselves. 323. The learned Senior Counsel Dr.Rajeev Dhavan, submitted thatthe surrender of lawyers on 19.02.2009 was a mock surrender only tobargain registration of case against Dr.Swamy. It was thereforesubmitted that it was unbecoming conduct of lawyers to enact suchmock surrender and urged us to initiate proceedings against thoseresponsible for the mock surrender and to provoke the incident on19.02.2009. 324. In so far as the incident in Court Hall III on 17.02.2009,public interest litigation is pending before the Larger Bench.Cr.13/2009– B4-High Court Police Station has also been registeredagainst lawyers and investigation is pending. That apart, when PIL ispending as to the attack of Dr.Swamy we do not propose to go indetail in the above matter. Nor do we think it appropriate to issueany direction for initiation of proceedings against those lawyers.325. Occurrence on 19.02.2009:-At the risk of repetition, let us recapitulate the happenings on19.2.2009: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

10.30 A.M.Dr. Subramaniam Swamy appeared before ACJ Court and inCourt Hall No.III.For providing security to Dr.Subramaniam Swamy, JCPmobilised 105 Police personnel.11.30 A.M.Dr. Subramaniam Swamy leaves High Court campus.Police personnel go to B2-Esplanade Police Station fordebriefing.12.00 NoonAdvocate Mr.Vijayendran and Mr.Kunaraja appeared inB2-Esplanade Police Station stating that they wouldsurrender and insisted for the list of Advocatesinvolved in Crime No.13/2009.2.00 – 2.30P.M.Large number of Advocates led by Mr.R.Karuppan,Rajinikanth, Vijayendran, Pugazhenthi and Jayakumarhad gone to B4-High Court Police Station and insistedfor registering the complaint against Dr. SubramaniamSwamy and Radha Mohan as a pre-condition to theirsurrender.On receiving information, Mr.Prem Anand Sinha, DC andMr.M.Ramasubramani, JCP rushed from B2-EsplanadePolice Station to B4-High Court Police Station.3.00 – 3.30P.M.On the basis of the complaint by AdvocateMr.Rajinikanth, case was registered in CrimeNo.14/2009 under Sec.3(1) SC/ST (Prevention ofAtrocities) Act and under Sec.506(ii) IPC.Available strength in B2-Esplanade Police Station wasshifted to B4-High Court Police Station.Advocates demanded copy of FIR and the same was handedover to them. Advocates then started demanding thatDr. Subramaniam Swamy to be arrested and onlythereafter, they would surrender and there was slogansraising.3.00 – 3.45P.M.Addl CoP (L&O) and JCP (Central Zone), 2 Dcs, 9 Acs,11 Inspectors, 4 S.Is. and 90 TSP men came as anadditional strength.Advocates were apprehended and those Advocates whoresisted the arrest were also taken to custody.3.45 – 3.55P.M.Stone pelting. Both sides claim that other sidepelted stones first.[Dispute as to time of arriving of Addl. CoP (L&O)Mr.Viswanathan and command to be dealt with later].[Teargas shells were fired and lathicharge wasordered. There is dispute as to the time firingteargas shells and lathicharge which, we shall dealwith it little later]. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

326. Exercise of Jurisdiction under Article 226 :-Both sides have filed counter-affidavits and replyaffidavits. There are number of inconsistent and varying versions.In the affidavit filed by Mr.Paul Kanagaraj, Ms.Nalini andMr.Sampathkumar, it is averred that at 3.30 P.M., they have seengroup of Police personnel throwing stones on the Advocates. Theyhave also averred that the Police in mufti were wearing Black andWhite mingled freely with the Advocates and they were theprovocateurs. In her affidavit, Ms.Nalini also averred thatPolicemen were seen carrying stones in a small cloth bag.327. Drawing our attention to varying versions, learned SeniorCounsel Dr.Rajeev Dhavan submitted that the issue involves disputedquestions of fact which cannot be determined except on evidence andtherefore, the same are not fit to be taken up for adjudication inexercise of Writ jurisdiction. It was further argued that there isno worthy reliable evidence to arrive at the conclusion andtherefore, Court should be slow in embarking upon the adjudication ofhighly disputed questions of fact. Even after lifting the veil,Court can still say that the materials available are not sufficientto arrive at the conclusion. Submitting that when number of personswere injured and the various factors are to be gone into fordetermining the compensation, such complicated questions of factcannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction. Learned Senior Counselfurther submitted that the massive facts and events are judicially"unmanageable" and therefore, identification of the delinquent Policeofficers and question of determining the compensation cannot bedetermined exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitutionof India. In support of his contention, learned Senior Counselplaced reliance upon 1958 SCR 499 [Union of India v. T.R.Varma];(2005) 12 SCC 725 [Orissa Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. v. BharatiIndustries] and (1969) 3 SCC 769 [Gunwant Kaur v. MunicipalCommittee, Bhatinda].328. Observing that where highly disputed questions of factexist which cannot be determined except on evidence, the High Courtshould not normally entertain the Writ Petition, in 1958 SCR 499[Union of India v. T.R.Varma], the Supreme Court held as follows:-".........On the other hand, the point fordetermination in this petition whether therespondent was denied a reasonable opportunity topresent his case, turns mainly on the questionwhether he was prevented from cross-examining thewitnesses, who gave evidence in support of thecharge. That is a question on which there is aserious dispute, which cannot be satisfactorilydecided without taking evidence. It is not thepractice of courts to decide questions of thatcharacter in a writ petition, and it would have beena proper exercise of discretion in the present caseif the learned Judges had referred the respondent toa suit." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

329. In (2005) 12 SCC 725 [Orissa Agro Industries CorporationLtd. v. Bharati Industries], Para 7, the Supreme Court held as under:-"7. .............. Where a complicated question offact is involved and the matter requires thoroughproof on factual aspects, the High Court should notentertain the writ petition. Whether or not the HighCourt should exercise jurisdiction under Article 226of the Constitution would largely depend upon thenature of dispute and if the dispute cannot beresolved without going into the factual controversy,the High Court should not entertain the writpetition."330. Observing that only as a matter of exception High Court canexercise its discretion under Article 226 of Constitution andentertain Writ Petitions involving disputed questions of factrequiring oral evidence, in (1969) 3 SCC 769 [Gunwant Kaur v.Municipal Committee, Bhatinda], Para 14, the Supreme Court held asfollows:-"14. .............. The High Court is not deprivedof its jurisdiction to entertain a petition underArticle 226 merely because in considering thepetitioner's right to relief questions of fact mayfall to be determined. In a petition under Article226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issuesboth of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdictionis, it is true, discretionary, but the discretionmust be exercised on sound judicial principles.When the petition raises questions of fact of acomplex nature, which may for their determinationrequire oral evidence to be taken, and on thataccount the High Court is of the view that thedispute may not appropriately be tried in a writpetition, the High Court may decline to try apetition......................"331. In (2003) 6 SCC 581 (T.K.Rangarajan v. Govt. of T.N.), theSupreme Court has reiterated the jurisdiction of this Court underArticle 226 of Constitution of India in the following words:-"5. At the outset, it is to be reiterated that underArticle 226 of the Constitution, the High Court isempowered to exercise its extraordinary jurisdictionto meet unprecedented extraordinary situation havingno parallel. It is equally true that extraordinarypowers are required to be sparingly used. The factsof the present case reveal that this was mostextraordinary case, which called for interference bythe High Court, as the State Government haddismissed about two lakh employees for going onstrike." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

332. In (1980) 2 SCC 593 (Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v.G.S.T.Mazdoor Sabha), the Supreme Court held as under:-" ..... Article 226 is a sparing surgery but thelancet operates where injustice suppurates. .......judicial daring is not daunted where glaringinjustice demands even affirmative action. ......And an appellate power interferes not when the orderappealed is not right, but only when it is clearlywrong. The difference is real though fine."333. In case of alleged rigging of Polling Booths in the ChennaiCorporation Election, referring to the above decisions, in (2007) 2MLJ 129 [All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, Chennai v. StateElection Commissioner and others] (in which one of us was a member –F.M.I.K.,J) summed up the legal position as under:-"156. ...... (iv) In a Public Interest Litigation,whenever injustice is meted out to a large number ofpeople, the Court should not hesitate to step in.(v) In a writ petition under Article 226 ofConstitution, even questions of fact of complexnature can be determined...................(viii) If the monstrosity of the situation or otherexceptional circumstances cry for timelyjurisdictional interdict or mandate, the Courtshould not hesitate to exercise its extraordinarypower under Article 226 of the Constitution.(ix) The mentor of law is justice and a potent drugshould be judicially administered.(x) Judicial daring is not daunted where glaringinjustice demands even affirmative action. ......"334. Exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitutionof India is not daunted, where glaring injustice demands affirmativeaction. This is the suo-moto taken up matter treated as PublicInterest Litigation. Whenever injustice is meted out to a largenumber of people, Court will not hesitate in stepping in. Infurtherance of the public interest and in the interest of justice, onthe available materials, it is necessary to enquire into theincidents on 19.2.2009.335. In Gunwant Kaur's case cited supra, Para 16, the SupremeCourt held as follows:-"16. In the present case, in our judgment, the HighCourt was not justified in dismissing the petitionon the ground that it will not determine disputedquestions of fact. The High Court has jurisdictionto determine questions of fact, even if they are indispute and the present, in our judgment, is a casein which in the interests of both the parties theHigh Court should have entertained the petition andcalled for an affidavit-in-reply from therespondents, and should have proceeded to try the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ petition instead of relegating the appellants to aseparate suit."336. The above said decision of the Supreme Court in GunwantKaur's case cited supra was followed in a decision of the SupremeCourt in ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit GuaranteeCorporation of India Ltd. [(2004) 3 SCC 553], wherein Para 19, theSupreme Court held as under:-"19. Therefore, it is clear from the aboveenunciation of law that merely because one of theparties to the litigation raises a dispute in regardto the facts of the case, the Court entertainingsuch petition under Article 226 of the Constitutionis not always bound to relegate the parties to asuit. In the above case of (Gunwant Kau (KunwantKaur v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda (1969) 3 SCC769) this Court even went to the extent of holdingthat in a writ petition, if the facts require, evenoral evidence can be taken. This clearly shows thatin an appropriate case, the writ Court has thejurisdiction to entertain a writ petition involvingdisputed questions of fact and there is no absolutebar for entertaining a writ petition even if thesame arises out of a contractual obligation and/orinvolves some disputed questions of fact."337. As held by the Supreme Court in Rohtas Industries Ltd. v.Staff Union (AIR 1976 SC 425 : (1976) 2 SCC 82 : 1976-I-LLJ-274), thewrit power has by and large been the people's sentinel on the quivive and to cut back on or liquidate that power may cast a peril tohuman rights.338. Having regard to the facts of the case, High Court hasdiscretion to entertain or not to entertain the Writ Petition.Ofcourse, by and large when disputed questions of fact arise, HighCourt would not go into such disputed facts and filing of suit may bethe appropriate remedy. Where necessary facts as tonegligence/excesses are available, the High Court can proceed underArticle 226 of Constitution of India. No hard and fast rules can belaid down on these aspects and obviously the remedy under Article 226would depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. 339. The case before us is unprecedented. On 19.2.2009 evenwhen the Courts were functioning, without informing ACJ/RegistrarGeneral, Police force was brought in. Police went on rampage andabout 175 lawyers, staff and also litigant public have sustainedinjuries. Needless for us to state that exceptional or extraordinarycircumstances of this case warrant exercise of jurisdiction underArticle 226 of Constitution of India. The monstrosity of thesituation and exceptional circumstances in this case convince us toexercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

340. In fact, due to the enormity of the situation thatprevailed in the campus of this Court, the Full Bench of this Courtthought it fit to suo moto issue a Writ in order to examine theghastly incident, its cause and the perpetration, for the purpose ofpassing appropriate orders to uphold the dignity and honour of thisgreat Institution. Therefore, we are convinced that the WritPetition is maintainable and we reject the said submission of thelearned counsel.341. Learned Senior Counsel Dr.Rajeev Dhavan submitted thatdisputed questions of fact cannot be determined except on evidenceand that hardly any reliable evidence has been placed before theCourt. Learned Senior Counsel would further urge that serious doubtsarise as to the acceptability of Videos and Photos and based on suchslender materials court cannot adjudicate upon the highly disputedquestions of fact. We are unable to subscribe the submissions thatthere are no sufficient materials produced before us to resolve thecontentious points raised. 342. Both in the suo-moto Writ Petition and other Writ Petitionsfiled by the Advocates, Respondents have filed counter-affidavitstraversing each and every allegations in the affidavits. Respondentshave clearly and distinctly dealt with the averments in theaffidavits. Both sides advanced an elaborate submissions and we haveheard the matter at length. In fact, hearing of the case stretchedover for a couple of weeks. Based on the averments in Petitioners'affidavits and counter-affidavits and from the elaborate submissions,we are able to analyse and examine the contentious points raisedbefore us. We are not to point accusing the finger either againstthe Police or Lawyers. We are primarily concerned with the Policeexcess/intrusion into the Majesty of the Institution and the attackon the persons and Court buildings and damage to Court propertiesparalysing the institution.343. Probabilities are important elements of consideration. Onthe materials placed before us and calling in aid experience and bypreponderance of probabilities, exercising Writ jurisdiction, weproceed to examine the facts and the contentious points urged beforeus.344. Admissibility of sound and video recordings and photography:-A series of videos and photographs have been filed and shown inthe Court and were marked as under:-➢Video Clippings provided by the Police on the 19.02.2009incident – CD-R1➢Video Clippings provided by Mr.Viswanathan – CD-R2➢Video Clippings filed by Ms.Vaigai -CD-P3 & P4➢Video Clippings provided by Mr.Karuppan-CD-P5➢Video Clippings provided by MHAA-CD-P1 & P2➢Photographs filed by both petitioners and respondents https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

345. Questioning authenticity of videos filed by petitioners,the learned senior counsel Dr.Rajeev Dhavan submitted that only thePolice video recording have been authenticated, as the Policevideographer has filed an affidavit in the Court and Photos andVideos produced by the Petitioners is not authenticated and henceunreliable. Placing reliance upon R.M.Malkani V. State of Maharashtra(1983) 1 SCC 471 the learned senior counsel submitted thatadmissibility of tape record of relevant conversation is subject toit being authenticated in terms of the source, time and place withouttampering. 346. A contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation isadmissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. The tape recordedconversation is relevant to the matter in issue if the identificationof the voice and accuracy of the conversation is proved byeliminating the admissibility of erasing the recorded tape. 347. In so far as admissibility of tape recorded statement, in1995 (supp.) SCC 611 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:-"A tape-recorded statement is admissible inevidence, subject to the following conditions:-(1) The voice of the speaker must be identifiedby the maker of the record or other personsrecognising his voice. Where the maker is unableto identify the voice, strict proof will be requiredto determine whether or not it was the voiceof the alleged speaker.(2) The accuracy of the tape-recorded statementmust be proved by the maker of the record bysatisfactory evidence: direct or circumstantial. (3) Possibility of tampering with, or erasureof any part of, the tape-recorded statement must betotally excluded.(4) The tape-recorded statement must berelevant.(5) The recorded cassette must be sealed andmust be kept in safe or official custody.(6) The voice of the particular speaker must beclearly audible and must not be lost ordistorted by other sounds or disturbances.In Ramsingh's case that, the tape-recordings were held misleading andcould not be relied on because in most places they wereunintelligible and of a poor quality and of no use so their potentialprejudicial effect outweighed the evidentiary value of therecordings. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

348. We are conscious that anything which is born of trickery ortrapping or cunningness should be very cautiously and carefullyconsidered by the Court before it is admitted and accepted. 349. That a bald denial of the contents of a video tape is notadequate to doubt its authenticity; there should be material to showthat the video clippings are doctored or morphed. This view wasreiterated in Jagjit Singh V. State of Haryana MANU/SC/5473/2006 :AIR 2007SC590. In R.M.Malkani V.State of MaharashtraMANU/SC/0204/1972:1973CrilJ228. It was noted that in Shri.N.Sri RamaReddy, Yusufalh Esmail Nagree V. State of MaharashtraMANU/SC/0092/1967 : 1968CrilJ103 and S. Pratap Singh V. State ofPunjab MANU/SC/0272/1963 : (1996) ILLJ458SC a conversation ordialogue recorded on a tape recording machine was accepted asadmissible evidence. But, it was pointed out that such a conversationis admissible provided:- first, the conversation is relevant to thematters in issue; second, there is identification of the voice;third, the accuracy of the tape recording is proved by eliminatingthe possibility of erasing the tape record. 'A contemporaneous taperecord of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and isadmissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. It is resgestae. Itis also comparable to a photograph of a relevant incident. The taperecorded conversation is therefore a relevant fact and is admissibleunder Section 7 of the Evidence Act. This is, of course, subject toascertaining the genuineness of the tape recording and its being freefrom tampering or mutilation. 350. The respondents have not disputed that the video clippingsfiled by the petitioners relate to the occurrence. Even though videoclippings filed by the petitioners do not have the running time, Wehave watched the videos and looked into the photos as corroborativepiece of evidence. In addition to the materials, we have watched thevideos and looked into the photos for proper appreciation of variouscontentions. In so far as timings of chasing of lawyers and lathicharge, we have mainly taken into account the video clippings filedby the respondents CD-R1 & CD-R2. It is to be noted that in CD-R1filed by the respondents video clippings jump at several places with'no footages'. We have mainly referred to the Video clippings filedby Mr.Viswanathan, Addl. CoP (L & O) C.D-R2. 351. Justice B.N.Srikrishna's report: On 26.02.2009, the Hon'ble Supreme Court requested JusticeB.N.Srikrishna, former Judge of the Supreme Court to inquire into theincident which happened on 19.02.2009 and file a report. Afterholding initial enquiry on 28.02.2009, 01.03.2009, JusticeB.N.Srikrishna submitted his report on 04.03.2009. On 06.03.2009, theHon'ble Supreme Court took the report as part of the record andpassed the following order:Report of enquiry submitted by JusticeSrikrishna is taken on record."...... Report is being sent to the StateGovernment and also the Acting Chief Justice of theMadras High Court for appropriate action if any". https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

352. In his report Justice B.N.Srikrishna though found policeexcess, observed that the "circumstances facing the police on thefateful day justified use of force by the police".353. Placing reliance upon (1984) 3 SCC 161 (Bandhua MuktiMorcha v. Union of India) the learned Senior Counsel Mr. RajeevDhavan, submitted that Enquiry Report would furnish prima facieevidence of the facts and data gathered by the Commission during theobjective and impartial enquiry carries much value. The learnedSenior counsel urged us to consider the report as primafacie evidenceof lawyers unruly behaviour justifying the use of force by thepolice. The learned Senior counsel would further submit that sincethe Supreme Court has taken on record Justice Srikrishna's reportwhich finds no mention as to any objections by the lawyers, to thatextent, Justice Srikrishna report attains prima facie finality andurged us to look into the report of Justice Srikrishna as ofevidentiary value. 354. With due respect, even in the beginning of hearing of thematter, we made it clear that we may not refer to JusticeB.N.Srikrishna's report. The reason being it was only an InterimReport. By its order dated 26.02.2009, Hon'ble Supreme Court askedACJ to decide terms of reference in consultation with the AdvocateGeneral of the Madras High Court and Presidents of various BarAssociations in Madras and place before the Committee the terms ofreference to the committee. It does not transpire from the report ofJustice Srikrishna that any such terms of reference was finalised byACJ for reference before the committee.355. Having regard to the then continuation of Courts' boycottby lawyers, Justice B.N.Srikrishna filed only an Interim Report.Since it is only an Interim Report, with due respect, we were of theview we may not refer to Justice B.N.Srikrishna report. We have heardthe matter at threadbare. Since overwhelming materials are placedbefore us by way of affidavits and counter affidavits and othermaterials and submissions, we proceeded to analyse the matter afresh.356. Incidents – Surrender, Stone pelting and Lathicharge:-We proceed to deal with this on the following aspects:-➢Whether there was pre-plan, premeditated and Policeconspiracy as alleged by the Advocates.➢Whether presence of Police force on the Court premises wasuninvited and unjustifiable or was it only a pre-cautionary measure.➢Whether there was imminent "Threat Perception" compellingthe need for mobilising the Police as alleged by thePolice. ➢Attack and who were responsible for the incident.➢Whether there is Contempt of Court and if so, who are tobe proceeded for Contempt of Court.➢Moulding of relief. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

357. Re.contention -Premeditation and Police conspiracy:-In the affidavits after affidavits, lawyers have alleged thatthe Police action against the unruling mob was pre-planned conspiracyto attack the lawyers. Lawyers have taken varied stance that Policeunleashed violence against the lawyers as part of pre-planned andpremeditated plan. In the representation dated 22.2.2009, Ms.Vaigaihas stated that "Police carried out a premeditated and well plannedattack on the judiciary". In his affidavit dated 09.3.2009, Mr.PaulKanagaraj, President MHAA has alleged that "it is a pre-plannedconspiracy to create a chilling effect on the legal fraternity in theState including the judiciary". In her affidavit dated 11.3.2009,Ms. Nalini, and in his affidavit dated 11.3.2009, Mr.Velmurugan,averred that the attack was with pre-plan. Mr.Velmurugan has gone astep further alleging that " the attack could not have been donewithout the knowledge of the Home Minister, Home Secretary and ChiefSecretary". In the affidavit of Mr.M.Baskar dated 07.9.2009, pureunfounded speculation has been made terming the incident as"Operation Blackcoat".358. Likening the February 19 violence to 'Operation Blue Star'at the Amritsar Golden Temple, Mr.S.Prabakaran, President TNAAsubmitted that similar preplanning preceded the campus violence,which was code-named by Police as "Operation Black Coat".Reiterating the averments, in their counter-affidavits Ms.Vaigai andMr.Paul Kanagaraj would also submit that the entire violence of thePolice was pre-planned and premeditated.359. Mr.S. Prabhakaran, President, TNAA and Ms.Vaigai, learnedcounsel have drawn our attention to the letter of the Commissioner inD.O.Lr.No. 151/S.B.VII/2009 dated 6.2.2009 to the Registrar-Generalbringing it to the notice of the Registrar-General the behaviour ofthe lawyers indulged in agitations, entering into ruckus with Policeofficials and disturbing the public peace. It was thereforecontended that the pre-determined mind of CoP is evident from theletter dated 6.2.2009. Based on the said letter we are not inclinedto hold that there was conspiracy by Police against lawyers. Thetenor of the said letter only indicates the anguish of CoP about thelaw and order situation in and around the High Court premises and nota pre-determined mind as alleged by the lawyers. 360. The stand of lawyers that the incident was pre-planned andpremeditated is unfounded. The allegations are pure unfoundedspeculation and unsupported by any materials. As rightly submittedby the learned Senior Counsel Dr.Rajeev Dhavan, mere assertion thatit is pre-planned and premeditated would not constitute the evidenceand mere assertion cannot by themselves lead to the conclusion thatthere was Pre-arranged Plan. To constitute premeditation, one shouldhave reflected the determination. There is no material showingexpression of 'ill-feelings' or 'previous threat' by the Police tosay that there was Pre-arranged plan. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

361. The allegations that the incident was well prepared infurtherance of Police conspiracy are baseless and mere speculationbased on nothing. Conspiracy consists in the agreement of two ormore persons to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawfulmeans. Absolutely, there is no material to show that there wastransmission of thoughts sharing unlawful design. To constituteconspiracy, there must be 'common design' and 'common intention' towork in furtherance of common design. Equally, the averments arelacking as to what was the unlawful design. In fact, if the group oflawyers had not gone to B4-High Court Police Station for surrender,the day 19.2.2009 would have passed off like any other normal day.While so, it is farfetched to contend that the incident on 19.2.2009was a pre-planned operation by the Police conspiracy. We have nohesitation in rejecting the plea of pre-plan and Police conspiracy.362. Whether mobilisation of Police force as pre-cautionary measure:- Before we deal with this question, it is necessary torefer security plan of the High Court and the sanctioned strength ofPolice personnel for the security of High Court.363. The High Court of Judicature, Madras is one of the threeChartered High Courts established by Letter Patent granted by HerMajesty Queen Victoria bearing dated 26.06.1862. High Court, Madrasis the highest Court in the State. The building is of antiquityHeritage building with Indo-Sarocenic construction. High Court is aplace of historical importance attracting tourists. For any tourist,visit to Chennai is incomplete without a visit to High Courtbuildings. High Court sprawls in an extent of 38 acres. Thepremises comprises of Court Halls, Judges' Chambers, Registry, LegalServices Authority, Museum, Law Chambers, Canteen, B4-High CourtPolice Station, City Civil Court, Family Court, Small Causes Court,Tribunals, Government Press, Law College, Fire Station, BSNL office,Railway Booking Office, Post Office etc. It is a place visited bynumber of litigants and public. Having regard to the antiquity andnature of Heritage building, there is compelling need to preserve thepresent building and premises for posterity. 364. Mobilisation of Police Force – Whether Precautionary Measure Security to the High Court : W.P.No.3197/2007 – 02.02.2007:Providing security to the High Court has drawn the attention forquite some time. Having regard to the vast extent accommodatingnumber of Courts and floating population of lawyers, staff, clients,witnesses, visitors and vendors, in G.O.Ms.No.1536 dated 11.10.1996,B4-High Court Police Station was established sanctioning Policepersonnel. 365. As per G.O.Ms.No.1810 dated 15.12.1997, Police protectionwas provided to all the Courts in the High Court complex and fourMagistrate Courts in Chennai and sanctioning additional manpower,arms, ammunition and equipments, vehicles etc. As per G.O.Ms.No.51dated 18.1.1999, Security wing was created to the Hon'ble the Chief https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Justice and to the Hon'ble Judges, High Court, Madras by providingpersonal security in the Cadre of Sub-Inspector of Police.366. For the purpose of ensuring security in High Courtpremises, Registrar-General, High Court, Madras filedW.P.No.3197/2007. In the said Writ Petition in W.P.No.3197/2007, itwas stated that the total sanctioned strength of Police personnelcomprising Officers and other rank is 252. Considering that HighCourt is a Court of Record under Article 215 of Constitution of Indiaas well as it is housed in a Heritage building and that it alsoattracts thousands of visitors every day and that there is animperative need to provide security cover to the premises of the HighCourt, in W.P.No.3197/2007 [Registrar-General, High Court, Madras v.State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by the Chief Secretary to Government,Chennai and others (reported in (2007) 2 MLJ 456)], Division Bench ofthis Court has issued the following directions to maintain thesanctioned strength of 252 Police personnel. In Para (13) theDivision Bench held as under:-"13. ......(i)The respondents are directed to maintain thesanctioned strength of 252 Police personnelcomprising of officers and other rank and providedin the tabular column above (para 6) at all timesand also to fill up the existing vacancies withina period of four weeks from today.(ii)The Registrar-General of the High Court willindicate a suitable place for constructingaccommodation for locating the Police outpostwithin the High Court campus to the respondents,who will construct a building at their own costswith a built-up area of 4000 sq.ft., comprising ofground floor and first floor.(iii)No personnel, who is coming within thesanctioned strength of 252, comprising of variouscategories listed above shall be deputed to anyother work, except for the work of the High Courtand no diversion of the force will be permitted,except with the prior permission of the HonourableChief Justice of the High Court.(iv)The respondents 1 and 2 are directed toascertain the number of Police personnel requiredfor providing security at the residence of theHonourable Judges within a period of four weeksfrom today and also issue an order sanctioning thesaid strength and report compliance to this Courtregarding the same, within a period of two weeksthereafter.(v)Adequate training to the Police force deployed assuggested by the Special Committee should begiven. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

367. By the letter dated 31.5.2007, Government of India issuedguidelines for the security of High Courts and District/SubordinateCourts in the country. In the said guidelines, it has beenmentioned as follows:-"(v) The High Court in the respective States/UTsshould be declared as High Security Zone.(vi)There should be fool-proof Access Control Systemfor the premises of the High Courts with regulatedentry for all concerned, including Judges, staffmembers, advocates, plaintiffs and respondents,accused persons, under trials, press, generalpublic, etc., on the basis of passes/IdentityCards. Different types of passes/Identity Cardsmay be issued to different visitors.(vii)There should be random frisking or checking ofpersons entering the Court premises.(viii)There should be provision for the separatefrisking of the under trials, preferably in thelock-up provided for them.368. After various incidents of terrorist attacks in the form ofserial blasts in different parts of the country and pointing thatthere have been certain incidents of bomb blasts in Court complexesin the State of Uttar Pradesh, reiterating the necessity for securityarrangements in the High Courts and District/Subordinate Courts andalso in respect of Hon'ble Judges, on 17.11.2008 directions wereissued to the Chief Secretary, State of Tamilnadu by the HomeSecretary, Government of India to review the security arrangements inthe High Court and District/Subordinate Courts and also in respect ofHon'ble Judges.369. Pursuant to these directions, Security Committee of theHigh Court reviewed the entire security system as per the revisedsecurity arrangement system in Para 2.5 of the Security Plan thatStatic Armed Guard of one plus four to be posted at all entrances inthe High Court campus. Those guards are to provide very effectivecheck against any surprise entry into restricted areas and form thefirst barrier against any unauthorised intrusion. The proposalenvisaging deployment of 451 personnel was approved by the Committeeof Judges in their meeting dated 28.1.2009. In compliance, QuickReaction Team (QRT) headed by an Officer has been positioned insidethe High Court premises from 28.1.2009. As per the direction ofthe Court in W.P.No.3197/2007, the sanctioned strength is 252 Policepersonnel. The proposal for deployment of 451 personnel was approvedby the Committee of Judges in their Proceedings dated 28.1.2009. 370. Shifting of Police personnel from B2-Esplanade PoliceStation to B4-High Court Police Station:- After a long period ofstrike, on 19.2.2009, Advocates resumed work. On 19.2.2009, Dr.Subramaniam Swamy appeared in Court Hall No.III and in another Court.The following security was mobilised for the security duty in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ connection with the visit of Dr.Subramaniam Swamy (excluding theactual strength available for duty in Court) at 9.00 A.M.Addl.CoPJcsDcsADCsAcsInsp.SIs.OthersTotalLocal131482365105QRT120 21SAG120 21TOTAL1314825105147Elaborate bandobust arrangement was made with 3 DCs including Mr.PremAnand Sinha-DCP, Mr.Ramasubramani-JCP(North) and Mr.Viswanathan-Addl.CoP. Addl. CoP Mr.Viswanathan and JCP (North) Mr.Ramasubramani cameto the High Court campus at 10.00 A.M. and remained till 11.30 A.M.Dr. Subramaniam Swamy left the Court at 11.30 A.M. and it was safeexit. When Dr. Subramaniam Swamy appeared in the Court absolutelythere was no ruckus.371. According to Mr.Ramasubramani-JCP (North), since Dr.Subramaniam Swamy within 'Z' category has to appear in the Court andthat it is the responsibility of the State to protect the personunder 'Z' category, to supervise the security arrangements, he cameto the High Court at 9.00 A.M. to personally oversee the bandobustarrangements. Further, according to JCP (North), since the Assemblywas in Session and the Hon'ble Chief Minister was then hospitalised,he took an objective decision in mobilising the strength to providesecurity to Dr. Subramaniam Swamy. We do feel that mobilisingstrength for security duty in connection with the visit of Dr.Subramaniam Swamy was a bonafide decision taken by JCP (North).After Dr. Subramaniam Swamy left, the Police personnel gathered atB2-Esplanade Police Station for debriefing. The debriefing afterbandobust is with meaning and purpose i.e. to find out any happeningsduring security and the personnel when will have to report back andto give such other instructions.372. In the counter-affidavit of the jurisdictional DCP, Mr.PremAnand Sinha, it is averred that when the Police personnel gathered atB2-Esplanade Police Station for debriefing, at about 12.00 noon, ACP– MKB Nagar told them that few Advocates approached him to surrenderand requested for list of accused Advocates concerned in B4-HighCourt Police Station Crime No.13/2009 and list of accused Advocateswas furnished to them by ACP – MKB Nagar. 373. From the Videos filed by the Respondents, it was seen thatlawyers have gone to B4-High Court Police Station at 14.00 hours forsurrender. It was also seen from the Videos that lawyers raisedslogans and insisted for registration of case against Dr. SubramaniamSwamy. Case in Crime No.14/2009 was registered against Dr.Subramniam Swamy and copy of FIR was handed over to the lawyers at14:20 – 14:22 hours. At that time, only one Police Officer wasseen in the midst of the lawyers. After receiving copy of FIR,lawyers started raising slogans and shouting for arrest of Dr.Subramaniam Swamy. After about 14:22 hours, there is a gap in the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Video clippings. In the Videos, we notice the presence of Policepersonnel shifted to B4-High Court Police Station between 14:22 to15:34 hours.374. According to Mr.Ramasubramani-JCP (North), he and Mr.PremAnand Sinha-DCP and other Police personnel waited in B2-EsplanadePolice Station waiting for surrender of Advocates. On receivinginformation that there was sloganeering and protest in B4-High CourtPolice Station, available strength in B2-Esplanade Police Station wasshifted to B4-High Court Police Station.375. In his counter-affidavit Mr.Viswanathan-Addl. CoP hasaverred that when he came to B2-Esplanade Police Station, he learntthat the entire Police force present in the B4-High Court PoliceStation at 10.00 A.M. continued to be stationed near B4-High CourtPolice Station. The averments in Para (8) alleging that the Policeforce continued to be stationed near B4-High Court Police Station isnot correct. It was seen from the Videos, from 14:00 – 14:20 hours,there was no Police force near B4-High Court Police Station. Only oninformation, about brewing tension in B4-High court Police Station,Police force was shifted from B2-Esplanade Police Station to B4-HighCourt Police Station.376. As per the order in W.P.No.3197/2007, the sanctionedstrength of Police personnel was 251 (excluding ACP). As per thesecurity plan of the High Court, the sanctioned strength is 451(including officers). According to Police that the strengthmobilised on 19.2.2009 was 292 in addition to the existing strengthof 130 more or less within the limits of 451 which is the sanctionedstrength as per the security plan. 377. By and large, the then strength actually available for dutyin the High Court (Guards, Judges Chambers, Halls, Gates, Booth,Traffic etc.) is only about 130. In addition to the existingstrength in the High Court 130, on 19.2.2009 additional strengthmobilised was 147 + 118 + 26 = 291 totalling 421 [130 + 291 = 421].As per the security plan, the sanctioned strength of 451 personnelwas mainly for man power deployment at (i) Gates; (ii) Armed Guard;(iii) Surveillance; (iv) Bomb detection; (v) Bomb Disposal; (vi)Control Room; (vii) Baggage Screening; (viii) High Court Halls/JudgesChambers; (ix) Other Court premises; (x) Parking areas and (xi) QRT.When the manpower deployment was for multi-purpose ensuring security,evidently that force was not meant to be garnered in B4-High CourtPolice Station. The additional strength deployed on 19.02.2009 wereTSP, SAG, TNCF and not regular Armed Reserve. While so, it cannot becontended that strength mobilised on 19.02.2009 was only as per thesanctioned strength of security plan.378. THREAT PERCEPTION: Learned Counsel Dr.Rajeev Dhavan mainlyargued that in the assessment of Police, there was 'ThreatPerception' which necessitated mobilisation of force and subsequentacts. According to the Police 'Threat Perception' was on twocounts:- (i) High Court being high security Zone, Police wasconcerned about general security and advocates gathered in huge https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ numbers were sloganeering. (ii) Antecedents of Advocates particularlyactivities from November 2008.379. Submitting that holistic threat perception meant takinginto account various antecedent facts related to the incidents ofAdvocates' excess in and around the High Court campus and involvingAdvocates, learned Senior Counsel enumerated number of incidents suchas:-➢2001 – 2007 - 92 criminal cases booked againstseveral Advocates.➢12.11.2008 – Incident of clash between two groups ofDr. Ambedkar Government Law College Students withinthe High Court campus.➢29.1.2009 – Advocates entered the Court presided byACJ and asked Advocates there to join in boycott.Further, the Advocates went to the Vth Courtpresided by Justice Manikumar and disruptedproceedings by banging on the door. Advocates movedinside High Court complex shouting slogans onmegaphone against Sonia Gandhi.➢30.1.2009 – Advocates hijacked MTC bus to pay homageMuthukumar. Subsequently, about 100 advocates wentin a procession inside the High Court campus andsloganeered.➢03.2.2009 – 50 Advocates staged demonstration to payhomage to Muthukumar and burnt a portrait ofSubramaniam Swamy.➢04.2.2009 – Hartal declared all over Chennai bypolitical parties. Cycle shop (Bombay Cycle Mart)opposite the High Court which was still open damagedby advocates.➢11.2.2009 – 100 Advocates headed by Mr.Kanakaraj leddemonstration and burnt Congress Party flag andportraits of Congress leaders within High Courtcampus.➢12.2.2009 – 60 Advocates headed by Mr.Kanakaraj tookout procession within High Court campus and burntCongress party banner. Later, 75 Advocates went inprocession from High Court and attempted to lay siegeto the Army Headquarters, Chennai.➢13.2.2009 – Two group of Advocates headed byMr.Kanakaraj and Mr.Rajinikanth led a procession topicket Central Railway Station.➢16.2.2009 – 20 Advocates sloganeered and burntportraits of Sonia Gandhi and Sri Lankan Presidentwithin the High Court campus. Later 35 Advocatesburnt their Election Photo Identity Cardsrenunciating their Indian citizenship and burnt photoof Sonia Gandhi.It was submitted that in the above circumstances, there was serious'Threat Perception' and in view of such 'Threat Perception', Policemobilised additional strength to provide security to Dr. SubramaniamSwamy and in the light of surrender by lawyers. Learned SeniorCounsel would further submit that it is for the Police to take https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ reasonable action to deal with the 'Threat Perception' and it is notfor the Court to substitute its own view whether mobilisation ofstrength was necessary or not. It was further submitted that leewayto be given to the Police to deal with the threats to Law and ordersituation or public order, Police must evaluate over all such ThreatPerception.380. Ofcourse, there have been number of cases against theAdvocates. But in most of the cases, charge sheets have not beenfiled. We do not subscribe to the contention of 'Threat Perception'based on the prior incidents. As we pointed out earlier, on19.2.2009 lawyers resumed work and from the morning Courts weresmoothly functioning. Visit of Dr. Subramaniam Swamy passed offpeacefully. Surrender was initially supposed to be a voluntarysurrender. In our considered view, there was no imminent 'ThreatPerception' as alleged by the Police to shift the Police personnelfrom B2-Esplanade Police Station to B4-High Court Police Station andto mobilise additional strength.381. In the counter-affidavit of Mr. Viswanathan, Addl. CoP, itis averred that when he reached B2-Esplanade Police Station at 3.10P.M., he learnt that "entire Police force secured in the morning at10.00 A.M. continued to be stationed near High Court Police Station".The stand of Mr.Viswanathan that Police Force continued in B-4 PoliceStation is not correct. As we pointed out earlier, at the time ofregistration of FIR and handing over copy of FIR to lawyers at 2.21P.M., in the video clippings, we do not find additional policestrength; But only Inspector of Police with lawyers. 382. According to Mr.Ramasubramani-JCP (North) and Mr. PremAnand Sinha-DCP, there was a meeting held by ACJ on 18.2.2009 andthey were instructed to take firm action against the lawyers involvedin the attack on Dr. Subramaniam Swamy in Crime No.13/2009. Mr.P.N.Prakash, learned counsel for Mr.Ramasubramani-JCP (North)submitted that Assembly was in Session and the Hon'ble Chief Ministerwas in hospital and Dr. Subramaniam Swamy was in 'Z' categoryprotection and therefore, even after his safe exit, and number ofadvocates gathered and since there was sloganeering and troublebrewing up, shifting of Police personnel was an objective decisiontaken by the JCP (North) in "Good faith".383. According to the General Clauses Act X of 1897 "A thingshall be deemed to be done in 'good faith' where it is in fact donehonestly whether it is done negligently or not.". Good faith isdenied in Sec.52 IPC as under:-"Nothing is said to be done or believed in "good faith"which is done or believed without due care and attention."Good faith requires not logical infallibility, but due care andattention. But how far erroneous actions or statements are to beimputed to want of due care and caution must in each case, beconsidered with reference to the general circumstances and thecapacity and intelligence of the person, whose conduct is inquestion. When a question arises as to whether a person acted ingood faith, then it devolves upon him to show not merely that he had https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ a good intention but that he exercised such care and skill as theduty reasonably demanded for its due discharge.384. Observing that the test is of a reasonable and prudent man,in Re : S.K.Sundaram (2001) 2 SCC 171, the Supreme Court, in Paras(28) and (29) held as follows:-"28. The expression "good faith" in criminaljurisprudence has a definite connotation. Itsimport is totally different from saying that theperson concerned has honestly believed the truth ofwhat is said. Good faith is defined in Section 52of the Indian Penal Code thus:"52. Nothing is said to be done or believed in 'goodfaith' which is done or believed without due careand attention."29. See the language of the law in this regard. Itstarts in the negative tone excluding all exceptwhat is allowed to be within its amplitude.Insistence sought to be achieved through thecommencing words of the definition "nothing is saidtobe done or believed in good faith" is that thesolitary item included within the purview of theexpression "good faith" is what is done with "duecare and attention". Due care denotes the degree ofreasonableness in the care sought to be exercised.In Black's Law Dictionary, "reasonable care" isexplained as"such a degree of care, precaution, or diligence asmay fairly and properly be expected or required,having regard to the nature of the action, or of thesubject-matter and the circumstances surrounding thetransaction. It is such care as an ordinary prudentperson would exercise under the conditions existingat the time he is called upon to act". "385. From the Video clippings [Respondents' side CD-R1], we haveseen that at 15:34 hours, lawyers were raising slogans asking thePolice “to go out” from the campus. Sloganeering continued till15:41 hours. We could see from the Video clippings, Mr.Ramasubramani-JCP(North) and other Police Officers trying to pacify the protestinglawyers. At about 15:45 hours, lawyers have been forcibly taken tocustody in the Police van. There was a lot of hustle and tusslewhile taking the lawyers to custody.386. After the lawyers were taken to custody and Police van leftthe premises, at 15:47 hours, there was a lot of protest by lawyers.What initially started as protest against the Police turned to be'stone pelting' by the lawyers from 15:50 hours onwards. It was seenfrom the Video clippings, lawyers have taken position in thecorridors of Courts and pelted stones towards the Police for abouttwo to three minutes. Within a couple of minutes stones were peltedfrom all directions. Police also pelted stones and matched thelawyers in their lawlessness. Stones that came their way was quicklythrown back by the Police. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

387. The relationship between the Police and lawyers has neverbeen cordial. In (2007) 2 MLJ 1 [Madras High Court AdvocatesAssociation represented by its President, High Court Campus, Chennaiv. State of Tamil Nadu rep. by the Chief Secretary, Fort St. George,Chennai and others], Division Bench of this Court has set out thegenesis of this problems of lawyers vs. Police rivalry and expoundedmeasures to nip such incidents in bud. Any friction between thefraternity of lawyers and police carry dangerous portents ofescalation beyond a point of easy containment. 388. In the background of persistent rift between police andlawyers, bonafide in shifting the Police personnel from B2-EsplanadePolice Station to B4-High Court Police Station has to be examined.The phrase "due care and attention" implies genuine efforts to reachthe truth and not the ready acceptance of ill-natured belief. Thetest is of a reasonable and prudent man. As we pointed out earlier,lawyers resumed work on 19.2.2009 and the Courts were functioningsmoothly. In fact, visit of Dr. Subramaniam Swamy passed offpeacefully. In such circumstance, was it prudent on the part of thePolice to accept the surrender of lawyers in B4 High Court PoliceStation. Police had well known that Advocate Mr.Vijayendran wasinvolved in several cases. Even though, Mr. Vijayendran, Advocateinvolved in Crime No.13/2009 approached the Police, Police have notchosen to arrest him. On the other hand, it is stated that they havebelieved the words of Mr. Vijayendran that the Advocates involved inCrime No.13/2009 have proposed to surrender.389. B4-High Court Police Station is situated in the midst ofCity Civil Court and Small Causes Court. City Civil Court, PrincipalJudge's chamber and Court are situated just abutting the access roadon the northern side of B4-High Court Police Station. City CivilCourt's Annexure building and Small Causes Court and Family Courtalong with creche are on the eastern side and north eastern siderespectively. Since the Courts were functioning on that date, beforeshifting the Police force from B2-Esplanade Police Station to B4-HighCourt Police Station, JCP (North) Mr.M.Ramasubramani and DCP Mr.PremAnand Sinha ought to have exercised 'due care and attention' andforeseen the consequences. The situation for further protest andsloganeering was created by the Police by forcibly taking the lawyersinto custody at 3.45 P.M.390. As we have pointed out earlier, Police personnel must havebeen shifted from B2-Esplanade Police Station to B4-High Court PoliceStation between 2.30 to 3.30 P.M. For shifting the Police personnelfrom B2-Esplanade Police Station to B4-High Court Police Station, JCP(North) must have certainly obtained permission from the CoP. Oncoming to know about brewing tension in the High Court campus between2.00 to 2.30 P.M., the CoP called Addl. CoP Mr.Viswanathan at 2.45P.M. and instructed him to go to High Court (according toMr.Viswanathan B-2 Esplanade Police Station) to monitor thesituation. The then Commissioner's Cellphone No. is 9444465555. CellPhone of Mr.A.K.Viswanathan is 9444000029. Cell Phone ofMr.Ramasubramani is 9940455455. The call log of CoP between 14:23:53 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ to 15:55 hours are as under:-919444465555919940455455Incoming19-2-0914:23:538791944459111111041356406011660381104-IBS-Commr919444465555919841021543Incoming19-2-0914:38:227591944459111111041356406011660381104-IBS-CommrJCP(N)callsCoP919444465555919841021543Roming-IC19-2-0914:38:38749194445900310919444465555919940455455Outgoing19-2-091439519291944459111111041356406011660381104-IBS-CommrCoPcallsJCP(N)919444465555919444000029Outgoing19-2-0914451811891944459111111041356406011660381104-IBS-CommrCoPcallsAddl.CoP(L&O)919444465555919443049191Incoming19-2-091447574191944459111111041356406011660381104-IBS-Commr919444465555919443049191Roming-IC19-2-09144814409194445968000919444465555919940455455Incoming19-2-0915010213791944459111111041356406011660381104-IBS-CommrJCP(N)callsCoP919444465555919600039077Incoming19-2-091523126591944459111111041356406011660381104-IBS-Commr919444465555914424301269Incoming19-2-0915280810591944459111111041356406011660381104-IBS-Commr919444465555914424301269Roming-IC19-2-091528241059194445911620919444465555919445012233Outgoing19-2-0915300822191944459111111041356406011660381104-IBS-Commr919444465555919444000029Outgoing19-2-091535058791944459111111041356406011660381104-IBS-CommrCoPcallsAddl.CoP(L&O)919444465555919444000029Incoming19-2-091538124991944459111111041356406011660381104-IBS-CommrAddl.CoP(L&O)callsCoP919444465555919444000029Incoming19-2-091550498991944459111111041356406011660381104-IBS-CommrAddl.CoP(L&O)callsCoP919444465555919600041411Outgoing19-2-091552503691944459111111041356406011660381104-IBS-CommrCoPcallsDCP919444465555919444000029Incoming19-2-091555571091944459111111211356406011660381121-EgmoreAddl.CoP(L&O)callsCoPBetween 2.23 P.M. to 3.55 P.M., CoP had spoken to JCP (North) atleast three times. The Commissioner directed Addl. CoPMr.Viswanathan to go to High Court to monitor the situation. NeitherCoP nor JCP (North) have chosen to inform the High Court/ACJ aboutthe shifting of Policer personnel from B2 to B4 Police Station. Theydid not take permission of the High Court/ACJ for deploying thePolice Personnel. 391. It is not the case of Police that they informed the HighCourt/ACJ about the brewing tension and mobilisation of additionalPolice force. From the call log of CoP, we do not find any suchcalls to the High Court Registry. The official Cellphone of the thenRegistrar-General is 9444449933. From the call log of CoP, we findthat the first call from Registrar-General was at 16:01:33 hoursabout which we shall deal a little later. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

392. It was nextly contended that in view of volatile situation,the Police were free to act and where the situation warranted inexercise of 'Good faith', Police mobilised additional strength. Aswe pointed out earlier, B4-High Court Police Station is in the midstof City Civil Court and Small Causes Court in the High Court campus.What ever be the compelling situation before mobilisation anddeployment of Police inside the Court premises, since Courts werefunctioning at that time, Police ought to have foreseen theconsequences. Having regard to the fact that High Court/ACJ was notinformed about the mobilisation of strength, in our considered view,the Police have not exercised 'due care and attention' beforedeployment of Police personnel.393. In 1995-2-LW (Crl) 723 [Rajendran and 23 othersContemners/Respondents/Police Officers/Advocates of Saidapet Bar], inSaidapet Metropolitan Magistrate Court, for taking into custody ofone Natarajan accused in a registered Crime and his Advocate who cameto surrender before Magistrate. The said Natarajan and his advocateswere taken away by the police forcibly, which, Police closed northerngates fully. Southern gate was partially closed. Taking seriousview of the act of Police in closing the gates and observing that thePolice officers must have intimated to the Senior Magistrate aboutthe closure of northern gate fully and the southern gate partially,Division Bench of this Court held as under:-"61-A. ....... Police Officers must have intimated tothe Senior Magistrate about the closure of northerngate fully and the southern gate partially and thepurpose for which they had closed the gates. They musthave equally informed the other heads of thedepartment, in the variety of officers situated in thatcampus. If there is an emergency, the police cancertainly act, without forwarding prior intimation, buteven then they would certainly owe a duty to inform theconcerned officers of court as well as other officerssoon thereafter about the closure of the gates, in asituation, emergent and the reasons, that led to suchclosure. It cannot be overlocked, that several hundredof member of the public would usually be visiting thiscampus in Saidapet. The question is not whether anyone of the members of the public or even the Magistratethemselves had complained about the inaccessibility tothe premises, leading to obstruction of the course ofjustice."394. We fully agree with the view taken by the Division Bench.For deployment of additional strength in the High Court campus, thePolice ought to have obtained permission of ACJ/Registrar General. Ifthere was an emergency, Police can certainly act, without priorintimation. Even then they are duty bound to inform the ACJ/RegistrarGeneral as to the problem in the campus and mobilisation ofadditional strength to handle the situation. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

395. Between 2.00 to 3.45 P.M., the trouble was brewing. In hisearlier report, CoP averred that around 2.30 P.M. trouble wasbrewing, he deputed Addl. CoP Mr.Viswanathan along with JCP (CentralZone) and other officers (118 men and officers) to the High Court totake charge of the situation. As seen from the report of CoP and thecounter filed by Mr.Prem Anand Sinha, DCP, at about 3.00 P.M., theAddl. CoP (L & O) and JCP (Central Zone), 2 Dcs, 9 Acs, 11Inspectors, 4 SIs and 90 TSP men [Totally 118] came as an additionalstrength. According to Addl. CoP (L & O), he arrived in the spotonly at 3.50 P.M. [regarding which, we shall deal later]. As per theMan power chart showing the presence of Police personnel at 3.00P.M., the total strength was 265 personnel and officers [147 + 118].Evidently, CoP has learnt about the volatile situation and onlybecause of which, CoP asked the Addl. CoP (L & O) to go to High Courtto monitor the situation and the additional strength of 118 men andofficers were also sent to High Court campus.396. As we have pointed out earlier, JCP (North)Mr.Ramasubramani has spoken to the CoP number of times from 14:23:53hours onwards. Based on the information, at about 2.30 P.M., CoP hasmade all arrangements to send additional reinforcement. Despitecommunication of the Officers who were in the field and despatchingof additional strength to the High Court, neither CoP norjurisdictional Officers present in the field have chosen to informthe High Court/ACJ about the volatile situation and mobilisation ofadditional strength of Police personnel and officers in B4-High CourtPolice Station.397. Onbehalf of the Registrar-General, High Court, Madras [12thRespondent], Mr.Muthukumaraswamy, learned Senior Counsel submittedthat High Court precincts cannot be tested on the touch stone ofCriminal Procedure Code and that as per Article 215 of Constitution,High Court is the superior Court of Records and power of regulatingthe entry of Police vests with the Chief Justice.398. As per Article 215 of Constitution of India, High Courts inIndia are superior Courts of Record. They have original andappellate jurisdiction. They have inherent and plenary powers.Unless expressly or impliedly barred, and subject to the appellate ordiscretionary jurisdiction of this Court, the High Courts haveunlimited jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction to determine theirown powers. [See AIR 1967 SC 1 (Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. StateofMaharashtra) & AIR 1993 SC 1014 (M.V.Elisabeth and others v. HarwanInvestment & Trading Pvt. Ltd., Hanoekar House, Swatontapeth, Vasco-De-Gama, Gao]. 399. The Constitution has assigned a new role to theConstitutional Courts to ensure rule of law in the country.UnderConstitutional frame, High Court is complete self-contained and self-sufficient Institution, independent of others. Every High Courtdraws its own power and jurisdiction from the provisions ofConstitution. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

400. The Chief Justice of High Court is the head of judiciary inthe State and in over all control of its administration. Being aself-contained institution, it is prerogative of the Chief Justice toregulate the entry of Police in the campus. That is why fordeploying the Police personnel or for increasing the strength and toregulate the security by the order of the Chief Justice, SecurityCommittee has been constituted. Before deploying additional strength(in addition to the existing personnel for security) either forproviding security to VIPs attending the Courts or under othercircumstances, permission of the High Court/ACJ ought to be obtained.401. Ofcourse, in cases of Law and Order problem in the Campus,Police cannot remain spectator as in the incident happened in Dr.Ambedkar Government Law College, Chennai. For deploying additionalstrength, permission of High Court/Hon'ble the Chief Justice shall beobtained. When there is serious Law and Order problem within thecampus, Police are to necessarily act even without prior intimationand even then, they are duty bound to inform the High Court/ChiefJustice about mobilisation of additional strength and the steps takenin handling the situation. In so far as the Districts, thePrincipal District Judge/District Judge is the authority to regulatethe entry of Police and security arrangements on the above linessubject to other directions issued by the High Court.402. In fact, CoP was conscious to inform the High Court beforeregistration of case regarding the incident on 17.2.2009. On17.2.2009, CoP had written letter Rc.No.203/SB VII/09 dated 17.2.2009seeking concurrence of the High Court to register a criminal case andset the criminal law in motion. In response to the said letter, bythe letter dated 18.2.2009, Registrar-General [Roc.No.760-A/2009/F1dated 18.2.2009] informed the CoP "that under law, the concurrence ofthe Registry is required (sic) to register a criminal case and inview of the fact that already a complaint is preferred by Mr. KaderMohideen, ACP, Police should do it on its own". By and large, toregister a case concurrence of High Court is not required. We feelthat in the said letter of Registrar General word 'not' is missingbefore the word 'required' and we think it is a typographicalmistake. When CoP was conscious of informing High Court beforesetting the criminal law in motion on 19.2.2009, CoP ought to haveinformed the High Court for mobilisation of extra strength.403. In (1996) 6 SCC 323 [Commissioner of Police, Delhi andanother v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, New Delhi], the former PrimeMinister Mr.P.V.Narasimha Rao was to be provided proximate securityby SPG during his appearance in Tis Hazari Courts. When SPG soughtpermission from Delhi High Court for deploying the Police persons inTis Hazari Courts, having regard to the practical difficultiesinvolved in Police personnel in the Court premises, AdministrativeCommittee of five Hon'ble Judges declined permission to deploy Policepersonnel in Tis Hazari Courts to provide proximate security. WhenCommissioner of Police moved the Supreme Court for change of venue,accepting the decision of Administrative Committee of Delhi High https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Court, Supreme Court accepted the plea of change of venue inproviding proximate security satisfactorily by deploying necessaryPolice officers. Mobilisation of additional strength in Courtpremises has its own impact involving practical difficulties andcannot be a matter of course. 404. At the risk repetition, we note that JCP (North)[Mr.M.Ramasubramani] and jurisdictional DCP [Mr.Prem Anand Sinha] donot seem to have exercised due care and attention. Question of 'Goodfaith' should be considered in the position of the Police officersand the surrounding circumstances. After the strike, lawyers resumedwork on 19.2.2009. From the incident on 04.2.2009 and 17.02.2009 andother incidents, the Police officers must have quite known about theunacceptable behaviour of the Advocates. While so, Police officersought to have tactfully handled the situation. It is not as if someofficers in the lower hierarchy alone were in the spot. Since theofficers in the higher hierarchy, Mr.Ramasubramani-JCP (North),Mr.Prem Anand Sinha-DCP were in the field, they ought to haveforeseen that any slight jerk would disrupt the functioning of theCourts. Keeping in view the facts circumstances and Courtsfunctioning, in our considered view in shifting and mobilisation ofPolice personnel from 2.30 P.M. to 4.30 P.M., the Police particularlyCoP Mr.Radhakrishnan, JCP (North) Mr.Ramasubramani and DCP Mr.PremAnand Sinha have not exercised due care and attention and are to beheld squarely responsible. This is all the more so, when they havenot chosen to inform the High Court/ACJ about mobilisation ofstrength. This initial mistake was a costly mistake which led toshedding of blood in the campus and extensive damages to the Courtbuildings and properties.405. In so far as, Mr.Viswanathan-Addl. CoP, as we pointed out,he was assigned the task of monitoring the surrender of lawyers.According to Mr.Viswanathan-Addl. CoP at 14:45 hours he was asked byCoP to proceed to “B2-Esplanade Police Station” and monitor thedevelopments caused by the surrender of Advocates. Mr.Viswanathan-Addl.CoP arrived at B2-Esplanade Police Station at 3.10 P.M. When hereached B2-Esplanade Police Station, Mr.Viswanathan-Addl. CoP musthave learnt about the brewing tension in B4-High Court Police Stationand advocates resisting the surrender. Even though, he arrived atB2-Esplanade Police Station at 3.10 P.M., Mr.Viswanathan, Addl. CoPhas chosen to remain in B2-Esplanade Police Station. Only after thelawyers were taken to custody at 15:45 hours, Mr.Viswanathan-Addl.CoP reached in B4-High Court Police Station at 3.50 P.M. Having beenassigned the task of monitoring the surrender of lawyers, we findthat Mr.Viswanathan-Addl. CoP has avoided his responsibility andchosen to remain in B2-Esplanade Police Station. 406. In his counter-affidavit, Mr.Viswanathan-Addl. CoP has notindicated the details of his conversation with Mr.Ramasubramani-JCP(North) and Mr.Prem Anand Sinha-DCP. In our considered view, Addl.CoP Mr.Viswanathan has also not exercised 'due care and attention'and not acted in 'good faith' in handling the situation and is to beheld equally responsible. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

407. Surrender and Arrest:-According to Police, Advocates proposed to surrender includingpersons who had several cases pending against them. Initially, itwas proposed to be a voluntary surrender. M/s.R.Karuppan,Rajinikanth, Vijayendran, Pugazhenthi, Jayakumar and large number ofAdvocates went to B4-High Court Police Station volunteering tosurrender at 2.00P.M. and demanding registration of case against Dr.Subramaniam Swamy as condition precedent. As seen from the Videoproduced by the Police (CD-R1) and from the contents in CrimeNo.15/2009, case against Dr. Subramaniam Swamy in Crime No.14/2009was registered prior to at about 2.20 P.M. and lawyers received copyof FIR at 2.21 P.M. On receipt of FIR, lawyers started raisingslogans that Dr. Subramaniam Swamy must be arrested immediately.408. Even though, lawyers came to B4-High Court Police Stationcreating an impression of voluntary surrender, it is stated thatafter registration of case, they were not prepared to surrender andstarted raising slogans for arrest of Dr. Subramaniam Swamy. Fromthe Videos (C.D-R1 and R2), it is seen that lawyers were shoutingslogans and were unruly. After noticing slogan shouting and unrulybehaviour of the lawyers, at least at that stage, Police ought tohave realised that any reaction by them would precipitate thesituation which was likely to disrupt the functioning of the Courts.In our considered view, Police instead of showing restraint havecommitted serious error in deploying additional strength of PolicePersonnel and arresting lawyers inside the campus. As pointed outearlier, between 14:23 hours to 15.55 hours, there were threeconversations between JCP (North) and CoP and at 14:45:18 hours, CoPissued direction to Addl. CoP Mr.Viswanathan to proceed to High Courtto monitor the situation. Even at that time, additionalreinforcement (118 personnel) was commanded and additional strengthof 118 reached High Court premises even at about 3.00 P.M.409. In the counter-affidavit of Mr.Prem Anand Sinha-DCP andfrom the Videos, we find that when the lawyers went to the PoliceStation and at the time of registration of FIR and immediatelythereafter, there was sloganeering and commotion. It is seen fromthe Videos that inspite of such commotion and volatile situation,lawyers were forcibly taken to custody and they were taken toThousand Lights Police Station.410. Onbehalf of the lawyers, it was submitted that in the meleeonly innocent Advocates who were standing by were taken to custodywhich provoked the lawyers to react. To ascertain about the names ofthe lawyers who were taken to custody, we have called for GeneralDiary of Thousand Lights Police Station. But we did not find anyentry regarding High Court lawyers taken to Thousand Lights PoliceStation. Ms.Jeyakodi, Inspector of Police, B2-Esplanade PoliceStation has filed an affidavit on 29.9.2009 stating that detailsshowing names of arrested lawyers was kept in B4-High Court PoliceStation was destroyed when the Police Station was set on fire.Regarding arrest of lawyers, advocate Mr.G.Balaji has filed affidavitmaking certain allegations against the Police officers. We are not https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ inclined to go into merits of rival contention. Such disputedquestions could be examined only in the trial in Cr.no.13/2009-B4,High Court Police Station and in [Crl. R.C.No.2(S)/2009/CBI/SCB]. However, the fact remains that the arrest of 15 Advocatestriggered the whole incident. It is hard to believe that no recordswere kept as to who were arrested and where they were taken tocustody. The story put forth in the affidavit of Mr.Jayakodi,Inspector of Police that the records were destroyed in the fire whenB4-High Court Police Station was set on fire cannot be believed. Infact, the affidavit of Mr.Jayakodi, Inspector of Police was filedonly after we repeatedly asked where the arrested Advocates weretaken to custody. Affidavit of Mr.Jayakodi, Inspector of Police thatthe records were destroyed in the fire clearly seems to be an afterthought. By seeing the Videos, we feel that no records could havebeen made as the lawyers were forcibly taken into the Van. In theaffidavit filed by Mr.G.Balaji, Advocate it is seen that they werekept in custody till night. B4-High Court Police Station was set onfire at 5.45 P.M. and fire was extinguished between 6.00 – 6.30 P.M.While so, the affidavit of Mr.Jayakodi, Inspector of Police that therecords showing arrest of Advocates were destroyed in the fire isunbelievable.411. Arrest of Advocates in the Court Premises:-Section 41 Cr.P.C. deals with the power of a Police officer toarrest any person without an order from a Magistrate and without awarrant. Section 42 deals with the power of a Police officer toarrest any person who in the presence of a Police Officer hascommitted or has been accused of committing a non-cognizable offenceand who refuses on demand "to give his name and residence or gives aname or residence which such officer has reason to believe to befalse". Section 43 empowers any private person to arrest any personwho in his presence commits a non-cognizable offence, or anyproclaimed offender. Section 44 states that when any offence iscommitted in the presence of a Magistrate whether Executive orJudicial, within his local jurisdiction, he may himself arrest ororder any person to arrest the offender and may thereupon subject tothe provisions contained in the Code as to bail commit the offenderto custody. Thus the Code gives power of arrest not only to a PoliceOfficer and a Magistrate but also under certain circumstances orgiven situations to private persons.412. Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned Senior Counsel and learnedcounsel Mr.P.N.Prakash contended that as per Sec.41 Cr.P.C., PoliceOfficer is empowered to arrest any person without an order from aMagistrate and without a warrant and there was nothing wrong for thePolice Officers to take the lawyers to Police custody. Learnedcounsel Mr.P.N.Prakash would submit that to diffuse the situation,Police have taken the lawyers to custody and it cannot be said thatthe Police acted with malafide. It was further urged that Police didnot go into the Court Halls searching for any accused/lawyers andwhen the lawyers came to the Police Station on their own, there wasnothing wrong in taking them to custody. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

413. Placing reliance upon 1995-2-LW (Crl) 723 [Rajendran and 23others/ Contemners/ Respondents/ Police Officers/ Advocates ofSaidapet Bar], learned counsel Mr.P.N.Prakash submitted that PoliceOfficers are empowered to arrest lawyers involved in cognizableoffence any where and there is no impediment for arresting thelawyers in the Court precincts.414. Reliance was placed upon 1956 Rajasthan 179 [Rajasthan BarCouncil v. Nathuram and another]. Observing that arrest of counselin the Court precincts may not amount to contempt of Court. In thesaid decision, it was held as follows:-"Generally speaking, arrest of counsel in the courtprecincts, without more, may not amount to contemptof Court because it cannot generally be predicatedof an arrest in such cases that it constitutes acontemptuous interference with the administration ofjustice or that it has the tendency to cause anysuch obstruction."415. Learned counsel Mr. P.N.Prakash also placed reliance upon1983 LW (Crl) 289 [Roshan Beevi and others v. Joint Secretary to theGovt. of Tamil Nadu, Public Dept. (Law and Order) and others] and(1994) 3 SCC 440 [Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan andanother] to show distinction between "Arrest" and "Taking intocustody". Those decisions deal with distinction between "Arrest" and"Taking into custody" are not of much relevance to the case on hand.416. Drawing our attention to Dr. D.C. Saxena V. Hon'ble theChief Justice of India reported in 1996 5 SCC 216 the learned counselMs.Vaigai submitted that in the said case even for taking thecontemnor into custody and confine him to Tihar Jail, The Hon'bleSupreme Court has directed Court Marshal to take custody of thecontemnor, the learned counsel Ms.Vaigai submitted that such is theaction taken by the Supreme Court in calling the Police inside theCourt premises even for handing over custody of a contemnor while sofor deploying additional strength of Police personnel, theCommissioner of Police ought to have obtained permission of the ACJ.417. Laying emphasis upon the concept independence of judiciary,the learned counsel Ms. Vaigai placed reliance upon Supreme CourtAdvocates-on-Record Association and another, V.Union of India, withS.P. Gupta V. Union of India [AIR 1994 SCC 268] wherein it has beenheld as under:-"75. In the draft Constitution, there was noreference to this Directive Principle, but on beingreminded of the important plank of the freedommovement, Article 39A was introduced which readsthus: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "39A. The State shall take steps to securethat, within a period of three years from thecommencement of this Constitution, there isseparation of the judiciary from the executive inthe public services of the State"...........78. During the Constituent Assembly Debates onArt. 39-A, one of the members, Shri R.K.Sidwa on25th November 1948 made the following pertinentobservation:"As Dr.Ambedkar stated yesterday, ever sinceits inception the Congress has been stating thatthese two functions must be separated if you reallywant impartial justice to be done to the accusedpersons.The arguments advanced yesterday were that inFree India the conditions have changed and thattherefore, it is not desirable that these twofunctions should be separated. The real secret, sofar as I know, of those who advocate retaining thesame position is that they want to retain theirpower. If the Honourable Ministers of the provincialGovernments feel that these two should not beseparated, it is because they feel the power ofappointments which is in their patronage, would goaway from them to the High Court Judges.".............81. Realising the significance of theindependence of judiciary and in order to give afull life to that concept, the founding fathers ofour Constitution, felt the need of separation ofjudiciary from executive and designedly insertedArt. 50 in the Constitution after a heated debate;because the judiciary under our constitutionalscheme has to take up a positive and creativefunction in securing socio-economic justice to thepeople".418. In the above case, focus was on the independence ofjudiciary and that it is the live wire of our judicial system. Ifthat wire is snapped, the doomsday of the judiciary will not be farof. The contention that independence of judiciary is to be extendedto the entire Court precincts does not merit acceptance. If suchcontention is to be accepted, Court premises would become a sanctuaryfor criminals and it would not be possible to maintain law and orderwithin the precincts of Court.419. In AIR 1945 Calcutta 107 [Niharendu v. Porter], SpecialBench of three Judges of Calcutta High Court held as under:-"It has been argued that arrests inside the courtbuilding are improper. I cannot agree with thatcontention. Persons going to and from the Courtupon the business of the Court in connection with https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ litigation are exempt from arrest under civilprocess, but there is no such exemption in respectof criminal process as the case in (1843-12-LJQB(N.S) 49, referred to hereafter, shows. If suchgeneral exemption were to obtain, the court buildingwould become a sanctuary for criminals and theadministration of justice in them would becomeimpossible. There have been cases where arrest oncriminal process have occurred in the Sessions Courtwhen a prisoner has been acquitted and discharged onthe charge and rearrested in the court, while theJudge is sitting, on another charge. A caseoccurred sometime back where a litigant in a civilcase on the conclusion of his case was arrested ashe was leaving the court room on a criminal chargepreferred at Madras".420. Read with Article 21 the directive principles in Article39-A of Constitution of India has been taken cognizance of by theSupreme Court. The State shall secure that the operation of the legalsystem promotes Justice on basis of equal opportunity. Placingreliance upon State of Maharashtra V. Maubhai Pragaji Vashi andOthers in (1995) 5 SCC 730, the learned counsel Ms.Vaigai submittedthat lawyers are rendering service in accomplishing theConstitutional goal of rendering free legal aid rendering speedytrial rendering their assistance for speedy trial and such freedom oflawyers cannot be scuttled by beating lawyers. Main plank ofarguments was that lawyers as Officers of Court are entitled toimmunity within the Court campus.421. Drawing our attention to Parliamentary privileges, thelearned counsel Ms.Vaigai submitted that as per Parliamentaryprivileges, no member of Parliament can be arrested within theprecincts of Parliament, and permission of Speaker/Chairman to beobtained and such immunity available even to the private personinside the Parliament House. It was further argued that any personentering the precincts of the Parliament are entitled to immunity andprivileges. Persuading us to draw an analogy, the learned counselMs.Vaigai submitted that Court premises is like the precincts ofParliament and submitted that deploying of Police personnel woulderode the independence of judiciary. It was further argued that whenSection 41 Cr.P.C. cannot be applied to the precincts of Parliament,the Police officials were not right in declaring the gathering oflawyers in the precincts of High Court as an "unlawful assembly". Itwas further argued that independence of judiciary is a larger conceptand such independence is available even to a practising lawyer.422. The above arguments advanced enlarging the concept ofindependence of judiciary to all the activities of practising lawyerscannot be countenanced. Source of Parliamentary privileges is fromArticle 105 of Constitution of India. Article 105 of Constitutionempowers the Parliament to frame such Parliamentary privileges. Moreimportant of the privileges is the freedom of speech in Parliamentand immunity to the members from any proceedings in any Court in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ respect of anything said in Parliament. The powers, privileges andimmunities of each HOUSE of Parliament its committees and its membersderive their authority from Article 105 of Constitution of India. Weare of the considered view that no such analogy can be drawn from theParliamentary privileges to that of the Court Precincts. Thecontention that there cannot be an arrest inside the Court buildingunder any circumstance cannot be countenanced. If such a contentionis to be accepted, Court premises would become a sanctuary for allunlawful activities.423. Onbehalf of the lawyers, it was contended that arrest ofthe lawyers in the premises was malafide and such arrest wouldamount to interference with the administration of justice. That anarrest to constitute contempt must be something more than arrestwithout legal justification and that there must be something in thenature of malafides, that is, an intention directly or indirectly tointerfere with the due administration of justice.424. Generally speaking, arrest of counsel in the courtprecincts, without motive, may not amount to contempt of court sinceit cannot, generally be predicated of an arrest in such cases that itconstitutes a contemptuous interference with the administration ofjustice or that it has the tendency to cause any such obstruction.425. In AIR 1956 Raj 179 [Rajasthan Bar Council v. Nathuram],counsel Kothari was conducting a criminal case in the Magistrate'scourt and while in the middle of the case he just went out for a fewseconds, to return back into court to continue the cross-examination.The Sub-Inspector arrested him, handcuffed him and took him away.That was a clear case of obstruction to the course of justice andpreventing counsel from doing his duty before the court who was thenengaged fully in the actual conduct of the case and whose progresswas interfered with by the act of the Sub-Inspector. The court heldthat where an arrest is sought to be made in the view of the court oralmost in its view and which causes an actual obstruction to thejudicial duties performed by presiding officer at the time of thearrest complained against. On this count the Sub-Inspector wasadjudged guilty of contempt and the more aggravating count was thatthe Sub-Inspector refused to produce counsel before the Magistrateeven after the later ordered it. On both counts he was found guiltyand fined Rs.100/- and to suffer imprisonment for one month in caseof default of payment within a month.426. Only where the circumstances of arrest of a counsel showthat it was in the bad faith and tended to interfere with theadministration of justice, it could be held to be contempt. When acounsel is arrested for criminal process, mala fide has necessarilyto be shown to indicate that there was an intention to interfere withthe due course of justice. As we pointed out earlier, Advocatesinvolved in Crime No.13/2009 volunteered to surrender. Though,arrest of lawyers was by force, it cannot be said that the arrest wasmala fide. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

427. Rule of law applies to all and lawyers are no exception:-There is fine distinction between discharge of professionalduties and other acts of the lawyers in the campus. As an officer ofthe Court, lawyers may be entitled to protection in discharging theirprofessional duties which again is subject to their adherence to theCode of Conduct. Say for instance, lawyers cannot be picked up fromCourt Hall or while proceeding to a court to defend a case. Whiledischarging his professional duties as an Officer of the Court, alawyer may be entitled to veil of protection. But to say that thereis general immunity for all the activities of lawyers inside theCourt premises would tantamount to conferring special privilege uponthem. Within the campus or elsewhere, lawyers are not above the law. 428. Throwing stones on 19.2.2009 by lawyers is mostunacceptable. For such behaviour in the campus lawyers cannot seekprotection. Regarding the incidents on 19.2.2009, a case wasregistered in Crime No.15/2009 which is now continued to beinvestigated by CBI in R.C.1(S)/2009/CBI/SCB under Sec.147,353,332,450,436,307 IPC and under Sec.3 (1) of TNP(PDL) Act.429. Recent violence in Dr.Ambedkar Government Law College,Chennai and conduct of lawyers on 19.2.2009 is a matter of seriousconcern. That being so, to accept the contention that the lawyersare entitled to immunity of all their activities in the Courtpremises would be dangerous. Acceptance of such contention wouldlead to a situation that lawyers would assume that they could violatethe law with impunity. Rule of law applies to all and lawyers are'no exception'.430. Incident: Pelting of stones and Lathicharge: The Respondentpolice officers Mr.Ramasubramani-JCP (North) and Mr.Prem Anand Sinha-DCP, Flower Bazaar averred that the crowd became restive and startedshouting at the police and started pelting stones. Addl. CoPMr.Viswanathan has also averred that " the mob of advocates gotunruly and started pelting stones at the police present there, whichmerely retreated to the police station inside the High Courtpremises".431. Learned senior counsel Dr.Rajeev Dhavan submitted that mobof lawyers threw stones first protesting against the arrest oflawyers. The learned senior counsel would further submit thatlawyers cannot take law into their own hands and react to the arrestby pelting stones and lawyers had no reason to use the force underany circumstances. 432. Per contra, the Petitioners/ lawyers averred that stoneswere pelted on all directions and that reports say that the policestarted first. In his affidavit, Mr.Paul Kanagaraj averred that theylearnt that the police and their hired goons in mufti were wearingblack and white uniforms mingled very well with the advocates andthey were the provocateurs. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

433. In his reply affidavit dated 14.9.2009, Mr.Paul Kanagarajhas taken a plea of self defence alleging that the advocates actedonly in self defence since the police abused all the advocates andprovoked the advocates by throwing stones at them. 434. Ms.Vaigai has submitted that pelting of stones was startedfirst by the police and in any event, it could only be stated thatthe lawyers acted in self defence on seeing other lawyers being takento custody and such reaction could only be a natural reaction. 435. From watching the videos, we have noticed that afterlawyers were taken to custody, from 15.46 – 15.47, there were lot ofprotest by lawyers. At about 15.47 hours, there were stone pelting bylawyers. The stone pelting persisted for about six minutes. Stonepelting continued till about 15.53.31 hours. At about 15.53.35 hours,the police chased the lawyers. For few seconds, thereafter there isno footage in the video. We have noticed that at every time, thepolice chased the lawyers, they went on damage-spree, damaging carsand motor cycles parked around the premises, particularly belongingto lawyers. We have also seen that at about 16.11.58 hours, theRegistrar-Management Mr.Vijayan, pacifying the lawyers and persuadedthem not to pelt the stones. From 16.14 to 16.18 hours, lawyersreceded back. At 15.55 hours, few advocates were loudly saying andasking the police to go out of the campus as their job of arrest isover. Inspite of the same, stone pelting continued. We have noticedthat at about 15.53.35 hours, there was chasing of lawyers by thepolice. At about 16.02.53 hours, one team of police seen enteringinto the corridors of the City Civil Court Annexe building.436. When the additional strength was deployed for taking thelawyers to custody, we fail to understand as to what was thenecessity for large number of police to be present in steel-helmeted,wielding lathies. We have also watched police acting in retaliationthrowing back the stones. We are of the view that the police officersin command did not act tactfully to bring the situation under thecontrol. The Addl. CoP Mr.Viswanathan, who was then in command doesnot seem to have acted to bring the situation under control. We alsofail to understand as to what was the need for retaining large numberof police personnel/riot police even after taking the lawyers tocustody. 437. In fact, from the call log of the CoP, we have also noticedthat then Registrar-General spoke to CoP (Registrar General Cell No.9444449933) at 16.01, 16.03 and 16.06. Though details of conversationare not known, we think that the Registrar General must have askedthe Commissioner to withdraw the police force. In para (34) of hiscounter affidavit CoP averred that ACJ requested him over phone towithdraw the police force. But the situation did not improve. On theother hand, the situation only worsened by deploying more strength. 438. From CD-R2 produced by Addl. CoP Mr.Viswanathan, it wasseen that from 16.14 to 16.18 hours, advocates were receding about16.23 hours, there was incessant stone pelting from police. At 16.24 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ hours, there was lathicharge on a private party/Sivakumar whosustained head injuries due to lathicharge. The said Sivakumarappeared before us on 08.10.2009 and reiterated that he sustainedhead injuries due to lathicharge. At about 16.26 hours, advocateMr.Mohanakrishnan pelted stones towards police. The advocateMr.Mohanakrishnan was not amongst the group of lawyers. But,emerging singly, advocate Mr.Mohanakrishnan pelted stones. At 16.26hours, number of riot police surrounded advocate Mr.Mohanakrishnanand he was brutally beaten causing and heavy bleeding head injuries.As we pointed out earlier, advocate Mr.Mohanakrishnan, pelted stonesas a single individual and not standing along with the group. Whileadvocate Mr.Mohanakrishnan was defiant by pelting stones, the policecould have very well surrounded and taken him to custody. On theother hand, advocate Mr.Mohanakrishnan was brutally beaten by thegroup of Police personnel.439. In paragraph 10 of the counter affidavit, Additional CoPMr.Viswanathan has averred that he told CoP that it would be prudentto withdraw the police force and that CoP insisted of retaining thepolice in the campus. We do not propose to go into the details of thesame, suffice it to note that if Additional CoP thought so, when hewas in command,he could have exercised control over the situation.But, that was not done. Seemingly there was no Police officers seenkeeping the personnel within the limits and ordering self-restraint.440. As we pointed out earlier, from 15.50 to 16.25 hours, therewas persistent stone pelting. The police did not act tactfully andbring the situation under control. During stone pelting, the policechased the lawyers number of times and every time, they chased thelawyers, the police behaved in a worst possible manner. Instead ofcontaining the violence, the police incited the violence and damagedthe vehicles. 441. During 16:30 – 17:30 hours, there were two spells oflathicharge. One at 16:39 hours and another at 17:05 hours. In hiscounter-affidavit, CoP has averred that he has entered the riot areaat 17:00 hours. In Para (37) of his counter-affidavit, CoP averredthat between 16:30 hours and 17:00 hours, he was continuously intouch with the Registrar-General/ACJ [7 calls] and that he wascontinuously coordinating with all top personalities to diffuse thetense situation. In Para (37), CoP further averred that -"..... Once I learnt about fresh tension around 17.00hours, I immediately rushed from the Esplanade Gate areatowards the riotous scene and personally started handlingthe situation"In their counter-affidavits, Mr.Prem Anand Sinha-DCP (12th Respondentin W.P.No.3910/2009) and Mr.Sarangan-DCP (11th Respondent inW.P.No.3910/2009) have also averred that they saw CoP in the place ofoccurrence at about 5.00 P.M. and that CoP directed the Policepersonnel and Police officers to withdraw and return to B2-EsplanadePolice Station. On the other hand, in his counter-affidavit, Addl.CoP Mr.Viswanathan averred that CoP came to the High Court Police https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Station with additional reinforcement of Armed Police of more than100 even at 16:30 hours.442. Statement of CoP that he entered the High Court premises at17:00 hours is demonstrably incorrect. Call logs of Cellphone of CoP[Mobile No.9444465555] indicates that presence of CoP near FamilyCourt even at 16:43:50 hours. The following call logs of CoP wouldshow his presence in the scene of occurrence even from 16:43:50 hours.919444465555919444449933Incoming19-2-0916:43:50791944459698710491356406011660381049-IBS-FamilyCourtCoP inFamilyCourt919444465555919444449933Incoming19-2-0916:44:217691944459111010372356406011660381037-HighCourt-2919444465555919840983832Incoming19-2-0916:47:538391944459111010372356406011660381037-HighCourt-2919444465555919444414203Incoming19-2-0916:49:17291944459111010372356406011660381037-HighCourt-2919444465555919444414203Outgoing19-2-0916:49:4010491944459111010372356406011660381037-HighCourt-2919444465555919444449933Incoming19-2-0916:51:267391944459111010372356406011660381037-HighCourt-2919444465555919444449933Outgoing19-2-0916:55:318691944459111010372356406011660381037-HighCourt-2919444465555919444449933Incoming19-2-0916:57:3614191944459111010372356406011660381037-HighCourt-2919444465555919444802222Roaming-IC19-2-0917:00:21359194445904200919444465555919444802222Incoming19-2-0917:00:253591944459111010372356406011660381037-HighCourt-2919444465555919003073527Incoming19-20917:29:333391944459111010392356406011660381039-FlowerBazar-S919444465555919444444710Outgoing19-2-0917:30:3117791944459111010392356406011660381039-FlowerBazar-S919444465555911204341925Incoming19-2-0917:33:521091944459111010372356406011660381037-HighCourt-2919444465555911204341925Roaming-IC19-2-0917:34:09109194445964970919444465555919944309627Incoming19-2-0917:34:331991944459111010362356406011660381036-FlowerBazar-E919444465555919444449933Incoming19-2-0917:36:2025691944459111010403356406011660381040-PortTrust-3443. From the photographs produced by the Petitioners, it isseen that standing alongside with JCP (North) Mr.Ramasubramani whileCoP was talking over Phone, the wrist watch of CoP shows the time as"16:43 – 16:44 hours". In fact at 16:43 – 16:44 hours, CoP receivedtwo calls from the Registrar-General. Those two calls indicate thetowers "Family Court" and "High Court" respectively. Call log,photographs and the averments in the counter-affidavit ofMr.Viswanathan-Addl. CoP, in our view, the CoP must have been presentin the scene of occurrence even from 16:43:50 hours. We areconstrained to express our disapproval in filing such false affidavitin the Court. By simply saying that around 17:00 hours, he rushedtowards riot scene and handled the situation, CoP has not chosen totaken up the responsibility for extensive lathicharge at 17:05 hourswhich we would shortly elaborate.444. Between 16:30 – 17:30 hours especially during lathicharge(two spells at 16:39 and 17:05 hours) and while chasing the lawyers,Policemen took law into their own hands. There was excessive use offorce on the lawyers. As many as 175 persons - lawyers, litigants,Court staff and one Hon'ble Judge [Justice A.C.Arumugaperumal https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Adityan] sustained injuries. Policemen chased the lawyers to thestreets and lashed out lathi blows on any one who was in white shirt.Even the parties [wearing white shirt], one P.A. to the Hon'bleJudges (who was wearing black Coat] and High Court drivers who werewearing white, none of them were spared. Police went on rampagethrowing stones and lashing out lathi blows on the Cars/Two wheelersparked in the complex. Policemen beat up even women lawyers whomthey came across.445. Policemen threw stones towards corridors including thecorridors adjacent to the Chief Justice Chamber and smashed thewindow panes. Police entered into the Court room of Small CausesCourt and Family Court within the High Court complex and indulged indestruction of furnitures, computers and other articles within theCourt premises. There was plenty of blood shed in the inner accessroads, along the corridors and also inside the office premises wherethe police entered looking out for the lawyers. It was submittedthat Police did not spare the children's creche also from theirattack. We have seen from the Videos, not being satisfied withbeating up the lawyers within the Court premises, the rampagingpolice ran through the Chambers of lawyers within the High Courtpremises and also went to the lawyers Chambers situated in LingiChetty street, Thambu chetty street and other streets in the vicinityof the High Court. It was submitted that extensive damages werecaused to the lawyers chambers and furnitures and also library of LawAssociation, MHAA and Small Causes Court. 446. Lathicharge continued irrespective of whether lawyer is amiscreant or not; whether the individual resisted the violence ornot. It was a mindless attack on whomsoever the Police came across –be it lawyers, litigants, Court staff. Even members of the media werenot spared, when the police chased and lathi-charged the advocates. Aphotographer of Tamizh Chudar, two cameramen of Makkal TV and aphotographer of Nakkeeran were among the injured brought to hospital.Another journalist N.Karthik Prabhu is said to have locked himself upalong with a few Judges in the Small Cause Court to escape from thepolice. But some police personnel are said to have knocked the doorand asked them to come out. When Mr.Prabhu and others came out toreveal their identity, the police hit them. (Source the Hindu dated20.02.2009)447. From the Videos, we have seen Justice A.C.ArumugaperumalAdityan went into the riot area, the Judge wearing white shirt andblack coat. One lathi blow fell on Justice A.C.ArumugaperumalAdityan and the Judge had fallen down. A lady advocate who wastrying to protect him had also fallen down. We have also noticedthat group of lawyers who tried to prevent the lathi blows on JusticeA.C.Arumugaperumal Adityan were alsobrutally attacked. The Hon'ble Judge while taken to ambulance, heardshouting "stop it, it is a Chartered High Court". The incident on19.2.2009 depicted above, left scores bleeding and thousandsembittered. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

448. Dispersal of unlawful assembly: Commissioner as Executive Magistrate empowered to exercise Powers:As per Sec.5 of Tamil Nadu City Police Act, 1888 –Administration of the Police of the City of Madras is vested with theCommissioner of Police, Madras.449. As per Sec.7 of Tamil Nadu City Police Act – Commissioneris vested with powers as Presidency Magistrate. Sec. 7 of TNCP Actreads as under:-“7. Commissioner's powers as Magistrate – TheCommissioner shall by virtue of his office be aPresidency Magistrate, but shall exercise his powersas Magistrate subject to such orders as may fromtime to time be issued by the State Government.Provided that he shall not exercise any powers underChapter XVIII, XX or XXI of the Code of CriminalProcedure, 1882.”450. Commissioner of Police of Chennai is also empowered as theAdditional District Magistrate of Chennai under a Government Order-G.O.Ms.No.736 dated 28.04.1974 issued by Home Department, Tamil NaduGovernment.451. Learned Senior Counsel Dr.Rajeev Dhavan contended that whenthere was serious Law and Order problem which was likely to breachpublic peace, to maintain public order, Police can exercise the powersubject to the provisions in Cr.P.C. Learned Senior Counsel furthercontended that the Commissioner as Executive Magistrate had astatutory right to disperse the assembly if it was unlawful and evenif it was not an unlawful assembly, Police had a statutory right todo so, if in their opinion the 'unlawful assembly' was likely tocause disturbance of public peace and conducted itself in such amanner showing determination not to disperse.452. Sections 129 and 130 Cr.P.C. give guidelines for dispersalof unlawful assembly by use of civil Force. Learned Senior CounselDr.Rajeev Dhavan urged that to control the 'unlawful assembly' oflawyers and to protect the premises and also the Police Station andto ensure public order within the campus, Police officers acted inaccordance with Secs.129 and 130 Cr.P.C. Learned Senior Counselfurther submitted that as per Sec.132 Cr.P.C., no person acting in'Good faith' under Chapter X of Cr.P.C., is liable to be criminallyprosecuted except with the sanction of Central or State Government asthe case may be.453. Section 129 Cr.P.C. would permit any Executive Magistrateor Officer-in-Charge of a Police station or in the absence of anyOfficer-in-Charge, any Police officer, not below the rank of Sub-Inspector to command the unlawful assembly likely to cause adisturbance of the public peace, to disperse. If on such commandbeing given the assembly does not disperse, the Executive Magistrateor the officers referred to in Sub-section (1) may proceed to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ disperse such assembly by force. The underlying intention of sectionSection 129 Cr.P.C. appears to be to disperse the assembly with theminimum amount of force and as little injury as possible. If theassembly shows no disposition to disperse quietly, force may beemployed to disperse it and it would be permissible to require anymale person to render assistance. The section, however, emphaticallydeclares that such male person shall not be an officer or member ofthe armed forces and acting as such. The section indicates clearlythat in order to disperse the crowd it is permissible to arrest andconfine in jail the person constituting the unlawful assembly.Thereafter, the arrested persons can be punished according to law.It is only when action taken under Section 129 fails to disperse theassembly, that an Executive Magistrate of the highest rank who ispresent may cause it to be dispersed by armed forces.454. According to Police, about 150 lawyers gathered and therewas indiscriminate stone pelting. Learned Senior Counsel submittedthat the common object of the unlawful assembly is to be deduced fromunruly behaviour of lawyers in pelting stones from all sides andsince lawyers indulged in stone pelting and because of resistance inexecution of law, Police officers arrived at 'subjectivesatisfaction' to declare the assembly as "unlawful assembly".Contending that the satisfaction of declaring the gathering as'unlawful assembly' and quantum of Force to be used has to be left tothe Officers, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that Court cannotsubstitute its own Judgment for the subjective satisfaction of thePolice officer who was in the midst of a grave situation and wastrying to maintain Law and Order.455. Contending that Court must give leeway to Police to assess'Threat Perception' and not substitute their own discretion for thatof the Police, learned Senior Counsel placed reliance upon (1997) 7SCC 91 [Amitabh Bachan Corporation Ltd., v. Mahila Jagran Manchwherein the Supreme Court held as under:-"The High Court should have realized that the rightsof the organisers and other members of the societyhad to be protected if a law and order situation wascreated on account of such agitation, demonstration,etc. If for dealing with the threat to law andorder, the State Government was required to use itsPolice Force or Security Forces, it was not properon the part of the High Court to interfere and givedirections in regard to the type of force to be usedbecause it is very difficult in such situations tovisualize what shape the demonstration and agitationmay take and the type of law and order situationwhich may have to be dealt with. To restrain theState from using the BSF or the Armed Forces, itnecessary would in certain situations create a veryserious problem as the State would not be able todeal with it in case it turns ugly. This is not anarea where the Court should exercise itsjurisdiction and issue directions because it isdifficult to anticipate how the situation will https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ develop in course of time. This is a function whichmust be left to the executive as the judiciary isnot equipped to deal with it."In the said case, providing security in relation to conducting'Beauty Pageant' was the subject matter. While issuing certaindirections to the State Government, Division Bench of Karnataka HighCourt directed that the Police security shall be provided only fromthe State Police Force and the Government shall not requisition fordeployment of any other force except with the permission of theCourt. In such facts and circumstances, Supreme Court held that itwas not proper on the part of High Court to interfere and givedirections in regard to the type of Force to be used because it isvery difficult in such situations to vizualize what shape thedemonstration may take. The above decision of the Supreme Courtcannot be applied to the case on hand as in the instant case, thevery deployment of Police strength inside the High Court campus is inquestion.456. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that sequenceof events the lawyers were involved, the Police officers evaluated'Threat Perception' and declared them as "unlawful assembly". Thelearned Senior Counsel submitted that resistance to carrying out thelegal process or to the execution of legal process is deemed to beillegal and the Police officers cannot said to have acted in malafidewarranting either Contempt proceedings or other proceedings. It wasargued that earlier, B4-High Court Police Station was attacked atleast two times. Therefore, it necessitated the Police to act andno malafide could be attributed to the Police. Learned SeniorCounsel mainly urged that Courts must give police the leeway toassess the threat perception and not substitute their own views.457. On the other hand, stand of lawyers is that number ofinnocent lawyers were taken to custody and when the Policemen weredetermined to take custody by force, gathering of lawyers resistedthe arrest of the innocent lawyers. Mr. S.Prabakaran, President-TNAA, Ms.Vaigai,learned counsel and Mr.R.C.Paul Kanakaraj, PresidentMHAA submitted that to arrest the lawyers without any justification,there were serious encroachment upon the professional discharge ofduties and irked by the conduct of Police, lawyers reacted and suchgathering of lawyers cannot be said to be an 'unlawful assembly'.458. The learned counsel Ms.Vaigai submitted that lawyers haveacted only in defence raising their protest for illegal arrest oflawyers. Contending that gathering of lawyers would not be anunlawful assembly, the learned counsel Ms.Vaigai placed reliance uponthe Judgement 1987 (3) SCC 434 (State of U.P. Vs. Niyamat andothers). That was the case where one Dharampuri was taken to PoliceCustody. The accused thereon came to the place with the object ofrescuing Dharampuri from the custody of the constables in which shotswere fired. Considering in the light of right of private defence, theHon'ble Supreme Court has held that the action of the accused thereonat best would only be to rescue Dharampuri from unlawful custody andthat there was no unlawful assembly. The lawyers were taken tocustody. The lawyers who gathered in numbers raised protest and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ started pelting stones. We do not propose to go into the question,whether lawyers had any such right of private defence and whether,the gathering would not constitute an unlawful assembly. Suchquestions are to be investigated and examined in Crime No.15/2009[R.C.No.1(S)/2009/CBI/SCB] now seized up by CBI.459. By seeing the Videos, we have seen both sides have peltedstones and trying to get their best. What would be an unlawfulassembly is defined under Section 141 IPC. Under this section anassembly of five or more persons is designated as unlawful assembly,if the common object of the person composing that assembly is tooverawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, the Central orany State Government, or any public servant in the exercise of thelawful power of such public servant. Whether lawyers taken tocustody are innocent lawyers; whether lawyers could so act resistingthe arrest and whether the gathering of lawyers constitute 'unlawfulassembly' are the points to be investigated in Crime No.15/2009[R.C.No.1(S)/2009/CBI/SCB] now seized up by CBI. Now we areconcerned with whether the Police was justified in deploying thePolice Force of various cadre including TN Commando Force and whetherPolice acted in 'good faith' in deploying the Armed Police andindulging in pitched battle.460. Judicial Review of Threat perception and use of force by Police:-Learned Senior Counsel Dr.Rajeev Dhavan submitted that judicialreview on use of force by Police is limited and that Courts cannotsubstitute its own judgment for the subjective satisfaction of thepolice officer who is in the midst of grave situation trying tomaintain law and order. Learned Senior Counsel would further submitthat the test is to see whether the Officer has acted in a good faithwithout exercising due care and attention and what a prudent officerwould do in such circumstances. Learned Senior Counsel would furthersubmit that the criteria for testing the good faith would be:-(i)apprehension of breach of peace;(ii)reasonable due care and attention;(iii)While so, acting and in good faith, whether there wasany error of judgment. The learned senior counsel mainlyurged that the officers acted with due care and attentionapprehending breach of peace and therefore, theprotection under Section 132 Cr.P.C. is available to CoPand other officers. The main plank of argument was that the Court cannot substitute itsview as to apprehension of peace and nature of force to be used toquell the mob. 461. Section 132 Cr.P.C. gives protection to persons. Section132, clauses (b) and (d) provide that no officer acting under Section131 in good faith and no inferior officer, or soldier, sailor orairman in the armed forces doing any act in obedience to any orderwhich he was bound to obey, shall be deemed to have thereby committedan offence. ... This section gives protection to persons againstprosecution for any act purporting to be done under Ss. 129-131,except with the sanction of the State Government or the Central https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Government. The protection conferred by this section will be renderednugatory if the onus is to be thrown on persons to prove at the trialthat they acted under the relevant sections. This could not have beenthe object of the Legislature when it provided safeguards for theprotection of public servants while they were acting in the dischargeof their duties. The deeming provision of sub-section (2) takes thebona fide acts of the Executive Magistrate, police officer, officersand members of the armed forces and persons bona fide acting incompliance with requisition made under Section 129 or Section 130,out of the category or offence". 462. In Nandigram's case [Association for Protection ofDemocratic Rights v. State of West Bengal and others [2007 (4) CHN842], a reference has been made as regards PANCHAM LAL's [Pancham Lalv. Dadan Singh – 1979 Cr. LJ 1018] case, in which it has been heldas follows:-"In the case of Pancham Lal, the Patna High Courthas held that the Officer on the spot would be thebest Judge of the degree of force which would berequired to control a particular situation. It isquite different from sitting and calculating in acool and serene atmosphere of a Court roomdissecting the acts and counter- acts alleged byparties. This observation has been approved by theSupreme Court in the case of Akhilesh Prasad v.Union Territory of Mizoram – 1981 CrlLJ 407. Againin the cases of Empress v. Tucker , Norman &Thompson reported in Indian Decisions (7) Bombay 28and D.N. Srivastava, IPS v. Shri Pathajoy Das andors – 1983 Crimes 248, it has been held that theopinion of the policemen as to what steps wouldsucceed in diffusing the situation are relevant. "463. In Nandigram's case, (cited supra), the Division Bench ofCalcutta High Court retained judicial review, but, reiterated theview that the Officer on the scene is the best judge of the situationand the quantum of force to handle the same. Learned senior counsellaid emphasis upon the following observation in para 63 inNandigram's case, which reads as follows:-".......... Indeed, the officer on the scene would be bestjudge as to the amount of force to be used, in a particularsituation. This would not preclude the Court from exercisingits power to judicial review. The aforesaid cases are whollyirrelevant for the decision in this case. 464. We agree with the submission of the learned senior counselDr.Rajeev Dhavan that power of judicial review as to the actions ofthe police is very limited. We are conscious of the fact that when adecision regarding use of force by police has to be taken on the spot,it is not possible to weigh with precision and accuracy the minimumforce required to disperse an unlawful assembly. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

465. In Nandigram's case, the Court has dealt with police firingon the agitating farmers protesting against acquisitions lands inwhich atleast 14 people died and number of them were injured. Even inNandigram's case, the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court has heldthat,"....................... All actions of the police wouldhave to be justified, to have been lawfully taken under aprocedure established by law. That procedure would haveto be just fair and reasonable. Article 21 of theConstitution makes provision for protection of life andpersonal liberty of all persons within the territory ofIndia."466. Even though the Police Officers in the field were the bestJudges as to the action to be taken and nature of force to be used,police action is not beyond the pale of judicial review. Adiscretionary power is one which is exercisable by the holder ofAuthoritative power on subjective satisfaction of appliance of hisintelligentia mind on evaluation of facts, prevailing circumstancesgoverning the situation and imminent necessity warranting foroperation of his empowerment as well as his answerability andresponsibility to the situation. The aforesaid onerous publicofficial responsibility of his, must not be arbitrary, fanciful andinfluenced by extraneous considerations. In matters of discretionlike this, the choice must have to be dictated by public interest, tosafeguard law and order as well as public tranquility and it must notbe unprincipled or unreasoned. Reasonableness and non-arbitraryexercise of discretion is an inbuilt requirement of the law and thediscretion must be exercised reasonably. 467. In our considered view, certainly the action of the policeofficers are to be tested on the following questions:-➢Was it necessary to mobilize the additional strengthdrawing force from TSF, QRT, SAG, TNCF in the High Court?➢Was the Police action justified in deploying large numberof police personnel even during court's working time?➢Whether due procedure was followed in disbursal ofalleged unlawful assembly of lawyers?➢Whether the police personnel were justified inindiscriminately lashing out lathi charge on the lawyersand others irrespective of whether they are miscreants ornot? ➢Whether the police acted in accordance with policestanding orders and whether reasonable force was used?468. We have already narrated the ugly incident/ fact situationwhich persisted for atleast 3 – 4 hours. From CD-R2 produced by Addl.CoP Mr.Viswanathan, it was seen that the police personnel entered thecorridors of Court buildings (firstly one team entering in the CityCivil Court Annex building at 16.02 hours), even when the Courts werefunctioning. The police personnel were not justified in entering thecorridors of Court even while the Courts were functioning. As wepointed out earlier, Registry has clarified that no permission was https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ given by the ACJ or Registrar General to the police to enter thepremises. 469. The Constitution is based on the Rule of Law. The questionbefore us is whether the police were justified in entering the Courtbuildings even when Courts were functioning and committed excess andwhether there was arbitrary exercise of powers, like any otherincidents or case. In the instant case, it is not a question of merepolice excess. By committing excess, police have hampered theadministration of Justice. It is really the Majesty of theInstitution is in peril. We cannot accept the contention of thepolice that sporadic stone pelting by lawyers has created serious lawand order problem which justified deploying of additional policeforce. Having regard to the gravity of the situation and keeping inview the number of persons injured and the damage caused to the Courtbuildings and the properties and the vehicle, the Court cannot affordto sit by limply, while those who committed excess go scot-free. Ofcourse, the police officers are vested with discretion to decide asto the proper action to be taken and as to the amount of force to beused in particular situation. Merely because such discretion isvested with the Officer, the Court cannot fold its hands in despairand declare that the powers of Judicial review is very limited. Ifthe police acted arbitrarily in an absolute disregard ofconstitutionalism and the police standing orders, they can bechallenged by seeking judicial review. So long as the question arisesthat the police have committed excess and exceeded their limits, itis always open to the Court to lift the veil and decide whether therewas good faith and whether the officer has acted with due care andattention. 470. In the case of Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan v. Vasant RaghunathDhoble (2003) 7 SCC 749, while considering the criminal appealagainst the conviction under Section 302 IPC, where the deceased diedof injuries received during the police custody, even though evidencewas not sufficient to convict the police man concerned under Section302 IPC, the Supreme Court inter alia issued directions for paymentof compensation to the heirs of the deceased against the State. 471. Expressing concern over diabolic recurrence of torture,quoting Abrahim Lincoln, the Supreme Court held as follows:-1........ "If you once forfeit the confidence ofyour fellow citizens you can never regain theirrespect and esteem. It is true that you can fool allthe people some of the time, and some of the peopleall the time, but you cannot fool all the people allthe time", said Abraham Lincoln. This Court inRaghbir Singh V. State of Haryana (1980) 3 SCC 70:1980 SCC (Cri)526:AIR 1980 SC 1087 took note ofthese immortal observations (SCC p.72, para 4) whiledeprecating custodial torture by the police.2....... The Universal Declaration of Human Rightsin 1948 which marked the emergence of a worldwidetrend of protection and guarantee of certain basic https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ human rights stipulates in Articles 5 that "No oneshall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhumanor degrading treatment or punishment." Despite thispious declaration, the crime continues unabated,though every civilized nation shows its concern andmakes efforts for its eradication. 3. If it is assuming alarming proportions, nowadays,all around, it is merely on account of the devilishdevices adopted by those at the helm of affairs whoproclaim from rooftops to be the defenders ofdemocracy and protectors of people's rights and yetdo not hesitate to condescend behind the screen tolet loose their men in uniform to settle personalscores, feigning ignorance of what happens andpretending to be peace-loving puritans and savioursof citizens' right.4........ This Court has in a large number of casesexpressed concern at the atrocities perpetuated bythe protectors of law. Justice Brandeis'observations which have become classic are in thefollowing immortal words;Government as the omnipotent and omnipresent teacherteaches the whole people by its example. If theGovernment becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contemptfor law; it invites every man to become a law untohimself. (In Olmstead V. United States 277 US438:72L Ed 944 (1928), US at P.485, quoted in Map V.Ohio 367 US 643:6L Ed 2d 1081 (1961), US at p.659.)5.The diabolic recurrence of police tortureresulting in a terrible scare in the minds of commoncitizens that their lives and liberty are under anew and unwarranted peril because the guardians oflaw destroy the human rights by custodial violenceand torture, invariably resulting in death. Thevulnerability of human rights assumes a traumatictorture when functionaries of the State whoseparamount duty is to protect the citizens and not tocommit gruesome offences against them, in realityperpetrate them. The concern which was shown inRaghbir Singh case [RAGHBIR SINGH v. STATE OFHARYANA – (1980) 3 SCC 70] more than two decadesback seems to have fallen on deaf ears and thesituation does not seem to be showing any noticeablechange. The anguish expressed in Gauri ShankerSharma v. State of U.P – 1990 Supp SCC 565, BhagwanSingh v. State of Punjab – (1992) 3 SCC 249,Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa – (1993) 2 SCC746, Pratul Kumar Sinha v. State of Bihar – 1994Supp (3) SCC 100, Kewal Pati v. State of U.P.-(1995) 3 SCC 600, Inder Singh v. State of Punjab –(1995) 3 SCC 702, State of M.P. v. Shyamsunder https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Trivedi – (1995) 4 SCC 262 and by now a celebrateddecision in D.K.Basu v. State of W.B. - (1997) 1 SCC416 seems to have caused not even any softeningattitude to the inhuman approach in dealing withpersons in custody. "472. The right to life and liberty is guaranteed under Article21 of the Constitution of India. Right to life and liberty have beengiven unique place in the scheme of the Indian Constitution.Fundamental Rights are so important that they occupy unique place inall civilized societies. Therefore, any apprehension of thefundamental rights must be strictly in conformity with the Lawvalidly enacted by a competent legislature. We are of the view, theaction of the police in using the force to disburse unlawful assemblyand the order of lathi charge cannot be said to be beyond the pale ofjudicial review. 473. As we pointed out earlier, the police strength wasmobilised from TSP, QRT, SAG and TNCF. That apart, number of officersin the ranking of JCs, DCs, ADCs and ACs and Inspector of SubInspectors were also drawn. As pointed out earlier, as per the ManPower Chart, the total strength mobilised was 147+118+26=291 apartfrom the strength of 130 already in High Court. When the acts ofpolice affected the fundamental rights, injuring many lawyers,litigants and courts staff, apart from causing damage to the courtbuildings and properties, it is for the Court to go into the decisionmaking process who were responsible for such excess. It cannot besaid that the nature of force to be used was within the discretion ofthe police officers which is beyond the pale of judicial review. Themain question falling for our consideration is whether the policeacted illegally, unjustifiably affecting the Majesty of theInstitution and thereby committed contempt of Court. Let us considerthe question of threat perception on which the police try to justifyusing the force.474. We proceed to consider the same on the following aspects. ➢Alleged threat perception and necessity for deployment ofpolice personnel for disbursal of unlawful assembly.➢Whether the procedure contemplated under the policestanding orders for disbursal of unlawful assembly wasduly complied with before ordering lathi charge. ➢Whether unreasonableness vitiates the action of thepolice. 475. Learned senior counsel Dr.Rajeev Dhavan submitted that from2001 to 2009, lawyers were involved in number of cases and the Courtcannot ignore the political activities in the campus. Submitting thatthe court will have to come to terms with the root cause, the learnedsenior counsel contended that the action on 19.2.2009 has to be viewedin the context of such political activities of a group of lawyerswhich is in total violation of the directions of the ConstitutionBench in Harish Uppal's case. Learned senior counsel would furthersubmit that while examining the acts of the police, the Court has tokeep in view the directions passed by the First Bench in W.P.No. 7646 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ of 2006. It was further submitted that in view of large number ofcases registered against the lawyers and their past conduct, thepolice officers had threat perception and that the threat perceptionis based on ample materials. Learned senior counsel would furthersubmit that the egg throwing incident on Dr.Swamy on 17.2.2009 hasfurther contributed to the threat perception. 476. It was mainly argued that the acts of the police on19.2.2009 cannot be examined in isolation and has to be read in thebackground of defiant conduct of the lawyers. We are unable toaccept the above contention that the incident on 19.2.2009 has to beviewed in the background of number of cases registered against thelawyers in the past. As we pointed out earlier, the lawyers resumedwork on 19.2.2009 and courts were functioning normally from morning.Earlier acts of lawyers or cases registered against them cannotcolour the incident on 19.2.2009. In our considered view, earlierconduct of lawyers cannot justify the police excess on 19.2.2009.Most of the cases registered against lawyers are either underinvestigation or pending trial. In our considered view, the pastconduct of the lawyers cannot be said to be a reasonable threatperception to deploy large number of Police personnel and lathicharge. 477. The learned Senior Counsel Dr.Rajeev Dhavan submitted thatin view of serious law and order problem and brewing tension to avoiddeterioration of the situation, Police was left with no other optionbut use the required minimum force to maintain order and to disperseunlawful assembly. The learned senior counsel further submitted thatthe reasonable apprehension of Police could be seen from subsequentdevelopments of setting fire to B-4 Police Station. Setting fire toPolice Station was post lathi charge. That cannot be the test forchasing of lawyers and use of force even from 15:53 hours. 478. The boycott of courts from 29.1.2009 was to expresssolidarity with the victims of Anti Tamil Genocide by SrilankanGovernment and demanding Indian Government to stop the genocide inSri Lanka. There was an unseemly incident on 17.2.2009 regardingwhich the advocates came to surrender in B4-High Court Police Stationon 19.2.2009 insisting of registration of a case against Dr.Subramaniam Swamy. In our considered view, there was nojustification to deploy posse of policemen when a group of lawyerscame to surrender. The lawyers were forcibly taken into custody. Evenafter taking the lawyers to custody, there was no need for retainingposse of policemen in B4-High Court Police Station situated withinthe campus. 479. In his counter affidavit, the Addl. CoP Mr.Viswanathan hasaverred that they have suggested to the CoP that it would be prudentto withdraw the police force. Retention of the police force evenafter the arrest of the lawyers seems to be against the suggestion ofMr.Viswanathan and other officers. Atleast when there was stonepelting from all directions, between 15.47 and 15.53 hours, thepolice force could have been withdrawn and taken outside the HighCourt premise keeping in view the functioning of the courts. By https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ deploying and retaining the police personnel, police officers havenot acted in good faith and have not exercised due care andattention. On the other hand by throwing back stones and byretaliating Police acted as provocateurs. 480. Lathicharge – Whether PSO was followed Whether reasonable force was used :-After the lawyers were taken to custody, from 15:47 hoursthere was a protest. At 15:49:49 hours, stone pelting by the lawyersby taking position in the corridors. For about five minutes, therewere stone pelting from all directions and it was a free fight bothfor lawyers and the Police. At about 15:53:35 hours, there was firstchasing of lawyers. According to lawyers, there was lathicharge evenat that time. From the Video, it could not be ascertained whetherthere was lathicharge at that point of time. From the CD-R2 producedby Mr.Viswanathan-Addl. CoP, it was seen that first time the Policeofficers went inside the City Civil Court Annexe building at 16:02:53hours. As we have pointed out earlier, there was lathicharge onprivate party Mr.Sivakumar and Advocate Mr.Mohanakrishnan at 16:24and 16:26 hours respectively. At 16:39:29 hours, there was vigorouschasing of lawyers by the Police. At 17:05 hours teargas was firedfollowed by lathicharge.481. In his counter-affidavit Mr.Prem Anand Sinha-DCP hasaverred that in consultation with Addl. CoP Mr.Viswanathan and JCP(North) Mr.Ramasubramani, ordered the Police personnel to make"lathicharge" to disperse the unlawful assembly and to return backafter the chase. Mr.Viswanathan, Addl. CoP has denied any suchconsultation. In the Videos, we have seen that lawyers are standingon the other side and pelting stones towards the Police which wasquickly thrown back by the Police towards the lawyers. As such we donot find any declaration declaring the gathering as 'unlawfulassembly' nor any warning was given prior to unlawful assembly. Atabout 17:02 – 17:03 hours, lawyers in huge gathering showing handsignal "not to pelt stones" were found proceeding towards the Police.In the CD-R2 produced by Mr.Viswanathan, we have also seen some ofthe Chowkidars with official headgears seen coming along side lawyersindicating arrival of some of the Hon'ble Judges. But there seem tobe no relenting by the Police. Even at that time there was incessantstone pelting by the Police and chasing followed by lathicharge.Only signal before chasing, was the mass pelting of stones by thePolice towards lawyers and chasing them and lashing out lathi blows.In Para (37) of his counter-affidavit, CoP averred that "havinglearnt about fresh tension around 17.00 hours, he immediately rushedfrom the Esplanade Gate area towards the riotous scene and personallystarted handling the situation". As we pointed out earlier, at 17:05hours there was another spell of lathicharge. Before chasing thelawyers and lashing out blows [17:05:38 hours] between 17:03 –17:05:34 hours, there was incessant stone pelting of stones by thePolice.482. In the CD-R1 produced by the Respondents, the slidesshowing arrival of Judges with their Chowkidars and lawyersproceeding towards the Police showing hands "not to pelt stones" were https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ edited. Only from the CD-R2 produced by Mr.Viswanathan, Addl. CoP,we were able to see that Advocates and couple of Chowkidars aremarching towards the Police persuading them with hand signal 'not topelt stones'. The response from the Police was only mass pelting ofstones between 17:03 – 17:05:34 hours followed by lathicharge. As wehave pointed out earlier, from the call logs of Commissioner, CoP wasvery much available inside the High Court premises even from 16:43:50hours. In his counter-affidavit, CoP has not averred anythingregarding the declaration of unlawful assembly at that spell oflathicharge (17:05 hours).483. Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, the learned Senior Counsel submitteddealing with preservation of peace under Tamil Nadu Police StandingOrders [PSO] 698, it is duty of the Police to collect informationabout the movement and that failure in their performance of theirduty will be severely noticed and the Police have acted in accordancewith Police Standing Orders in taking precautionary measures andpreventive actions and Police officers cannot be faulted for takingsuch precautionary measures. The main plank of argument is thatPolice acted in accordance with Police Standing Orders. 484. Chapter X of Cr.P.C. lays down the procedure that isrequired to be followed in the dispersal of unlawful assemblieseither by use of Civil Force or Armed Force. Sec.129 Cr.P.C. usesthe word 'Force in a broad sense' and in order to regulate the use ofsuch Force and the manner in which should be used Tamil NaduGovernment issued Police Standing Orders [PSO]. PSO 699 stipulatespreventive action and PSO 703 deals with dispersal of unlawfulassembly.485. The learned Senior Counsel has drawn our attention to PSO698(2) & (5); 699 (1) and PSO 700 (9) which read as under:-"PSO 698 – Watching for developments:- (2) One of themost important duties of the Police is the collectionof information about every movement, state of feeling,dispute or incident which may lead to breach of peaceand the communication of such information to theDistrict Collector. Failure in the performance of thisduty will be severely noticed.(5) But, generally speaking when tension is reallyacute, experienceis very definitely in favour of takingexcessive rather than inadequate precautions, sincethese tend to inspire confidence in the weaker partyand caution in the stronger one. They also tend tocheck the ardor of the inflammatory elements on bothsides."PSO 699 Preventive Action:- (1) When a breach of thepeace is anticipated, the Police should take timelyaction under the preventive sections of Chapter XI andXII of the Criminal Procedure Code, and under theprovisions of Sections 30 and 30A of the Police Act,1861 (Act V of 1861). First report made to theMagistrates with a view to action being taken underSections 144 and 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ should be made on the First Information Report form andsubsequent reports on case diary forms, as in ordinarycases under the Indian Penal Code and copies sent tothe superior Police Officers concerned."PSO 700 (9) When clashes occur:- If a clash occursimmediate and vigorous action may nip the trouble inthe bud and prevent it from spreading. If it ispossible to make arrests, these will have a goodeffect. Where the clash take the form of mob fighting,there should be no hesitation to disperse by force orto resort to firing, if life is seriously endangered,the provisions of the law in their respects being, ofcourse, observed. Procrastinating and feeble parleyingfor long periods often lead to the heightening oftension and worsening of the situation. This isfrequently so because lack of prompt firmness anddecision is interpreted as weakness and vacillation onthe part of the authorities, which it frequentlyactually is."486. PSO 703 stipulates standing orders for dispersal ofunlawful assembly in consonance with Sections 129 and 130 Cr.P.C.The Police draws its authority to declare and disperse unlawfulassemblies. The relevant clauses in PSO 703 (1) (a) (b) (g) & (h)reads as under:-"(1)(a) It is the bounden duty of the Police to preventcognizable offences as per Section 149 Cr.P.C. which is asfollows:"Every Police Officer may interpose for the purpose ofpreventing and shall to the best of his ability, prevent,the commission of any cognizable offence".(b) The police draws its authority to declare and disperseunlawful assemblies from Section 129 Cr.P.C., "Any Executive Magistrate or Officer in-charge of aPolice Station or, in the absence of such Officer in-charge, any Police Officer not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector, may command any unlawful assembly, or anyassembly of five or more persons likely to causedisturbance of the police peace, to disperse, and itshall there upon be the duty of the members of suchassembly to disperse accordingly.If, upon being so commanded, any such assembly does notdisperse, or if, without being so commanded, it conductsitself in such a manner as to show a determination not todisperse, any Executive Magistrate or Police Officerreferred to in Sub-section (1), may proceed to dispersesuch assembly by force, and may require assistance of anymale person, not being an officer or member of the armedforces and acting as such, for the purpose of dispersingsuch assembly and, if necessary, arresting and confiningthe persons who form part of it in order to disperse suchassembly or that they may be punished according to law."........... https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (g) The procedure to be followed in dealing with unlawfulassemblies is laid down in the "Drill and Training Manual"Section 123-Drill instruction for dealing with crowds,riotous, mobs etc. and in section 126-Mob, firing smallparties of Police.(h) All Police Officers should be fully conversant withthe above noted provisions of law which enumerate theirrights and responsibilities in dealing with unlawfulassemblies and with the drill procedure as laid down inthe Drill and Training Manual.487. PSO 702 (2) (3) & (4) elaborates upon Standing orders fordispersal of unlawful assembly and use of minimum necessary force.PSO 703 (2), (3) and (4) read as under:-"2 (a) When a Magistrate is present, an assemblyshall not be called upon to disperse nor shall forcebe used to disperse it without the order of suchMagistrate; provided that if a gazetted PoliceOfficer is present in the absence of the Magistrate,such Police Officer may act independently inordering an assembly to disperse.(b) If an Executive Magistrate is present at thespot, it shall be his responsibility to declares themob unlawful and direct them to disperse. If themembers of the unlawful assembly do not disperse theExecutive Magistrate shall direct the Police to useforce that is necessary for the purpose. The natureof force to be used. Tear gas, lathi-charge or waterjet and the method and quantum of force to be usedshould be decided by the senior most Police Officerpresent on the spot. Thereupon the ExecutiveMagistrate shall not interfere with the physicaloperation of mob dispersal.(c) In the absence of an Executive Magistrate, thesenior most Police Officer not below the rank ofSub-Inspector will carry out the functions of theExecutive Magistrate in addition to his own.(d) If any Police Officer below the rank of a Sub-Inspector is faced with a mob, he shall exercise hisright of private defence, taking particular care notto exceed his rights.(e) All commands to the Police are to be given byOfficer-in-Command of the party.(f) The main principle to be observed is that theminimum necessary force to achieve the desiredobject should be used regulating it according to thecircumstances of each case. The object of the use offorce is to prevent disturbance of the peace or todisperse an assembly which threatens suchdisturbances and has either refused to disperse orshows a determination not to disperse; no punitiveor repressive considerations being permitted tobecome operative while this is being done. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (g) Having decided on the kind of force to be usedthe Officer-in-charge of the Police will beresponsible for deciding as to the exact amount ofthe force to be used, the manner of using it and forsetting the details of the operations connected withthe use of force the Police Officer should, ofcourse, bear in mind the principle that no forcemore than is necessary should be used.(h) If the members of the unlawful assembly do notdisperse, the Executive Magistrate or the seniormost Police Officer present in the absence of theExecutive Magistrate shall direct the Police to useforce, that is necessary for the purpose. The natureof force to be used, tear gas, lathi cane charge orwater jet and the method of quantum of force to beused should be decided by the senior most PoliceOfficer present on the spot.(i) If the crowd refuses to follow the lawfulinstructions to disperse, the riot flag should beraised, the attention of the mob drawn through abugle call with long blast and a clear warning thatforce would be used to disperse them will be giventhrough megaphone. The operation will commence ifthe mob refuses to head to the warning.(j) Officers commanding police parties will on everyoccasion when employed in the suppression of a riotof enforcement of the law, ensure that the fullestwarning is given to the mob in a clear and distinctmanner before any order is given to use tear gas orlathi/cane or fire arms and to use the mosteffectful means to explain before hand to the peopleopposed to them, in the event of the Police partyordered to fire that the fire will be effective.(k) If any or all these method fail to disperse themob and if in his opinion nothing short of firingcan disperse the mob, the Executive Magistrate willorder fire to be opened. Again the manner in whichfiring is to be directed against the mob, type ofammunition to be used and the method of firing arethe individual responsibilities of the senior mostPolice Officer.3. If the crowd becomes defiant tear gas should beused effectively. If this becomes in fractious thenlathi can charge can be made. If the crowd is stilldefiant resort, may be had to the use of fire arms".4. (a) It is not necessary that on every occasiontear gas should be used. Use of tear gas willdepend on the availability of a sufficient stock ofgas ammunition, wind direction, nature of theneighbourhood and availability of escape routes forthe mob. On no account should gas be used in poorvisibility especially between sunset and sunrise,and inside buildings or when the wind direction issuch that the smoke will affect the Police party or https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ innocent people in the vicinity or when the mob istoo close to the Policy party..........(e) If water jets or tear gas fail to disperse themob, lathi cane charge should be ordered.Lathi/Cane charges should not be attempted if thestrength of the Police force is not adequate tocreate an effect on the crowd and the crowd islikely to overhelm the Police party easily. Thepersonnel engaged in the lathi/cane charge should beunder the proper control and the charging shouldcease as soon as the desired objective is achieved.The procedure laid down in the Drill and TrainingManual will be followed. Care should be taken toprevent the lathi/cane sections getting separatedfrom the main party and the Commander."488. As per PSO 703 (2) (b) if Executive Magistrate is presentat the spot, it shall be his responsibility to declare the mobunlawful and direct them to disperse. As we pointed out earlier, wedo not find any such declaration of gathering as 'unlawful assembly'before ordering lathicharge. In Para (38) of the counter-affidavit,CoP averred that after B4-High Court Police Station was set on fireby the Advocates and when stone pelting continued, at 17:45 hours inconsultation with the other Officers present on the spot, acollective decision was taken to disperse the unlawful assembly whichindulged in stone pelting preventing the arrival of Fire tendervehicle. Thereafter, there was chasing of lawyers followed bylathicharge. Other than the above, we do not find any otheraverments declaring the gathering as 'unlawful assembly'. 489. For the earlier spells of lathicharge, there was clearviolation of the requirement of PSO 703 (2) (b) declaring thegathering as unlawful assembly. None of the recorded Videos showthat any prior warning was given. Absolutely, there was no orderdeclaring it as 'unlawful assembly' or warning that Police is goingto resort to lathicharge. The procedures stipulated in PoliceStanding Orders was neither followed nor reasonable Force was used todisperse the gathering. It was mindless pelting of stones by thePolice followed by lathicharge.490. As per PSO 703 (2) (b) – "Executive Magistrate to directthe Police to use force necessary for the purpose and nature of forceto be used". The procedure to be followed in dealing with theunlawful assemblies is laid down in Drill and Training Manual andthe procedure thereon will have to be followed. As per PSO 703 (4)(e) – "care should be taken to prevent the lathi/cane sectionsseparated from the main party and the Commander. Seemingly, no onewas in command leading lathi/cane sections. What we have seen in theVideo is each one of Police personnel of lathi/cane sections going intheir own way and indulging the mindless attack of lawyers, passersbyand who came on their way. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

491. Excepting the mere allegations that the mob was declared'unlawful', we could not see anything declaring the mob as an'unlawful assembly'. As per PSO 703 (2) (j) – "Officers commandingPolice parties will on every occasion when employed in thesuppression of a riot, ensure that the fullest warning is given tothe mob in a clear and distinct manner before any order is given touse teargas or lathicharge". Absolutely, no such warning seemed tohave been given before ordering lathicharge.492. Police violence:-The degree of force which may be lawfully used in thesuppression of an unlawful assembly depends on the nature of suchassembly, for the force used must always be moderated andproportioned to the circumstances of the case and to the end to beobtained. But in the incident on 19.2.2009, Police used excessiveforce in clear violation of PSO 703. By pelting stones lawyers tookthe law into their own hands. Needless for us to state that lawyersbehaved in a most unacceptable manner, but what was the reaction ofthe Police. 493. No matter how rude or unruly the lawyers were, the Policeshould not have used extreme force. The riot Police personnel wereall steel-helmeted and were having riot shields. Pelting stones bythe lawyers though reprehensible, would have hardly affected thePolice as they were steel-helmeted. But the Police quickly turnedback the stones that came their way at the lawyers and matched thelawyers in their lawlessness. Hardly any Police officer could beseen keep their men under restraint. The most notorious is theactions of the Police going on rampage in the entire premises. Claimof Police that lawyers were rioting would be of no justification forletting loose violence by the Police in the entire campus. Policesmashed the glass doors, tube lights and extensive damages to theCourts, Cars/two wheelers and whatever they could hit with lathi.494. There are some widely known cases of Police excess. Butthere are thousands of incidents that never received attention. Theincident on 19.2.2009 would be remembered for long as a widely knowncase of Police excess. In the confrontation between Police andLawyers, in our considered view, Police used wrongful,disproportionate, unlawful and excessive force against the lawyers,litigants, staff and whoever came on their way. The act of the Policeattacking lawyers whether they were miscreants or not was a blatantdisregard of Police Standing orders. Ofcourse, there was alsorioting by handful of lawyers. But the initial reaction by thelawyers can be no argument for the brute force used by the Police.Ofcourse setting fire to the Police Station is a grave offence. Butsetting fire to Police Station was at 5.45 P.M. after number ofspells of lathicharge. Lashing out lathi blows and having sustainedinjuries, the angered mob set fire to the Police Station. The wrathof lawyers was against the Police. Subsequent events after 5.45 P.M.may not justify the Police excess between 4.00 – 5.30 P.M. Policeused teargas, lathicharge to disperse groups of lawyer who wereunarmed (though disobedient even disorderly). Police violence led to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the extreme situation like break down of law and order in the campusultimately damage to the Court properties and also closure of Courts.It was mindless attack by the Police on any one who came across andvehicles parked in the campus. Police have ransacked the courtbuildings and even went up to the Chief Justice chamber and beaten upthe lawyers who assembled in the verandah to complain to the ChiefJustice. No one was spared.495. No higher officer/Commando seemed to be in control of thesituation. No officer was seen preventing the Police personnel frompelting the stones. No instructions seem to have been given forself-restraint during lathicharge. No efforts were taken to see thatlathi/cane sections do not separate from the main party and thecommander. There is clear violation of directions in PSO 703 fordispersal of unlawful assembly. 496. Coming to the question of manner the injured were treatedand taken to the hospital. Even while taking to the Ambulance, nearthe Ambulance some of the injured lawyers were mercilessly beateneven though some of them were already profusely bleeding. Some ofthe injured were seen forcibly dragged and placed in Ambulance.497. As per Police Standing Orders and instructions, while usinglathi/cane sections, as far as possible, the blows should be belowthe knee. But in clear violation of directions in Police StandingOrders, the riot police inflicted most of the lathi blows on the headas in seen from the Accident Registers. While there can be nopossible justification for the assembly of lawyers resorting to stonethrowing, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion thatthere was excessive use of force by the Police. There was clearviolation of PSO 703 (2) (f) as to use of minimum necessary force.498. Responsibility of Police:-Police are subject to the same crowd psychology as any othergroup of armed men and women, when in large confrontational groups inencounters whose outcome is uncertain, when in the grip of anger, orstrong emotion. However, Police carrying deadly weapons and aprivileged authority and so have a special responsibility to keepcontrol of themselves and their fellow officers especially since abreach in relations between Police and Civilians can make their jobsimpossible and lead to more widespread violence.499. Any action of the Government or its Officers must be freefrom arbitrariness and reasonableness. In the case of Maneka Gandhiv. Union of India and another [MANU/SC/0133/1978], it has beenclearly held as follows:"120. To sum up, 'procedure' in Article 21 means fair, notformal procedure 'Law' is reasonable law, not any enactedpiece."500. The aforesaid proposition has been reiterated by theSupreme Court in the case of Olga Tellis and others v. BombayMunicipal Corporation and others [MANU/SC/0039/1985] as follows:- https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "39. It is far too well-settled to admit of anyargument that the procedure prescribed by law forthe deprivation of the right conferred by Article 21must be fair, just and reasonable [See E.P.Royappav. State of Tamil Nadu MANU/SC/0380/1973; MenakaGandhi v. Union of India MANU/SC/0133/1978;M.H.Hoskot v. State of MaharashtraMANU/SC/0119/1978; Sunil Batra v. DelhiAdministration MANU/SC/0184/1978; Sita Ram v. Stateof U.P MANU/SC/0244/1979; Hussainara Khatoon I v.Home Secretary, State of Bihar, PatnaMANU/SC/0121/1979; Hussainara Khatoon II v. HomeSecretary, State of Nihar, Patna MANU/SC/0119/1979;Sunil Batra II v. Delhi AdministrationMANU/SC/0184/1978; Jolly George Verghese v. Bank ofCochin MANU/SC/0014/1980; Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddyv. State of Jammu & Kashmir MANU/SC/0079/1980; andFrancis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, UnionTerritory of Delhi MANU/SC/0517/1981.40. Just as a male fide act has no existence in theeye of law, even so, unreasonableness vitiates lawand procedure alike. It is thereafter essentialthat the procedure prescribed by law for depriving aperson of his fundamental right, in this case theright to life, must conform to the norms of justiceand fair play. Procedure, which is unjust or unfairin the circumstances of a case, attracts the vice ofunreasonableness, thereby vitiating the law whichprescribes that procedure and consequently, theaction taken under it. Any action taken by a publicauthority which is invested with statutory powershas, therefore, to be tested by the application oftwo standards. The action must be within the scopeof the authority conferred by law and secondly, itmust be reasonable. If any action within the scopeof the authority conferred by law, is found to beunreasonable, it must mean that the procedureestablished by law made which that action is takenis itself unreasonable. The substance of the lawcannot be divorced from the procedure which itprescribes for how reasonable the law is dependsupon how fair is the procedure prescribed by it.Sir Raymond Evershed says that 'The Influence ofRemedies on Right' (Current Legal Problems 1953,Volume 6.). "from the point of view of the ordinarycitizen, it is the procedure that will most stronglyweigh with him. He will tend to from his judgmentof the excellence or otherwise of the legal systemfrom his personal knowledge and experience in seeingthe legalmachine at work". Therefore, "He thattakes the procedure sword shall perish with thesword". Per Frankfuter J. In Vitarelli v. Seaton1959 (3) Law ED 2d 1012. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

41. Justice K.K.Mathew points out in his article on'The Welfare State, Rule of Law and NaturalJustice", which is to be found in his book'Democracy, Equality and Freedom', that there is'substantial agreement in justice thought that thegreat purpose of the rule of law notice is theprotection of the individual against arbitraryexercise of power wherever it is found'. Adoptingthat formulation. Bhagwati, J. Speaking for theCourt, observed in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v.International Airport Authority of IndiaMANU/SC/0048/1979, that it is "unthinkable that in ademocracy governed by the rule of law, the executiveGovernment or of its officers should possesarbitrary power over the interests of theindividual. Every action of the ExecutiveGovernment must be informed with reason and shouldbe free arbitrariness. That is the very essence ofthe rule of law and its bare minimal requirement."501. Power of the Police under Police Standing Orders cannot bedissociated from the procedure which it prescribes for reasonableexercise of power in dispersal of unlawful assembly. Learned SeniorCounsel Mr. Rajeev Dhavan submitted that from the consequences ofPolice action viz., photographs of injured lawyers cannot be taken asbasis for testing the reasonableness. When there is clear violationof procedure and fundamental rights, the consequences ofarbitrariness cannot be ignored. 502. The independence and impartiality of the judiciary is oneof the Hallmark of a judicial set up. Courts are the Institutionsby which justice is rendered to the people. By setting ablaze to thePolice Station and indulging in stone pelting ofcourse, lawyersbehaved in a most unacceptable manner. The Courts are not forthe individual Judges or lawyers; but the Courts are for renderingadministration of justice. 503. If the judiciary has to perform its duties and functions ina fair and free manner, the dignity and the authority of the Courtshas to be respected and maintained at all stages and by allconcerned, failing which the very constitutional scheme and publicfaith in the judiciary runs the risk of being lost. The cause is ofthe public. It is this Police, Justice delivery system depends asone of the important wing in the administration of criminal justice.Police who are supposed to be the protectors of the Institution,barged into the Court rooms damaging the Court properties. Policewent berserk in the Court premises and beat any one they came acrossand smashing the vehicles and the furious attack venting their anger.The violent acts of the Police undermined the Majesty of theInstitution. Any time a Police officer abuses his or her authorityand inflicts undue suffering on any person, it is an affront, notonly to the victim of the pain but to society as a whole. In thiscase, it is an affront to judiciary. Even slightest disrespect to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the judicial system or its Constituents may lead to disastrous effectannihilating the very fabric of Rule of law.504. Contempt of Court:-In a democratic society, the three organisation of Governmentnamely the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary are expectedto perform their function within their limitations for the benefit ofthe public. No one organisation is expected to interfere with thefunctioning of the other. Though Judiciary is entrusted with thefunction of Administration of Justice, it cannot claim superiorityover other two organisations and Judiciary has been given all therequirements needed for upholding the majesty of law particularlywhen it has neither the power of purse nor power of the Police. Sothrough contempt proceedings the Judiciary performs its function ofproper Administration of Justice and safeguards the Rule of law. Itis fairly well settled that Contempt jurisdiction is extraordinary incharacter, should not be used for the personal protection of theJudges. The jurisdiction is applied against any authority or personwhenever there is any kind of interference in the Administration ofJustice and to maintain supremacy of law.505. As per Article 215 of Constitution every High Court shallbe a Court of Record and shall have all powers of such a Courtincluding the power to punish for contempt of itself. While much ofthe contempt power of the High Courts and Supreme Court has beencodified by the Contempt of Courts Act 1971, there remains areservoir of inherent power which draws from them being Courts ofRecord, which has not been trammelled by Statute.506. As per Sec.23 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – SupremeCourt and High Courts are empowered to make Rules. Section 23 readsas under:-"23. Power of Supreme Court and High Courts to makerules. - The Supreme Court or, as the case may be,any High Court, may make rules, not inconsistentwith the provisions of this Act, providing for anymatter relating to its procedure."507. Referring to Rule making power of Supreme Court and HighCourts, in (1997) 3 SCC 11 [High Court of Judicature at Allahabad v.Raj Kishore Yadav], the Supreme Court held as follows:-"Contempt jurisdiction is an independentjurisdiction of original nature whether emanatingfrom the Contempt of Courts Act or under Article 215of the Constitution of India. How such originaljurisdiction can be exercised is a matter which canlegitimately be governed by the relevant Rulesframed by the High Court on its administrative sideby exercising its rule-making power under Section 23of the Act or under its general rule-making powerflowing from the relevant provisions of theconstitutional scheme as seen earlier." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

508. Delhi Judicial Service Association Tis Hazari Court v.State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 406 : 1991 Cri LJ 3086, facts are toowell known to the legal world and need not be recapitulated indetail. It was a case where a Chief Judicial Magistrate wasarrested, assaulted and kept in wrongful detention after having beentaken to a Police Station. The Supreme Court held that "a Court ofjustice without power to vindicate its own dignity, to enforceobedience to its mandates, to protect its officers, or to shieldthose who are entrusted to its care, would be an anomaly which couldnot be permitted to exist in any civilised community."509. Before we proceed to consider the question of contempt, wewould like to remind ourselves the observation of the Supreme Courtin the case of Special Reference [1965 (1) SCR 413] "The power topunish for contempt large as it is, must always be exercisedcautiously, wisely and with circumspection. Frequent orindiscriminate use of this power in anger or irritation would nothelp to sustain the dignity of the Court, but may sometimes affect itadversely".510. Contempt of Court - Civil Contempt:On 18.3.2009, Court has passed an order directing the StateGovernment to initiate disciplinary proceedings against Addl. CoPMr.Viswanathan and JCP (North) Mr.Ramasubramani and that they shouldbe placed under suspension. But the officers were not immediatelyplaced under suspension. Onbehalf of the lawyers, it was contendedthat order of the Court [18.3.2009] was not obeyed by the StateGovernment and therefore, the Chief Secretary and Home Secretary areliable to be proceeded with for Civil contempt for disobeying theorders of the Court. 511. We are unable to accept the above contention. After theorders of this Court dated 18.3.2009, number of Petitions came to befiled before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court seized up thematter. Challenging the order of suspension on the ground ofviolation of principles of natural justice, both the officers havefiled SLP No.7540/2009 before the Supreme Court. By the order dated14.7.2009, the Supreme Court set aside the order of suspension andremitted back the matter to the High Court for affording opportunityto both the officers. Having regard to the subsequent developments,we do not find any wilful disobedience of the order of the Courtdated 18.3.2009 by the State Government.512. Lawyers have called for production of call log of CoP andother officers. Call log of CoP was filed without 'Tower details'.Onbehalf of the lawyers, it was therefore submitted that there wasdisobedience of the Court order by not filing the call logs withcorrect particulars. Onbehalf of CoP, the learned Government Pleadersubmitted that on being requested, call log was given without Towerand there was no wilful disobedience of the order of the Court.Subsequently, the call log was filed with Towers. Therefore, we arenot inclined to accept the contention that there is disobedience ofthe orders of the Court. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

513. Chief Secretary and Home Secretary:Placing reliance upon 1994 (6) SCC 442 [Mohd. Aslan @ Bhure,Acchan Rizvi v. Union of India, State of Uttar Pradesh and others],it was contended that when a Government Official has committedcontempt of court, State Government are also to be proceeded forcontempt of court. Onbehalf of the lawyers, it was contended that inthe order dated 19.2.2009, Court has clearly pointed out that ACJ hascontacted CoP as well as Chief Secretary requesting them to withdrawthe Police forces. But the Police force was not withdrawn; but on theother hand, they came to ACJ's Chamber along with CoP only after 6.00P.M. and therefore, there is disobedience of the order of Court.514. Ofcourse, in the order dated 19.2.2009, it is indicatedthat ACJ had telephonic conversation with CoP and Chief Secretaryrequesting them to withdraw the Police force. According to thePolice to quell the mob, additional strength was deployed in the HighCourt campus. We have already held that CoP Mr.Radhakrishan, Addl.CoP Mr.Viswanathan, JCP (North) Mr.Ramasubramani and DCP Mr.PremAnand Sinha have not exercised due care and caution in deploying thepolice force and retaining them. The time of telephonic conversationwith the Chief Secretary is also not indicated in the order dated19.2.2009. While so, it cannot be contended that State Governmenthas also contributed to the situation.515. While the matter was heard at 6.40 P.M. on 19.2.2009 in theChambers of ACJ, the Chief Secretary and Home Secretary who werepresent have undertaken to abide the orders of the court in referringthe matter to CBI. By Notification No.13933/Pol.VII/2009 dated23.2.2009 under Sec.6 of DSPE Act, 1946 of Home (Pol.VII) Department,Government of Tamil Nadu and Notification No.228/10/2009-AVD-IIdated28.2.2009 under Sec.5 of DSPE Act, 1946 of Government of India, StateGovernment has referred the case registered against the lawyers inCrime No.15/2009 on the file of B4-High Court Police Station forinvestigation to CBI. The investigation as to the entire incidentand the Police excess and the order of the Court was not referred.Based on the same, CBI has re-registered the case in R.C.No.1(S)/2009/CBI/SCB/Chennai under Sec. 147, 353, 332, 450, 436, 307 IPC andSec.3 (1) TNPPDL Act. 516. Court order dated 19.2.2009 was not made the basis forreferring the matter to CBI. In the order dated 02.3.2009, Court hasobserved that State has violated the Court's direction in notregistering the case pursuant to the Court's order dated 19.2.2009and asking CBI to investigate the matter as per the Court's orderdated 19.2.2009. State Government addressed Government of India,Department of Personnel and Training, Ministry of Personnel, PublicGrievances and Pensions referring to the order passed by the Court on2.3.2009. Based on the order dated 19.2.2009, CBI has registered thecase in R.C.No.2(S)/2009/CBI/SCB/Chennai under Sec. 144, 147, 148,323, 325, 326, 427, 436 and 450 IPC and under Sec. 3(1) and 4 ofTNPPDL Act. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

517. Onbehalf of the lawyers, it was contended that there wasclear violation of State Government in not referring the entireincident on 19.2.2009 and therefore, State Government has to beproceeded with for civil contempt. Learned Government Pleader triedto explain that without complaint as to the incident on 19.2.2009,the matter could not be referred to. Even though, in the order dated02.3.2009, Court has observed that State have violated the Court'sorder dated 19.2.2009, having regard to the fact that subsequently,CBI has registered the case in R.C.No.2(S)/2009/CBI/SCB/Chennai, wedo not find any disobedience of the order of the Court committed bythe State Government. Prima facie, we do not find any wilfuldisobedience of the Court's order by the State Government to proceedagainst the State Government.518. Contempt of Court – Criminal Contempt:- Criminal contempt has been defined under Section 2 (c) of theContempt of Courts Act. Sec.2(c) of Contempt of Courts Act reads asunder:-"2 (c) 'Criminal Contempt' means the publication (wheneverby words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visiblerepresentation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing ofany other act whatsoever which -(i)scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers ortends to lower the authority of, any court; or(ii)prejudices, or interferes or tends to interferewith, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or(iii)interferes or tends to interfere with, orobstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration ofjustice in any other manner.519. Contempt is sui generis. There is no prosecution, nosummons or warrant, no right of trial by jury. The judge decides thematter, as in this case, on the basis of his own knowledge of thefacts which is the basis of his power.520. In Baradakanta Mishra v. The Registrar of Orissa HighCourt, MANU/SC/0071/1973 : 1974 Cri LJ 631, the Supreme Court notedthat all the three clauses of Section 2(c) of the Contempt of CourtsAct, 1971 that define 'criminal contempt' define it in terms ofobstruction of or interference with the administration of justice.It was further noted that broadly the Act accepts that proceedings incontempt are always with reference to the administration of justice.With reference to the three sub-clauses of Section 2 (c) of the Act,the Supreme Court observed that Sub-clauses (i) and (ii) deal withobstruction and interference respectively in the particular waydescribed therein, while Sub-clause (iii) is a residuary provision bywhich any other type of obstruction or interference with theadministration of justice is regarded as a criminal contempt. Alittle later in the decision citing R v.Gray [1900] 2 QB 36 it wassaid that the contempt jurisdiction should be exercised 'withscrupulous care and only when the case is clear and beyond reasonabledoubt. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

521. In 1981 Cri LJ 315 [Rachpudi Subba Rao v. AdvocateGeneral], the Supreme Court considered the scope of the expressions'administration of justice' appearing in Sub-clause (iii) of Section2(c) of the Act and 'course of judicial proceedings' appearing inSub-clause (i) and (ii) thereof. It was observed that the expression'administration of justice' is far wider in scope than the expression'course of judicial proceedings'. The words 'in any other manner'further extend its ambit and give it a residuary character. It wasemphasized that 'although Sub-clauses (i) to (iii) describe threedistinct species of 'criminal contempt' they are not mutuallyexclusive. Interference or tendency to interfere with any judicialproceeding or administration of justice is a common element of Sub-clauses (ii) and (iii).522. In (2004) 5 SCC 26 [Daroga singh and others v. B.K.Pandey]on 18.11.1997 at Bhagalpur in Bihar, 1st Additional District Judge inhis Court room and Chambers was attacked by number of Policeofficers. Because of non-appearance in Court, NBW was issued againstone Investigating Officer-Jokhu Singh and he was remanded to judicialcustody. Reiterating their demand for unconditional release of JokhuSingh, number of Police Officers armed with lathis and other weaponsand shouting slogans against the Judicial Officer, barged in to hisCourt room and overpowered the bodyguard assaulted the JudicialOfficer. Based on the report sent by the District Judge, Patna HighCourt initiated suo moto contempt where Police officers and personnelwere found guilty of contempt of court. Observing that the actcommitted amounts to deliberate interference with the discharge ofduty of the Judicial Officer and that it has the tendency to affectthe entire judiciary in the country which is a dangerous trend,Supreme Court held as follows:-"27. In the present case, a judicial officer of therank of District Judge was attacked in a pre-plannedand calculated manner in his courtroom and when hetried to protect himself from physical harm byretiring of his chambers by chasing him there andcausing injuries to him. The raising of slogans anddemanding unconditional bail for Jokhu Singh furthercompounded the offence. The courts cannot becompelled to give "command orders". The actcommitted amounts to deliberate interference withthe discharge of duty of a judicial officer byintimidation apart from scandalising and loweringthe dignity of the court and interference with theadministration of justice. The effect of such anact is not confirmed by to a particular court or adistrict, or the State, it has the tendency toaffect the entire judiciary in the country. It is adangerous trend. Such a trend has to be curbed. Iffor passing judicial orders to the annoyance of thepolice the presiding officers of the courts are tobe assaulted and humiliated the judicial system inthe country would collapse. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ ...........41. In the constitutional scheme the judiciary isentrusted with the task of upholding theConstitution and the laws. Apart from interpretingthe Constitution and the laws, the judiciarydischarges the function of securing maintenance oflaw and order by deciding the disputes in a manneracceptable to civilised and peace-loving society.In order to maintain the faith of the society in therule of law the role of the judiciary cannot beundermined. In a number of cases this Court hasobserved that foundation of the judiciary is thetrust and confidence of the people of the nationaland when such foundation or trust is rudely shakenby means of any disrespect by the very persons whoare required to enforce the orders of the court andmaintain law and order the people's perception ofefficacy of the systems gets eroded.42. The judges are – as a jurist calls them – "papertigers". They do not have any machinery of theirown for implementing their orders. People, whileapproaching the court of law which they regard asthe temple of justice, feel safe and secure whilstthey are in the court. Police personnel aredeployed in the court campus for the purpose ofmaintaining order and to see that not only thejudges can work fearlessly in a calm, cool andserene atmosphere but also to see that anyone comingto the court too feels safe and secure threat.Every participant in court proceedings is either aseeker of justice or one who comes to assist inadministration of justice. So is the expectation ofthe members of the Bar who are treated as officersof the court. We shudder to feel what would happenif the police personnel themselves, and that toc inan organised manner, are found to be responsible fordisturbing the peace and order in the court campus,for causing assault on the judges and thus sullyingthe temple of justice apart from bringing a bad nameto an indispensable organ of the executive wing ofthe State.43. Police is the executive force of the State towhich is entrusted the duty of maintaining law andorder and of enforcing regulations for theprevention and detection of crime. (EncyclopaediaBritannica, Vol.58, p.158). The police force isconsidered by society as an organised force of civilofficers under the command of the State engaged inthe preservation of law and order in the society andmaintaining peace by enforcement of laws andprevention and detection of crime. One who isentrusted with the task of maintaining discipline inthe society must first itself be disciplined.Police is an agency to which social control belongs https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ and therefore the police has to come up to theexpectations of the society." (Emphasis added)523. The learned counsel Mr.Raghavachari placed reliance upon2009 Cri LJ 677 [Courts on its own motion v. State and others] – Suomoto Contempt Petition in the case of Senior Counsel Mr.R.K.Anand.Referring to plethora of decisions, Delhi High Court summarised theemerging principles as important considerations in dealing with thecases of Criminal Contempt of Court as under:-1.The contempt jurisdiction of a Court is suigeneris; it is a special jurisdiction and asummary jurisdiction. The Court is in effect thejury, the prosecutor, the judge and the hangmanand so the jurisdiction has to be exercised withgreat caution and circumspection.2.Action for contempt may be taken only if there isa substantial interference in the administrationof justice. A Court should not be hypersensitiveand take umbrage at every trivial misdemeanor. ACourt should punish for contempt only if the actof omission complained of is deliberate andcontumacious.3.Proceedings for contempt are quasi-criminal innature. While it may not be necessary to provemens rea, but the standard of proof is that ofproof beyond a reasonable doubt. This is becausean alleged contemnor may be sent to prison forcriminal contempt of Court.4.Since proceedings for contempt of Court are quasicriminal in nature, the alleged contemnor must beduly informed, with sufficient particularity, ofthe allegations against him so that he mayeffectively defend himself.5.A burden of proof is on the person asserting thatthere is a contempt of Court.6.The Court is entitled to devise its own procedurefor dealing with contempt of Court, and thegenerally accepted criminal law principles or theEvidence Act are not applicable to suchproceedings. However, the principles of naturaljustice must be adhered to Summary justice may berough justice, but it should be fair.We keep these principles in mind before proceeding to consider thecontempt committed by the Police Officers and Police personnel. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

524. Aftermath of 19.02.2009:-Let us give a brief sketch how the incident on 19.2.2009affected functioning of Courts and administration of justice. Theviolence left scores of Advocates and some of Police personnel, Courtstaff, litigants injured. Police entering into Court halls andattacking the Court premises, lawyers, Court staff is a seriousmatter. The incident persisted for nearly 3- 4 hours. TheCommittee of Hon'ble Judges was appointed to assess the damagescaused to the Court property and also to the vehicles. The smashedCars and other vehicles and mangled remains of damaged Courtproperties remained as it is for a few days. Glass pieces, vehiclesand other articles were found strewn all around the court premises.Because of brewing tension and damages caused to the Court buildingsand properties, both Principal Seat and Madurai Bench of Madras HighCourt remain closed on 20.2.2009, 23.2.2009 and 24.2.2009. CityCivil Court, Small Causes Court, Tribunals functioning in the HighCourt campus remained closed for about one week and the Courts openedonly on 02.3.2009.525. Police entering the court premises and lathicharging thelawyers has also caused ripples in the District Courts and moffusilCourts. Both High Court and District Courts and also moffusilCourts, lawyers staged protest throughout the State. Because of therift between the lawyers and the Police, the under-trial prisonerscould not be taken to the Courts for remand extension and remandextension could not be done.526. The stand off between advocates and Police personnel hadresulted in the Police taking decision not to enter Court premises inmany Districts. Resultantly the work of the criminal Courts couldnot make progress. In Madurai, Court of VIth Judicial Magistratehimself did the Escort work taking the surrendered accused to Prison[Source – The Hindu dated 06.3.2009].527. As we elaborated earlier, the riot Police barged into thecorridors of the Court Halls even when the Courts were functioning.The chaos and confusion in the premises disrupted the Courtproceedings. By the mindless attack, Police smashed tube lights,glass doors and whatever they could damage with their lathis. Theincident persisted for 3 -4 hours. The gross impropriety committedby the Police on the Court premises and the rank lawlessness theyindulged in by resorting to indiscriminate attack on everyoneincluding Judges, litigants and lawyers is clearly an affront to thejudiciary. 528. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Rajeev Dhavan submitted thatonly to diffuse Law and Order problem and to protect the Courtbuildings and also B4-High Court Police Station within the premises,the Police had to act using the required minimum force and the Policeofficers had no personal affront to the Institution. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

529. Inherent power of the Court to protect the public in theAdministration of Justice and to convict by way of fine orimprisonment had existed in the Courts from time immemorial. InMorris v. Crown Office (C.A) [(1970) 2 QB 114 – Law graduates ofimpeccable character felt that attention should be drawn to the lackof status and dignity accorded to their mother tongue in Wales. Therecommendation of the committee under Sir David Hughes Parry in 1965in favour of the equal validity of Welsh and English in alldepartments of public administration in Wales has only been partiallyimplemented through the Welsh Language Act, 1967. Being impatientover the delay in implementation the Appellants decided to invadedthe Court. It was clearly prearranged. They had come all the wayfrom their University of Aberystwyth. They strode into the well ofthe Court. They flocked into the public gallery. They shoutedslogans. They scattered pamphlets. They sang songs. They broke upthe hearing. The judge had to adjourn. Some of them were sentencedto three months imprisonment for contempt and those who were appealedwere imposed fine of 50£. In the said case the contention raised wasthat the appellants intended no personal affront to the Judge.Observing that whatever be the noble aim of the appellants andaffirming the orders of the lower court finding them guilty, Court ofAppeals held as under:-"In sentencing these young people in this way thejudge was exercising a jurisdiction which goes backfor centuries. It was well described over 200 yearsago by Wilmot J. in an opinion which he prepared butnever delivered. "It is a necessary incident," hesaid, "to every court of justice to fine andimprison for a contempt of the court acted in thefact of it." That is Rex v. Almon (1765) Wilm 243,254. The phrase "contempt in the fact of the court"had a quaint old-fashioned ring about it; but theimportance of it is this; of all the places wherelaw and order must be maintained, it is here inthese courts. The course of justice must not bedeflected or interfered with. Those who strike atit strike at the very foundations of our society.To maintain law and order, the judges have, and musthave, power at once to deal with those who offendagainst it. It is a great power – a power instantlyto imprison a person without trial but it is anecessary power. ......" (Emphasis added)We are of the considered view, the degree of violence unleashed inthe High Court campus is clear obstruction and interference in thecourse of Administration of justice.530. Responsibility of individual Officers/Role played by individual Officers: As we pointed out earlier, as per Sec.5 of Chennai City PoliceAct – Administration of the City of Chennai is vested with theCommissioner. As per Sec.7 of Chennai City Police Act, Commissioner https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ shall be the Executive magistrate within the city limits. UnderSec.6 of the Act, Government appoints Jt. Commissioner of Police/Dy.Commissioner of Police or Asst. Commissioners who shall perform anyof the duties or exercise any of the powers assigned to that Officersas Commissioner directs.531. In his capacity as Commissioner of Police, 7th Respondenthas seized up the problem of lawyers' boycott even from 29.1.2009.On 6.2.2009, Commissioner has written a letter inD.O.Lr.No.151/S.B.VII/2009 to the Registrar-General, High Court,Madras narrating various types of agitations indulged by the lawyersin and around the High Court premises. Referring to egg throwingincident and attack on Dr. Subramaniam Swamy, on 18.2.2009a meetingwas convened by ACJ in which DGP-Mr.K.P.Jain, Addl. DGP (L&O)-Mr.Rajendran, CoP-Mr.Radhakrishnan, JCP (North)- Mr.Ramasubramani,DCP-Mr.Prem Anand Sinha, ACP-Mr.Kader Mohideen attended.532. After safe exit of Dr. Subramaniam Swamy, after the lawyerscame to B4-High Court Police Station for surrender, strength ofPolice personnel (147) was shifted by JCP (North) Mr.Ramasubramaniand DCP Mr.Prem Anand Sinha. As pointed out earlier, this initialmistake of shifting the Police personnel from B2-Explanade PoliceStation to B4-High Court Police Station led to the sordid episode.As we pointed out earlier, there was communication between CoP andJCP(North) between 14:23 – 15:01 hours. From the facts andcircumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that shifting ofPolice personnel (147) from B2-Esplanade Police Station to B4-HighCourt Police Station must have been with the knowledge of CoP. At14:45 hours, CoP issued direction to Addl. CoP Mr.Viswanathan to goto B2-Esplanade Police Station to monitor the developments caused bythe surrender of Advocates.533. During the course of arguments, Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learnedSenior Counsel would submit that CoP Mr.Radhakrishnan is one of thedistinguished meritorious Police Officer in the State and that he hasalso addressed the United Nations as to "Harmonious functioning ofthe Police in the Inter Religious Community Living". Learned SeniorCounsel has also submitted that the Officer being a distinguishedOfficer needs protection from the higher judiciary in his actionsdone in 'good faith'. As we have discussed earlier, the Officerappears to have acted with obstinate mind. Acting ChiefJustice/Registrar-General kept on calling CoP from 16:01 hoursrequesting him to withdraw the Police Force from High Court campus.What we find is, again and again, the strength in the High Courtcampus was increased. Being vested with the Administration of CityPolice, we find the then CoP Mr.Radhakrishnan is squarely responsiblefor deploying the riot Police inside the High Court campus on19.2.2009.534. As we discussed earlier, CoP was present in the riot areaeven from 16:43:50 hours. Even according to the version of CoP, heentered into the riot area at 17:00 hours. As pointed out by usearlier, from the Video clippings [CD-R2], it was clear that between17:03 – 17:05 hours there were incessant pelting of stones by the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Police inspite of the fact that lawyers were showing hands 'not topelt stones'; and inspite of the signals that Hon'ble Judges who werecoming along with their chowkidars. Inspite of such signals, lawyerswere chased and there was lathicharge at 17:05 hours. According toCoP. after Police Station was set fire, a collective decision wastaken and lathicharge was ordered at 5.45 P.M. As discussed earlier,there was clear violation of PSO 703. On the basis of the materialsproduced before us, we are of considered view that CoP being vestedwith the Administration of City Police was mainly responsible fordeploying the riot Police force and violence in the High Court campusand which caused obstruction and interference in the course ofAdministration of Justice. 535. Being jurisdictional Officers, JCP (North) Mr.Ramasubramaniand DCP Mr.Prem Anand Sinha mobilised the strength for providingsecurity in connection with the visit of Dr. Subramaniam Swamy on19.2.2009. As jurisdictional Officers and being present in thepremises from the morning, both these Officers are solely responsiblefor shifting of strength (147) from B2-Esplanade Police Station toB4-High Court Police Station. Both these Officers are also to beheld responsible for not appraising the CoP about the volatilesituation. The then JCP (North) Mr.Ramasubramani and DCP Mr.PremAnand Sinha have committed the initial mistake of shifting the Policestrength and thereafter B2-Esplanade Police Station to B4-High CourtPolice Station and forcibly taking the lawyers to custody andcontinuing to retain the Police force in the premises. As perlawyers' version, first spell of lathicharge was between 3.30 – 4.00P.M. From CD-R2, we have also seen that there was chasing of lawyerseven at 15:53 hours and damages caused to vehicles. Even from 15:53hours Police retaliated and no one seems to be controlling thesituation.536. Both JCP(North) Mr.Ramasubramani and DCP-Mr.Prem AnandSinha have not foreseen the consequences of such shifting andforcible taking of lawyers to custody and thereafter continuing toretain the Police force near B4-High Court Police Station. In ourconsidered view, in shifting the Police personnel from B2-EsplanadePolice Station to B4-High Court Police Station and retaining theadditional strength in B4-High Court Police Station JCP (North)Mr.Ramasubramani and DCP-Mr.Prem Anand Sinha have not acted in 'goodfaith' and they have not exercised due care and caution and thereforeto be held responsible. 537.As pointed out earlier, at 14:45:18 hours, Mr.Viswanathan,Addl. CoP was directed by the CoP to go to B2-Esplanade PoliceStation to monitor the developments caused by the surrender of theadvocates in B2-Esplanade Police Station. Mr.Viswanathan arrived inB2-Esplanade Police Station at 15:10 hours. When Mr.Viswanathanarrived in B2-Esplanade Police Station, the officer must have learntabout the brewing tension in B4-High Court Police Station. ButMr.Viswanathan has not chosen to proceed to B4-High Court PoliceStation to monitor the situation; but he has chosen to reach B4-HighCourt Police Station only at 15:50 hours after the lawyers wereforcibly taken to custody. While Mr.Viswanathan, Addl. CoP was in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ B2-Esplanade Police Station, there were number of calls betweenMr.Viswanathan Addl. CoP and Mr.Ramasubramni-JCP(North) and Mr.PremAnand Sinha-DCP. The call log of Addl CoP Mr.Viswanathan (CellNo.9444000029) is as under:-919444000029919444082838Outgoing19-2-091518211091944459111010392358984014150791039-FlowerBazaar-STR-29194440000299919940455455Outgoing19-2-0915223812091944459111010392358984014150791039-FlowerBazaar-STR-2JCP(N)callsAddl.CoP9194440000299919445300101Incoming19-2091527014091944459111010392358984014150791039-FlowerBazaar-STR-2DCPcallsAddl.CoP9194440000299919840566666SMSIncoming19-2-091531320919444591110103921039-FlowerBazaar-STR-29194440000299919840566666SMSIncoming19-2-091533180919444591110103921039-FlowerBazaar-STR-29194440000299919444465555Incoming19-2091535058791944459111010392358984014150791039-FlowerBazaar-STR-2CoPcallsAddl.CoP9194440000299919445300101Outgoing19-2-091536516791944459111010392358984014150791039-FlowerBazaar-STR-2DCPcallsAddl.CoP9194440000299919444465555Outgoing19-2-091538124991944459111010392358984014150791039-FlowerBazaar-STR-2CoPcallsAddl.CoP9194440000299919444082838Outgoing19-2-09155017991944459111010372358984014150791037-HighCourt-29194440000299919444465555Outgoing19-2-091550498991944459111010372358984014150791037-HighCourt-2Addl.CoPcallsCoPIn his counter-affidavit, Mr.Viswanathan, Addl.CoP has not elaboratedupon the details of those conversation and what was theinstructions/directions given by him to JCP(North) Mr.Ramasubramaniand DCP Mr.Prem Anand Sinha.538. Be that as it may, admittedly Mr.Viswanathan, Addl. CoP hadarrived at B4-High Court Police Station at 15:50 hours. Being higherofficer, he was in command from 15.50 hours till CoP arrived in theriot area at 16.43 hours. As elaborated earlier, at 15:53 hours,there were stone pelting by the Police and chasing of lawyers. Asnoted earlier, at 16:25 hours, there was lathicharge on the litigantpublic Mr.Sivakumar. At 16:26 hours Advocate Mr.Mohanakrishnan wassurrounded by number of Policemen and lashed out lathi blows. At16:39 hours, there was chasing of lawyers followed by lathicharge.539. In his counter-affidavit, Mr.Viswanathan averred that whentrouble was brewing, Police had to chase the angry advocates now andthen as ordered by the CoP. Mr.Viswanathan, Addl. CoP has furtheraverred that he contacted CoP number of times at 15:55, 16:04, 16:24and 16;27 hours seeking permission to withdraw the Police force fromHigh Court Campus. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

540. Mr.V.Selvaraj, learned counsel for Mr.Viswanathan submittedthat Mr.Viswanathan, Addl. CoP repeatedly suggested to CoP that itwould be prudent to withdraw the entire Police force from the HighCourt premises, but the CoP insisted that Police should not bewithdrawn and that the entire Police Station should remain in theHigh Court campus and protect the Police Station in the High Courtpremises.541. In his counter-affidavit, CoP has denied any suchsuggestion by Mr.Viswanathan, Addl.CoP. By saying that they havesimply obeyed the direction of the CoP, Mr.Viswanatha, Addl. CoPcannot avoid his responsibility. As held in 1898 ILR Mds (21) 249[Queen-Empress v. Subba Naik and others], Police officer is notprotected in that as he obeyed the orders of superior officer. Itis pertinent to note that Mr.Viswanathan-Addl.CoP andMr.Ramasubramani-JCP (North) were directed to be suspended by theorders of this Court dated 18.3.2009 which was challenged before theSupreme Court in SLP No.7540/2009. In such circumstances, the valueto be attached to the averments in the counter-affidavit filed byMr.Viswanathan on 27.8.2009 and 16.9.2009 remains to be seen. Theofficer Mr.Viswanathan, Addl. CoP being in command from 15:50 to16:43 hours has not exercised due care and caution. 542. We are of the considered view that there are overwhelmingmaterials prima facie to show that the actions of Mr.Radhakrishnan,then CoP; Mr.Viswanathan, then Addl. CoP; Mr.Ramasubramani, then JCP(North) and Mr.Prem Anand Sinha-then DCP, Flower Bazaar causedobstruction to functioning of Courts and interference in the courseof administration of justice and therefore, contempt proceedings areto be necessarily be initiated against them. Contempt notice isordered to be issued to the above Officers under Sec.15(1) read withSec.2(c)(iii) of Contempt Act for the following alleged excessesviz., (i) for deployment of additional armed force inside the HighCourt campus on 19.02.2009, after 11.30 am i.e. after Dr.SubramaniamSwamy left the High Court premises and that too withoutintimation/permission of the Registry; (ii) for the act of creatingcommotion inside the High Court premises under the guise of attemptto arrest the accused advocates and other advocates in between 12.00noon and 3.45 p.m.; (iii) for the act of entering the High Court,City Civil Court, Court of Small Causes, Family Court, LawAssociation premises, Madras High Court Advocates Associationpremises under the guise of chasing the lawyers; (iv) for the allegedact of causing extensive damages to the properties inside the campussuch as vehicles, buildings and association libraries and furniture;(v) for the alleged act of causing injuries on the personnel namelythe sitting Judge of this Court, the lawyers, court staff andlitigant public who assembled in the High Court campus for carryingon their lawful activities; (vi) for the alleged acts of interferencein the course of justice by paralysing the functioning of the HighCourt on 20th, 23rd and 24th of February, 2009, the functioning of CityCivil Court, Court of Small Causes and other Judicial Forums locatedinside the High Court campus on 20th and 23rd to 27th February, 2009 andparalysing the functioning of subordinate Courts throughout the State https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ on 20th, 23rd and 24th February, 2009; (vii) for the alleged act offailure to withdraw the additional armed forces drawn into High Courtpremises inspite of specific and repeated directions of the Hon'bleActing Chief Justice; (viii) for having filed false affidavits inthis proceedings; and (ix) for such other acts of the abovecontemnors which this Court comes across in the course of the hearingof the contempt petition.543. Director General of Police-Mr.K.P.Jain:As we pointed out earlier, administration of City Police isvested with CoP. Even though, administration of City Police isvested with the Commissioner, in the counter-affidavit, DGP hasextensively referred to Police Standing Orders and has only averredthat it was well within the jurisdiction of CoP to handle any law andorder situation to the best of his ability. We are not happy withthe way in which counter affidavit has been filed by the DGP. Theentire averments in the counter-affidavit appears to be only blamingthe lawyers. As the Head of Police department, it was expected ofthe DGP to file the counter affidavit with definite averments as towho were the Police officers and Police personnel deployed and whatare the positive steps that DGP has taken in this regard. Though, weare not happy with the averments in the counter-affidavit filed byDGP, we do not think that there are enough materials to initiatecontempt proceedings against DGP.544. Other Officers and various Police personnel present in High Court Premises on 19.02.2009: Mr.Anup Jaiswal-DGP (I&T), Mr.Sunil Kumar-Addl. CoP (Traffic),Mr. Sandeep Rai Rathore, JCP [Central], Mr.Gunaseelan-JC (SouthZone), Mr.Sarangan-DCP, Kilpauk, S.Panneerselvam-DCP, Pulianthope,Mr.T.S.Anbu-DCP, Anna Nagar, Mr.C.Sridhar, DCP, Adyar, Mr.M.S.Muthusamy-DCP, T.Nagar, Mr.K.Joshi Nirmal Kumar-DCP (Traffic-South), Mr.Thirugnanam-DCP (Traffic-North) and Mr.C.Jayakodi-Inspector of Police were all present. That apart number ofInspectors and Police personnel were also deployed.545. On behalf of Mr.Sandeep Rai Rathore-JCP (Central),Mr.Muthusamy-DCP (T.Nagar) and Mr.K.Joshi Nirmal Kumar-DCP (Traffic-South), it was stated that those officers have no role to play in theincident on 19.2.2009.546. In his counter, Mr.Rajendran-Addl. DGP averred that theonly role played by him was to attend the meeting held in the Chamberof ACJ on 18.2.2009 and he had no role to play in the incident on19.2.2009. Mr.Rajendran-then Addl. DGP attended only the meeting on18.2.2009 and no case is made out to initiate Contempt proceedingsagainst Mr.Rajendran-then Addl. DGP.547. In the counter-affidavit filed by Mr.Anup Jaiswal-DGP(I&T), it is averred that he had nothing to do with the occurrencewhich took place on 19.2.2009 and never took park in any of theevents happened there. In his counter, Mr.Sunil Kumar-Addl. ACP(Traffic) averred that his role was confined to see the free flow oftraffic on 19.2.2009 around the High Court. In his counter, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Mr.Gunaseelan-JCP has stated that he reached the High Court at 5.00P.M. and he had nothing to do with the incident on 19.2.2009.Mr.Sarangan-DCP has stated that he was present in the High Court asper direction. Like wise, in their counter-affidavitsMr.S.Panneerselvam-DCP, Mr.T.S.Anbu-DCP and Mr.C.Sridhar-DCP averredthat they had no role to play and they reached the High Court only at5.00 P.M. In his counter, Mr.N.K.Joshi-DCP averred that he had torole to play and he was not even present in the campus on 19.2.2009.Mr.Thirugnanam-DCP has stated in his counter that he had no role toplay and from 4.00 P.M. he was directed to control traffic work. Ithis counter, Mr.C.Jayakodi-Inspector of Police averred that he simplyassisted in the operations and no role was assigned to him other thanbeing present. 548. As per the direction of CoP/JCP (North), the above Officerswere deployed in the High Court premises and outside. Mr.AnupJaiswal-DGP (I&T); Mr.Sunil Kumar-Addl. CoP (Traffic); Mr. SandeepRai Rathore-JCP [Central]; Mr.Gunaseelan-JCP (South Zone);Mr.Sarangan-DCP, Kilpauk; Mr.S.Panneerselvam-DCP, Pulianthope;Mr.T.S.Anbu-DCP, Anna Nagar; Mr.C.Sridhar, DCP, Adyar; Mr.M.S.Muthusamy-DCP, T.Nagar; Mr.K.Joshi Nirmal Kumar-DCP (Traffic-South) and Mr.Thirugnanam-DCP (Traffic-North) had no role in thedecision making process either in deploying the police personnel orordering lathicharge. There are no materials warranting initiation ofcontempt proceedings against the above officers. But it would notabsolve them of their misconduct, if any, for the respective offencesin R.C.No.2(S)/2009/CBI/SCB/Chennai under Sec.144, 147, 148, 323,325, 326, 427, 436 and 450 IPC and under Sec.3 (1) and 4of TNP (PDL)Act, the FIR registered by the CBI. If any of the above Officers areidentified as having committed excess, those of the Officers are tobe proceeded with in accordance with law both in R.C.No.2 (S)/2009/CBI/SCB/Chennai and also disciplinary proceedings.549. So far as, Mr.Jeyakodi, Inspector of Police and otherInspectors and Police constables including the riot police, are notproceeded for contempt Cout . But it would not absolve them of theirmisconduct, if any, for the respective offences in R.C.No.2(S)/2009/CBI/SCB/Chennai under Sec.144, 147, 148, 323, 325, 326, 427, 436and 450 IPC and under Sec.3 (1) and 4 of TNP (PDL) Act in accordancewith law.550. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS:-Upon analysis of materials, we have arrived at the conclusionthat CoP- Mr.Radhakrishnan, Addl.CoP – Mr.Viswanathan, JCP (North) –Mr.Ramasubramani and DCP (Flower Bazaar) – Mr.Prem Anand Sinha wereresponsible for deploying the police force and for interference withthe administration of justice. Having regard to our order directinginitiation of the contempt proceedings on the above Officers, thenext aspect to be considered is initiation of appropriatedisciplinary proceedings against the said four officers. 551. By order dated 18.3.2009, the Full Bench has directedinitiation of disciplinary proceedings against JCP (North) –Mr.Ramasubramani and Addl. CoP (L&O) Mr.Viswanathan and directed them https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ to be placed under suspension. In SLP (Civil) No. 7540 of 2009, theSupreme Court has set aside the order and remitted the matter back tothe High Court to afford an opportunity to the above two officers. 552. We have heard the arguments at length on behalf of JCP(North) – Mr.Ramasubramani and Addl. CoP (L&O) Mr.Viswanathan.553. On behalf of the State, it was submitted that Sundaradevan- One Man Committee headed by Mr.Sundaradevan, IAS was appointed toinquire into the police action and to fix the responsibility for thealleged excess committed during the law and order incident whichhappened in the High Court campus on 19.2.2009 and the lawyers didnot co-operate with the Sundaradevan Committee. 554. The learned Advocate General submitted that since thelawyers did not co-operate in the inquiry by the One Man Committee,the Committee is yet to arrive at the conclusion as to who wereresponsible for committing excess and in such circumstances, writ ofmandamus to initiate disciplinary proceedings may not be appropriate. 555. Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned Senior Counsel submitted that apositive mandamus will lie when the exercise of power containsobjective criteria and where there is a power coupled with a duty. Itwas further submitted that while dealing with the law and ordersituation in the High Court campus on 19.2.2009 for committing thealleged excess, no mandamus could lie to the Government toinitiate disciplinary proceedings.556. Elaborating upon the circumstances under which the writ ofmandamus will lie, the learned senior counsel Dr.Rajeev Dhavan placedreliance upon judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in Comptrollerand Auditor-General of India v. K.S.Jagannathan - (1986) 2 SCC 679,wherein it was held as follows:-"There is thus no doubt that the High Courts inIndia exercising their jurisdiction under Article226 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or awrit in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders andgive necessary directions where the government or apublic authority has failed to exercise or haswrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon itby a statute or a rule or a policy decision of thegovernment or has exercised such discretion malafide or on irrelevant considerations or by ignoringthe relevant considerations and materials or in sucha manner as to frustrate the object of conferringsuch discretion or the policy for implementing whichsuch discretion has been conferred. In all suchcases and in any other fit and proper case a HighCourt can, in the exercise of its jurisdiction underArticle 226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ inthe nature of mandamus or pass orders and givedirections to compel the performance in a proper andlawful manner of the discretion conferred upon thegovernment or a public authority, and in a proper https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to theconcerned parties, the court may itself pass anorder to give directions which the government or thepublic authority should have passed or given had itproperly and lawfully exercised its discretion."[Emphasis added].557. It was submitted that since the police officers have actedin good faith to maintain law and order situation in the premises, nocase is made out for issuing direction to the State Government toexercise its discretion to initiate disciplinary proceedings againstthe officers. 558. Article 311 of the Constitution of India gives a two-foldprotection (i) against dismissal or removal by authority subordinateto that by which appointed and (ii) against dismissal, removal orreduction in rank without giving a reasonable opportunity of showingcause against the proposed action. Protection under Article 311 isavailable to permanent as well as temporary employees. To invokeArticle 311, the Court has to apply two tests viz., (i) whether thegovernment servant has right to the post or the rank or (ii) whetherhe has been visited with civil consequences. The protection underArticle 311 of the Constitution of India applies to the persons whoare members of civil servant of the State or All India service orholding Civil post under Union or State. 559. We have already arrived at the conclusion that theOfficers viz., CoP- Mr.Radhakrishnan, Addl.CoP – Mr.Viswanathan, JCP(North) – Mr.Ramasubramani and DCP (Flower Bazaar) – Mr.Prem AnandSinha were responsible for causing obstruction to the functioning ofthe Courts on 19.2.2009 and also caused interference with the courseof administration of justice which led to closure of the High Courton 20.2.2009, 23.2.2009 and 24.2.2009 and for one week in the CityCivil Court and Small Causes Court situated in the High Courtpremises. Hence, we are of the considered view that disciplinaryproceedings are to be initiated against CoP-Mr.Radhakrishnan,Addl.CoP– Mr.Viswanathan, JCP (North)–Mr.Ramasubramani and DCP(Flower Bazaar)–Mr.Prem Anand Sinha. 560. For any action taken under Sections 129 and 130 ofCrl.P.C., in dispersal of assembly by use of civil force and for useof armed forces to disperse assembly, the Officers/ Police personnelare entitled to protection against the prosecution for acts doneunder Sections 129 and Section 130 Cr.P.C., only if they have actedin good faith. We have already held that prima facie that there areover whelming materials to show that the above officers have notacted in good faith and they have not exercised due care and caution;nor did they have foreseen the consequences of their action upon theadministration of justice. In such view of the matter, there could beno impediment in initiating disciplinary proceedings. 561. In the counter affidavit filed by the Home Secretary, inpara 22, the State Government placed on record its statement that anyPolice Personnel if found to be the cause for the excess committed https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ they will be suitably punished by initiating appropriate departmentalaction. During his submission, the learned Advocate General alsoreiterated the stand of the Government. 562. On behalf of the lawyers, it was submitted that theOfficers, who were at the helm of affairs should be (a) transferred,(b) suspended, (c) to file criminal complaints against them and (d)to initiate disciplinary proceedings. It was mainly argued thatsuitable directions are to be issued to the State Government forinitiating disciplinary proceedings and during pendency of thedisciplinary proceedings to suspend the officers responsible for theincident on 19.2.20009. 563. Submitting that suspension is a major punishment, thelearned senior counsel Dr. Rajeev Dhavan contended that order ofsuspension cannot lightly be passed against a civil servant who isentitled to protection under Article 311 of the Constitution ofIndia. It was further argued that only when the Officer was proceededunder the following charges, any suspension can be ordered viz., (i)Rule 17(e) of the TNCS (D & A) Rules (or) (ii) Rule 3(e) of TNPSS (D& A) Rules (or) (iii) Rule 3 of the AIS (D & A) Rules and nosuspension can be made apart from the above circumstances. 564. The learned senior counsel would further submit thatresponsibility for ordering suspension is wholly with theconstitutional and statutory authorities and it is not for the Courtto see whether to keep an employee under suspension pending anyaction. In support of his contention, the learned senior counselplaced reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered inState of Orissa v. BimalKumar Mohanty - (1994) 4 SCC 126, whereinthe Supreme Court has held that after taking into consideration thegravity of the misconduct sought to be inquired into or investigatedand the nature of the evidence placed before the appointing authorityand on application of mind by disciplinary authority, should considerthe above aspects, decide whether it is expedient to keep an employeeunder suspension pending disciplinary proceedings. It is fairlysettled that it is the prerogative of the appointing authority ordisciplinary authority whether to place the officer on suspension ornot on consideration of gravity of the alleged misconduct or thenature of the allegations imputed to the delinquent employee. Thelearned senior counsel Dr.Rajeev Dhavan submitted that when it ispurely the discretion of the Government to keep an employee undersuspension pending disciplinary proceedings, no mandamus will lie tousurp statutorily assigned role or dictate how it is to be done. 565. Learned Senior Counsel mainly urged that the Court cannotdictate the decision of the statutory authority that ought to be madein the exercise of discretion in given case and the Court cannotdirect the statutory authority to exercise the discretion in aparticular manner. Reliance was placed in the Supreme Court judgmentrendered in U.P. State Road Transport Corpn. v. Mohd. Ismail (1991) 3SCC 239 and Aeltemesh Rein v. Union of India (1988) 4 SCC 54. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

566. Reliance was also placed on the judgments of the SupremeCourt reported in State of W.B. v. Nuruddin Mallick (1998) 8 SCC 143and A.P. SRTC v G. Srinivas Reddy (2006) 3 SCC 674. In one of thedecision viz., in (1998) 8 SCC 143, it was held that,"................... It would not be appropriate for theCourt to substitute itself for the statutory authoritiesto decide the matter". 567. Observing that the Court cannot direct the statutoryauthority to exercise the discretion in a particular manner, reliancewas placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported inChingleput Bottlers v. Majestic Bottling Co., (1984) 3 SCC 258,wherein it is held as follows:-"....... Normally, where the statute vests adiscretionary power upon an administrative authority, theCourt would not interfere with the exercise of suchdiscretion unless it is made with oblique motives orextraneous purposes or upon extraneous considerations."(Emphasis added)568. We are conscious that it would not be appropriate for theCourt to substitute itself for the statutory authorities and usurpthe discretion of the Government in dealing with its Officers. We arealso conscious that normally writ of mandamus may not be issueddirecting the State Government to exercise its discretion in aparticular manner. The extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226of the Constitution of India is not daunted where there is glaringviolation of fundamental rights and situation warrants an affirmativeaction. 569. In the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in GUJARATSTEEL TUBES LTD. v. G.S.T. MAZDOOR SABHA 1980 (1) LLJ 137, it wasobserved that the power under Article 226 of the Constitution ofIndia is larger. In para 80 of the said judgment, it was held asfollows:-“ ....... So broad are the expressive expressionsdesignedly used in Article 226 that any order whichshould have been made by the lower authority couldbe made by the High Court. The very width of thepower and the disinclination to meddle, exceptwhere gross injustice or fatal illegality and thelike are present, inhibit the exercise but do notabolish the power.“570. We are mainly concerned with fair and unbiased inquiry.Continuance in office by the Officers who were responsible for thepolice excess might prejudice the inquiry. Having regard to ourconclusion that the Officers viz., CoP- Mr.Radhakrishnan, Addl.CoP –Mr.Viswanathan, JCP (North) – Mr.Ramasubramani and DCP (FlowerBazaar) – Mr.Prem Anand Sinha are responsible for the excesscommitted and causing obstruction to administration of justice, toenable fair and unbiased inquiry, in our considered view that it will https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ be in order for the State Government to exercise its discretion byplacing the above Officers under suspension pending the disciplinaryproceedings. 571. Directions to CBI case:R.C.No.1(S)/2009/CBI/SCB/Chennai:- Based on the complaint lodgedby Mr.Jayakodi-Inspector of Police on 19.2.2009, case was registeredin Crime No.15/2009 under Sec.147, 353, 332, 450, 436, 307 IPC r/w. 3(1) TNPPDL Act against named five lawyers and 150 lawyers. CrimeNo.15/2009 was transferred to CBI and re-registered in R.C.No.1(S)CBI/SCB/Chennai under Sec.147, 353, 332, 450, 436, 307 IPC and underSec.3 (1) TNPPDL Act.572. Mr.Prabakaran, President TNAA and Mr.Paul Kanagaraj,President MHAA contended that as per the order dated 2.3.2009 anyinformation given subsequently after 6.40 P.M. on 19.2.2009 cannot betreated to be a case and urged us to pass appropriate directions thatR.C.No.1(S)/2009/CBI/SCB/Chennai registered against lawyers cannot beproceeded with.573. We are unable to accept the contention that R.C.No.1(S)/2009/CBI/SCB Chennai cannot be proceeded with. The relevant portionof the order dated 2.3.2009 reads as under:-"4. ...... It will also be open to therespondents/State authorities and Union of India topass appropriate orders on the basis of the firstinformation received by them at 6.40 P.M. pursuantto the Court's order dated 19th February 2009. Anyother information given subsequently at or about19.20 hours (7.20 P.M.) cannot be treated to be acase registered pursuant to the Court's order. Itwill also be open to the CBI to register a case onthe basis of the Court's order dated 19th February2009.Court has only expressed its concern for non-registration of the casebased upon the order passed by the Bench at 6.40 P.M. on 19.2.2009.Absolutely, there is nothing to indicate that Court has interdictedcontinuance of investigation in R.C.No.1(S)/2009/CBI/SCB/Chennai[Crime No.15/2009]. This is made very clear from the earlier orderof the Court dated 19.2.2009. In the said order dated 19.2.2009,Court has recorded statement of Home Secretary that regarding theincident on 19.2.2009, no lawyer would be taken to custody. However,Court has categorically said after investigation, if necessary, theymay proceed in accordance with law. The relevant portion of theorder reads as follows:-" 2 (ii) The Home Secretary states that no lawyer willbe taken in custody in connection with today'sincidence. After proper police investigation and afterinforming the matter to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice(Acting Chief Justice for the present), if necessary,in future, they may proceed in accordance with law." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

574. As we elaborated earlier, group of lawyers pelted stonesand acted in a most unacceptable manner. There are also prima facieevidence to indicate that miscreants appearing to be lawyers settingfire to the B4-High Court Police Station. If really the lawyers havecaused damage to the public properties and set fire to the B4-HighCourt Police Station, they are necessarily to be proceeded with inaccordance with law. 575. On 18.9.2009, CoP has filed list of names of Advocates whoare said to have formed an unlawful assembly in front of B4-HighCourt Police Station at 2.00 P.M. and also names of advocates who aresaid to have set fire to B4-High Court Police Station. On the side ofAdvocates, strong objections were raised contending that the list iscamouflaged by including the names of lawyers whom the Police seek tovictimise. As such we are not inclined to accept the list of namesfurnished either by lawyers or by police involved. Therefore, wedirect the investigation in Crime No.15/2009 now CBI R.C.No.1 (S)/2009/CBI/Chennai be proceed in accordance with law.576. R.C.No.2(S)/2009/CBI:- After the orders of the Court dated02.3.2009 and based upon the order dated 19.2.2009, CBI hasregistered the case in R.C.No.2(S)/2009/CBI/SCB/Chennai against theunnamed Police officials and other Police personnel. In its report,CBI has stated that it has examined number of witnesses, Policeofficers, Advocates, Judicial Officers, Court staff, litigant publicand others.577. In Para (16) of its report, CBI averred that "particularsrelating to identity of the Advocates have been collected from MadrasHigh Court Advocates Association and Madras Bar Association. But thereport does not indicate anything about the identification of thePolice personnel who indulged in deliberate destruction of vehiclesand court properties and beating of lawyers. After the incident,eight months had gone; but still the identity of the Police personnelwho indulged in deliberate destruction of vehicles and properties areyet to be known. 578. In the rejoinder, lawyers have given annexure containingnames of Police officers and Police constables allegedly involved indamaging the vehicles. In the list, they have also alleged that onlyPolice officers set fire to Police Station. The learned GovernmentPleader raised serious objections contending that such allegationsare baseless and reckless allegations are levelled against thePolice Officers. We are not inclined to place any reliance upon theannexure filed by the lawyers and we eschew it from ourconsideration. CBI is directed to proceed with the investigation inR.C.No.2(S)/2009/CBI/SCB/Chennai independently.579. In so far as, R.C.No.2(S)/2009/CBI/SCB/Chennai, CBI isdirected to identify the Police officers and Police personnel whoindulged in excesses lashing out lathi blows on the lawyers, litigantpublic, Court staff and who indulged in causing damage to thevehicles and also to the Court properties. The State Government and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Director General of Police are directed to immediately furnish thelist of entire Police officers and Police personnel and their presentdesignation who were in the High Court on 19.2.2009 to the CBI toenable it to identify the Police officers and Police personnel.CBI is also permitted to have copy of Video and Photos taken by theCommittee constituted by the High Court to assess the damages. Onidentification of the Police Officers and police Personnel CBI isdirected to proceed with the investigation in R.C.No.2(S)/2009/CBI/SCB/Chennai in accordance with law.580. CBI shall proceed with the investigation in both the casesexpeditiously and CBI is directed to file final Report in both caseswithin a period of three months from the date of this order. 581. Incident on 17.2.2009/Crime No.13 of 2009:In so far as the incident on 17.2.2009, already larger Bench hasseized up the matter and therefore, it is not necessary for us toissue any direction in respect of Crime No.13/2009.582. Compensation:-To reimburse the medical expenses and for payment ofcompensation to the damages caused to the vehicles, State Governmenthas placed [G.O.Ms.No.668 dated 20.07.2009] at the disposal ofRegistrar-General a total sum of Rs.61,00,000/-. Out of the saidamount of Rs.61,00,000/-, medical expenses and compensation to theinjured and to the damaged vehicles were paid as under:- 1.Payment to Hospitals (Apollo Hospital ..Rs.11,97,827.00and Lifeline Multi Speciality Hospital)2.Compensation for injuries to persons ..Rs.20,99,768.003.Damages to Vehiclesi) Four Wheelers to 56 persons ..Rs.10,63,953.00ii) Two Wheelers to 59 personsiii) For Cycles to 3 persons4.Expenditure incurred for RepairingThe Damages caused to High Court, ..Rs. 6,39,460.00City Civil Court, Small Causes Court5.Law Association (TV) ..Rs. 40,000.00 --------------------TOTAL Rs. 50,41,008.00 --------------------Compensation for injuries to some more claimants is said to be underprocessing.583. Apart from medical expenses, the lawyers who sustainedgrievous and simple injuries were also paid compensation as indicatedin the report filed by the Registrar-General. The question fallingfor consideration is whether any further amount is to be paid to thelawyers for infringement of their fundamental rights and for theignominy and humiliation suffered by them . 584. Award of compensation against the State is an appropriateand effective remedy for redress of an established infringement of a https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ fundamental right under Article 21 by a public servant. The quantumof compensation will, however, depend upon the facts andcircumstances of each case. Award of such compensation by way ofpublic law remedy will not come in the way of the aggrieved personclaiming additional compensation in a civil Court, in enforcement ofthe private law remedy in tort, nor come in the way of the criminalCourt ordering compensation under Section 357 of Code of CivilProcedure. 585. Award of compensation as a Public law remedy for violationof fundamental rights enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution,in addition to the private law remedy under the Law of Torts wasevolved in the last two and half decades. The Supreme Courtconsidered the question of awarding compensation as Public Law remedyin AIR 1981 SC 928 [Bhagalpur Blinding case, (Khatri (ii) v. State ofBihar]. 586. In [Rudul Sah case Vs. State of Bihar [1983(4) SCC 141],the petitioner therein approached the Supreme Court under Article 32of the Constitution alleging that though he was acquitted by theSessions Court on 3-6-1968, he was released from jail only on 06-10-1982, after 14 years, and sought compensation for his illegaldetention. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while recongnizing that Article32 cannot be used as a substitute for the enforcement of rights andobligations which can be enforced efficaciously through the ordinaryprocesses of courts, civil and criminal, raised for consideration theimportant question as to whether in the exercise of its jurisdictionunder Article 32, the Supreme Court can pass an order for payment ofmoney, as compensation for the deprivation of a fundamental right.Awarding compensation the Supreme Court held as follows:- 6. "Article 21 which guarantees the right tolife and liberty will be denuded of its significantcontent if the power of this Court were limited topassing orders of release from illegal detention. Oneof the telling ways in which the violation of thatright can reasonably be prevented and due compliancewith the mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulctits violators in the payment of monetarycompensation. Administrative sclerosis leading toflagrant infringements of fundamental rights cannotbe corrected by any other method open to thejudiciary to adopt. The right to compensation is somepalliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalitieswhich act in the name of public interest and whichpresent for their protection the powers of the Stateas a shield. If civilisation is not to perish in thiscountry as it has perished in some others too well-known to suffer mention. It is necessary to educateourselves into accepting that, respect for the rightsof individuals is the true bastion of democracy.Therefore, the State must repair the damage done byits officers to the petitioner's rights. It may haverecourse against those officers". https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

587. Rudul Sah case was followed in Bhim Singh V. State of J&K[1985(4) SCC 677] and People's Union for Democratic Rights V. PoliceCommissioner, Delhi Police Headquarters [1989 (4) SCC 730].588. The law was crystallised in Nilabati Behera V. State ofOrissa [1993 (2) SCC 746]. In that case, the deceased was arrested bythe police, handcuffed and kept in a police custody. The next day,his dead-body was found on a railway track. The Supreme Court awardedcompensation to the mother of the deceased. Hon'ble Supreme Courtspelt out the following principles:-"Award of compensation in a proceeding under Article32 by this Court or by the High Court under Article226 of the Constitution is a remedy available inpublic law, based on strict liability forcontravention of fundamental rights to which theprinciple of sovereign immunity does not apply, eventhough it may be available as a defence in privatelaw in an action based on tort.Enforcement of the constitutional right and grant ofredress embraces award of compensation as part ofthe legal consequences of its contravention.9. A claim in public law for compensation forcontravention of human rights and fundamentalfreedoms, the protection of which is guaranteed inthe Constitution, is an acknowledged remedy forenforcement and protection of such rights, and sucha claim based on strict liability made by resortingto a constitutional remedy provided for theenforcement of a fundamental right is 'distinctfrom, and in addition to, the remedy in private lawfor damages for the tort' resulting from thecontravention of the fundamental right. The defenceof sovereign immunity being inapplicable, and aliento the concept of guarantee of fundamental rights,there can be no question of such a defence beingavailable in the constitutional remedy. It is thisprinciple which justifies award of monetarycompensation for contravention of fundamental rightsguaranteed by the Constitution, when that is theonly practicable mode of redress available for thecontravention made by the State or its servants inthe purported exercise of their powers, andenforcement of the fundamental right is claimed byresort to the remedy in public law under theConstitution by recourse to Articles 32 and 226 ofthe Constitution.589. The distinction between tort by the officers for which theState may be vicariously liable and the primary and strict liabilityof the State for the public law wrong of violation of a fundamentalright has sometimes not been maintained and cases of public lawwrongs redressed under the public law remedies by applications underArticle 226 have at times been, referred to as cases of tort. InChairman Railway Board V. Mrs. Chandrima Das (AIR 2000 SC 988) where https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ a Bangladeshi woman was gang raped by employees of the IndianRailway, the court rightly held that it was a case of violation ofthe fundamental right of the Bangladeshi woman under Article, 21which applies also to non-citizens and the High Court was right inallowing compensation of Rs.10 lakhs against the Railway in a publicinterest petition under Article 226 as the "state was under aconstitutional liability to pay compensation to here. But in thecourse of discussion some earlier cases relating to violation offundamental right awarding compensation under Article 32 or 226 havebeen described as cases "in the the realm of tort" and there is alsosome reference to vicarious liability of the State. As submittedearlier, the liability enforced under Article 32 or 226 for violationof a fundamental right is the primary and strict liability of theState and not its vicarious liability for the tort committed by itsofficers. 590. We are conscious that extension of fundamental rights underArticles 21 and 32 against private persons, apart from being ofdoubtful validity, may open a Pandora's box and flood the SupremeCourt and High Courts with petitions seeking damages. Rights to lifeand personal liberty against private persons are already covered bycommon law and statute law and private law remedies are available forviolations of these rights. The courts must also be astute to guardagainst the trend that the blame for every misfortune must be laid atthe doorstep of the State under Article 21, lest every wrong oroffence against the person or property becomes redressable as apublic law wrong against the State on the ground that it was notsufficiently vigilant in protecting the person or property of thevictim. Time and again the Supreme Court deprecated the tendency togrant huge sums as damages under Article 226 in cases where the factsare disputed and there has been no trial of issues involved.591. In Nilabati Behera's case [1993 AIR SCW 2366], the SupremeCourt put in a word of caution as follows:-"Of course, relief in exercise of the power underArticle 32 or 226 would be granted only (when) it isestablished that there has been an infringement ofthe fundamental rights of the citizen and no otherform of appropriate redressal by the court in thefacts and circumstances of the case, is possible, ...Law is in the process of development and the processnecessitates developing separate public lawprocedures as also public law principles. It may benecessary to identify the situations to whichseparate proceedings and principles apply and thecourts have to act firmly but with certain amount ofcircumspection and self-restraint lest proceedingsunder Article 32 or 226 are misused as a disguisedsubstitute for civil action in private law". 592. We are conscious that it is not in every case where thereis breach of fundamental right committed by the violator/Police thatcompensation would be awarded under Article 226 of Constitution. Theinfringement of the fundamental right must be gross and patent and in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ controvertible and ex-facie glaring. But the case before us is ofexceptional nature where number of lawyers sustained grievous andsimple injuries. It is a clear case of breach of fundamental rightsand the infringement of fundamental rights is gross and patent andex-facie glaring. Having regard to the large scale infringement offundamental rights of large number of persons, in our considered viewthat this is an appropriate case to award further damages towards theinjured persons.593. Committee of Hon'ble Judges was constituted and thecommittee had gone into the nature of injuries and fixed thecompensation payable. Depending upon the nature of injuries and painand suffering the injured lawyers, Courts staff and others were paidsome amount as compensation. We are informed that most of the lawyershave received the compensation amount without prejudice to theirright of claiming further compensation.594. Having regard to the breach of fundamental rights of largenumber of persons and with a view to give quietus to the matter, wedeem it appropriate to award further compensation to the injuredpersons. We have carefully examined the list furnished by theRegistrar-General and the nature of injuries sustained by each of theinjured persons. As per the report of the Registrar General, totally175 were injured, out of which only 139 appeared before the MedicalBoard/Committee. Those of them who sustained grievous injuriesresulting in impairments shall be entitled to Rs.1,00,000/- each asex-gratia amount. Those of them sustained simple injuries shall bepaid a sum of Rs.25,000/- each as ex-gratia amount. The above ex-gratia amount shall be in addition to the compensation already paidto them.595. The following lawyers/ Court staff who sustained grievousinjuries shall be paid further ex-gratia amount of Rs.1,00,000/-each. 1) K.Sudhan7) S.Raghu13) A.Zakir Hussain 2) V.Ramalingam 8) S.Alagarraj14) B.Dakshinamurthy(Court Staff)3) S.V.Karthikeyan, 9) P.Gnana Sekaran 15)P.Balasubramanian(Court Staff) 4) D.Sivakumar, 10)M.Muneeswaran16)K.Prabhu 5) S.Anandan11) D.Anandan 17) R.J.Arjuna6) R.Bhagawat Krishna12) N.Gowthaman18) P.Subramanian [Totalling Rs.18,00,000/-]Sl.Nos.1 to 12 .... Advocates; Sl.Nos.14 to 18 – Court Staff.The following lawyers/court staff/law college students and others whosustained injuries/simple injuries shall be paid further ex-gratiaamount of Rs.25,000/- each. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 1)T.Karthikeyan42)R.Raja83)G.Sathyaraj2)K.Jayakannan43)P.Rajendran84)P.Chinnadurai3)J.Kingsly Solomon44)S.Sankar85)G.Senthil Kumar 4)N.A.Saidque45)M.Thomas Acquinas86)V.Karthikeyan 5)Dr.R.Sampath Kumar46)A.Mohandoss87)P.Vijayakanth 6)V.Thirunavukkarasu47)M.Rajendran88)R.Kamalakkannan 7)Dr.G.Krishnamurthy48)S.Sankaranarayana89)Vellidoss 8)U.Prabhu49)T.M.Ajin90)S.Jeevarathinam9)I.Arockia Selvaraj50)R.Velu91)Thangapandian10)A.Singaravelu51)P.Arivumani92)M.Mahalingam11)D.Thirumurthy52)J.John93)N.Chandrababu12)K.Gokulram53)S.Ananda Kumar94)V.Srinivasan13)S.V.Singaravelan54)R.Vijayakumar95)R.Sathyamoorthy14)K.Jayaraman55)R.Kubendiran96)T.E.Sampath Kumar15)J.Karthick56)V.Selvaperumal97)T.Baskaran16)R.Sudhakar57)S.ImmanuvelThamilselvan98)M.Rajendran17)R.L.Saravanan58)K.Jagannadha Rao99)R.Sekar18)R.Sudha59)S.Arul100)P.Pooliahpandian19)L.Sasidharan60)M.Anbuselvan101)J.Abdul Malick20)K.S.Purushothaman61)S.Nagarajan102)M.Chennakesavalu21)T.S.Kanmani62)M.Mohamed Rafi103)R.Manickam22)C.Narayana Ram63)G.Mohanakrishnan104)G.Vijayakumar23)S.Meenakshi Sundaram64)G.Balakrishnan105)S.Chandrasekaran 24)R.Suresh Kumar65)G.Vijaya Balan106)M.Jahir Hussain 25)S.Siva Sankar66)J.Pooma Chandran107)Mrs.Bhuvaneswari 26)C.S.V.Loganathan67)B.Mohan Raj108)E.Sivaraj 27)G.Srinivasan68)T.Senthil Rajan109)S.Gopi 28)R.Sreerangan69)P.Madasamy110)Rajaguru 29)A.K.Kaleel Ahamed70)R.Murali111)K.Hemalatha 30)Kayal @ Angayarkanni71)K.Ramasundaram112)M.Sekar 31)M.Zainul Abideen72)S.Kamaraj113)K.Shanmugam32)C.Panneer Selvam73)N.Vijayaraj114)D.Williams33)V.Alamelu74)S.Vijayalakshmi115)P.Akila34)S.Ramajayam75)R.Janagi116)M.Bharathi35)M.Karthikeyan76)V.Amudha117)Vishwanth Swami36)A.Anandan77)R.Arun118)S.Usha Koshi37)A.Juhilin JinuHebarson78)N.Velayudam119)N.Selvam38)M.K.Thiruvengadam79)M.Jaikumar120)B.Ellappan39)C.Ramesh80)J.N.Nareshkumar121)M.S.Sivakumar 40)A.Arokiadoss81)S.Arumugam41)C.Chandrasekar82)K.Nagarajan[Totalling Rs.30,25,000/-] https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Sl.Nos. 1 to 84 ... Advocates; Sl.No.85 to 89 ... Law CollegeStudents; Sl.Nos. 90 to 105 ... Court Staff and Sl.Nos. 106 to121 ... Others.596. We direct that the payment of ex-gratia amount shall be in'full and final settlement' of all the claims of injured persons. Onpayment of the said amount no further claim shall lie in this regard.We direct the State Government to place further a sum ofRs.48,25,000/- at the disposal of Registrar General for disbursementof the ex-gratia amount to the injured persons as indicated above.597. On 19.02.2009 the Police have also entered into the LawAssociation, Small Causes Court, and Madras High Court AdvocateAssociation [MHAA] and caused extensive damages to the library andother furnitures. Already an amount of Rs.40,000/- was paid to SmallCauses Court for replacement of damages for Sony LCD TV. We havealso seen the photographs and the damages caused. Having regard tothe damages caused to the above two Associations, an amount ofRs.5,00,000/- each shall be paid to the Law Association and MHAArespectively. [Total Rs.10,00,000/-].598. The State Government is directed to place at the disposalof Registrar-General a total sum of Rs.58,25,000/- for being paid tothe injured persons and to the Law Association and MHAA. After payingthe amount, the Registrar General is directed to send report to theState Government as to amount disbursed.599. We make it clear, apart from the claims so far already madeand the 36 injured persons who have not appeared before the Hon'bleCommittee/Registrar-General (as per the list filed by the Registry),no fresh claim shall be entertained. 600. SECURITY IN PRINCIPAL SEAT AND MADURAI BENCH:The revised security Scheme/Plan for Principal Seat with thestrength of 252 Police personnel was inaugurated on 21.1.2009. With252 Police personnel, the scheme was implemented from 28.1.2009 and252 Police personnel [in shift] continued in the premises anddischarging their security duty in the respective assigned area. On17.2.2009, Dr. Subramaniam Swamy appeared in Court Hall No.III andwas attacked. After the incident on 19.2.2009, Police Force insidethe High Court premises was withdrawn. On 23.4.2009, the Hon'bleSecurity Committee directed the Registry to address the StateGovernment to restore the complement of Police force as it existedprior to 17.2.2009 with effect from 01.5.2009. But from 01.5.2009,only a skeletal complement of Police personnel is being posted insidethe High Court premises at important places.601. High Court being high Security Zone, as resolved by theHon'ble Security Committee, State Government is directed to restorecomplement of Police force as it existed prior to 17.2.2009. Lawyersare directed to render all co-operation for implementation ofSecurity plan as it existed prior to 17.2.2009.* * * * * https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ F.M.IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J. &R.BANUMATHI, J.602. COMMON CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS:I. Compensation:-(a) It is held that the injured lawyers/courtstaff/others who sustained grievous injuries shall be paidan ex-gratia amount of Rs.1,00,000/- each (Rupees One lakhonly). The injured lawyers/court staff/others whosustained simple injuries shall be paid an ex-gratiaamount of Rs.25,000/- each (Rupees Twenty five thousandonly). [Vide List in Para (595)]. Payment of ex-gratiaamount to the injured lawyers/court staff/others shall bein addition to the compensation amount already paid tothem from and out of the amount already sanctioned by theState Government. Payment of ex-gratia shall be in fulland final settlement of all the claims of the injuredlawyers/court staff/others and there shall be no furtherclaim in this regard.(b) Law Association and Madras High Court AdvocatesAssociation (MHAA) shall be paid Rs.5,00,000/- each(Rupees Five lakhs) towards the damages caused to theLibrary and other infrastructures of their Associations.(c) State Government is directed to place furtheramount of Rs.58,25,000/- (Rupees Fifty eight lakhs twentyfive thousand) at the disposal of the Registrar-General,High Court, Madras for disbursement of ex-gratia amount asdirected by us in Para (598) to the injured lawyers/courtstaff/others and for payment of damages to the LawAssociation and MHAA within six weeks from the date ofthis order.(d) The Registrar-General and Registrar-Managementshall ensure disbursement of the amount to the injuredpersons as per the list in Para (595) and to the LawAssociation and Madras High Court Advocates Association(MHAA).(e) No fresh claims shall be entertained apart fromthe claims already made before the Registrar-General. II. Contempt Proceedings:(a) Primafacie case is made out againstMr.Radhakrishnan,then CoP, Chennai; Mr.A.K.Viswanathan thenAddl. CoP (L&O), Chennai; Mr.Ramasubramani-then JCP(North)and Mr.Prem Anand Sinha-then DCP, Flower Bazaar that theyhave caused obstruction in the course of administration ofjustice and contempt proceedings have to be necessarilyinitiated against them. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (b) Contempt notice under Section 15(1) read withSection 2 (c) (iii) of Contempt of Courts Act is ordered tobe issued to Mr.K.Radhakrishnan-then CoP, Chennai;Mr.A.K.Viswanathan-then Addl. CoP, Chennai;Mr.M.Ramasubramani-then JCP(North) and Mr.Prem Anand Sinha-then DCP, Flower Bazaar for the following alleged excesses:(i) for deployment of additional armed forceinside the High Court campus on 19.02.2009, after11.30 am i.e. after Dr.Subramaniam Swamy left theHigh Court premises and that too withoutintimation /permission of the Registry;(ii) for the act of creating commotion insidethe High Court premises under the guise of attemptto arrest the accused advocates and other advocatesin between 12.00 noon and 3.45 p.m.;(iii) for the act of entering the High Court,City Civil Court, Court of Small Causes, FamilyCourt, Law Association premises, Madras High CourtAdvocates Association premises under the guise ofchasing the lawyers;(iv) for the alleged act of causing extensivedamages to the properties inside the campus such asvehicles, buildings and association libraries andfurniture;(v) for the alleged act of causing injuries onthe personnel namely the then sitting Judge of thisCourt, lawyers, court staff and litigant public whoassembled in the High Court campus for carrying ontheir lawful activities;(vi) for the alleged acts of interference inthe course of justice by paralysing the functioningof the High Court on 20th, 23rd and 24th of February,2009, the functioning of City Civil Court, Court ofSmall Causes and other Judicial Forums locatedinside the High Court campus on 20th and 23rd to 27thFebruary, 2009 and paralysing the functioning ofsubordinate Courts throughout the State on 20th, 23rdand 24th February, 2009;(vii) for the alleged act of failure towithdraw the additional armed forces drawn into HighCourt premises inspite of specific and repeateddirections of the Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice; (viii) for having filed false affidavits inthis proceedings; and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (ix) for such other acts of the abovecontemnors which this Court comes across in thecourse of the hearing of the contempt petition.(c) No case is made out to initiate Contemptproceedings against the Chief Secretary, Home Secretary,Director General of Police and then Addl. Director Generalof Police (L&O) Mr.T.Rajendran.(d) No case is made out to initiate Contemptproceedings against other officers viz., Mr.Anup Jaiswal-DGP (I&T); Mr.Sunil Kumar-Addl. CoP (Traffic); Mr. SandeepRai Rathore-JCP [Central]; Mr.Gunaseelan-JCP (South Zone);Mr.Sarangan-DCP, Kilpauk; Mr.S.Panneerselvam-DCP,Pulianthope; Mr.T.S.Anbu-DCP, Anna Nagar; Mr.C.Sridhar-DCP,Adyar; Mr. M.S.Muthusamy-DCP, T.Nagar; Mr.K.Joshi NirmalKumar-DCP (Traffic-South); Mr.Thirugnanam-DCP (Traffic-North) and Mr.C.Jayakodi-Inspector of Police B2-EsplanadePolice Station. Even though, no prima facie case is madeout to initiate Contempt Proceedings against theseOfficers, in the Criminal Case, if the above said Officersare charged as having committed excess in the incident on19.2.2009, those Officers should be proceeded with inaccordance with law both in R.C.No.2(S)/2009/CBI/SCB/Chennai and also by way of disciplinaryproceedings.III. Directions to the Government:In as much as the learned Advocate General in thecourse of his submissions stated that the State Governmentwill scrupulously comply with the directions that may beissued for taking any action against erring officers, weissue the following directions:(a) In the light of various specific directions issuedin this order, it is up to the State Government to considerwhether continuance of One Man Committee (Dr.N.SundaradevanCommittee) appointed by the State Government should bepursued or not.(b) Having regard to our conclusions holding thatMr.Radhakrishnan-then CoP, Chennai; Mr.A.K.Viswanathan-thenAddl. CoP, Chennai; Mr.Ramasubramani-then JCP(North) andMr.Prem Anand Sinha-then DCP, Flower Bazaar are responsiblefor the incident in the High Court campus on 19.2.2009 andPolice excess in violation of statutory provisionsincluding Police Standing Orders, we direct the StateGovernment to initiate appropriate disciplinary proceedingsagainst the above said officers and proceed with them inaccordance with law.(c) To enable fair and unbiased enquiry, it will be inorder for the State Government to exercise its discretion https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ to place the Officers viz., Mr.Radhakrishnan-then CoP,Chennai; Mr.Viswanathan-then Addl. CoP, Chennai;Mr.Ramasubramani-then JCP(North) and Mr.Prem Anand Sinha-then DCP, Flower Bazaar under suspension pendingdisciplinary action.(d) In so far as, other Police officers and Policepersonnel deployed in the High Court on 19.2.2009, if inthe final report in R.C.No.2/2009/CBI/SCB/ Chennai, arecharged as having committed excess in the incident on19.2.2009, we direct suitable disciplinary proceedings tobe initiated against those Police officers and personnelalso.IV. Directions to CBI:(a) We direct CBI to proceed with the investigation inR.C.No.1(S)/2009/CBI/SCB/ Chennai registered against thelawyers in accordance with law.(b) In so far as, R.C.No.2(S)/2009/CBI/SCB /Chennai,registered against the Police, CBI is directed to proceedwith the investigation in accordance with law.(c) The CBI shall proceed with the investigation inboth the cases expeditiously and file the final Reportwithin three months from the date of this Order.V. Directions to Registry:-(a) Directions in W.P.No.7646/2006 dated 20.6.2006shall be strictly implemented. We further direct that asper the directions of the Supreme Court in S.L.P. (Civil)No.7540/2009 dated 14.7.2009, there shall be no processionor Meetings in the Court verandah or in any part of theCourt premises except within their Association Halls andthat too in a peaceful manner in order to ensure that theproceedings of the Court is not in anyway disrupted.(b) We reiterate the directions in W.P.No.24445/2006dated 09.10.2006 which led to the constitution of StateLevel Co-ordination Committee in G.O.Ms.No.1249 Home(Police IX) Department dated 28.12.2006.(c) We direct the Registrar-General to send a copy ofthe order in W.P.No.7646/2006 dated 20.6.2006 and ourdirections in these Writ Petitions to the Bar Council, allthe Bar Associations in the Principal Seat and MaduraiBench and to the District Judges for being circulated toall the Bar Associations in the District Courts and inMoffusil Courts for strict implementation within six weeksfrom the date of this order.VI. Security to High Court:-(a) As far as the guidelines issued by the Governmentof India for preserving the Security of this Institution isconcerned as per the direction contained in the letterNo.IV.23014/79/2005/VS dated 31.5.2007 and the subsequent https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ order dated 17.11.2008 and the steps taken by the MadrasHigh Court Security Committee revising the Securityarrangement system as was implemented from 28.1.2009,should be restored forthwith.(b) State Government is directed to restorecomplement of Police force as it existed prior to 17.2.2009as resolved by the Hon'ble Security Committee. Lawyers aredirected to co-operate with the Registry for implementationof Security Plan as it existed prior to 17.2.2009.VII. Security to District Courts and other Courts:-State Government is directed to restore Security toDistrict Courts and other Courts throughout the State asit existed prior to 19.02.2009.603. We have dealt with the issues, keeping in view the publicinterest, interest of the Police, interest of the lawyers and aboveall, interest of the Institution. Though, we have found fault withsome of the Officers, it should not be taken to mean that the wholePolice Force is at fault. While we have found fault with certainOfficers, in the same breath, we have also found fault with thelawyers for their continued boycotts and how it caused inconvenienceto the public at large. We wish that Police and lawyers would burytheir differences and rift in the interest of the public at large andin the interest of the Institution. Both the lawyers and Police, thetwo wings of the Institution should always work together for theadministration of justice. Functioning of Courts and carrying onbusiness of administration of justice depends upon the harmoniousrelation between the Police and lawyers. We wish that better counselwill prevail upon the Police and lawyers. We hope that Police andlawyers work hand in hand and promote better relationships. We alsofeel that it may be appropriate for the Police and lawyers toconstitute their respective Committees both at State level/Districtlevel to resolve the differences in an amicable manner. 604. With the above directions and observations, all the WritPetitions are disposed off except Suo Moto W.P.No.3335/2009 whichshall be called along with the Contempt proceedings to be initiatedas directed in this Order. Since CBI has registered the case in R.C.No.2 (S)/2009/CBI/SCB/Chennai, the Criminal O.Ps. are dismissed asinfructuous. Consequently, all the connected M.Ps. and M.P.S.Rs. areclosed. No costs.605. The CDs filed and marked on either side [CD-P1 to P5 andCD-R1 & R2] and other CDs and documents shall form part of record andordered to be kept along with the records in safe custody. 606. Likewise, the call log particulars filed byMr.A.K.Viswanathan-Addl. CoP along with his counter shall form partof record and ordered to be kept along with the other records.607. CBI is permitted to peruse the CDs and records and if needbe, copy of records and CDs may also be furnished to CBI tofacilitate the investigation. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

608. We place on record the valuable assistance rendered byMr.P.S.Raman, learned Advocate-General; learned Senior CounselDr.Rajeev Dhavan; and Mr.Raja Kalifullah, Government Pleader. Wealso place on record the co-operation extended by Mr.V.Selvaraj,Mr.P.N.Prakash and Mr.Swaminathan who argued onbehalf of some of thePolice Officers.609. We also place on record the co-operation of the lawyers ingeneral and in particular Mr.S.Prabakaran, President TNAA,Mr.R.C.Paul Kanagaraj, President, MHAA, Ms.R.Vaigai, Senior CounselMr.R.Krishnamurthy, Senior Counsel Mr.T.V.Ramanujam, Mr.N.G.R.Prasadand Mr.V.Raghavachari.Sd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.Registrarkk/bbrTo1. The Chief Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu,Fort St. George, Chennai - 09.2. The Home Secretary to Government,Fort St. George, Chennai - 09.3. The Director General of Police,Chennai - 4.4. The Commissioner of Police,Greater Chennai, Chennai - 8.5. The Secretary,Union of India,Department of Personnel and Training,New Delhi - 2.6. The Director,Central Bureau of Investigation,Shastri Bhavan, Chennai.7. The Registrar General,High Court, Madras.8. The Registrar (Judicial)High Court, Madras. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

9. The Advocate General,High Court, Madras.10. The Additional Solicitor General of Inida,High Court, Madras.11. The Secretary,Bar Council of Tamil Nadu & Pondicherry,High Court Buildings, Madras.12. The Secretary,Madras Bar Association,High Court, Madras.13. The Secretary,Madras High Court Advocates Association,High Court, Madras.14. The Secretary,Women's Lawyers Association,High Court, Madras.14. The Secretary,Law Association,High Court, Madras.16. The Secretary,Tamil Nadu Advocates Association,High Court, Madras.17. The Inspector of Police,B-2, Esplanade Police Station,Chennai - 104.18. The Joint Commissioner of Police,North Chennai, Madras.19. The Additional Commissioner of Police,Rajaji Salai, Madras - 1.20. The Assistant Commissioner of Police,North Madras, Rajaji Salai, Madras - 1.21. The Secretary to Government of India,Ministry of Home Affairs,New Delhi.22. The Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu,Home, Excise and Prohibition Department,Fort St. George, Chennai - 09.23. The Director,The Central Bureau of Investigation,New Delhi. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

24. The Deputy Superintendent of Police,Central Bureau of Investigation,Rajaji Bhavan, Chennai.25. The Chief Investigating Officerand Superintendent of Police,Central Bureau of Investigation,Government of India,(Special Investigation Team)C. Wing A. Block, III Floor,SCB Annx, Rajaji Bhawan,Besant Nagar, Chennai – 600 090.26. The Section Officer,Contempt Section,High Court, Madras.(For issuing notice to contemnors)4 cc To Mr.P.N.Prakash, Advocate, SR.57552,57556, 57553, 57554.1 cc To Mrs.A.L.Gandhimathi, Advocate, SR.57685.1 cc To The Government Pleader, SR.57641.1 cc To Mr.N.Chandrasekaran, Spl.PP for CBI Cases, SR.57680.2 cc To M/s.S.Meenakshi & M.N.Sumathy, Advocate, SR.57603.1 cc To Mr.D.Prasanna, Women Lawyers Association, SR.57547.2 cc To Mr.V.Selvaraju, Advocate, SR.57579.1 cc To Mr.V.Raghavachari, Advocate, SR.57623.1 cc To Mr.P.Chandrasekaran, SCCG, SR.57943.1 cc To Mr.P.N.Swaminathan, Advocate, SR.57895.1 cc To Mr.V.Elangovan, Advocate, SR.57658.1 cc To Mr.M.S.Sivakumar, Advocate, SR.57492.1 cc To Mr.D.G.Krishnamurthy, Advocate, SR.57564.W.P.Nos.3335, 3703, 3704,3705 and 3910/2009 and ConnectedM.Ps. and M.P.S.Rs. & Crl.O.P.Nos.4085, 4287 and 4434/2009RL, LA (CO)RVL 09.11.2009