V.C.Shyamala v. State byInspector of PoliceCBI/SCB/Chennai R.C.No.1(S)/2001

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDATED : 21-1-2009CORAMTHE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.CHOCKALINGAMANDTHE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.VENUGOPALCRL.A.No.178 of 2007V.C.Shyamala.. Appellant/AccusedvsState byInspector of PoliceCBI/SCB/Chennai R.C.No.1(S)/2001.. Respondent/ComplainantCriminal appeal preferred under Sec.374(2) of the Code ofCriminal Procedure against the judgment of the V Additional SessionsJudge, Madras, in S.C.No.370 of 2004 dated 31.1.2007.For Appellant: Mr.Shunmughasundaram Senior Counsel for Mr.A.GandhiFor Respondent: Mr.N.Chandrasekaran Special Public Prosecutorfor CBIJUDGMENT(Judgment of the Court was delivered by M.CHOCKALINGAM, J.)This appeal challenges a judgment of the V Additional SessionsJudge, Madras, made in S.C.No.370 of 2004 whereby the soleaccused/appellant stood charged, tried, found guilty under Sec.302 ofIPC and awarded life imprisonment.2.The short facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal canbe stated thus:(a) The deceased Tharakeswari, a practising lawyer of the HighCourt of Chennai, who fell in love with one Balaji, anotherpractising lawyer, married him on 28.8.1998 despite the objectionfrom her parents side. After the marriage that took place atTitutani Temple, she was living with her husband Mr.Balaji, themother-in-law namely the accused/appellant and her father-in-law atHouse No.217, Paper Mills Road, Perambur, Chennai. At the time ofthe eighth month of her pregnancy, she ceased to practise, and shewas in the house. She gave birth to a child. There was frequent https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ quarrel between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law which wasused to be settled by her husband. P.Ws.1, 2 and 10 are theneighbours. The husband of the accused was carrying on a small shopnearby. As usual on 23.11.2000, a quarrel started between theaccused and the deceased on the issue of the motion passed by thechild. The accused tried to convince for which she sought the helpof P.Ws.3 and 4, but in vain. The husband of the deceased left thehouse at about 11.30 A.M. to bring the aunt to pacify her. This wasspoken to by P.Ws.4, 6, 7 and 11. P.W.12, the landlord of P.W.6would also state that the accused purchased milk at about 2.30 P.M.from the shop. (b) At about 3.00 P.M., the very day, the accused called P.W.1informing that smoke was coming out of the hall of the kitchen, andP.Ws.1 and 2 rushed to the spot. They could not enter into the hallthrough the kitchen side door. Hence they came towards the backsidedoor, and they could not also enter through that. Then, P.W.1 peepedthrough the ventilator and found the dead body of Tharakeswari.Immediately, he went to K-9 Thiru-Vi-Ka Nagar Police Station andpreferred Ex.P1, the complaint. P.W.13, the Sub Inspector of Police,who was on duty, on the strength of Ex.P1, the report, registered acase in Crime No.2050 of 2000 under Sec.174 of Cr.P.C. and informedthe same to the higher officials. Ex.P39 is the printed FIR whichwas sent to the Court. (c) P.W.21, the Assistant Commissioner of Police, on receipt ofthe copy of the FIR took up investigation, proceeded to the spot,made an inspection, prepared an observation mahazar, Ex.P3, and alsodrew a rough sketch. He also recorded the statements of thewitnesses, and altered the case to Sec.306 of IPC. He also recoveredmaterial objects. P.W.16, the Tahsildar, was informed about the samesince the death has taken place within two years from the time ofmarriage. P.W.16 also conducted inquest on the dead body in thepresence of witnesses and panchayatdars and prepared an inquestreport, Ex.P15. The dead body was sent to the Hospital along with arequisition for the purpose of postmortem. (d) P.W.18, the Professor of Forensic Medicine, Kilpauk MedicalCollege, Chennai, on receipt of the requisition, conducted autopsy onthe dead body of Tharakeswari and has given a postmortem certificate,Ex.P25. He has given his final opinion after getting the report fromthe Analyst, that the deceased would appear to have died of asphyxiadue to strangulation and the burns on the body are postmortem innature. (e) On the intervention of this Court in C.M.P.No.994 of 2001,the investigation was transferred to the CBI. The statements of boththe appellant/accused and her son Balaji were recorded by P.W.20, theXIII Metropolitan Magistrate, and the proceedings are marked asExs.P29 to P36 respectively. (f) P.W.22, the Inspector of Police, attached to the CBI, SCB,Chennai, took up investigation and on completion of investigation,filed the final report against the accused under Sec.302 of IPC.3.The case was committed to Court of Sessions, and necessarycharge was framed. In order to substantiate the charge, theprosecution examined 22 witnesses and also relied on 48 exhibits and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 9 material objects. On completion of the evidence on the side of theprosecution, the accused was questioned under Sec.313 of Cr.P.C. asto the incriminating circumstances found in the evidence of theprosecution witnesses which she flatly denied as false. On the sideof the defence, one Dr.K.Thangaraj was examined, and 18 exhibits weremarked. The trial Court heard the arguments advanced and afterlooking into the materials, took the view that the prosecution hasproved the case beyond reasonable doubt and hence found her guiltyand awarded life imprisonment which is the subject matter ofchallenge before this Court. 4.The learned Senior Counsel Mr.Shunmughasundaram appearing forthe appellant, would submit that in the instant case, the prosecutionhas miserably failed to prove its case; that the prosecution restedits case entirely on the circumstantial evidence; that the defenceplea before the trial Court that it was a case of commission ofsuicide, and the appellant had no role to play was not at allconsidered by the trial Court despite sufficient materials that wereavailable indicating the same; that as far as the motive wasconcerned, the prosecution projected its case stating that theaccused-the mother-in-law and her daughter-in-law-the deceased hadoften quarrel which led the accused to strangulate her and cause herdeath; that the only witness examined in that regard is P.W.9 oneArunkumar, the brother of the deceased; that according to him, thedeceased phoned over to him that she was actually attacked by hermother-in-law; but, he did not go over there immediately or make anyenquiry about the incident from the accused; that the same would goto show that if really there was a quarrel between the accused andthe deceased, nobody would keep quiet without pacifying or informingabout the incident to the inmates of the house; that it is notuncommon between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, and thus, thesame cannot be attributed to the accused/appellant to do such a gravecrime; that the same also remained not proved; that further, theallegation that the accused was residing in that place for more than30 years, and she gained popularity, and she could not control thefilthy language uttered by the daughter-in-law in the presence ofpublic, and hence she made up her mind to cause the death of herdaughter-in-law cannot also be stated to be correct since there is noevidence pointing to the same; and that in the absence of anyevidence indicating the involvement of the accused, it cannot bestated that the accused entertained any motive to do the crime.5.The learned Senior Counsel would further add that the medicalevidence is given a go-by to the entire prosecution story; thataccording to the charge that was levelled against theappellant/accused, she actually strangulated and caused her death,and thereafter she poured kerosene and set her ablaze; but, theadmissions made by P.W.18, the Doctor, would stand contra to theprosecution case; that first of all, the step mother of the deceasedmet the Doctor in the Office to obtain the postmortem certificate;that there was unexplained delay of 19 days in giving the postmortemcertificate; that P.W.18, the Doctor, had not taken any steps to sendthe same immediately; that further, no interim report was also sentby P.W.18 within 24 hours regarding the presence of the injuries, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ etc., to the Investigating Officer or to the Court concerned asstipulated in Ex.D13, the specimen form; that further Ex.D14, thepostmortem rough notes, would clearly indicate that P.W.18 reservedthe final opinion for chemical report to come; but, he issued apostmortem certificate, Ex.P25, based on the histopathology report,Ex.P42; that from the said report it could be seen that the skin bitsreceived by the department, were free from burns; but, P.W.18, theautopsy Doctor, has wrongly sent the unburnt skin to the departmentto know whether the burns were ante-mortem or postmortem from whichany opinion could not be formed; that further P.W.18 gave thepostmortem certificate only based on that report; and that the reportcontained "no vital reaction seen in the skin bits received". It wascontended before the trial Court and equally here also that theautopsy Doctor sent only the unburnt skin bits to the department tofind out whether they were ante-mortem or postmortem; that since noreaction was found, it would be clearly indicative of the fact thatthe unburnt skin bits were found, and hence no opinion could beformed; that regarding the injury No.3, he has mentioned in hisearlier notes that it was only 3 inches; but when he came forwardwith the postmortem certificate, it was found to be of 1 ½ inches;that how it had happened, P.W.18 could not explain; and that it wouldbe quite clear that he has not properly done the postmortem. 6.Added further the learned Senior Counsel that the Doctor hasgiven his report that the injuries which were abrasions, were foundon the neck, and if the body was actually burnt and charred, thoseinjuries could not have been noticed at all; that such injuries wouldbe clearly indicative of the fact that the postmortem was notconducted properly or he has come with the version other than thetruth; and that according to the prosecution, she also consumedsleeping pills, and they were also found aside, and 4 grams ofdiazepam were also found in the stomach. The learned Senior Counseltook the Court to the medical jurisprudence and would submit that inthe contacting part of the buttock and also the palms, there were noburn injuries found; that it would clearly be indicative of the factthat it could have been only by suicide and not by the act bysomebody else; that in the instant case, only the high dosage led tothe death if left untreated as per the opinions of the Doctors bothon the side of the prosecution and also on the side of the defence. 7.It is further submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that theprosecution much relied upon the confessional statement alleged tohave been given by the accused/appellant before the XIII M.M.,Madras, examined as P.W.20; that it is pertinent to point out thatthe occurrence has taken place on 23.11.2000; that they applied forbail, and bail was granted on 7.12.2000; that originally her son whowas also a practising Advocate, was added as an accused; that at thetime of filing the charge sheet, he was dropped; that she also askedfor bail, and she was enjoying bail; that at that time, the case wasentrusted to CBI at the intervention of the orders of this Court;that it is pertinent to point out that after the case was taken upfor investigation by the CBI, she was summoned to appear before theCourt; that she appeared before the Court and gave a confessionalstatement; that it is true that it was a judicial confession; but, it https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ was retracted twice, for the first time when she was before the sameMM and also for the second time when she was questioned under Sec.313of Cr.P.C.; that it is true that though it was a retractedconfession, it could be acted upon, but it must be corroborated onthe relevant particulars; that in the instant case, it failed to doso; that the confessional statement was actually relied upon by theprosecution and accepted by the trial Court for sustaining aconviction; but, for two reasons, it should not have been done; andthat the mandatory provisions under Sec.164(2) of Cr.P.C. have notbeen actually strictly followed. The learned Counsel relied on thedecisions of the Apex Court reported in 1995 SCC (CRI) 323 (SHIVAPPAV. STATE OF KARNATAKA) and 2002 SCC (CRI) 673 (AYYUB V. STATE OFU.P.) wherein it is held that under the provisions, the Magistratehas to append a certificate, and he must clearly reflect that whenthe accused appeared and gave the statement, it was voluntarily made;that even the Magistrate before the trial Court at the time of cross-examination has candidly admitted that he has not asked the necessaryquestions; that further, he has also not informed that though she hadnot given the confessional statement, she would not be sent to policecustody; that this would clearly be indicative of the fact that theMagistrate has not strictly followed the mandatory provision underSec.164 of Cr.P.C. which, according to the decision, would hit; thatunder the circumstances, the confession should not be given anyeffect at all; that further, it cannot be acted upon; that it is truethat she appeared before the Court on summons and gave a statement;that the confession could be acted upon if it gets corroboration asto the material particulars; that in the instant case, the specificcharge was that she strangulated her and caused her death; that inthe course of the entire confession, she has not spoken a word aboutthe strangulation; that under the circumstances, it could not havelent any support to the prosecution case; that under thecircumstances, the motive found, the medical opinion canvassedthrough the Doctor, and also the confession which cannot be actedupon both factually and legally, will not in any way be helpful tothe prosecution case, and hence the prosecution has miserably failedto prove its case, and the trial Court has not considered any one ofthe aspects now placed before the Court. 8.Added further the learned Senior Counsel as his last pointthat even according to P.W.1 and other witnesses, the house wasbolted on both sides, and the deceased was found inside; that if itis true that the accused had got any role to play, she should havebeen inside the house; but the accused was outside the house, and itwas bolted on both sides; that it would also be indicative of thefact that the deceased has actually committed suicide by pouringkerosene and setting fire, and under the circumstances, she isentitled for acquittal in the hands of this Court.9.The Court heard the learned Special Public Prosecutor for CBIon all the above contentions and paid its anxious consideration onthe submissions made.10.It is not in controversy that the dead body of Tharakeswari,a practising lawyer of this Court, was actually found inside her https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ house, and on information, a case was registered originally underSec.174 of Cr.P.C., and investigation was taken up by P.W.21. Duringthe investigation, it was found to be a suspicious one. Thenimmediately an information was given to P.W.16, the Tahsildar, whomade a visit. He conducted inquest on the dead body, and thereafter,the dead body was sent to the Hospital for the purpose of autopsy.P.W.18, the Doctor, who conducted autopsy, after getting the reportfrom the department, gave his opinion that she died out of asphyxiadue to strangulation, and the burns on the body are postmortem innature. Thus, how Tharakeswari met her death was actually thesubject matter in controversy before the trial Court. 11.It is true that the prosecution rested its entire case on thecircumstantial evidence. The main three circumstances relied on bythe prosecution are as follows. (1) motive; (2) medical opinion thatwas canvassed and (3) confessional statement given by theaccused/appellant before the XIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras.The Court made a thorough scrutiny of the entire materials. By doingso, the following circumstances are noticed by the Court. 12.Tharakeswari who fell in love with one Balaji anotherpractising lawyer, the son of the appellant/accused, married himdespite the objection made by the parents. The evidence wouldclearly indicate that her parents did not attend the marriage, andonly her brother and sister attended. She did not go to her parents'house at any point of time after the marriage, and she was livingwith the father-in-law, mother-in-law and her husband during therelevant time. She has given birth to a child, and the child wasalso in her custody during the relevant time. Even from thestatement given by Balaji, her husband, it would be quite clear thatthe mother-in-law and daughter-in-law had often quarrel with eachother. It would be quite clear that the appellant has been living inthat area for number of years, and she was an illiterate. But, thedeceased was not only literate, but also a practising lawyer. Therewere quarrels in which the deceased has used words which could havebeen not liked by her mother-in-law. As far as the motive part isconcerned, it could be seen that there were often quarrels even asper the statement of her husband, between the mother-in-law anddaughter-in-law. 13.On the date of occurrence, it is not in controversy that theappellant/accused was very well available in the house, and she wasalong with the deceased. According to her version, she took thechild outside, and the child was in the nearby shop where the husbandwas carrying on the business. As stated above, during the relevanttime, it is not in controversy that the accused was also along withher daughter-in-law. According to her, when she went outside, shefound fumes coming out of the house, and she informed to P.Ws.1 and 2and others, and they found the house locked inside and outside, andthen it was broke open. The only contention put forth by the learnedSenior Counsel for the appellant is that while the house was lockedon both sides and it was also broke open, there was no possibility toattribute any role to the appellant/accused cannot be countenanced.From the evidence of the Investigating Officer and also the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ observation mahazar, it could be seen that the house could be lockedboth from inside and from outside. Thus, there was all possibilityfor locking the house from outside also. 14.Further, a strong circumstance, in the opinion of the Court,is the medical evidence adduced by the prosecution and placed beforethe trial Court. The occurrence has taken place on 23.11.2000 atabout 3.15 P.M. The FIR has come into existence at about 3.30 P.M.,wherein it is mentioned that suspicious death has taken place. Atthis juncture, it is pertinent to point out that the report was givenby P.W.1 and not by the accused or the husband of the deceased. Itis not her case that she was not present. But, it was her case thatit was she who found the fumes coming out of the house and informedto P.Ws.1 and 2. If the accused and the husband of the deceased werereally available at that time and they informed about the situationto others, they could have well gone to the police stationimmediately and gave a report; but, they have not done so. But, itwas P.W.1 who went to the police station and gave a report, and therewas some suspicion in her death. Thereafter, it was registered underSec.174 of Cr.P.C., and investigation was taken up. Further, it isto be pointed out that the postmortem was done by P.W.18, the Doctor,on 25.11.2000. The Doctor has reserved his opinion, and he has takenthe skin bits and sent to the Department of Pathology forhistopathological examination in order to give his final opinion asto the cause of death. Ex.P42 is the histopathology report. Afterreceiving the said report, the Doctor has given his final opinionthat the deceased would appear to have died of asphyxia due tostrangulation, and his further opinion was to the effect that theburns found were postmortem in nature. 15.At this juncture, the learned Senior Counsel pointed outcertain discrepancies found in the postmortem notes prepared by thepostmortem Doctor and also the subsequent final report, that themeasurement was found to be discrepant. In the considered opinion ofthis Court, these are all immaterial for the simple reason that theonly question that arose before the trial Court was whether it was anact of suicide or an act done by the accused. Now, the only questionis whether the deceased set herself ablaze or whether it was a caseof strangulation. In the instant case, the injuries that were foundwould clearly indicate that they were all abrasions on the neck.Further, if the death was actually caused already and thereafter, shewas set ablaze, there was no possibility of the carbon particlesentering into the larynx and trachea. According to the earliestreport, they were not actually found, and carbon particles were foundon the portion of the neck which was protruding outside and notinside. The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the similarsituation in a case reported in AIR 2005 SUPREME COURT 1014 (STATE OFKARNATAKA V. K.GOPALAKRISHNA) and has held that the absence of carbonparticles and fumes in the trachea and bronchus lead to theirresistible conclusion that the deceased must have died before shewas set on fire, and some amount of carbon particles and fumes wouldhave certainly been found in the trachea and bronchus if she werealive when set on fire. In the instant case, all the above would goto show that setting ablaze affair should have taken place only https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ subsequent to the death caused, and there were abrasions found. Bothwould be pointing to the fact that death has been caused already bystrangulation, and thereafter, it was set fire. Now, at thisjuncture, the only person available at that time along with thedaughter-in-law was the accused mother-in-law. Thus, all the abovecircumstances would be clearly pointing to the fact that she was theperson who actually caused the death by strangulation and also sether ablaze after the death was caused, and came outside and informedto others as if there was something happened that it was a case ofself immolation. 16.It is true that the Court has to necessarily agree with thecontentions put forth by the learned Senior Counsel in respect of theconfessional statement recorded by the XIII MM for the infirmitiesfound. Sec.164 of Cr.P.C. as rightly pointed out by the learnedSenior Counsel, mandates that it should be done following theprocedural formalities found therein. Two lacunas are noticed by theCourt as pointed out by him. Firstly, before appending a certificate,there is nothing to indicate that the Magistrate satisfied himselfthat it was given voluntarily. Secondly, there is nothing further toshow that he told the accused that even if the confession is notgiven, she would not be sent to police custody. In the decisionreported in 1995 SCC (CRI) 323 (SHIVAPPA V. STATE OF KARNATAKA) theApex Court has held as follows:"6.From the plain language of Section 164 CrPC and therules and guidelines framed by the High Court regarding therecording of confessional statements of an accused underSection 164 CrPC, it is manifest that the said provisionsemphasise an inquiry by the Magistrate to ascertain thevoluntary nature of the confession. This inquiry appears tobe the most significant and an important part of the dutyof the Magistrate recording the confessional statement ofan accused under Section 164 CrPC. The failure of theMagistrate to put such questions from which he couldascertain the voluntary nature of the confession detractsso materially from the evidentiary value of the confessionof an accused that it would not be safe to act upon thesame. Full and adequate compliance not merely in form butin essence with the provisions of Section 164 CrPC and therules framed by the High Court is imperative and its non-compliance goes to the root of the Magistrate'sjurisdiction to record the confession and renders theconfession unworthy of credence. Before proceeding torecord the confessional statement, a searching enquiry mustbe made from the accused as to the custody from which hewas produced and the treatment he had been receiving insuch custody in order to ensure that there is no scope fordoubt of any sort of extraneous influence proceeding from asource interested in the prosecution still lurking in themind of an accused. In case the Magistrate discovers onsuch enquiry that there is ground for such supposition heshould give the accused sufficient time for reflectionbefore he is asked to make his statement and should assure https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ himself that during the time of reflection, he iscompletely out of police influence. An accused shouldparticularly be asked the reason why he wants to make astatement which would surely go against his self-interestin course of the trial, even if he contrives subsequentlyto retract the confession. Besides administering thecaution, warning specifically provided for in the firstpart of sub-section (2) of Section 164 namely, that theaccused is not bound to make a statement and that if hemakes one it may be used against him as evidence inrelation to his complicity in the offence at the trial,that is to follow, he should also, in plain language, beassured of protection from any sort of apprehended tortureor pressure from such extraneous agents as the police orthe like in case he declines to make a statement and begiven the assurance that even if he declined to make theconfession, he shall not be remanded to police custody.7.The Magistrate who is entrusted with the duty ofrecording confession of an accused coming from policecustody or jail custody must appreciate his function inthat behalf as one of a judicial officer and he must applyhis judicial mind to ascertain and satisfy his consciencethat the statement the accused makes is not on account ofany extraneous influence on him. That indeed is the essenceof a 'voluntary' statement within the meaning of theprovisions of Section 164 CrPC and the rules framed by theHigh Court for the guidance of the subordinate courts.Moreover, the Magistrate must not only be satisfied as tothe voluntary character of the statement, he should alsomake and leave such material on the record in proof of thecompliance with the imperative requirements of thestatutory provisions, as would satisfy the court that sitsin judgment in the case, that the confessional statementwas made by the accused voluntarily and the statutoryprovisions were strictly complied with.8.From a perusal of the evidence of PW 17, Shri Shitappa,Additional Munsif Magistrate, we find that though he hadadministered the caution to the appellant that he was notbound to make a statement and that if he did make astatement that may be used against him as evidence but PW17 did not disclose to the appellant that he was aMagistrate and that the confession was being recorded byhim in that capacity nor made any enquiry to find outwhether he had been influenced by anyone to make theconfession. PW 17 stated during his deposition in court: "Ihave not stated to the accused that I am a Magistrate" andfurther admitted: "I have not asked the accused as towhether the police have induced them (Chithavani) to givethe statement." The Magistrate, PW 17 also admitted that"at the time of recording the statement of the accused nopolice or police officials were in the open court. I cannottell as to whether the police or police officials werepresent in the vicinity of the court". From the memorandumprepared by the Munsif Magistrate, PW 17 as also from his https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ deposition recorded in court it is further revealed thatthe Magistrate did not lend any assurance to the appellantthat he would not be sent back to the police custody incase he did not make the confessional statement. CirclePolice Inspector Shivappa Shanwar, PW 25 admitted that thesub-jail, the office of the Circle Police Inspector and thepolice station are situated in the same premises. Nocontemporaneous record has been placed on the record toshow that the appellant had actually been kept in the sub-jail, as ordered by the Magistrate on 21-7-1986 and that hewas out of the zone of influence by the police keeping inview the location of the sub-jail and the police station.The prosecution did not lead any evidence to show that anyjail authority actually produced the appellant on 22-7-1986before the Magistrate. That apart, neither on 21-7-1986 noron 22-7-1986 did the Munsif Magistrate, PW 17 question theappellant as to why he wanted to make the confession or asto what had prompted him to make the confession. It appearsto us quite obvious that the Munsif Magistrate, PW 17 didnot make any serious attempt to ascertain the voluntarycharacter of the confessional statement. The failure of theMagistrate to make a real endeavour to ascertain thevoluntary character of the confession, impels us to holdthat the evidence on the record does not establish that theconfessional statement of the appellant recorded underSection 164 CrPC was voluntary. The cryptic manner ofholding the enquiry to ascertain the voluntary nature ofthe confession has left much to be desired and hasdetracted materially from the evidentiary value of theconfessional statement. It would, thus, neither be prudentnor safe to act upon the confessional statement of theappellant. Under these circumstances, the confessionalstatement was required to be ruled out of consideration todetermine the guilt of the appellant. Both the trial courtand the High Court, which convicted the appellant only onthe basis of the so-called confessional statement of theappellant, fell in complete error in placing reliance uponthat statement and convicting the appellant on the basisthereof. Since, the confessional statement of the appellantis the only piece of evidence relied upon by theprosecution to connect the appellant with the crime, hisconviction cannot be sustained."17.Applying the above principles, it can be well stated that inthe instant case, the confessional statement will not in any way helpthe prosecution. Even assuming that part of the confessionalstatement relied on by the prosecution and accepted by the trialCourt was actually not to be given effect, the Court is thoroughlysatisfied that all the circumstances stated above, would be pointingto the guilt of the accused apart from motive remained proved. Addedcircumstance is the medical evidence. All other circumstancesattendant would be pointing to the fact that none else except theaccused/appellant could have committed the offence. Under thecircumstances, the trial Court was perfectly correct in finding the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ appellant/accused guilty and awarded the punishment. There isnothing to interfere in the judgment of the trial Court eitherfactually or legally. 18.In the result, this criminal appeal fails and the same isdismissed confirming the judgment of the lower Court.Sd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.Registrarnsv/To:1.The V Additional Sessions Judge Madras2.-do- thro' Principal Sessions Judge,Chennai.3.The Inspector of Police CBI/SCB/Chennai R.C.No.1(S)/20014.The Superintendent,Special Prison for Women, Puzhal, Chennai.5.The District Collector, Chennai.6.The Director General of Police, Chennai.7.The Special Public Prosecutor for CBI High Court,Madras-104.+1cc to Mr.A.Gandhi, Advocate Sr 2462SSN (CO)km/30.1.CRL.A.No.178 of 2007