Parimala @ Parimala Gandhi & Ors. v. State

Bail SlipThe appellant/Accused -2 namely Sethuraman was directed to bereleased on bail as per the order of this Court dt.3.1.2007 and madein M.P.No.1/2007 in Crl.A.No.7/2007 on the file of this Court.IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDATED : 30.01.2008CORAMTHE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.MURUGESANANDTHE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.PERIYA KARUPPIAHCriminal Appeal Nos.6 & 7 of 2007Parimala @ Parimala GandhiAppellant (A1) inW/o Ganesan.. Crl.A.No.6 of 2007SethuramanAppellant (A2) inS/o Packrisamy..Crl.A.No.7 of 2007-vs-State rep.by Deputy Superintendent of PoliceTiruvarur Town Police StationTiruvarurRespondent in(Crime No.496 of 2004)..both the Crl.As.Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Appeals under Section 374(2)of the Criminal Procedure Code against the judgment dated 5.12.2006made in S.C.No.92 of 2005 on the file of the learned District &Sessions Judge, Nagapattinam.For Appellants::Mr.V.GopinathSenior Counsel forMr.K.Srinivasan inCrl.A.No.6 of 2007Mr.K.Srinivasan forMr.G.Saravanan inCrl.A.No.7 of 2007For Respondent::Mr.P.KumaresanAddl. Public Prosecutor https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ JUDGMENTD.MURUGESAN, J.The appellant in Crl.A.No.6 of 2007 by name Parimala @ ParimalaGandhi, arrayed as A-1, was put on trial in S.C.No.92 of 2005 on thefile of the learned District & Sessions Judge, Nagapattinam and wasfound guilty, convicted and sentenced to undergo life imprisonmentand to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to undergo simpleimprisonment for six months for the offence under Section 302 IPC. 2. The appellant in Crl.A.No.7 of 2007 by name Sethuraman,arrayed as A-2, was also put on trial in the same sessions case andwas found guilty, convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorousimprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- indefault to undergo three months rigorous imprisonment for the offenceunder Section 498(A) IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for oneyear and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- in default to undergo threemonths rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 4 of DowryProhibition Act and the sentence of imprisonment imposed on him is torun concurrently. 3. Both the appellants (who will be hereinafter referred to as"A-1 and A-2") were put to face the trial on the followingprosecution case:-The deceased-Jansi Rani is the wife of A-2. A-1 is the wifeof A-2's elder brother. Both the deceased and A-2 got married on29.10.2001. After the marriage, they started residing at VijayapuramMettupalayam, Tiruvarur. Out of wedlock, a male child was born andon the date of occurrence, the child was two years old. At the timeof marriage, a demand for 25 sovereigns of jewels and Rs.1,50,000/-was made. However, 15 sovereigns of jewels and household articlesvalued at Rs.30,000/- were given. As the remaining jewels and cashwere not given, there were frequent demand of dowry by A-2 and as thehusband of A-1, who is none other than the elder brother of A-2, wasworking in Malaysia, A-2 developed illicit intimacy with A-1 and atthe instigation of A-1, the deceased was driven away from the house.Hence the deceased started living with her mother. A-2 did not evenvisit the deceased or his child for over a period of two years as thedemand of dowry was not fulfilled. Therefore, on the fateful dayi.e., on 15.11.2004, the deceased as well as P.Ws.1,4 & 6 went to thehouse where A-1 and A-2 were living and at about 5.00 p.m., A-1,after questioning the deceased as to how she could come there, pouredkerosene and set her on fire after scolding. At that time, A-2 wasalso present and had stated that unless the deceased is killed, hecould not live peacefully. Hence both A-1 and A-2 were charged forthe offence of murder and A-2 was also charged for the demand ofdowry and harassment. 4. Immediately after the occurrence, the deceased was taken toTiruvarur Government Hospital by P.W.4-Kannan, the brother of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ deceased, and was first seen by the doctor, P.W.2 at 5.20 p.m. Thedeceased had told the doctor that A-1 poured kerosene and set her onfire at around 5.00 p.m., on the same day. P.W.2 has issued theaccident register, Ex.P-2 at 5.20 p.m. Thereafter, intimationswere sent to the learned Judicial Magistrate, Tiruvarur, P.W.15 andto the police under Exs.P-3 & P-4 by P.W.2.5. P.W.14, the Sub Inspector of Police attached to TiruvarurTown Police Station, on receipt of intimation, reached the hospitalat 5.30 p.m., and recorded the statement of the deceased under Ex.P-1, which was certified by the doctor, P.W.2. She returned to thepolice station at 7.00 p.m., and registered a case in Cr.No.496 of2004 for the offence under Section 307 IPC and forwarded the reportto P.W.16, the Inspector of Police for further investigation. Theprinted First Information Report is Ex.P-10. 6. P.W.15, the Judicial Magistrate, Tiruvarur in-charge, onreceipt of intimation, went to the hospital and, after following theprocedures and after ascertaining the fit state of mind of thedeceased from the doctor, P.W.2, recorded the dying declaration,Ex.P-5 between 8.45 p.m., and 9.15 p.m. P.W.2 has also certifiedthat the deceased was conscious and oriented throughout the period ofrecording of the dying declaration. 7. In the meanwhile, P.W.16, the Investigating Officer, wentto the scene of occurrence at about 8.00 p.m., on 15.11.2004 andprepared the Observation Mahazar, Ex.P-11 and also drew rough sketch,Ex.P-12 in the presence of P.Ws.10 & 11. He also seized the plasticcan, M.O.1, Match box, M.O.2 and the partly burnt portion of thesaree, M.O.5 under the mahazar, Ex.P-13 in the presence of the samewitnesses. He examined the mahazar witnesses and other witnesses andrecorded their statements. As he received intimation from theGovernment Thanjavur Medical College & Hospital that the deceased haddied at 12.30 a.m., on 16.11.2004, he altered the offence to oneunder Section 302 IPC and sent the altered report, Ex.P-15 to theCourt as well as to the higher police officials. Thereafter, he wentto Government Thanjavur Medical College and Hospital and conductedinquest on the body of the deceased between 8.30 a.m., and 10.30a.m., in the presence of relatives of the deceased and prepared theinquest report, Ex.P-16. As the deceased had died within three yearsof her marriage, he sent a requisition to the Revenue DivisionalOfficer, Thanjavur for conducting inquest.8. P.W.5, the Revenue Divisional Officer, went to the hospitalon 16.11.2004 at 12.00 noon and conducted inquest on the body of thedeceased and prepared the inquest report, Ex.P-8. He thereafter sentthe body of the deceased through the Grade I Police Constable alongwith a requisition, Ex.P-6 to the medical team for conducting post-mortem. He examined the witnesses and sent his report, Ex.P-9 to theDeputy Superintendent of Police.9. P.W.3, Professor, along with Dr.R.Sugumar, Tutor,Department of Forensic Medicine attached to Thanjavur Medical College& Hospital, on receipt of requisition and the body at 1.45 p.m., on https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

16.11.2004, commenced post-mortem at 2.10 p.m., and they noted thefollowing:-"(1) Dermo-epidermal burns noted all overthe body surface except over the lower part ofsternal region, waist line of front of abdomen andexternal genitalia - total amounting to 97% ofburns.(2) Peeling of the cuticles, reddening ofthe skin, with evidence of carbonisation noted overthe burns affected areas.(3) Singeling of scalp hair, eyebrows, eyelashes and axillary hair noted.All the above mentioned injuries areantemortem in nature.They issued the post-mortem certificate, Ex.P-7 with their opinionthat the deceased would appear to have died due to the effects andcomplications of extensive burns.10. P.W.16, continuing with his investigation, examinedP.Ws.1,4,6 and other witnesses in the hospital and recorded theirstatements. He returned to Tiruvarur and recorded the statements ofP.Ws.9 to 11. He arrested A-1 and A-2 near the Tiruvarur bridge on17.11.2004 at the evening hours and recorded their confessionalstatements in the presence of the witnesses namely, Nagarajan andManoharan, Village Assistant. He brought A-1 and A-2 to the policestation and remanded them to judicial custody. He sent the seizedmaterial objects for chemical examination through the Court under therequisition, Ex.P-17. He handed over the investigation to P.W.17 ashe was transferred.11. P.W.17, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, took upinvestigation in this case on 22.11.2004. He went to GovernmentThanjavur Medical College & Hospital on the same day and examined thedoctor, P.W.2 and recorded his statement. On 2.12.2004 he examinedP.Ws.1,4,12 and other witnesses at Tiruvarur and recorded theirstatements. As the deceased had died due to dowry demand andharassment, he altered the offence to one under Sections 498(A), 302and 304-B IPC and sent the altered report, Ex.P-18 to the Court. Hewent to the hospital on 14.12.2004 and examined the post-mortemdoctors and recorded their statements. He examined the photographer,P.W.8 and P.W.14, the Sub Inspector of Police and other witnesses on28.12.2004 and recorded their statements. After completinginvestigation, he laid the final report on 31.1.2005 against A-1 andA-2 before the Court. 12. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined 17witnesses, marked 20 exhibits and produced 5 material objects. 13. When A-1 and A-2 were questioned under Section 313 of theCriminal Procedure Code as to the incriminating materials appearingagainst them, they denied each and every incriminating material asfalse. No witness was examined and no document was marked on the sideof the defence. However, the learned trial Judge found A-1 and A-2 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ guilty, convicted and sentenced them for the offence as statedearlier, but acquitted A-2 of the charge of murder.14. Mr.V.Gopinath, learned senior counsel appearing for A-1 inCrl.A.No.6 of 2007 has submitted that there are two dyingdeclarations namely, Ex.P-1 recorded by P.W.14, the Sub Inspector ofPolice and Ex.P-5 recorded by P.W.15, the Judicial Magistrate andthere are lot of contradictions in both the dying declarations. Hewould submit that while in Ex.P-1, the deceased has mentioned thepresence of A-2 as well as the witnesses namely, P.Ws.1,4 & 6 and hasimplicated only A-1, strangely, in Ex.P-5, she has not mentioned thepresence of either A-2 or the witnesses-P.Ws.1,4 & 6, but hasimplicated the other family members of A-2 as well for the cause forthe occurrence. She has also strangely implicated the husband of A-1for financing A-1 and A-2 for the commission of the offence. In viewof the above, the evidence of P.Ws.1,4 & 6 as to the occurrencecannot be believed, as they have been brought at a later point oftime only to speak about the occurrence. The learned senior counselwould further submit that even in respect of the place of occurrence,there are contradictions, as it is the case of the prosecution thatA-1, after pouring kerosene and setting the deceased on fire, hadpushed the deceased outside the house and locked the door and if thatbe so, P.Ws.1,4 & 6 could not have witnessed the pouring of kerosene,as they came after the quarrel between A-1 and the deceased whichtook place inside the house. The said contradiction relating to themanner in which the occurrence had taken place throws serious doubtabout both the dying declarations and therefore they should not bebelieved. Equally when the contradictions are vital and materiallyaffect the prosecution version, it is unsafe to rely upon the dyingdeclarations.15. He would also submit that in Ex.P-2, the accident registerissued by P.W.2, it is stated that the deceased was brought by oneKannan, P.W.4. On the other hand, in Ex.P-4, the Magistrateintimation book, it is stated that the deceased was brought by oneGanesan. He would also submit that even in the original of Ex.P-2,it is stated that the assailant is her husband's elder brother'swife. This overwriting and the different names have not beenexplained, which goes to the veracity of Exs.P-2 and P-4. He wouldalso submit that at the time when the statement of the deceased inEx.P-5 was recorded by P.W.15, the relatives were present andtherefore there could have been a possibility of tutoring. He wouldfurther submit that the deceased had sustained 100% burns andtherefore it would be only a case of self-immolation and not as putforth by the prosecution. He would therefore submit that if theevidence of P.Ws.1,4 & 6 are eschewed, the conviction and sentence onA-1 cannot be sustained, as it is only on the basis of the dyingdeclarations which are contradictory to each other. 16. Mr.K.Srinivasan, learned counsel appearing for A-2 inCrl.A.No.7 of 2007 has submitted that there is absolutely no evidenceto the demand of dowry and harassment by A-2. He would submit thatin the event the evidence of P.Ws.1,4 & 6 is eschewed, then, there isno evidence whatsoever to sustain the conviction and sentence on A-2. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

17. On the other hand, Mr.P.Kumaresan, learned AdditionalPublic Prosecutor would submit that the occurrence had taken place at5.00 p.m., on 15.11.2004 and immediately the deceased was taken tothe hospital by P.W.4 and the deceased had informed the doctor, P.W.2at 5.20 p.m., that A-1 poured kerosene and set her on fire andtherefore she sustained injuries. He would submit that the accidentregister, Ex.P-2 issued by the doctor, P.W.2 proves the statement ofthe deceased. He would also submit that when the intimation in Ex.P-3 was sent to the police, P.W.14 came to the hospital at 6.00 p.m.,and recorded Ex.P-1 from the deceased. Thereafter also, pursuant tothe intimation in Ex.P-4, the Judicial Magistrate, P.W.15 came to thehospital and recorded the dying declaration, Ex.P-5. In all thesestatements, the deceased has consistently implicated A-1 for havingpoured kerosene and setting her on fire. He would further submitthat the presence of plastic can, M.O.1 and the match box, M.O.2 inthe place of occurrence would also go to show that it is not a caseof self-immolation, but it is a case of murder. He would also submitthat P.W.6 is an independent witness who has spoken about theoccurrence. His evidence corroborates the evidence of P.W.1 as wellas P.W.4. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor would also submitthat so far as A-2 is concerned, the evidence of P.Ws.1,4 & 6 iscategorical as to his involvement in the crime apart from the demandof dowry and harassment. Hence the judgment of the Court below needsno interference. 18. We have considered the rival submissions very carefully.The prosecution case mainly rests on the dying declarations namely,Exs.P-1 and P-5. The law as to how the prosecution case put forth onthe basis of dying declaration should be considered has been dealtwith by the Supreme Court in the judgments in Jai Karan v. State ofDelhi (NCT) (1999 SCC (Crl.) 1385) and in P.V.Radhakrishna v. Stateof Karnataka (2003 SCC (Crl.) 1679). In Jai Karan's case, the SupremeCourt has laid down the following law in paragraph 10:"A dying declaration is admissible inevidence on the principle of necessity and canform the basis for conviction if it is found to bereliable. While it is in the nature of anexception to the general rule forbidding hearsayevidence, it is admitted to the premise thatordinarily a dying person will not falselyimplicate an innocent person in the commission ofa serious crime. It is this premise which isconsidered strong enough to set off the need thatthe maker of the statement should state so on oathand be cross-examined by the person who is soughtto be implicated. In order that a dyingdeclaration may form the sole basis for convictionwithout the need for independent corroboration, itmust be shown that the person stating it had theopportunity of identifying the person implicatedand is thoroughly reliable and free from blemish.If, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ is found that the maker of the statement was in afit state of mind and had voluntarily made thestatement on the basis of personal knowledgewithout being influenced by others and the courton a strict scrutiny finds it to be reliable,there is no rule of law or even of prudence thatsuch a reliable piece of evidence cannot be actedupon unless it is corroborated. A dyingdeclaration is an independent piece of evidencelike any other piece of evidence -- neither extrastrong nor weak -- and can be acted upon withoutcorroboration if it is found to be otherwise trueand reliable."19. In P.V.Radhakrishna's case, the Supreme Court has laiddown the law in paragraphs 11 & 12 as follows:-"This is a case where the basis ofconviction of the accused is the dyingdeclaration. The situation in which a person is onthe deathbed is so solemn and serene when he isdying that the grave position in which he isplaced, is the reason in law to accept theveracity of his statement. It is for this reasonthe requirements of oath and cross-examination aredispensed with. Besides, should the dyingdeclaration be excluded it will result inmiscarriage of justice, because the victim beinggenerally the only eyewitness in a serious crime,the exclusion of the statement would leave thecourt without a scrap of evidence.Though a dying declaration is entitled togreat weight, it is worthwhile to note that theaccused has no power of cross examination. Such apower is essential for eliciting the truth as anobligation of oath could be. This is the reasonthe court also insists that the dying declarationshould be of such a nature as to inspire fullconfidence of the court in its correctness. Thecourt has to be on guard that the statement of thedeceased was not as a result of either tutoring,or prompting or a product of imagination. Thecourt must be further satisfied that the deceasedwas in a fit state of mind after a clearopportunity to observe and identify the assailant.Once the court is satisfied that the declarationwas true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can baseits conviction without any further corroboration.It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of lawthat the dying declaration cannot form the solebasis of conviction unless it is corroborated.The rule requiring corroboration is merely a ruleof prudence...." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

20. In Thurukanni Pompiah and another v. State of Mysore (AIR1965 SC 939), the Supreme Court has held that a truthful and reliabledying declaration may form the sole basis of conviction, even thoughit is not corroborated. But the Court must be satisfied that thedeclaration is truthful. The reliability of the declaration should besubjected to a close scrutiny, considering that it was made in theabsence of the accused who had no opportunity to test its veracity bycross examination. Further, a note of caution has been added by theSupreme Court that in the event the Court finds that the declarationis not wholly reliable and the material and integral portion of thedeceased's version of the entire occurrence is untrue, it would beonly unsafe to convict the accused on the basis of such declarationalone without there being any corroboration.21. A dying declaration is admissible in evidence as any otherevidence in terms of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. Though adying declaration is entitled to great weight, it must be kept inmind that the accused has no power of cross examination and such apower is essential for eliciting the truth. The Court must seereasons that the dying declaration of such a nature has inspired fullconfidence as to its correctness. The Court must satisfy itself thatthe dying declaration was not as a result of either tutoring orprompting or a product of imagination and the deceased was in a fitstate of mind to give such a declaration. The credibility of a dyingdeclaration does not depend upon the number of dying declarations noron the length of statements made by the deceased. The main test ofreliability of a dying declaration is mental and physical fitness andcapability of the person to make the statement at that point of time.22. It has been strenuously argued that in the wake of vitalcontradictions, the dying declarations cannot be believed. To decideas to whether the dying declaration, Ex.P-1, which is treated ascomplaint, and the dying declaration, Ex.P-5 recorded by theMagistrate could be believed to sustain the conviction and sentence,it is necessary to discuss the circumstances under which both thestatements were recorded. The occurrence had taken place at about5.00 p.m., on 15.11.2004. The deceased was immediately taken byP.W.4, the younger brother of the deceased, to Tiruvarur GovernmentHospital. P.W.2, the doctor attached to the said hospital, has firstseen the deceased at 5.20 p.m., and issued the accident register,Ex.P-2. It is seen from the said accident register that the deceasedwas brought by P.W.4-Kannan. It is also stated that the deceased wasset on fire by A-1 after pouring kerosene. But in thePolice/Magistrate intimation book, it is mentioned that the deceasedwas brought by one Ganesan. Much was argued that in view of thediscrepancy in the names as to who had brought the deceased, theaccident register must be disbelieved. We have perused the originalsof Exs.P-2 & P-4. In Ex.P-2 the name of Kannan has been written inEnglish. However, in Ex.P-4, the name of the person is written inTamil and therefore it is apparent that the name of Kannan in Ex.P-4was wrongly written as Ganesan, which is only a minor contradiction.We have our own reason for such conclusion namely, in Ex.P-4, anendorsement is made by the doctor that the deceased sustained injury https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ due to pouring of kerosene and setting her on fire by A-1. BothExs.P-2 and P-4 refer A-1 for the alleged cause of pouring keroseneand setting fire on the deceased. Both these documents came intoexistence just within twenty minutes of the occurrence. It is arguedthat the doctor, P.W.2 has not mentioned in Exs.P-2 and P-4 to theeffect that the statements were made by the deceased and therefore,these statements cannot be treated as dying declarations. We do notfind any force in the said submission. It must be kept in mind thatthe deceased had sustained 100% burns and was taken to the hospitaland endorsements were made by the doctor as to the cause for theburns. Of course, the doctor is expected only to save the life ofthe injured and not to make any entries as to the cause for theoccurrence, particularly, in respect of the names of the assailants.But when a statement recorded by the doctor turns out to be the dyingdeclaration in view of the fact that the author of the statement haddied subsequently, such statement can also be considered to be one ofdying declaration. Therefore the failure on the part of the doctorto make any endorsement to the effect that the statement was given bythe deceased or not will not make any impact on the credibility ofthe statement given to the doctor. In this context, the evidence ofP.Ws.2 & 3 are referable. P.W.2 in his evidence before the Court hasspecifically stated that the endorsement in Ex.P-2 was made only onthe basis of the statement of the deceased. Hence, Ex.P-2 could beconsidered to be the dying declaration given by the deceased for thefirst time to the doctor. It has been settled in law that even adying declaration given to the doctor can also be relied upon if thetruthfulness of the same is accepted by the Court.23. After the intimation to the Magistrate as well to thePolice was sent under Exs.P-3 & P-4, P.W.14, the Sub Inspector ofPolice came to the hospital and recorded Ex.P-1 at 6.00 p.m. Even inthe said dying declaration, the deceased has specifically implicatedA-1 for pouring kerosene and setting her on fire. It is to be bornein mind that the dying declaration need not contain elaboratestatements of the persons who were present at the time of occurrenceand the names of all the assailants for that matter, and if the maincore of the case is found in the dying declaration, the prosecutioncase cannot be disbelieved merely because of failure on the part ofthe deceased to refer to the names of some other assailants or thepresence of the witnesses. Simultaneously, on receipt ofintimation, P.W.15, the Judicial Magistrate, had gone to the hospitaland recorded the dying declaration, Ex.P-5 between 8.45 p.m., and9.15 p.m., where also the deceased has specifically implicated A-1for having poured kerosene and set her on fire. Of course, in Ex.P-5, she has not mentioned the presence of either A-2 or P.Ws.1,4 & 6and has mentioned some other names as well for the cause for theoccurrence. Further, her statement is consistent that even when shewas burnt to death, one Rubi, D/o Vedarathinam had witnessed and sheran away. Of course, the prosecution case will be still appreciableif the said Rubi had been examined but, in our considered view,either the mentioning of the name of Rubi in the dying declaration,Ex.P-5 or the failure on the part of the deceased to mention her namein Ex.P-1 would in no way lead us to come to the conclusion that thedying declarations implicating A-1 for the commission of the offence https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ should be discarded.24. It has been further argued by the learned senior counselthat there are contradictions in the dying declarations as to theplace of occurrence. While in Ex.P-1 the deceased has stated thatshe along with P.Ws.1,4 & 6 came to the house of A-1 & A-2 justbefore the occurrence, in Ex.P-5 recorded by the Magistrate, she hasstated as if she was in the house already when the occurrence tookplace. In this context, it must be again kept in mind that thedeceased, who had sustained 100% burn injuries, was suffering forlife and there may be some variation in her statements. So far asthe statement implicating A-1 is concerned, she was consistent inEx.P-2, Exs.P-3 & P-4, intimations sent to the Magistrate and police,as well as in Ex.P-5 given to the Magistrate. Though a faint attemptis made that the relatives were present along with the deceased andthere could have been a possibility of tutoring, in our opinion, evenat the earliest point of time namely, when the deceased was admittedwithin 20 minutes of the occurrence, she has specifically implicatedA-1 for pouring kerosene and setting her on fire. In the judgment inNallam Veera Satyanandam and others v. Public Prosecutor, High Courtof A.P. (AIR 2004 SC 1708), the Supreme Court has held that in caseswhere there are more than one dying declaration, it is the duty ofthe Court to consider each of them in its correct perspective andsatisfy itself which one of them reflects the true state of affairs.In this context, useful reference can be made to the judgment of theSupreme Court in State of Punjab v. Parveen Kumar (2006 1 SCC (Crl.)146), where the Supreme Court has held that the truthfulness of dyingdeclaration can be tested and believed on the basis of other reliablecorroborative evidence. Recently, the above law has been restated bythe Supreme Court in Mohan Lal and others v. State of Haryana (2007(3) SCC (Crl.) 94). Hence we have no doubt in our mind that the dyingdeclarations implicating A-1 in the occurrence cannot be disbelievedon any account.25. An overall consideration of Exs.P-1, P-2, P-4 & P-5, wehave no hesitation in our mind to hold that A-1 had poured keroseneand set the deceased on fire and due to the above act of A-1, thedeceased has sustained burn injuries to which she succumbed.26. In fact, the dying declaration, if accepted by this Court,may be the sole basis for conviction. The circumstances in this casedo not indicate any reason to exclude A-1 from the guilt. In thejudgment in Bhola Turha v. State of Bihar (1998) 9 SCC 15, theSupreme Court, after holding that the dying declaration made within 2hours of the incident in which the deceased clearly explained how hecame to be injured by the appellant, affirmed the conviction andsentence. Apart from that, the evidence of an independent witness,P.W.6, corroborates the version of the deceased in the dyingdeclarations. P.W.6 has stated that he saw A-1 pouring kerosene andsetting the deceased on fire and at that time, A-2 was also present.When there is no inconsistency found between the dying declarationsand the other evidence on record, it will be only justifiable to findA-1 guilty and award her appropriate sentence. Hence we do not findany merit in any of the contentions made by the learned senior https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ counsel for A-1 and accordingly, Crl.A.No.6 of 2007 is liable to bedismissed.27. So far as A-2 is concerned, here again, the evidence ofP.Ws.1,4 & 6 as to the demand of dowry and harassment by A-2 isconsistent throughout and there is no contradiction in theirevidence. In addition to the above, P.W.6 has also spoken as to theconvening of the panchayat by himself on the demand of dowry andharassment by A-2. Hence we hold that the evidence of P.Ws.1,4 & 6unerringly points to the guilt of A-2 for the demand of dowry andharassment and accordingly, Crl.A.No.7 of 2007 is also liable to bedismissed.28. For all the above discussions, both the appeals aredismissed confirming the judgment of the Court below. It is seenfrom the records that A-2 is on bail. The learned District &Sessions Judge, Nagapattinam shall take steps to secure the presenceof A-2 and commit him to prison to undergo the remaining period ofsentence. Bail bonds executed by A-2 shall stand terminated.Sd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.RegistrarssTo1. The District & Sessions Judge, Nagapattinam2. The Judicial Magistrate, Tiruvarur3. -do- thru' the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nagapattinam4. The Superintendent, Central Prison for Women, Tiruchi 5. The Public Prosecutor, High Court, Madras6. The District Collector, Nagapattinam7. The Director General of Police, Chennai8 .The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Tiruvarur Town Police Station, Tiruvarur+1cc to Mr.K.Srinivasan, Advocate Sr 4053+1cc to Mr.G.Saravanan, Advocate Sr 4052MDR (CO)km/8.2.Crl.A.Nos.6 & 7 of 2007