✦ Madras High Court · 15 Oct 2009

Chinnappa Pandithar v. Masilamani Udayar

Case Details Madras High Court · 15 Oct 2009
Court
Madras High Court
Decided
15 Oct 2009
Bench
—
Length
4,749 words

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Original judgment text

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDATED: 15-10-2009CORAMTHE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.JAICHANDRENSecond Appeal No.204 of 1995Chinnappa Pandithar (died)2.Janaki3.C.Devarajan4.C.Murugesan5.C.Ekambaram(Appellants 2 to 5 are broughton record as legal representativesof the deceased sole appellantvide order of Court, dated 26.12.2002,made in C.M.P.No.17039 to 17041 of 2000.. Appellants/Appellants/PlaintiffsVersus1.Masilamani Udayar (died)2.Jagannatha Udayar3.Rathinam4.Sarangapani5.Tamilselvi6.Meera(RR3 to R6 are brought on record as Legal representativesof the deceased 1st respondentvide Order of Court, dated 19.2.2007, made in C.M.P.No.1051 of 2006... Respondents/Respondents/DefendantsPRAYER:Appeal filed under section 100 CPC against the judgment anddecree, dated 12.7.1994 passed in A.S.No.72 of 1992, on the file ofthe Subordinate Judge, Arni, confirming the judgment and decree,dated 2.9.1992, passed in O.S.No.321 of 1985, on the file of thePrincipal District Munsif, Arni.For Appellants : Mr.M.Venkatachalapathy, Senior Counsel for Mr.P.SrinivasFor Respondents : Ms.Mythili Suresh for M/s.Sarvabhauman Associates. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ J U D G E M E N TThis second appeal has been filed against the judgment anddecree, dated 12.7.1994, made in A.S.No.72 of 1992, on the file of theSub Court, Arni, confirming the judgment and decree, dated 2.9.1992,made in O.S.No.321 of 1985, on the file of the Principal DistrictMunsif Court, Arni. 2. The plaintiff in the suit in O.S.No.321 of 1985, is theappellant in the present second appeal. The suit, in O.S.No.321 of1985, had been filed by the plaintiff for a declaration and forpossession, in respect of the suit property. The plaintiff had statedthat one Narayanasamy had filed a suit, in O.S.No.143 of 1971, againstthe first defendant, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Arni,for declaration of his title and for recovery of possession, inrespect of the suit property. A decree had been passed in the saidsuit, on 9.6.1971, based on the compromise entered into between theparties. The decree passed by the District Munsif Court, Arni, was infavour of the said Narayanasamy, in respect of the suit property.Thereafter, Narayanasamy has been in possession of the said property.However, with regard to the other properties the suit had beendismissed. The suit property, with an extent of 0.50 cents, is theproperty found in the second item of the `A' schedule of the suit.Since 0.05 cents of the property consisted of a Well and its adjoiningmound, only an extent of 0.45 cents had been declared in favour ofNarayanasamy. Further, 1/3rd of the Well and the mound had also beendeclared in his favour. Thus, Narayanasamy had been in possession andenjoyment of the suit property, since then. 3. It has been further stated that the said Narayansamy had soldthe suit property to the plaintiff, by way of a sale deed, dated13.2.1985. The plaintiff has been in possession of the suit propertysince the date of the said sale. He has also been paying the propertytax, in respect of the suit property. The first defendant, namely,Masilamani Udayar, had refuted the claims of the plaintiff, in hiswritten statement. The second defendant, namely, Jaganatha Udayar, hadbeen made a party to the suit, as a defendant, as he is the co-owner.The first defendant, who is in the adjacent property has beeninterfering with the plaintiff's possession and enjoyment of the suitproperty, without having any right to do so. In view of the fact thatthe plaintiff is an aged person, the first defendant has beencompelling the plaintiff to sell the suit property to him. Further,the first defendant had started cultivating crops in the suitproperty, after having encroached upon the said property. In suchcircumstances, the plaintiff had preferred the suit, in O.S.No.321 of1985, before the Principal District Munsif Court, Arni, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

4. In the written statement filed on behalf of the firstdefendant it has been stated that the suit is not maintainable, bothin law and on facts. The suit property, originally, belonged to oneSubbaraya Udayar, the grand father of the first defendant. Thereafter,it was in the enjoyment of his sons Rathina Udayar, Kothanda Udayarand Jeyarama Udayar and later, it had belonged to the first defendantand his younger brother Jaganathan. The suit is not maintainable inview of the fact that the brother of the first defendant, who is a co-owner of the property, had not been made a party to the suit. Thefirst defendant had obtained the shares of Kothandaraman andJayaraman, after having settled their loans. The settlement said tohave been made, on 12.6.1969, in favour of Minor Narayanasamy, byDhanabakiam, cannot be said to be valid. Ethiraj the father ofNarayanasamy, had instituted a suit, in M.C.No.119 of 1970 and he hadlost the same. After a lapse of 16 years the plaintiff cannot claimany right in respect of the suit property, based on the alleged saleof the said property, in favour of the plaintiff by the saidNarayanasamy. 5. In the additional written statement filed in the suit inO.S.No.321 of 1985, it has been stated that it is incorrect to claim,as stated in the plaint, that there was a settlement in the suit inO.S.No.143 of 1971. In fact, the said suit had been withdrawn, forsettling the matter amicably, by way of mediation. Thereafter, EthirajUdayar had given a sum of Rs.300/-, as legal expenses, to the firstdefendant, in the presence of the mediators and he had stated that hewould not claim any right in the property. Since then the firstdefendant has been in enjoyment of the property for over 40 years andhe has been paying the kist for the property. Thus, the firstdefendant is entitled to his rights in the suit property by way ofadverse possession.6. It has also been stated that the compromise decree, inO.S.No.143 of 1971, filed by Ethiraj Udayar, as a Guardian, does notrelate to the issues in the suit. Therefore, the compromise decree isnot valid in law. Hence, there is no necessity to set it aside.Further, the settlement decree is hit by the doctrine of laches, inview of the fact that no final decree had been passed, thereafter. Theproperty had not been divided by metes and bounds and the possessionof the property had not been taken. The compromise decree said to havebeen made, in O.S.No.143 of 1971, had not been implemented, till date.There was no handing over of possession in view of the allegedcompromise decree obtained by way of settlement. The description ofthe properties in the compromise decree, in O.S.No.143 of 1971, isfound to be different. Since the compromise decree is vague andambiguous it has to be declared as invalid. The suit properties havenot been partitioned, till date and they have been in the possessionand enjoyment of the first defendant. The suit properties have been inthe possession and enjoyment of the first defendant for the past 50 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ years and and therefore, he has perfected title over the suitproperties, by way of adverse possession. The suit filed by theplaintiff, fraudulently, without having possession of the suitproperties, is liable to be dismissed, with costs. 7. In the reply statement filed by the plaintiff it has beenstated that the defendant has full knowledge of the proceedings andthe judgment and decree, in O.S.No.143 of 1971. The suit property hadbeen handed over to the plaintiff immediately, thereafter. Therefore,the question of passing of a final decree or handing over of thepossession of the property, does not arise. It is incorrect to statethat the suit is hit by the doctrine of laches. The documents filed bythe plaintiff would show that the plaintiff is in possession of thesuit property. It is incorrect to state that the defendant is inpossession of the suit property. The averments made in the additionalwritten statement are totally false. Therefore, for the reasons statedabove, the suit is to be decreed, with costs.8. In view of the averments made in the plaint, the writtenstatement, the additional written statement and the reply statementfiled in the suit, the trial Court had framed the following issues forconsideration:1) Whether the settlement, dated 12.6.1969, made inrespect of the suit property is valid?2) Whether the plaintiff had the right to purchase thesaid property?3) Whether the suit is affected by the non-joinder ofnecessary parties as defendants?4) Whether the plaintiff would be entitled to thereliefs sought for by him in spite of the 45 years ofpossession of the suit property by the defendant?5) What relief the plaintiff is entitled to?9. The additional issues framed by the trial Court, on 16.7.1991,are as follows:1) Whether the compromise decree mentioned in the suitis correct? Whether it would bind the defendant?2) Whether the defendant is entitled to any right inthe suit property by way of adverse possession?3) Whether the defendant is entitled to any right inthe suit property in law?10. The additional issues framed by the trial Court, on24.2.1992, are as follows:1) Whether the compromise decree in O.S.No.143 of 1971is valid?2) Whether there was any relief of possession grantedby way of the compromise decree?3) Whether the compromise decree is hit by the doctrineof laches? https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 4) Whether the compromise decree has been given effectto?5) Whether the entire suit property has been in thepossession and enjoyment of the defendant for a long timecreating a right by adverse possession?6) Whether the defendant is entitled to any right inthe suit properties in accordance with law?7) Whether the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff inthe suit would bind the defendant?8) Whether the defendant in the suit is entitled to thecosts in the suit?11. The trial Court had found that the main contention of theplaintiff is that he had purchased the suit property fromNarayanasamy, on 13.2.1985. Narayanasamy had got the property by wayof Ex.B-1. Thereafter, Narayanasamy had instituted a suit, inO.S.No.143 of 1971, against the first defendant. A compromise decreehad been passed in the said suit, whereby, the suit properties had tobe given to Narayanasamy. Since then Narayanasamy has been inenjoyment of the said properties and he had sold the same to theplaintiff. Thereafter, the plaintiff has been in enjoyment of the saidproperty. Since the defendant had encroached upon the suit propertyand as he has been in occupation of the said property, illegally, theplaintiff had preferred the suit, praying for a declaration and forpossession. 12. The trial Court had also found that the defendants hadclaimed that the suit properties were their ancestral properties. Thepatta for the suit properties had been in the name of their father.After the life time of their father, the defendant and his brother hadbeen in enjoyment of the property. The settlement in favour ofNarayanasamy is not valid. The defendant had no knowledge of thecompromise decree made in O.S.No.143 of 1971, till the filing of thepresent suit. The defendant has been in enjoyment of the suit propertyfor more than forty years, without any hindrance. The chitta andadangal, in respect of the suit properties, are with the defendant.Even if the vendor of the plaintiff had got the properties, by way ofa compromise decree, he had not taken possession of the same. Sincethe defendant has been in enjoyment of the properties and has beenpaying the taxes, he is entitled to the rights in the suit properties,by way of adverse possession. Therefore, the plaintiff has no right inthe suit property, as claimed by him. 13. Similarly, three witnesses had been examined on behalf of thedefendants. The plaintiff had marked Exs.A-1 to A-3 to substantiatehis claim that the suit properties belonged to him. Ex.A-1, dated13.2.1985, is the original sale deed by which the plaintiff hadpurchased the suit properties from Narayanasamy. A-2, dated 12.6.1969,is the settlement deed written by Dhanabakiammal in favour ofNarayanasamy, according to which 0.50 cents, in Survey No.185/27, has https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ been settled in favour of Narayanasamy. According to the compromisedecree, made in O.S.No.143 of 1971, 1/3rd share in 0.42 cents, in anextent of 1.36 acres, in Survey No.185/27 and the Well therein, wouldbelong to Narayanasamy. A joint UDR patta had also been issued in thename of Masilamany, Jeganathan and Chinnapa Pandithar, in respect ofSurvey No.185/27. The claim of the defendant, in respect of the suitproperties, is based on Ex.B-1. Patta No.144 has been issued, inrespect of the suit properties and certain other properties. However,with regard to the question as to how the property had been obtained,it has been stated in the patta book that the said property showntherein were ancestral in nature. Eventhough the defendants had filedEx.B-1 to claim that the suit properties had belonged to them, as theywere ancestral in nature, it was found that the defendants had alsosigned in the compromise decree. Even though the suit properties mighthave belonged to the defendants it had been assigned to Narayanasamy,in accordance with the compromise decree, as it had been contended onbehalf of the plaintiff. Eventhough the defendant had claimed that hedid not have knowledge of the compromise decree, from the fact that hehad signed in the said decree it could be inferred that the saiddecree is valid and that the settlement made by the plaintiff's vendorNarayanasamy, is also valid. 14. The trial Court had also found that the defendant had furtherclaimed, in his written statement that the compromise decree isinvalid and even otherwise the vendor of the plaintiff had not takenpossession of the suit properties, pursuant to the compromise decree.Further, as the compromise decree has not been executed it has becomeineffective due to the law of limitation. In such circumstances, thedefendant had got the title in the suit properties, by way of adversepossession. On the other hand the plaintiff had claimed that he hadtaken possession of the properties, pursuant to the compromise decree,as the properties were in the enjoyment of Narayanasamy andthereafter, it had been passed on to the plaintiff, in accordance withEx.A-1. As such, the defendant cannot have any claim, in respect ofthe suit properties.15. The trial Court had also found that according to thecompromise decree the vendor of the plaintiff, namely, Narayanasamy,should take possession of the suit properties. Even though theplaintiff had claimed that he had taken possession of the suitproperties, pursuant to the compromise decree, there is no documentfiled to substantiate the said claim of the plaintiff. It was furtherfound that no action had been taken to execute the compromise decreeto take delivery of the suit properties. However, it has been seenthat the defendant had been in possession of the suit properties,prior to the compromise decree, as well as subsequent to the saiddecree. As proof of the said facts the defendant had marked Exs.B-1 toB-18. Ex.B-2 is the patta book in the name of Masilamani andJeganathan. Ex.B-4 is the chitta copy given in the name of thedefendant. Patta No.144 has been issued in the name of the defendants, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ for faslis 1386 to 1394, to show that the suit properties had been inthe enjoyment of the defendants. Copies of the adangal has been markedas Exs.B-5 to B-17. The adangal accounts for Faslis 1387 to 1399 hasbeen found in the name of the defendants. Exs.B-18 to B-31 are the taxreceipts for the taxes paid by the defendants in respect of the suitproperties. Even though the plaintiff had claimed that he has been inenjoyment of the suit properties he has not filed copies of adangalaccounts, in support of his claims. Ex.A-5, filed by the plaintiff, isa receipt for the tax paid by Chinnapa Pandithar relating to the year,1985, and thereafter. The plaintiff had also filed the joint patta toshow that the suit properties are in his name. D.W.3, the villageKarnam, who has been examined on behalf of the defendants, while hewas working as the Karnam of the concerned Village, had stated thatthe patta had been issued in the name of the plaintiff, without theknowledge of the defendants, based on the sale of the suit propertiessaid to have been made in favour of the plaintiff. Even thoughNarayanasamy had got the suit property, in view of the compromisedecree made in the year, 1971, the plaintiff had not taken thenecessary steps to transfer the patta in his name, in respect of thesuit properties. There is no entry in the adangal accounts, withregard to the cultivation of crops in the said properties. However, itwas found that the plaintiff had included the suit properties for thepurpose of obtaining a joint patta, only after the purchase of thesaid properties in the year, 1985. Therefore, Ex.A-4, cannot be takenas sufficient proof to show that the plaintiff is in possession of thesuit properties. Even though the plaintiff had filed the tax receipts,marked as Exs.A-5 to A-8, it was noted by the trial Court that theywere relating to the period subsequent to the filing of the suit andtherefore, they cannot be shown as evidence to prove the claim of theplaintiff that he is in possession of the suit properties. D.W.1examined on behalf of the defendants had stated that there is no proofto show that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit properties.Further, from the evidence of D.W.3 it was found that the firstdefendant had taken a loan, in respect of the suit properties and thepatta and the chitta are in the name of the first defendant. D.W.3 hadfurther deposed that the adangal relating to the suit properties arein the name of the defendant. D.W.2 had also stated in his evidencethat the defendant has been in possession of the suit properties, fora long period and they have been paying the taxes, in respect of thesuit properties. He had also stated that the plaintiff had never beenin possession of the suit properties. 16. Based on the oral, as well as the documentary evidenceavailable on record, the trial Court had found that even though theplaintiff had claimed that Narayanasamy had sold the suit propertiesto him pursuant to the compromise decree made in the year, 1971, thedefendants have been in possession of the suit properties for morethan thirty years. The trial Court had come to the conclusion that theplaintiff had not proved that he had taken possession of the suitproperties, in spite of his claim that he had got the suit properties https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ from Narayanasamy, based on the compromise decree, made in O.S.No.143of 1971. No documentary evidence had been shown by the plaintiff thathe had taken possession of the suit properties. Further, there was noproof shown by the plaintiff that the plaintiff’s vendor, namely,Narayanasamy, had been in enjoyment of the suit properties, beforethey had been sold to the plaintiffs. Even if the compromise decree,made in the year, 1971, could be taken to be true, nothing has beenshown on behalf of the plaintiff that his vendor, namely, Narayanasamyhad taken further steps to implement the said decree by way ofexecution proceedings. In fact, the said Narayanasamy, who is said tobe the vendor of the suit properties ought to have filed the executionproceedings in the year, 1983, within a period of twelve years fromthe date of the compromise decree. However, the present suit had beenfiled only in the year, 1985. Thus, it is clear that the compromisedecree made in O.S.No.143 of 1971, had become time barred. 17. The trial Court had further noted that a perusal of Exs.B-1to B-31 would show that the defendants have been in possession of thesuit properties for a long time. The chitta, the adangal and the taxreceipts would also show that the defendants have been in possessionand enjoyment of the suit properties for over 30 years. Since thedefendants have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of thesuit properties for over a period of twelve years, they have perfectedtheir title over the suit properties, by way of adverse possession.Further, the plaintiff had filed the suit, in O.S.No.321 of 1985,belatedly. The Trial Court had found that he is not entitled to thereliefs sought for in the suit. For the said reasons the trial Courthad dismissed the suit, by its judgment and decree, dated 2.9.1992.18. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court,dated 2.9.1992, the plaintiff in the suit in O.S.No.321 of 1985, hadfiled a first appeal before the Subordinate Court, Arni, in A.S.No.72of 1992. The first Appellate Court had framed the following points forconsideration:"1) Whether the claim of the defendants is to beaccepted?2) What is the relief the appellant is entitled to?"19. The first Appellate Court had found that the claim of theappellant that the suit properties belonged to him is primarily basedon his claim that the said properties had been sold to him by the saidNarayanasamy, as the vendor of the properties, having obtained thesaid properties, pursuant to the compromise decree, made in the year,1971, in O.S.No.143 of 1971. However, the plaintiff had not been in aposition to show that his vendor, namely, Narayanasamy, had taken thenecessary steps to implement the compromise decree, made in O.S.No.143of 1971, either by requesting for the appointment of an AdvocateCommissioner, for dividing the properties by metes and bounds, or to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ take possession of the said properties after the passing of a finaldecree. The first Appellate Court had also found that the suit filedby the plaintiff is hit by the law of limitation, since the compromisedecree made in the year, 1971, had not been implemented, by way ofexecution proceedings, within a period of twelve years, thereafter. Assuch, necessary steps ought to have been taken for the implementationof the compromise decree, on or before the year, 1983. However, thesuit, in O.S.No.321 of 1985, had been filed only in the year, 1985,belatedly. 20. The first Appellate Court had also come to the conclusionthat the appellant had not shown sufficient proof to substantiate hisclaim that he has been in possession of the suit properties, from thedate of its purchase. On the other hand it was found that therespondents were in continuous possession of the suit properties, fora long period of time. The possession of the defendants had beenproved, both by the documentary evidence adduced by the respondentwitnesses and the documents filed on behalf of the respondents.Therefore, the first Appellate court had concluded that therespondents had obtained rights in the suit properties, by way ofadverse possession, as they had been in occupation and enjoyment ofthe suit properties, for over twelve years, which is the prescribedperiod for claiming rights by adverse possession. Accordingly, thefirst Appellate Court had confirmed the judgment and decree of thetrial Court, by its judgment and decree, dated 12.7.1994, made inA.S.No.72 of 1992.21. Aggrieved by the concurrent findings of the Courts below, theplaintiff in the suit, who was the appellant in the first appeal, hadfiled the present second appeal, before this Court. This court hadadmitted the second appeal on the following substantial questions oflaw:"1. Whether in law the defendant, who is a co-ownercould claim adverse possession in respect of the suitproperty against the plaintiff's vendor during his minorityunder Article 65 of the Limitation Act and that too withoutany adverse act or notice in writing?2. Whether the Courts below erred in law andmisdirected themselves in casting the burden on theplaintiff to prove his and his vendor's possession of thesuit property within twelve years against the a co-owner andwhen in law it is for the defendant to establish his plea ofadverse possession and plea of ouster?3. Whether the courts below erred in law in holdingthat the defendant is entitled to the suit property byadverse possession when admittedly the defendant is co-owneralong with the plaintiff's vendor and when he failed toestablish his open, continuous and uninterrupted hostilepossession of the suit property for more than the statutoryperiod after ouster? https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

4. Whether the present suit claim is barred bylimitation?"22. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of theplaintiff/appellant had submitted that the Courts below had erred inrefusing to grant the reliefs, as prayed for by theplaintiff/appellant, based on the evidence adduced on his behalf andhaving found that the plaintiff's/appellant's vendor had acquiredtitle to the suit properties, under Ex.A-1 sale deed and Ex.A-2settlement deed. The learned counsel had also submitted that theCourts below had failed to properly appreciate the evidence availableon record, in favour of the plaintiff/appellant. Even though theappellant had filed a patta, marked as A-4 and the kist receipts,marked as Ex.A-5 to A-6, to show that the plaintiff had been inpossession of the suit properties, such evidence adduced on behalf ofthe plaintiffs had not been considered by the Courts below. Once itwas found that Ex.A-2 settlement deed was valid and the compromisedecree, made in O.S.No.143 of 1971, was true, the Courts below oughtto have granted the reliefs, as prayed for by the plaintiff/appellant.The Courts below ought to have considered the U.D.R patta granted tothe plaintiff/appellant, on the basis of his possession of the suitproperties. 23. It was also submitted that the Courts below had erred incoming to the conclusion, without sufficient evidence having beenshown on behalf of the defendants that they have perfected the title,in respect of the suit properties, by way of adverse possession.Further, the Courts below had erred in coming to the conclusion thatthe compromise decree, made in O.S.No.143 of 1971, was barred bylimitation, as no execution petition was filed to execute thecompromise decree. Since the suit property had been handed over to theplaintiff's vendor, immediately, after the compromise decree had beenmade, there was no necessity for the filing of an execution petition.Further, the Courts below had erred in coming to the conclusion thatnecessary steps, to recover the suit property, ought to have beentaken, within three years after Narayanasamy had attained majority.Such a view is erroneous, in view of Section 6 of the Limitation Act,as the period of limitation prescribed, under Article 65 of the saidAct, starts only after attaining of the majority and cessation of thedisability, in respect of the person concerned. 24. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondentshad submitted that the Courts below had come to the right conclusion,based on the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondents. The suitfiled by the plaintiff/appellant is barred by limitation, as held bythe Courts below. The plaintiff's vendor, namely, Narayansamy, oughtto have taken the necessary steps to implement the compromise decree, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ made in O.S.No.143 of 1971, within a period of twelve years from thedate of the decree or within a period of 30 years after he hadattained majority, since no such action had been initiated byNarayansamy, the vendor of the plaintiff, the suit filed by theplaintiff, praying for declaration and for recovery of possession, isbarred by limitation and therefore, it cannot be sustained in the eyeof law. The period prescribed, under Article 65 of the Limitation Act,1963, would apply only in respect of the person suffering adisability. However, it would not come to the rescue of the plaintiff,who claims to have purchased the suit properties, from Narayanasamy,the vendor of the suit properties who was a minor at the time when thecompromise decree was made, in O.S.No.143 of 1971. Since sufficientevidence have been shown on behalf of the respondents to prove theirlong and continuous possession and enjoyment of the suit properties,they have perfected title, in respect of the suit properties, by wayof adverse possession. In such circumstances, the Courts below hadrightly come to their conclusions, to dismiss the suit filed by theplaintiff/appellant, in O.S.No.321 of 1985.25. In view of the submissions made by the learned counselsappearing for appellants, as well as the respondents and on a perusalof the records available, this Court is of the considered view thatthe appellants have not shown sufficient cause or reason to interferewith the findings of the Courts below. Both the trial Court, as wellas the Appellate Court had come to the right conclusions based on theevidence adduced on behalf of the respondents. The plaintiff in thesuit in O.S.No.321 of 1985, who is the appellant in the present secondappeal, had not been in a position to prove that he had been inpossession of the suit properties from the date of purchase of thesuit properties from Narayanasamy. Even though the plaintiff/appellanthad claimed that Narayanasamy had got the suit properties, pursuant tothe compromise decree, made in the year, 1971, in O.S.No.143 of 1971,there is nothing to show that Narayanasamy had taken possession of thesuit properties, before he had sold the same to the plaintiff.Further, it has not been shown by the plaintiff/appellant thatNarayanasamy had taken necessary steps to implement the decree, madein O.S.No.143 of 1971. Even though Narayanasamy was a minor at thetime of passing of the decree, in O.S.No.143 of 1971, he had not takennecessary steps to perfect his title in the suit properties, withinthe period of limitation prescribed by the provisions of theLimitation Act, 1963. It is only the plaintiff/appellant, who is saidto be the purchaser of the suit properties from his vendor,Narayanasamy had filed the suit in O.S.No.321 of 1985 in the year,1985, belatedly. Further, the Courts below had found that therespondents had perfected their title in the suit properties, by wayof adverse possession, as it has been seen from the evidence producedon their behalf to show that they have been in long and continuouspossession and enjoyment of the suit properties, beyond the prescribedperiod. In such circumstances, the second appeal is liable to be https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ dismissed and accordingly, it is dismissed, confirming the judgmentand decree of the Courts below. No costs.cshSd/-Asst. Registrar//True Copy//Sub Asst. RegistrarTo1.The Subordinate Judge, Arni.2.The Principal District Munsif, Arni.3.The Section Officer, VR Section, High Court, Madras.+ 1 cc to Mr. P. Srinivas, Advocate SR No.54630+ 1 cc to M/s.Sarvabhauman Associates, Advocate SR No.54730BVN(CO)SR/29.1.2010Second Appeal No.204 of 1995

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