Dhanapal v. Chandrasekharan (Deceased) & Ors.

PRAYER IN S.A.No.1647 of 2000: This second appeal has been filedagainst the judgment and decree passed by the Sub Judge, Poonamallee,dated 28.4.2000, in the First appeal in A.S.No.54 of 1998, confirmingthe judgment and decree passed by the District Munsif Court,Poonamallee, dated 31.8.1998, in O.S.No.338 of 1996.PRAYER IN S.A.No.1651 of 2000: This second appeal has been filedagainst the judgment and decree passed by the Sub Judge, Poonamallee,dated 28.4.2000, in the First appeal in A.S.No.55 of 1998, confirmingthe judgment and decree passed by the District Munsif Court,Poonamallee, dated 31.8.1998, in O.S.No.337 of 1996. For Appellant : Mr.G.K.R.Pandian For Respondents : Mr.S.SridharC O M M O N J U D G M E N TAll the three second appeals have been taken up together forfinal hearing by the consent of the counsels, as they involve commonissues. In view of the fact that the respondent had died, his legalheirs had been brought on record, as sole respondent by orders ofthis Court, dated 23.8.2009 and 9.10.2009. S.A.No.1512 of 2000: This second appeal has been filed against the judgment anddecree, dated 28.4.2000, made in A.S.No.53 of 1998, on the file ofthe Sub Judge, Poonamallee, confirming the judgment and decree dated31.8.1998, made in O.S.No.272 of 1996, on the file of the DistrictMunsif Court, Poonamallee.2. The defendant in the suit, in O.S.No.272 of 1996, is theappellant in the present second appeal. The respondent in the presentsecond appeal was the plaintiff in the said suit. 3. The plaintiff had filed the suit, in O.S.No.272 of 1996, onthe file of the District Munsif Court, Poonamallee, praying for adeclaration to declare the plaintiff's title to the propertyprescribed in 'A' schedule, appended to the plaint, for recovery ofvacant possession of the suit property, after removing thesuperstructure put up thereon; for mandatory injunction directing thedefendants to demolish the wall and the superstructure put up by thedefendant and for costs. 4. The plaintiff in the suit, who is the respondent in thepresent second appeal, had stated that the property described in 'A'schedule had originally belonged to one Hari Govindan, son of NarayanNair. The defendant in the suit, who is the appellant in the presentsecond appeal, had entered into an agreement of sale with the said https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Hari Govindan, but he did not fulfil the contract, within thestipulated period. Instead, the defendant had trespassed into the 'A'schedule property, unlawfully, without having the sale deed executedin his favour from Hari Govindan. Therefore, Hari Govindan had fileda suit before the District Munsif Court, Poonamallee, in O.S.No.49 of1977, against the defendant for recovery of possession of theproperty. The said suit was decreed, on 21.2.1977, giving thedefendant one month time to vacate the property. Since, the defendanthad not contested the suit, an ex-parte decree had been passed in thesuit, by the District Munsif Court, Poonamallee. 5. While Hari Govindan was making arrangements to execute thedecree, the defendant had been requesting for time to vacate theproperty, to avoid execution of the decree. While so, the defendant,who is related to the plaintiff, had persuaded the plaintiff topurchase the property in question from Hari Govindan. The defendanthad also requested the plaintiff to permit him to continue hisoccupation of the property as a tenant under the plaintiff. On suchpersuasion, the plaintiff had purchased the property from HariGovindan, under a registered sale deed, dated 12.8.1977. 6. Thus, the plaintiff had become the owner of the propertymentioned in schedule 'A' of the plaint. The defendant had alsoattested the sale deed executed by Hari Govindan, in favour of theplaintiff. 7. The plaintiff had further stated that the defendant hadexecuted the rent note for the 'B' schedule property, agreeing to paya monthly rent of Rs.5/-. Thereafter, the defendant had continued tooccupy the 'B' schedule property. Even though the rent note was forone year, the defendant had continued to occupy the property eventhereafter. Therefore, the plaintiff had been requesting thedefendant, orally, to vacate the property so that he could put upconstruction thereon. However, the defendant had not vacated from theproperty. 8. The plaintiff had further stated that the defendant is only atenant under the plaintiff and that he had also executed a rent note,in respect of the property. In such circumstances, the defendant hasfiled a suit, in O.S.No.2315 of 1987, and had obtained an order ofinterim injunction. Since the defendant claims right to the entire'A' schedule property, the plaintiff is to file a suit fordeclaration of his title to the suit 'A' schedule property and forrecovery of possession of the same. Further, the defendant, havingdisputed the title of the plaintiff in the suit property, had losthis rights as a tenant, in accordance with Section 111(g) of theTransfer of Property Act, 1882. The notice, dated 20.12.1987, issuedby the plaintiff in that regard had been received by the defendant,on 22.12.1987. However, he had not replied to the said notice. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

9. The plaintiff had further stated that even though the suitproperty bears S.No.195/2, of Korattur Village, the defendant hadgiven a wrong survey number, in respect of the suit property, inO.S.No.2315 of 1987. The survey number given in the said suit is155/2. Further, the defendant has been harassing the plaintiff byattempting to put up a wall in the suit property. In suchcircumstances, the plaintiff had filed the present suit, inO.S.No.272 of 1996. 10. In the written statement filed on behalf of the defendant,the averments made by the plaintiff, in his plaint, have been denied.It has been stated that the suit property had originally belonged toone Hari Govindan, of Perambur. The suit property had been lyingvacant. Since the suit property is lying vacant, the defendant hadtrespassed into the said property during the year, 1972, and had putup a thatched hut in which the defendant and his family members wereliving. In the month of February, 1973, the owner of the suitproperty, namely, Hari Govindan, had attempted to evict the defendantfrom the suit property. However, the plaintiff was not successful indoing so. The defendant had also been paying the property tax.Thereafter, the defendant had put up a brick building for residentialpurpose in the year, 1974. While so, Hari Govindan, who was the ownerof the suit land, had brought the plaintiff for inspecting the saidproperty, in the month of July, 1977. Since the plaintiff is relatedto the defendant, he had full knowledge about the defendant'spossession and enjoyment of the suit property and that the defendanthad put up a construction therein. The defendant had also put upfencing around the suit land. In spite of knowing the said facts, theplaintiff had purchased the suit property from Hari Govindan, on12.8.1977. In spite of having purchased the suit property in theyear, 1977, by way of a sale deed, dated 12.8.1977, the plaintiff hadnot taken any legal action against the defendant till he had filedthe suit, in O.S.No.2315 of 1987, for declaration, on the file of theDistrict Munsif, Poonamallee. 11. The defendant had further stated that since he is inuninterrupted and peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suitproperty, for a long time, he had obtained title over the suitproperty by adverse possession. Further, the defendant had also dug awell in the suit property. While so, on 24.10.1987, the plaintiff hadattempted to dispossess the defendant from the suit property.Thereafter, the defendant had filed a suit for declaration and forconsequential injunction against the plaintiff, in O.S.No.2315 of1987, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Poonamallee. 12. The defendant had further stated that the sale made by HariGovindan, on 12.8.1977, in favour of the plaintiff, is sham andnominal and had not been acted upon. The alleged sale has been madeonly with an intention to defraud. The decree, made in O.S.No.49 of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 1977, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Ponnamallee, was notknown to the defendant, as it was an ex-parte decree. It was revealedto the defendant only after the filing of the suit, in O.S.No.2315 of1987. 13. The defendant had further stated that he had not requestedfor time to vacate the suit property. He had also denied theallegations of the plaintiff that he had agreed to pay the rent, inrespect of the suit property. The defendant had not attested the saledeed, as alleged by the plaintiff, nor had he executed a rent note,as stated by him. The defendant continues to be in possession andenjoyment of the entire extent of the suit property. Since, the suitfiled by the plaintiff is devoid of merits, it is liable to bedismissed. S.A.No.1647 of 2000: 14. This second appeal has been filed against the judgment anddecree, dated 28.4.2000, made in A.S.No.54 of 1998, on the file ofthe Sub Judge, Poonamallee, confirming the judgment and decree, dated31.8.1998, made in O.S.No.338 of 1996, on the file of the DistrictMunsif Court, Poonamallee.15. The plaintiff in the suit is the appellant in the presentsecond appeal and the defendant in the suit is the respondent herein. 16. The plaintiff had filed the suit, in O.S.No.338 of 1996,praying for the relief of declaration to declare that the plaintiffhad become the absolute owner of the suit property, by perfecting histitle in the suit property, by adverse possession and for aconsequential injunction restraining the defendant and others actingon his behalf, in any manner, interfering with the plaintiff'speaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property. 17. The plaintiff in the suit in O.S.No.338 of 1996, has statedthat the suit property had originally belonged to one Hari Govindan,of Perambur. The suit property had been lying vacant. Since theplaintiff was residing in the suit village for the past severalyears, he had trespassed into the suit property in or about the year,1972 and he had put up a thatched hut in which the plaintiff and hisfamily members were living. In the month of February, 1973, the ownerof the suit property, namely, Hari Govindan, had attempted to evictthe plaintiff from the suit property. However, the plaintiff hadsuccessfully prevented the same. The plaintiff had also been payingthe property tax. Thereafter, the plaintiff had put up a brickbuilding, for residential purpose, in the year, 1974. While so, HariGovindan, who was the owner of the suit land, had brought thedefendant for inspecting of the said property, in the month of July,1977. Since, the defendant is related to the plaintiff, he had fullknowledge about the plaintiff's possession and enjoyment of the suit https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ property and that the plaintiff had put up a construction therein. Inspite of knowing the said facts, the defendant had purchased the suitproperty from Hari Govindan, on 12.8.1977. 18. The plaintiff had further stated that since he is inuninterrupted, continuous and peaceful possession and enjoyment ofthe suit property, for a long time, he had obtained title over thesuit property, by adverse possession. Further, the plaintiff had alsodug a well in the suit property. While so, on 24.10.1987, thedefendant had attempted to dispossess the plaintiff from the suitproperty. Thereafter, the plaintiff had filed a suit for declarationand for consequential injunction against the defendant in O.S.No.338of 1996, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Poonamallee.19. In the written statement filed on behalf of the defendant,the averments made on behalf of the plaintiff, in his plaint, havebeen denied. It has been stated that the property described in the'A' schedule had originally belonged to one Hari Govindan, son ofNarayan Nair. The plaintiff in the suit, who is the appellant in thepresent second appeal, had entered into an agreement of sale with thesaid Hari Govindan, but he did not fulfil the contract, within thestipulated period. Instead, the plaintiff had trespassed into the 'A'schedule property, unlawfully, without having the sale deed executedin his favour. Therefore, Hari Govindan had filed a suit, before theDistrict Munsif Court, Poonamallee, in O.S.No.49 of 1977, against theplaintiff for recovery of possession of the property. The said suitwas decreed, on 21.2.1977, giving the plaintiff one month time tovacate the property. Since, the plaintiff had not contested the suit,an ex-parte decree had been passed in the suit, by the DistrictMunsif Court, Poonamallee. 20. While Hari Govindan was making arrangements to execute thedecree, the plaintiff had been requesting for time to vacate theproperty to avoid execution of the decree. While so, the plaintiff,who is related to the defendant had persuaded the defendant topurchase the property in question from Hari Govindan so that theplaintiff may continue in the property for some time, without anydisturbance. On such persuasion, the defendant had purchased theproperty from Hari Govindan under a registered sale deed, dated12.8.1977. The plaintiff had also attested the sale deed executed byHari Govindan in favour of the defendant. The plaintiff had executedthe rent note, for 2 cents, in favour of the defendant agreeing topay a monthly rent of Rs.5/-. Although the plaintiff was regularlypaying the rent for some years, he had failed to pay the rent,thereafter. 21. It has also been stated that the defendant has dug a well inthe property, and he had also made arrangements to build a compoundwall on all the sides. However, the plaintiff had prevented thedefendant from putting up compound wall and he rushed to the Court to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ file the suit. 22. It has also been stated that Hari Govindan had obtained adecree against the defendant for recovery of possession and later,when the defendant had purchased the property from Hari Govindan, theplaintiff has not only attested the said document before theconcerned sub registrar but he has also executed the rent note infavour of the defendant. Further, being a tenant he is not entitledto question the title of the landlord. As such, the plaintiff cannotclaim any right or title in the suit property by way of adversepossession. Further, the plaintiff cannot claim that the sale deedexecuted by Hari Govindan in favour of the defendant is sham andnominal. S.A.No.1651 of 2000: 23. This second appeal has been filed against the judgment anddecree, dated 28.4.2000, made in A.S.No.55 of 1998, on the file ofthe Sub Judge, Poonamallee, confirming the judgment and decree, dated31.8.1998, made in O.S.No.337 of 1996, on the file of the DistrictMunsif Court, Poonamallee.24. The plaintiff in the suit is the appellant in the presentsecond appeal. The defendant in the suit is the respondent herein.The suit, in O.S.No.337 of 1996, had been filed praying for therelief of permanent injunction restraining the defendant and othersrepresenting him from putting up the roof of the hut in the suitproperty and to direct the defendant to pay the cost of the suit. 25. The plaintiff had stated that he is in possession andenjoyment of the land with an extent of 0.06 cents, situated inS.No.195/2 of Korattur village, from the year, 1972. He had also putup a hut in the suit property and he has been living therein, alongwith the other members of his family. On 6.8.1991, the defendant hadfiled a false complaint against the plaintiff before the Koratturpolice in an attempt to evict the plaintiff from the suit property.Due to heavy rains, the plaintiff was making arrangements to repairhis hut, on 19.8.1991. However, the defendant, along with his men hadprevented the plaintiff from doing so. Even though the plaintiff hadlodged a complaint before the local police, no action had been takenagainst the defendant. If the plaintiff is prevented from renewinghis hut, the plaintiff and his family members would be put toirreparable loss and hardship and they would not be able to use thehut to take shelter therein. In such circumstances, the plaintiff hadfiled the suit, in O.S.No.337 of 1996, on the file of the DistrictMunsif Court, Poonamallee. 26. In the written statement filed on behalf of the defendant,it has been stated that the claims made by the plaintiff are falseand frivolous and therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiff is https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ unsustainable, both in law, as well as on facts. The plaintiff hadalready filed the suit in O.S.No.2315 of 1987 (O.S.No.181 of 1992).The property in dispute, which is situated in S.No.195/2 of KoratturVillage, had belonged to Hari Govindan, son of Narayan Nair, fromwhom the defendant had purchased the said property, under aregistered sale deed, dated 12.8.1977. While Hari Govindan, was theowner of the suit property, the plaintiff had entered into anagreement of sale with him. However, he did not honour the contract,within the stipulated time. Instead, the plaintiff had trespassedinto the property unlawfully. Therefore, Hari Govindan had filed asuit, in O.S.No.49 of 1977, in the District Munsif Court,Poonamallee, for recovery of possession. The said suit had beendecreed, on 21.2.1977, whereby, the plaintiff had been given onemonth time to vacate. While so, the defendant had purchased theproperty from Hari Govindan, under the sale deed, dated 12.8.1977.The plaintiff had attested the said sale deed, as an identifyingwitness before the sub registrar concerned. On the same date, theplaintiff had executed a rent note for two cents, in favour of thedefendant, agreeing to pay a monthly rent of Rs.5/-. Even though theplaintiff had been paying the rent for some time, he had failed topay the rent, thereafter. Since, the plaintiff is only a tenant withthe defendant, he has no right, whatsoever, to claim title in respectof the suit property, by adverse possession. In fact, the defendanthad already filed a suit for declaration of his title and forrecovery of possession, on the file of the Sub Court, Poonamallee,against the plaintiff, in O.S.No.411 of 1988, and it is stillpending. In such circumstances, the suit filed by the plaintiff,praying for the relief of injunction is not maintainable in law. 27. In O.S.No.272 of 1996, the trial Court had framed thefollowing issues for consideration:"(i) Whether the plaintiff had obtained his title inrespect of the suit property?(ii) Whether the defendant had perfected his title inrespect of the suit property?(iii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to possession,as prayed for by him?(iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief ofmandatory injunction as prayed for by him?(v) To what relief the parties are entitled to?"28. In O.S.No.337 of 1996, the trial Court had framed thefollowing issues for consideration:"(i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to permanentinjunction, as prayed for? https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (ii) To what reliefs, the plaintiff is entitled to?"29. In O.S.No.338 of 1996, the trial Court had framed thefollowing issues for consideration::"(i). Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefof declaration of title, as prayed for? (ii). Whether the sale in favour of the defendant isonly a nominal one and whether such a plea is open to theplaintiff?(iii). Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefof consequential injunction against the defendant?"30. Since all the three suits were arising out of same facts andcircumstances, the suits were tried together and a common judgment,dated 31.8.1998, was passed by the District Munsif, Poonamallee, bywhich, the suit filed by the respondent in the second appeals,namely, Chandrasekharan, in O.S.No.272 of 1996, had been allowed andthe relief of declaration and recovery of possession, as prayed fortherein had been granted. The suits filed by the appellant herein,namely, Dhanapal, in O.S.No.337 of 1996, and O.S.No.338 of 1996, hadbeen dismissed. 31. The trial Court, based on Exhibit A1 to A6, had come to theconclusion that the respondent in the present second appeals hadobtained a valid sale deed, dated 12.8.1977 (Exhibit A.1) in thepresence of the appellant. The trial Court had held that theappellant continued to be in possession of the suit property, only asa tenant and therefore, he cannot claim title, in respect of the suitproperty, by way of adverse possession. 32. The trial Court had also found that the appellant hadexecuted a tenancy agreement in favour of the respondent on the samedate, on which the sale deed, dated 12.8.1977, had been registered.In the said tenancy agreement (Exhibit A.6), the appellant hadaccepted the ownership of the respondent, in respect of the suitproperty. The trial Court had found that the respondent had also paidthe kists for the suit property and it had been marked as ExhibitA.10. The patta transferred in the name of the respondent had beenmarked as Exhibit A.7. 33. It had been further found that the appellant had agreed topay the rent to the respondent in respect of the suit property andthat the appellant had been residing in the said property, as atenant. The appellant had been paying the rent to the respondentduring the first few years of the tenancy, however he had stoppedpaying the rent, thereafter. Therefore, the respondent had beenmaking demands to the appellant to pay the rental amounts, which were https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ due from the appellant. Since the appellant had not responded to therequests, the respondent had demanded that the appellant shouldvacate the suit property. While so, the appellant had filed the suit,on the file of the District Munsif Court, Poonamallee, claiming thathe is the owner of the suit property, by way of adverse possession.He had also obtained an order of injunction restraining therespondent from interfering with his peaceful possession andenjoyment of the suit property. In such circumstances, the respondenthad filed a suit for declaration of his title, in respect of the suitproperty and for recovery of possession of the said property and fora mandatory injunction to demolish the superstructure put up by theappellant therein. 34. It had also been found that the respondent had issued anotice, under section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,on 20.12.1987, marked as Exhibit A.8. The acknowledgement of the saidnotice by the appellant had been marked as Exhibit A.9. Since theappellant, who was the tenant in the suit property, had denied thetitle of the respondent, who is the owner of the suit property, theappellant had lost his rights, even as a tenant. 35. The Trial Court, after considering the evidence adduced onbehalf of the plaintiff, as well as the defendant, had declared thetitle of the respondent, in respect of the suit property and had alsogranted the relief of recovery of possession. Accordingly, the trialCourt, by its judgment and decree dated 31.8.1998, had allowed thesuit, in O.S.No.272 of 1996, filed by the respondent (Chandrasekaran)by granting the reliefs of declaration and recovery of possession.Consequently, the trial Court had dismissed the suits filed by theappellant (Dhanapal), in O.S.NO.337 of 1996 and O.S.No.338 of 1996. 36. Aggrieved by the common judgment of the trial Court, dated31.8.1998, the appellant in the present second appeal, namelyDhanapal, had preferred three first appeals, in A.S.No.53 of 1998,A.S.No.54 of 1998 and A.S.No.55 of 1998, on the file of the SubCourt, Poonamallee. The first appellate Court had framed thefollowing points for consideration: A.S.No.53 of 1998: "1. Whether the relief sought for by the respondent toremove the thatched superstructure and the construction putup in the suit property and for recovery of vacant possessionof the said property is proper? 2. What other reliefs?"A.S.No.54 of 1998:"1. Whether the appellant is entitled to the relief ofpermanent injunction restraining the respondent frominterfering with the possession of his suit property?" https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ S.A.No.55 of 1988: "1. Whether it is proper for the appellant to pray forthe relief of permanent injunction restraining therespondent from interfering with the possession andenjoyment of his suit property?2. What other reliefs?"37. Based on the evidence available, and in view of thecontentions raised on behalf of the parties concerned, the firstappellate Court had come to the conclusion that the appellant, afterhaving purchased the suit property, by virtue of Exhibit A.1, hadbecome the tenant of the respondent in accordance with Exhibit A.6,tenancy agreement. Thus, the appellant had become the tenant of therespondent. As such, he did not have any legal right to claim title,in respect of the suit property, by way of adverse possession or byprescription, nor is he entitled to get the relief of injunctionagainst the respondent. The first appellate court had found that theappellant had paid the tax only in respect of the superstructure inthe land in question and not for the suit property. 38. The first appellate Court, while dismissing the appeals, hadordered the appellant to vacate and deliver vacant possession of thesuit property, to the respondent, since, the appellant had not paidthe rent, in respect of the suit property, properly. 39. The first appellate Court had found that the appellant hadbecome a tenant, in respect of the suit property, in view of ExhibitA.6, dated 12.8.1977, and that he has no other rights, in respect ofthe said property. Therefore, he cannot claim title, in respect ofthe suit property, by adverse possession. The first appellate Courthad refused to believe the claim of the appellant that he did nothave any knowledge about Exhibit A.1, even though he had, earlier,admitted that he had signed the said document. Therefore, the firstappellate Court had disbelieved the said claim of the appellant. 40. The first appellate Court had noted the fact that theappellant had claimed that he had stated in his evidence that he hasbeen in possession of the suit property, after he had entered into asale agreement with Hari Govindan. However, it was also seen that theappellant, apprehending that he would be evicted from the suitproperty, pursuant to the judgment made in O.S.No.49 of 1977, filedby Hari Govindan, had approached the respondent and had persuaded himto purchase the suit property. Since then, the appellant had beencontinuing as a tenant in the suit property, under the respondent, inview of Exhibit A.6. The appellant had signed in the tenancyagreement marked as Exhibit A.6. He had also admitted that he hadsigned as a witness, in Exhibit A.1. Having done so, he has putforward a claim for the sake of the suit that he does not have the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ knowledge about the said document. Further, the first appellate Courthad clearly found that the appellant is only a tenant in the suitproperty. 41. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that theappellant had been in possession of the suit property from the year,1972, as a tenant. He had perfected his title, in respect of the suitproperty, by way of adverse possession. However, the first appellatecourt had not accepted the said contentions. The first appellateCourt had held that even if the appellant had been in possession ofthe suit property for a considerable length of time, he had been insuch possession, only as a tenant. Therefore, the appellant'scontention that he had perfected the title, by way of adversepossession, cannot be accepted. Further, the first appellate Courthad not accepted the claim of the appellant that the purchase of thesuit property, by the respondent, was only a sham and nominaltransaction, as it had been done only at the behest of the appellant. 42. The first appellate Court had dismissed the appeals filed bythe appellant also on the ground that the appellant had signed as awitness in the sale deed, dated 12.8.1977, marked as Exhibit A.1 andthat the appellant cannot claim that he had no knowledge of the saleof the suit property, which had taken place, on 12.8.1977. Further,the first appellate Court had also come to the conclusion, based onthe fact that the appellant had entered into a lease agreement withthe respondent, by way of a tenancy agreement, dated 12.8.1977,marked as Exhibit A.6. 43. The contention of the appellant that Exhibit A.6, which isan unregistered tenancy agreement, cannot be relied on, since it isnot an admissible evidence, has not been accepted by the firstappellate Court. In such circumstances, the first appellate Court haddismissed the appeals filed by the appellant, by its common judgmentand decree, dated 28.4.2000. 44. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, dated 28.4.2000,the appellant in the first appeals had preferred the present secondappeals before this Court. 45. This Court had admitted the second appeals on the followingsubstantial questions of law:"(1) Whether signing as attesting or identifyingwitness of Ex.A.1 will bar the appellant from canvassing thecorrectness of the same?(2) Whether the respondent on his admission that he isonly the owner of the land, that the appellant owner ofsuperstructure is entitled to disregard the provision ofCity Tenants Protection Act? https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (3) Whether the appellant on admitted case should bedeclared as owner of suit land having perfected title byadverse possession?"44. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant inthe above second appeals had contended that the lower appellate Courthad failed to decide the issue as to whether the sale in favour ofthe respondent, dated 12.8.1977, is sham and nominal. 46. The learned counsel had relied on the decision of theSupreme Court, in VISHWANATHA ACHARI Vs. KANAKASABAPATHY (2005 (6)SCC 56). The courts below had erred in coming to the conclusion thatthe appellant had not perfected his title by way of adversepossession, even though he had been in continuous, uninterrupted,open and adverse possession of the suit property. The Courts belowhad erred in coming to the conclusion that the appellant, is notentitled to the reliefs sought for by him, mainly on the ground thatthe appellant has signed as a witness in the sale deed, dated12.8.1977. The Courts below had also erred in coming to theconclusion that the appellant is not entitled to the suit property byway of adverse possession, as he was only a tenant of the respondent,in accordance with Exhibit A.6 tenancy agreement, dated 12.8.1977. 47. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant hadcontended that, merely for the reason that the appellant was anidentifying or attesting witness to the sale deed, dated 12.8.1977,it cannot be held that he was in full knowledge of the contents ofthe document. Further, it cannot be held that there was a juralrelationship of landlord and tenant between the appellant and therespondent. The notice of forfeiture of tenancy, issued under Section111(g) of the Transfer of property Act, 1882, is unsustainable, asper the decision of the Supreme Court in GURUAMARJIT SINGH Vs. RATTANCHAND (1993 (4) SCC 349). 48. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant hadcontended that the Courts below had not considered the admitted factthat the superstructure had been put up by the appellant, in the suitproperty, in the year, 1973 and that he has been paying the propertytax, continuously, thereafter. The Courts below ought to have takennote of the fact that the respondent had issued the notice forforfeiture of tenancy only, on 24.12.1987, after the institution ofthe suit for declaration of title in respect of the suit property, byway of adverse possession, by the appellant, on 26.10.1987. Onlythereafter, the respondent had filed a suit for the declaration ofhis title and for the consequential relief of removal of thesuperstructure in the suit property, on 14.12.1988. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

49. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant had reliedon the following decisions in support of his contentions:1. BONDAR SINGH Vs. NIHAR SINGH (2003 (2) CTC 635) 2. HERO VINOTH Vs. SESHAMMAL (2006) 5 SCC 545)3. GOVINDARAJA NAIDU Vs. MEENATCHI SUNDARAM (2008) 1 MLJ 810 50. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondenthad submitted that the appellant has no legal right to deny the titleof the respondent, in respect of the suit property. The appellant hadclearly admitted in his evidence, that the ownership of the suitproperty is vested in the respondent. Even though the appellant hadstated, initially, that he had no knowledge of the suit, in O.S.No.49of 1977, later, he had admitted, in his evidence, that he came toknow about the suit and that he did not do anything to set aside theex-parte decree passed in the said suit.51. It had been further stated that there is no mention by theappellant, either in his suit, in O.S.No.338 of 1996 or in thewritten statement filed in O.S.No.272 of 1996, about the agreemententered into between Hari Govindan and himself. In case, the claim ofthe appellant that he had entered into a sale agreement with the HariGovindan, with regard to the suit property, is correct, he could havefiled a suit for specific performance. However, he had not taken anyaction to enforce the alleged sale agreement. Further, the appellanthad known about the sale of the suit property by Hari Govindan, as hehad signed in the sale deed, marked as Exhibit A.1, as a witness. Theappellant had also admitted the sale agreement entered into betweenhimself and the respondent. In fact, they had gone together to theSub registrar's office at Ambattur, for the registration of the saledeed. In such circumstances, it would not be open to the appellant tocontend that he did not know about the sale of the suit property infavour of the respondent. In the suits filed by him, in O.S.No.337 of1996, and O.S.No.338 of 1996, the appellant had stated that therespondent had purchased the suit property from Hari Govindan. Whenthe title of Hari Govindan, in respect of the suit property, had beenaccepted by the appellant, he cannot deny the title of therespondent, who has also got the patta in his name, in respect of thesaid property. The respondent had purchased the suit property in theyear, 1977 and he had filed the suit, in O.S.No.411 of 1988, on thefile of the Sub Court, Poonamallee, within a period of twelve years,thereafter. In such circumstances, the appellant had no legal rightto contest the title of the respondent, in respect of the suitproperty. 52. The learned counsel for the respondent had further submittedthat the appellant had failed to prove his title, in respect of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ suit property, either by prescription or by adverse possession, byadducing oral and documentary evidence. The respondent had onlyprayed for a decree for recovery of possession, after the appellanthad removed the superstructure put up by him in the suit property.Even though the appellant had filed house tax receipts, in respect ofthe superstructure, he cannot deny the title of the respondent, inrespect of the suit property, as he had purchased the said propertyfrom Hari Govindan, for a valid consideration. Further, the appellanthad attested the sale deed, as an identifying witness. 53. The learned counsel for the respondent had further submittedthat the appellant had stated, in his evidence, that he is inpossession and enjoyment of the suit on the belief that he hadpurchased the suit property from Hari Govindan. Hence, his possessioncannot be considered to be adverse to the interest of the owner ofthe suit property. As such, the appellant cannot make a claim by wayof adverse possession against the respondent, who is the absoluteowner of the property in question. 54. It had also been stated by the appellant that, while thesuit, in O.S.No.411 of 1988, on the file of the Sub Court,Poonamallee, which had been renumbered as O.S.No.272 of 1996, waspending, the appellant had filed a suit for injunction restrainingthe respondent from interfering with his possession. Therefore, theappellant had been served with the notice, under Section 111(g) ofthe Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which had also been acknowledgedby the appellant. In such circumstances, the appellant's possessionof the suit property is unlawful, as he had denied the title of thelandlord. Further, the suit filed by the appellant, praying for therelief of injunction, is not maintainable in law, in view of the factthat the unlawful occupier of the property cannot seek for the reliefof injunction against the real owner. 55. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent had reliedon the following decision in support of his contention:1. ACHAL REDDY Vs. RAMAKRISHNA REDDIAR (1990) 4 SCC 7062. RAM NATH AND ORS Vs. NETA (AIR 1962 ALL 604)56. In view of the submissions made on behalf of the appellant,as well as the respondent and on a perusal of the evidence availableon record and taking into consideration the decisions cited supra, itis clear that the appellant had not been in a position tosubstantiate his claims, by sufficient evidence. The appellant hadadmitted that Hari Govindan was the owner of the suit property. Whileso, since the respondent had purchased the said property from HariGovindan, by way of a sale deed, dated 12.8.1977, marked as ExhibitA.1, it would not be open to the appellant to claim that the title,in respect of the suit property, did not pass to the respondent. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Further, the appellant had signed in the sale deed, dated 12.8.1977,as a witness. Therefore, he cannot deny the title of the respondent,in respect of the suit property. Further, the appellant had enteredinto a lease agreement with the respondent by way of Exhibit A.6,dated 12.8.1977. As such, the appellant was a tenant in the suitproperty. In such circumstances, he cannot claim title, in respect ofthe suit property, by way of adverse possession. 57. Further, there is nothing on record to show that theappellant has been paying the property tax for the suit property, ashe had only filed certain documents to show that he had been payingthe tax, in respect of the superstructure, in the land in question. 58. It has been proved by acceptable evidence that therespondent is the owner of the suit property and that the appellantis only a tenant therein. Therefore, the contentions raised on behalfof the appellant that he has perfected his title, in respect of thesuit property, either by prescription or by adverse possession,cannot be countenanced. In such circumstances, this Court is of theconsidered view that there is no infirmity in the findings of theCourts below. In such view of the matter, the second appeals standdismissed, confirming the judgment and decree of the Courts below. Nocosts.Sd/Asst. Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.RegistrarlanTo1.The Subordinate Judge,Poonamallee2.The District Munsif,Poonamallee.The Section Officer, V.R.Section, High Court, Madras3 ccs To Mr.S.Sridhar, Advocate, SR.54254 to 54256S.A.No.1512 of 2000, S.A.No.1647 of 2000and S.A.No.1651 of 2000CK (CO)SS (19.12.2009)