Tmt. Anushammal2. V. Narasimhan v. The Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunal, Chennai-600 004

O R D E RT.S.SIVAGNANAM,J.,The above Writ Petition has been filed challenging theorder passed by The Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Special AppellateTribunal dated 20.07.1998 in D.No.401 of 1995. 2. The facts of the case are as follows:(i) One S.Vasudevan, S/o Srinivasa Iyer of Manarkudiheld an extent of 55.03 ordinary acres equivalent to 32.80 standardacres as on the crucial date 15.02.1970. Since the provisions of theTamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on land) Act 58 of 1961as amended by Act 17 of 1970, hereinafter referred to as the Act,was attracted, proceedings were initiated under the Act. The holdingof the land owner included the minor son's property to an extent of18.33 ordinary acres equivalent to 14.11 standard acres. Whilecalculating the holding of the land owner, the Authorized Officerexcluded an extent of 18.33 ordinary acres, equivalent to 14.11standard acres belonging to the minor son Narasimhan, who derivedthe property pursuant to a Deed of Partition, dated 18.04.1970registered as Document No.1078 of 1970. After excluding the saidextent, the Authorized Officer declared an extent of 2.59 ordinaryacres as "surplus". Draft statement was published on 05.07.1972 andfinal statement under Section 12 of the Act was published on13.12.1972 and notification under Section 18 (1) of the Act waspublished on 10.02.1973. The surplus declared was distributed toeligible persons in terms of the rules and compensation was alsopaid to the land owner.(ii) The Deed of Partition, dated 18.04.1970 was enteredinto between S. Vasudevan and his wife Tmt. Anushammal, whereincertain lands, which were described in the Schedule "B" to the saidDeed of Partition were set apart in favour of an unborn child. TheDepartment came to the conclusion that allotting an extent of landin favour of the unborn child was with the aim of escaping from theclutches of Act and to retain the said extent which was declaredsurplus. Further, the Department was of the opinion that theAuthorized Officer who dealt with the case wrongly validated theDeed of Partition, without properly appreciating the scope ofSection 21 A of the Act. By stating that this error goes to the rootof the matter, defeating the very purpose of the Act, theDepartment, represented by the Director of Land Reforms, Chennai,invoked the jurisdiction of the Special Appellate Tribunal andpresented a petition to exercise its power under Section 83 of theAct and to set aside the notification issued under Section 10 (1) of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the Act, published in the Government Gazatte dated 05.07.1972,excluding the land to an extent of 18.33 ordinary acres, covered inthe Deed of Partition, dated 18.04.1970, on the ground that anunintended benefit has been granted to the land owner by wrongapplication of Section 21 A of the Act.(iii) The Department in the said petition requested theSpecial Appellate Tribunal to invoke its suo-moto powers on theground that the Deed of Partition, dated 18.04.1970 is solelyintended to defeat the provisions of the Act and the order of theAuthorized Officer is erroneous, since he failed to appreciate thetrue spirit of Section 21 A and the reasons assigned by theAuthorized Officer for validating the Deed of Partition areperverse. This petition which was presented by the Department wasregistered as D.No.401 of 1995 on the file of Special AppellateTribunal.(iv) The son and the wife of the land owner filed acounter statement before the Special Appellate Tribunal, interaliacontending that the petition is not maintainable, since, after thedraft statement under Section 10 (1) of the Act was published in theGazatte on 05.07.1972, the final statement has been published on13.12.1972 and thereafter notification under Section 18 (1) of theAct has also been published on 10.07.1973 and the surplus has beenacquired and after a lapse of 23 years, the present revision wasfiled before the Special Appellate Tribunal and under the Scheme ofthe Act, period of limitation has been prescribed for preferring anappeal under Section 78 as well as under Section 82 of the Act.Therefore, it was contended that the rights which vested with theland owner for over 23 years is now sought to be altered to theirprejudice and such action should not be permitted.(v) It was further contended that in the Deed ofPartition, the unborn son was represented by the land owner's wife,who was the 2nd respondent before the Tribunal and the 2nd petitionerherein and she also joined in the execution of the deed. Further, itwas submitted that the Deed of Partition was effected by aregistered document and the land was allotted to Narasimhan, whocontinued to be in enjoyment of the same from the date of partition.Further, it was contended that the son was born on 22.05.1970 i.e.prior to 02.10.1970 and such partition effected between the saidNarasimhan and his father would be valid and binding. It was furthersubmitted that the suo-moto power of the Special Appellate Tribunalcannot be entertained after a lapse of 23 years and especially, whenthe legal position is that an unborn son could be given a part ofestate and therefore the re-opening of the proceedings is whollyillegal.3. Based on the above pleadings, the matter was taken upby the Special Appellate Tribunal and by order dated 20.07.1998, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the Tribunal, after considering the factual and legal aspects heldthat the Tribunal's suo-moto power under Section 83 has beenexercised by re-opening cases after a long delay when it is foundnecessary that the propriety or legality or correctness of anydecision made has to be examined. Therefore, the Tribunal held thatthe delay in filing the case by itself cannot be a ground forthrowing out the case at the initial stage. Further, the Tribunalobserved that the fact, the proceedings have been completed long agoand the Government did not file an appeal or revision at an earlierstage, will be the factors to be taken into account along with theother factors, when a final decision is to be made.4. The Tribunal further observed that at the threshold,the authorities have made out a case, that the Authorized Officervalidated the Deed of Partition between the husband and wife, underwhich a portion of the property has been set apart in favour of anunborn child which is not allowed. Hence, the Tribunal felt that thematter requires scrutiny and instead of sending the case back to theAuthorized Officer, the Tribunal itself shall finally decide thematter. Accordingly, the petition was held to be maintainable anddirection was issued to number the case, to enable the Tribunal tocontinue the hearing on merits.5. Aggrieved by the said order, dated 20.07.1998, thepresent Writ Petition has been filed.6. The petitioners after reiterating the grounds raisedbefore the Tribunal would contend that when the Tribunal isexercising powers under Section 83, it should consider whether thereis sufficient and reasonable cause for condoning the delay in filingthe revision petition and it is not open to the Tribunal to actbeyond its power by overriding the prescribed period stipulated inthe Act for filing an Appeal or Revision.7. It was further contended that the Tribunal passed theimpugned order condoning the delay without considering the mandatoryperiod prescribed in the Act and without following the provisionsprescribed in the Act for entertaining a Revision or Appeal filedbeyond the period stipulated. The petitioners further contendedthat the Application ought to have been dismissed for non-complianceof the procedure as prescribed under Rule 29 (7) of the Rules. Itwas further contended that the Revision Petition had been filed onlyagainst the notification under Section 10 (1) and subsequently,notifications under Sections 12 and 18 (1) have been issued and therevision petition ought to have been rejected as not maintainable.8. The respondents have filed a counter affidavit inwhich, after reiterating the factual aspects which were raised inthe petition filed before the Special Appellate Tribunal in D.No.401of 1995, the respondents submitted that there is no period specified https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ for invoking the power under Section 83 of the Act and the Tribunalhas exercised its suo-moto power in several cases after a longdelay, if it is satisfied that there is sufficient cause for re-opening the matter. Hence, it was contended that the order passed bythe Tribunal calls for no interference.9. We have heard the submissions made by Mr.K.Manoj Menon,the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mrs.Malarvizhi Udayakumar, the learned Special Government Pleaderappearing for the respondents and carefully perused the materialsavailable on record.10. The grievance of the petitioner in the above WritPetition is that the Tribunal ought not have entertained thepetition filed by the Director of Land Reforms, seeking to invokethe power of the Tribunal under Section 83 of the Act after a longperiod of 23 years, after the proceedings initiated under the Acthad attained finality. The learned counsel would submit that theundue delay in making the petition is itself a good ground fordismissing the petition and the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in severalcases has held that unless the delay is satisfactorily explained,the question of condoning the delay does not arise. It was furthercontended by the learned counsel that considering the facts andcircumstances of the case, the length of delay is an importantcircumstance, because, the rights which had accrued in favour of thepetitioners is sought to be disturbed after a long period of 23years. In support of his contention, the learned counsel placedreliance on the following decisions:1) Aflatoon Vs. Lt. Governor, Delhi in AIR 1974Supreme Court 2077, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court wasconsidering the Writ Petitions which questioned thevalidity of a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act andin paragraph-11, of the said judgment the Hon'ble SupremeCourt held that 'there is no reason as to why, the WritPetitioners in the said case should have waited till 1972for challenging the validity of the notification issued in1959'. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further, observed that thepetitioners have sat on the fence and allowed theGovernment to complete the acquisition proceedings and thenthey sought to attack the notification at belated stage andif allowed, it would be putting a premium on dilatorytactics. (2) I.G.N. Sahakari Samiti Vs. State of Rajasthan AIR1974 Supreme Court 2085. In the said case, the Hon'bleSupreme Court was also dealing with the case underRajasthan Land Acquisition Act and after following thedecision in Aflatoon's case cited supra, held that in suchcases the length of delay is an important circumstance https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ because of the nature of acts done during the interval onthe basis of the notification and the declaration.(3) PT Giridharan Prasad Missir Vs. State of Bihar1980 2 Supreme Court Cases 83, wherein the Hon'ble SupremeCourt also dealing with the matter arising under the LandAcquisition Act, held that rejection of petition filedafter 17 months was justified.(4) R.Padmavathy Vs. The Land Commissioner (LandRecords), Chennai, (2001) 3 M.L.J 1. In the said decision,the Division Bench of this Court while dealing with thepower under Section 83 which came to be exercised by theSpecial Appellate Tribunal, when the identical matter waspending before the land Tribunal. Under such circumstances,the Division Bench held as follows:"9. In respect of D.No.825 of 1993, however, theTribunal has made observations that the order dated1.2.1973 was patently wrong in the light of theprovisions of Section 22 of the Act and the said ordercould not be sustained. Then Tribunal went on todiscuss the question of delay, wherein it held, inexercise of the suo motu jurisdiction of the Tribunal,there was no time limit and therefore there was noinjustice caused to the land owner since the appealagainst the second order dated 18.11.1988 was pendingand the Land Tribunal could go into all the argumentswhich can be put forward as regards that order. TheTribunal then observed as follows:"In these circumstances, to overcome thetechnical objection and in the interests ofjustice, I hereby set aside the orders of theAuthorized Officer, Land Reforms, Trichy, in hisproceedings MRI, 11BM (144 Per.)/17-70, dated01.12.1973 under the suo motu powers vested inthis Tribunal under Section 83 of this Act. Hence,D.No.825/93 is allowed."The Land Tribunal thereafter has been requested todispose of the appeal expeditiously. It is this orderwhich is very heavily assailed by the learned counselin the present writ petition. Before approaching thisCourt, the petitioners had gone directly to the SupremeCourt by way of a Special Leave Petition (S.L.P)wherein, a notice was issued. However, afterwards thesaid S.L.P. was withdrawn as it was held inL.Chandrakumar VS. Union of India (1997) 3 S.C.C. 261,a writ petition could be filed against the order of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Tribunal. The said S.L.P. was, therefore, withdrawn andthe Court was approached in the present writ petition.10. Learned counsel urges that the SpecialAppellate Tribunal has acted without jurisdiction inentertaining a hopelessly time-barred revision and thensetting aside in order and deciding an issue whichprecisely was pending before the Land Tribunal. It waspointed out by the learned counsel that the very basisof the appeal pending before the Land Tribunal againstthe order dated 18.11.1988 was that in the wake oforders dated 01.12.1973, such order dated 18.11.1988could not have been passed by the same Authoritywithout there being any provisions of law. In fact, inthe impugned order itself, there is a clear cutreference to the said Appeal in paragraph 2 (page 66):"In any case an appeal against the order ofthe Authorized Officer in 1983 is pending beforethe Land Tribunal. If the earlier order of 1973 isnot set aside, it will lead to a technicalobjection that the Authorized Officer cannotreview his own orders. The petitioner can put inall these arguments before the Land Tribunalbefore whom the appeal is pending."11. Now it is clear that the issue whether thesubsequent order could be passed dated 18.11.1988 onthe backdrop of the order dated 01.12.1973 was asubstantial issue pending before the Land Tribunal.Under Such circumstances, the Special AppellateTribunal could not have wiped out the order dated01.12.1973 much less using the so called suo motupowers. WE are not able to understand the user of thesuo motu powers by the Special Appellate Tribunal. Infact, what was filed before the Special Land Tribunalwas nothing but a revision by the Director, LandReforms. In order to get out of the difficulty oflimitation, it is mentioned that the suo motu powerswere being activated. What was filed before theTribunal was, in fact, nothing but a revision underSection 83 of the Act. The Tribunal, therefore, couldnot have ignored the question of limitation as it did.But even if we can take the view, that the SpecialAppellate Tribunal could go into the merits anddemerits of the revision, one fails to understand asto how the Tribunal could have straight away wiped outthe order dated 01.12.1997 which order was faitaccompli, which was finally passed against which therewas no appeal or revision and which remained on the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ record till it was set aside by the Tribunal by theimpugned order dated 28.04.1998. It is liable to beseen that the said order was referred to in the orderdated 18.11.988 also and yet the order dated18.11.1988 came to be passed. Taking a view that allthe transactions entered into by Muthu Reddiar werehit by Section 22 of the Act and the land disposed of,had to be included in the holding of Muthu Reddiar.12. We are not going to comment on the merits ofthe matter at all, for the simple reason that a properappeal is pending against the order dated 18.11.1988.In that appeal, all the questions would be openincluding the proprietary of that order as alsowhether the same could have been passed in the wake ofthere already being one order dated 01.12.1973 inwhich the question of surplus lands held by thepetitioner was considered. In our opinion, the SpecialLand Tribunal could not have simply set aside theorder dated 01.12.1973 and wiped it out of the record,so as to show that the order dated 18.11.1988 was afresh order passed for the first time by an Authorityunder Section 10 of the Act. All these questions whichare pending before the Land Tribunal should have beenallowed to be decided by the Land Tribunal itself. Wetherefore feel that in the interest of justice, itwould not be proper to allow the order of the SpecialAppellate Tribunal to be sustained. Instead we willset aside that order holding that the said order issans proprietary in law. The Tribunal erred in law inactivating its suo motu powers under Section 83 inparticular and decide the precise question which waspending before the Land Tribunal. In our opinion, thesuo motu powers cannot be sued to pre-empt aparticular question and to bye-pass a decision whichis legally due from the other Tribunal. In fact, theSpecial Appellate Tribunal has also given all thefindings regarding the correctness or otherwise of thevalidity of the transactions by Muthu Reddiar. Theproprietary demanded that the Special AppellateTribunal should not have entered not those questions,particularly when the matter was pending in an appealbefore the Land Tribunal, much less such expressionshould not have me in a revisional and that too suomotu revisional jurisdiction."(5)F.M.Devaru Ganapati Bhat Vs. Prabhakkar GanapathiBhat, (2004) 1 M.L.J. 180 (S.C.). The issue before theHon'ble Supreme Court related to a matter arising under theTransfer of Property Act, where a point relating to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ creation of interest in favour of an unborn child wasconsidered. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that there is noban on the transfer of interest in favour of an unbornperson and Section 20 of the Transfer of Property Actpermits an interest being created for the benefit of anunborn person who acquires interest upon his birth." By relying on the above judgment, the learned counsel wouldsubmit that the order passed by Special Appellate Tribunal has to beset aside.11.The learned Special Government Pleader Mrs. MalarvizhiUdayakumar, after reiterating the averments in the counter affidavitwould submit that the order passed by the Tribunal is legal andproper and the power under Section 83 of the Act could be invoked sothat the Tribunal could satisfy itself as to the regularity inproceedings or correctness, legality of any decision or order madeunder the Act, if in the opinion of the Tribunal such decision ororder should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted forreconsideration.12. The learned Special Government Pleader contended thatthe Special Appellate Tribunal considering the issue raised andbearing in mind the object of the enactment, decided to hear thematter itself without remanding the matter to the AuthorizedOfficer. Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that there is noerror in the order passed by the Tribunal. 13. The learned Special Government Pleader placed relianceon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in N. Balakrishnan Vs.M.Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 Supreme Court Cases 123 andwould submit that the condonation of delay is a matter of discretionof the Court and length of delay is not a matter and acceptabilityof the explanation is the only criteria. The learned counsel wouldnext submit, by relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Courtin State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani reported in (1996) 3 SupremeCourt Cases 132, that the sufficient cause for the delay should beconsidered with pragmatism in justice oriented manner.14. The learned Special Government Pleader placed relianceon Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Mst.Katiji reported in(1987) 2 Supreme Court Cases 107 and held that liberal approach isto be adopted in the matter of condonation of delay and by applyingthe ratio of the said judgment, the delay could be condoned.15. The only issue arises for consideration in the presentWrit Petition is as to whether the Special Appellate Tribunal wasright in invoking its jurisdiction under Section 83 of the Act forthe purpose of examining as to whether there has been any illegalityor impropriety or incorrectness in the order passed by the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Authorized Officer. Before proceeding to considering the facts ofthe case and various contentions raised, it is useful to examine thepower accorded to the Tribunal under Section 83 which reads asfollows:"83. Revision by Special Appellate Tribunal – (1)The Special Appellate Tribunal may of its own motion or onapplication, call for and examine the record of theAuthorized Officer, the Land Board, the Land Commissioneror the Land Tribunal in respect of any proceeding underthis Act to satisfy itself as to the regularity of suchproceeding or the correctness or legality or propriety ofany decision passed or order made therein, and if, in anycase it appears to the Special Appellate Tribunal that anysuch decision or order should be modified, annulled,reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may passorders accordingly:Provided that every application to the SpecialAppellate Tribunal for the exercise of the powers underthis section shall be preferred within such period as maybe prescribed:Provided further that the Special Appellate Tribunalmay admit an application after the expiration of prescribedperiod if it is satisfied that the party concerned hassufficient cause for not presenting it within such period:Provided also that this section shall not apply to anyproceeding of the Land Tribunal in respect of which appeallies under Section 79 to the Special Appellate Tribunal.(2) No order prejudicial to any person shall be passedunder sub-section (1), unless such person has been given anopportunity of making his representations.Amendments – Section 83 substituted by Act 3 of 1984.In sub-section (1), the words "the authorized officer, theLand Board" substituted by Act 57 of 1986."Thus it could be seen from the language of the provisionsthat the powers of the Special Appellate Tribunal are very wide toexamine the correctness or legality of any of the proceedings underthe Act so as to satisfy itself as to the regularity of suchproceedings and the Special Appellate Tribunal is entitled to passorders either modifying or annulling or reversing or remitting thematter for reconsideration.16. As stated by learned Special Government Pleader, thereis no period of limitation prescribed under the rules for invocationof the said powers by the Special Appellate Tribunal. In reply to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the said contention, the learned counsel for the writ petitioners,would submit that by going through the provisions of the Act, moreparticularly Sections 79 and 82, limitations have been prescribedfor filing an Appeal to the Special Appellate Tribunal and aRevision to the Land Commissioner under Section 80. However, interms of Section 80 of the Act, the provisions of the LimitationsAct was applicable to an appeal under Sections 78 or 79. Therefore,the learned counsel would submit that such power could be exercisedwithin a reasonable time and in the instant case, 23 years cannot beconsidered as a reasonable time for the invocation of the saidpower. 17. By placing reliance on the Judgments cited supra, thelearned counsel had contended that Hon'ble Supreme Court had upheldthe decision of the High Court, when an Application challenging theLand Acquisition Proceedings was made after 17 months. However, inthe instant case, the said issue is sought to be re-opened after aninordinate delay of 23 years and there is absolutely no explanationfor having invoked the said power at this point of time.18. It is true that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has rejectedthe petitions challenging the validity of Land AcquisitionProceedings, which were belatedly filed and in the case of Aflatoon,a petition filed after a period of 13 years was rejected, as it washeld that, if the petition is allowed to be entertained, it would beputting a premium on dilatory tactics. Therefore, the law laid downby the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that, undue delay in making apetition is sufficient ground to reject the petition at thethreshold.19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector, LandAcquisition, Anantnag Vs. Mst.Katiji (1987) 2 Supreme Court Cases107, referred to supra has also considered the question, whether tocondone or not to condone or considering the question whether or notto apply the standard in applying the "sufficient cause" test to allthe litigants regardless of their personality. The Hon'ble SupremeCourt after analyzing the power conferred under Section 5 of theLimitations Act, held that liberal approach is to be adopted and theHon'ble Supreme Court laid down six principles: "3. The legislature has conferred the power to condonedelay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantialjustice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. Theexpression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislatureis adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the lawin a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice– that being the life purpose for the existence of theinstitution of Courts. It is common knowledge that thisCourt has been making a justifiably liberal approach in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ matters instituted in this Court. But the message does notappear to have percolated down to all the other Courts inthe hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted onprinciple as it is realized that:1.Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit bylodging an appeal late.3.Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritoriousmatter being thrown out at the very threshold andcause of justice being defeated. As against this whendelay is condoned the highest that can happen is thata cause would be decided on merits after hearing theparties.5."Every day's delay must be explained" does not meanthat a pedantic approach should be made. Why notevery hour's delay, every second's delay? Thedoctrine must be applied in a rational common sensepragmatic manner.7.When substantial justice and technical considerationsare pitted against each other, cause of substantialjustice deserves to be preferred for the other sidecannot claim to have vested right in injustice beingdone because of a non-deliberate delay.9.There is no presumption that delay is occasioneddeliberately, or on account of culpable negligence,or on account of mala fides. A litigant does notstand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact heruns a serious risk.11.It must be grasped that judiciary is respected noton account of its power to legalize injustice ontechnical grounds but because it is capable ofremoving injustice and is expected to do so."Therefore, in the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Courtheld that in making a justice oriented approach, there wassufficient cause for condoning the delay in instituting the appeal. 20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, time and again held thatthe words "sufficient cause" should be considered liberally andacceptability of the explanation for the delay is the sole criteriaand length of delay is not relevant. Further, it was also held thatthe matter has to be decided on case to case basis, depending onfacts and circumstances of each case. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in (1979) 3 Supreme CourtCases 466 (AUTHORISED OFFICER, THANJAVUR AND ANOTHER Vs. S.NAGANATHAAYYAR AND OTHERS) was considering the scope and construction of 1961Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:"7. When a whole legislation is geared todeprivation of property, subject to payment ofcompensation, rules which have frowned upon confiscatorylegislation cannot apply at all. We are concerned with aRepublic created by the people of India, with a socialtransformation where the State is not antagonistic to thecitizen but harmonises individual interest with communitygood. The jurispridential principles in such a situationcannot be the same as have been inherited from a culturewhich postulates the State versus the subject. We do notexplore the aspect of the law further as we are satisfiedthat the answer to the specific question raised before usflows directly from a reading of the Section in the lightof well-established rules of interpretation.14.Moreover, when the whole purpose of the section isto prevent any alienation which defeats any of theprovisions of the Act, it is impermissible to introduce anyrequirement, other than is mentioned in the Section, as acondition for its operation. Obviously, the provision seeksto provide social justice for the landless and it defeatsthe purpose if, by the interpretative process, soft justiceto large landholders is brought about. We consider the'literal' meaning of the section to be that any transfer ofother alienation mentioned in the section which reduces orimpairs the otherwise available extent of surplus landbeyond the ceiling "defeats ..... the provisions of thisAct." This is the plain meaning of the Section which giveno room for doubt or justification for importation of anyfurther condition like sham, bogus, etc.16.In the interpretation of Section 22 we too arePortia me. For this reason we reverse the view of the HighCourt that Section 22 will not apply nullify anytransaction of transfer or partition unless it is furthershown that it is sham, nominal or bogus. Nor do we agreewith Shree Ramamurthi that even if a transaction defeatsthe ceiling provisions, it may still be valid if thetransfer is, from an individual point of view bona fide.The short reply is that from the community's angel,especially the landless community's angle hungering forallotment, the alienation, however necessary for theindividual, is not bona fide vis-a-vis the community." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ From the above judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, itis clear that the object behind enacting the Land Reforms Act was tosecure the ownership and control of the material resources of thecommunity and to ensure that they are distributed to subserve thecommon good and the operation of the economic system does not resultin the concentration of wealth and means of production to the commondetriment. The Act was enacted to ensure that the distribution ofthe land will best subserve the common good, increase theagricultural production and protect justice, social and economic. 22. Thus, bearing in mind the object of the enactment, wefeel that the normal interpretation given in matters relating toland acquisition proceedings or service matters or challenge asregards validity of an enactment cannot be applied to the facts andcircumstances of this case, which arose under the provisions of theLand Reforms Act. On a careful reading of the impugned order passedby the Special Appellate Tribunal, it is to be noted that theTribunal did not come to any specific conclusion on merits. It cameto a conclusion that at the threshold, the Department has made out acase that the authorities have acted upon the Partition Deed betweenthe husband and wife wherein a property has been set apart for anunborn son. Therefore, the Special Appellate Tribunal came to aconclusion that the propriety or legality of the order of theAuthorized Officer validating such Deed of Partition under Section21 A is justified or not has to be examined. Further, the SpecialAppellate Tribunal was conscious of the fact that the proceedingshad concluded long back and no Appeal or Revision had been filedagainst the notification issued at various stages. However, bearingin mind the object of the Act, the Special Appellate Tribunal itselfdecided to take up the matter and hear the case, instead ofremanding the matter back to the Authorized Officer. Therefore, inour view, the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the writpetitioners cannot be applied to the facts and circumstances of thepresent case arising under the Land Reforms Act and more so,considering the scope of the direction issued by the SpecialAppellate Tribunal. 23. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector, LandAcquisition, Anantnag Vs. Mst.Katiji (1987) 2 Supreme Court Cases107, had held that there should be liberal approach and the approachshould be justice-oriented and refusing to condone the delay canresult in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the verythreshold and cause of justice being defeated. The Hon'ble SupremeCourt in State of Haryana Vs. Chandramani reported in (1996) 3Supreme Court Cases 132 referred supra while considering the issuerelated to "sufficient cause" had observed in paragraph-11 whichreads as follows:"The expression 'sufficient cause' should, therefore,be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause forexplaining every day's delay. The factors which arepeculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of thegovernmental conditions would be cognizant to and requiresadoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process.The Court should decide the matters on merits unless thecase is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards todetermine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis privatelitigant could be laid to prove strict standards ofsufficient cause. Litigants including the State areaccorded the same treatment and the law is administered inan even-handed manner.The Government at appropriate level should constitutelegal cells to examine the cases whether any legalprinciples are involved for decision by the Courts orwhether cases require adjustment and should authorize theofficers to take a decision or give appropriate permissionfor settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal theneeded prompt action should be pursued by the officerresponsible to file the appeal and he should be madepersonally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, theState cannot be put on the same footing as an individual."24. Thus, by applying the law laid down by the Hon'bleSupreme Court, it is to be noted that considering the facts andcircumstances of the present case, the matter cannot be thrown atthe threshold and there should be an opportunity to examine thecorrectness of the issue as to whether the setting up of an extentof property in favour of an unborn child is valid, and as to whethersuch document was intended to defeat the provisions of the Act. Aswe are satisfied that the matter cannot be thrown out at thethreshold, we hold that in the facts and circumstances of thepresent case, the Special Appellate Tribunal was justified indeciding to hear the matter on merits, rather to reject the matteron the ground of delay. However, we refrain from deciding the issueas to whether the Authorized Officer was justified in validating theDeed of Partition under Section 21 A of the Act as it has to bedecided by examining oral and documentary evidence after hearingthe parties.25. In view of the above, we hold that the impugned orderis legal and valid and does not call for any interference and theWrit Petition is liable to be dismissed.26. The Special Appellate Tribunal in the penultimateparagraph of the order observed that the Tribunal itself woulddecide the matter on merits. Since the Tribunal is no longerfunctioning, it would be appropriate for the 2nd respondent, namely,the Director of Land Reforms, Chennai-5, to hear the matter after https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ issuing notice to the petitioners and the 3rd respondent and passorders in accordance with law and on merits. As observed by theTribunal, it would be open to the petitioner to raise before the 2ndrespondent that the proceedings have been completed long ago and theGovernment did not file any Appeal or Revision at an earlier stage,against the notifications issued under Sections 12 and 18 of the Actand if the said question is raised, the 2nd respondent shall alsodecide on the same on merits and in accordance with law.With the above observations, the Writ Petition isdismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.rpa/va Sd/- Asst.Registrar/True Copy/ Sub.Asst.RegistrarTo1. The Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunal, Chennai-600 004.2. The Director of Land Reforms Chepauk, Chennai-600 005.3. The Assistant Commissioner, Land Reforms Mayiladuthurai. + 1 cc to Mr.S. Raghunathan Advocate CC SR.55980 W.P.No.13104 of 1999GV(CO)EU 30.10.2009.