Valliammal v. Lakshiammal & Ors.

defendants 1 to 3 were entitled to 1/5th share each.Accordingly they were enjoying the suit propertiesjointly. (c) Thereafter, the plaintiffs sought amicable partition,which evoked no positive response. The legal noticefailed to pave the way for amicable partition. But, onthe other hand, it evoked untenable reply from thedefendants as though D3 became the absolute owner of thesuit properties by virtue of the 'Will' executed by thedeceased Narayana Gounder. Upon the death of NarayanaGounder's wife, each of the plaintiffs is entitled to ¼th share.3. Refuting and remonstrating, inveighing and impugning theallegations/averments in the plaint, the second defendant filed thewritten statement, the warp and woof of it would run thus:Narayana Gounder obtained a small portion of the suitproperty in the partition, which emerged among NarayanaGounder and his co-parceners. From out of the incomederived from the said joint family nucleus and also fromthe joint exertion of Narayanasamy Gounder and D3-Ramasamy, several other immovable suit properties werepurchased. Since the second plaintiff got married thehusband of the first plaintiff, quite against the wish andwill of her parents, Narayana Gounder wanted to deprive theplaintiffs to have any claim over the suit properties andaccordingly Narayana Gounder executed Ex.B2-the 'Will' infavour of D3, as per Ex.B1 the cancellation deed, aftercancelling Ex.B12 the earlier 'Will' of the year 1973executed by him in favour of his grand children. Accordingly, she prayed for the dismissal of the suit.4. The epitome and the long and short of the case of D3, as stoodexposited from his written statement,which was adopted by D1,succinctly and concisely, be set out thus:In the partition, which emerged among Narayana Gounderand his co-sharers, Narayana Gounder was allotted the landbearing Survey No.159/2 measuring an extent of 1 acre and 97cents. The rest of the immovable properties were purchasedfrom out of the independent income derived by D3 and he hasbeen enjoying them separately. D3 constructed a Mill, inthe said Narayana Gounder's ancestral land, which heobtained in the partition. D3's mother in law, who had nomale issues contributed necessary funds for suchconstruction of Mill by D3. Ex.B12 the 'Will' dated14.06.1973 was executed earlier by Narayana Gounder in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ favour of D3's sons. Subsequently, the testator cancelledit as per Ex.B1-the 'Will' dated 15.03.1982, whereupon,Ex.B2-the 'Will' dated 17.03.1982 was executed by the sameNarayana Gounder bequeathing all his properties in favourof D3. As per Ex.A1-the partition deed dated 05.12.1985, apartition was effected among Narayana Gounder's wife-D1, hisson D3 and his paternal grand sons and they have beenenjoying it peacefully. The plaintiffs are having no rightover the suit property. Accordingly, he prayed for the dismissal of the suit.5. D6 filed the written statement buttressing and fortifying thestand of D3.6. In fact, D3 filed two additional written statements,detailing additional facts in support of his contention that theplaintiffs are having no right over the suit properties and alsocontending that the land bearing survey No.339/1, 4.55 acres wasgiven in his favour by the Government under one "D" patta.Accordingly, he prayed for the dismissal of the suit.7. The trial court framed the relevant issues. During the trial,the second plaintiff examined herself as PW1 and Exs.A1 to A8 weremarked on the plaintiffs' side. On behalf of the defendants, onescribe by name Kandhasamy was examined as D.W.1, one Natesan wasexamined as D.W.2 and D3 examined himself as D.W.3 and Exs.B1 to B.12were exhibited on the defendants' side.8. Ultimately, the trial Court dismissed the suit. Beingaggrieved by and dissatisfied with, the judgement and the dismissaldecree of the trial Court, the plaintiffs have filed this appeal onthe various grounds inter alia thus:(a) The judgement and decree of the trial court isagainst law, weight of evidence and all probabilities of thecase. (b) Ex.B2, the 'Will' is a fabricated and forged one,but the trial Court failed to take note of the same.(c) The trial Court also fell into error in holdingthat the suit properties are not the joint familyproperties, despite the defendants having admitted that theland in Survey No.159/2 is the ancestral property. Thetrial Court was not justified in dismissing the suit inentirety.(d) In the absence of any evidence adduced on the sideof the defendants to prove their contention that from out of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ D3's mother-in-law's funds, D3 had source of income toacquire his own properties, the trial Court should not havedismissed the suit.(e) Overlooking the defects in the evidence of D.Ws.1and 2, the trial Court simply believed the theory of thedefendants and dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs.(f) In Ex.A1-the Partition Deed, there is no referenceto Ex.B2-the 'Will', nonetheless, the trial Court believedthe genuineness of Ex.B2 and that too, in the absence of anyevidence to demonstrate and exemplify that it was NarayanaGounder, who signed it as executor of the 'Will'.Accordingly, the second plaintiff/appellant prayed for setting asidethe judgement and decree of the trial Court.9. The parties are referred to here under, for convenience sake,according to their litigative status before the trial Court.10. The points for determination are as to :1. Whether Ex.B2-the 'Will' was proved in accordancewith law by D3, the propounder of the 'Will'?2. Whether the suit properties are co-parceneryproperties?3. Whether the suit properties are partly ancestraland partly self-acquired properties of D3?4. What were the rights of the deceased NarayanaGounder over the suit properties as on the date of his deathand what was the quantum of his share in those properties?5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any share inthe suit properties?6. Whether there is any infirmity in the judgement anddecree of the trial Court?Point No.1:11. The epitome and the long and short of the argument of thelearned counsel for the appellant/second plaintiff is that Ex.B2-the 'Will' is ex facie and prima facie a dubious document, whichsmacks falsehood; it allegedly emerged on 17.03.1982 as anunregistered 'Will'; whereas Ex.B1-the registered cancellation deeddated 15.03.1982, cancelling the earlier registered 'Will'-Ex.B2dated 17.3.1982 would reveal that Narayana Gounder intended not todivert the line of succession by his 'Will' and in such a case in allprobabilities, he might have intended to execute Ex.B2, the 'Will' infavour of D3 immediately two days after his decision not to interferewith the line of succession to the property by his legal heirs after https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ his death; there is no reference to Ex.B2-the' Will' in Ex.A1-thepartition deed, dated 05.12.1985, which emerged a year and a halfafter the death of Narayana Gounder; the trial Court did not takeinto account the supine admission made by D3 quite against his ownpleading; whereas it has simply accepted the case of D3 in toto; thetrial Court ignored that the pleas of D3 were antithetical to his ownpleadings, depositions and the recitals in Ex.A1 and other documents,which he relied on. Accordingly, she prayed for the dismissal of thesuit.12. The warp and woof, the gist and kernel of the argument ofthe learned counsel for the respondents/ defendants could beportrayed to the effect that the patchy evidence adduced on theplaintiffs' side is quite antithetical to the pleadings, so to say,the plaintiffs' claimed their alleged shares in the suit property bytrying to project as though the suit properties are the self-acquiredproperties of deceased Narayana Gounder; but, on the other hand,during trial, the plaintiffs tried to project their case as thoughthose properties are the joint family properties; the plaintiffscannot blow hot and cold, approbate and reprobate and accordingly,their appeal should be dismissed.13. The learned counsel for the respondents/ defendants wouldalso develop his argument that by virtue of Ex.B2, the "Will",Narayana Gounder after cancelling the earlier Will Ex.B12, as per thecancellation deed Ex.B1, bequeathed his half share in the ancestralproperties, which are found set out in the "B" Schedule of the plaintleaving the self-acquired properties of DW3, Ramasamy Gounder; DW3,the propounder of the "Will" Ex.B2 by examining DW1 Kandhasamy, thescribe of the Will and DW2 Natesan, the only surviving witness provedthe "Will" and as such, absolutely there is no merit in the case ofthe plaintiffs.14. Indubitably and incontrovertibly, the plaintiffs approachedthe Court with the case that the suit properties are the self-acquired properties of their father deceased Narayana Gounder, hopingand believing that, by such a plea, consequent upon the death ofNarayana Gounder on 17.05.1984, the plaintiffs would be entitled totheir respective shares as Class-I heirs under the Hindu SuccessionAct. But the circumstances, established before the Court unerringlyand unassailably pointed out to the effect that by no stretch ofimagination, the suit properties could be termed as the exclusiveself-acquired properties of the deceased Narayana Gounder, asadmittedly Narayana Gounder got an extent of 1.97 acres of land inthe partition Ex.B3 dated 05.05.1927, which emerged between NarayanaGounder and his co-parceners; and the income derived from out of thesaid ancestral property, he acquired various other items of suitproperties in his own name as per sale deeds, Exs.B5, B6 and B10. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

15. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for therespondents/defendants before this Court that the properties claimedto have been purchased by DW3 Ramasamy Gounder, the son of NarayanaGounder were not from out of the income derived from the said jointfamily properties.16. At this juncture, my mind is reminiscent and redolent of thetrite proposition of law that in a partition suit, the plaintiffs aredefendants and the defendants are the plaintiffs and that de horsthe contentions of the plaintiffs and their claim for specificshares, the Court could grant appropriate relief from what transpiredfrom the admissible evidence, which were adduced before the trialCourt. Accordingly, if viewed, it is crystal clear that simplybecause the plaintiffs wittingly or unwittingly, knowingly orunknowingly, had taken the plea that all the suit properties are theself-acquired properties of the deceased Narayana Gounder,nonetheless, relief could be granted in favour of the plaintiffs,depending upon the reliable piece of evidence which were placedbefore the trial Court.17. Among the immovable suit properties, which are found set outin the "B" schedule of the plaint, three categories are involved:-(i) the admitted ancestral properties in the name ofdeceased Narayana Gounder; (ii) Ramasamy Gounder's alleged self-acquiredproperties, which he claims to have purchased from out ofhis own funds as per Ex.B7 and incorporated in the "B"Schedule of the plaint and (iii) the property bearing survey No.339/1, which wasgiven by the Government in the name of Ramasamy Gounder asper "D" memo-Ex.B9.18. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, theproperties purchased under Ex.B7 and also the property acquired underEx.B9 in the name of DW3 Ramasamy Gounder, should be taken as the co-parcenery properties of Narayana Gounder in view of the candid andsupine admission made by DW3 Ramasamy Gounder in his deposition asunder:@ehd; jdpg;gl;l Kiwapy; mlkhdk; bgw;w brhj;jhf ,Ue;jhYk;. fpiuak; bgw;wbrhj;jhf ,Ue;jhYk; bghJ FLk;g brhj;jhf mDgtpf;fg;gl;L te;jJ. vf;rpgpl; V1 gj;jpuj;jpy;brhj;Jf;fs; bghJ FLk;gj;jpw;Fk; ghj;jpag;gl;lJ vd;Wk;. gphpf;fg;gltpy;iy vd;Wk; Twp ,Ue;jhy; rhp jhd;/@It is therefore crystal clear from the perusal of the above excerptsfrom the deposition of DW3, that DW3 without minching words admittedthat all the properties referred to in the "B" Schedule of the plaintare the joint family properties of Narayana Gounder and himself. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

19. The common or garden legal principle is that the propounderof the Will has to prove it. DW3 Ramasamy Gounder (D3), being thepropounder of the alleged unregistered Will Ex.B2, was expected toprove it, strictly in accordance with law. 20. The propounder should have examined himself first andthereafter, the scribe DW1 and the attesting witness DW2 Natesan,should have been examined, but surprisingly and curiously, in thiscase, those two witnesses have been witnessed as D.Ws.1 and 2 and thepropounder of the Will examined himself as DW3. Apparently, I couldsee no material to indicate that DW3 obtained any permission fromCourt to examine himself after examining the witnesses. 21. Trite the proposition of law is that preponderance ofprobabilities would govern the adjudication in civil cases and it istherefore just and necessary to detail and delineate thecircumstances involved in this case.22. Indubitably and indisputably, Narayana Gounder executedEx.B12 the registered Will dated 14.06.1973 in favour of his grandsons, viz., Kumaravel, Soundararajan and Sundararajan, all sons ofDW3 Ramasamy, bequeathing his properties. However subsequently, byvirtue of Ex.B1, the registered cancellation deed dated 15.03.1982,the same Narayana Gounder cancelled Ex.B12, the Will on the soleground as revealed by the recitals contained therein that he did notwant to enforce the earlier Will, Ex.B12.23. Curiously and surprisingly, hardly two days after suchcancellation deed Ex.B1 dated 15.03.1982, Ex.B2 the allegedunregistered Will dated 17.03.1982 is purported to have emerged, atthe instance of Narayana Gounder in favour of DW3. But, Ex.B2 is nota registered one, even though after the alleged execution of Ex.B2on 17.03.1982, the said Narayana Gounder lived for nearly 14 monthsand died only on 17.05.1984.24. In this factual matrix, the evidence adduced on the side ofthe defendants has to be scrutinised and that too, in the light ofthe dicta as found enunciated in the various decisions of the Hon'bleApex Court and this Court.(i) 2005(1) SCC 40 [Daulat Ram and other vs. Sodha and others](ii)2005(1) SCC 280 [Meenakshiammal (Dead)through LRs. and others vs.Chandrasekaran and another] (iii)2005(1) CTC 443 [Sridevi and others vs. Jayaraja Shetty and others] https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (iv) 2005(1) L.W.455 [Janaki Devi vs.R.Vasanthi and 6 others](v)1989 (1) L.W.396 [Nagarajan and 3 others vs. Annammal](vi)AIR 1982 SC 133 [Smt.Indu Bala Bose and others vs. Manindra Chandra Bose and another](vii)AIR 1985 SC 500 [Satya Pal Gopal Das vs. Smt.Panchubala Dasiand others](viii)AIR 1991 Bom. 148 [Asber Reuben Samson and others v. Eillah Solomon and others](ix)2008(2) MLJ 119 [M.Anandan and others vs. A.Dakshinamoorthy](x) 2006(4) L.W.942 [Gurdev Kaur & others vs.Kaki & others](xi)2008(1) MLJ 1337 SC [Savithri and others vs.Karthyayani Amma and others](xii)2007(3) L.W.916 [1. J.Mathew (died) 2.J.Damien and 3 others vs. Leela Joseph]A few excerpts from some precedents would run thus:(i) 2001(3)CTC 283 [Corra Vedachalam Chetty and another vs.G.Jankiraman]. The aforesaid decision is on the point that the Court whileanalysing the Will is acting as a Court of conscience. An excerptfrom the above said decision would run thus:"26. This need for caution, cannot be exploited byunscrupulous caveators who choose to cull out imaginarysuspisions with a view to prevent the legatees under theWill from claiming the benefit thereunder and to renderthe last Will of the deceased wholly ineffective. In thiscontext, the conduct of the persons who raise the allegedground for suspision is also to be looked at, to know asto how credible are the grounds for suspisions sought tobe raised by such persons. In this case, the suspicion is https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ sought to be raised by a person who is keenly interestedin making the Will ineffective and whose conduct is farfrom one which would inspire confidence in truthfulness ofhis statements."(ii) 2003(1)CTC 308 [ Janki Narayan Bhoir vs. Narayan NamdeoKadam]. An excerpt from it would run thus:"8. To say will has been duly executed therequirements mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) ofSection 63 of the Succession Act are to be complied withi.e., (a) the testator has to sign or affix his mark to thewill, or it has got to be signed by some other person inhis presence and by his direction; (b) that the signatureor mark of the testator, or the signature of the personsigning at his direction, has to appear at a place fromwhich it could appear that by that mark or signature thedocument is intended to have effect as a will; (c) the mostimportant point with which we are presently concerned inthis appeal, is that the will has to be attested by two ormore witnesses and each of these witnesses must have seenthe testator sign or affix his mark to the Will, or musthave seen some other person sign the Will in the presenceand by the direction of the testator, or must have receivedfrom the testator a personal acknowledgement of signatureor mark, or of the signature of such other person, and eachof the witness has to sign the Will in the presence of thetestator.9. It is thus clear that one of the requirements ofdue execution of Will is its attestation by two or morewitnesses which is mandatory.10. Section 68 of the Evidence Act speaks as to how adocument required by law to be attested can be proved.According to the said Section, a document required by lawto be attested shall not be used as evidence until oneattesting witness at least has been called for the purposeof proving its execution, if there be an attesting witnessalive, and subject to the process of the Court and capableof giving an evidence. It flows from this Section that ifthere be an attesting witness alive capable of givingevidence and subject to the process of the Court, has to benecessarily examined before the document required by law tobe attested can be used in an evidence. On a combinedreading of Section 63 of the Succession Act with Section 68of the Evidence Act, it appears that a person propoundingthe Will has got to prove that the will was duly andvalidly executed. That cannot be done by simply proving https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ that the signature on the Will was that of the testator butmust also prove that attestations were also made properlyas required by clause (c) of Section 63 of the SuccessionAct. It is true that Section 68 of the Evidence Act doesnot say that both or all the attesting witnesses must beexamined. But at least one attesting witness has to becalled for proving due execution of the Will as envisagedin Section 63. Although Section 63 of the Succession Actrequires that a Will has to be attested at least by twowitnesses, Section 68 of the Evidence Act provides that adocument, which is required by law to be attested, shallnot be used as evidence until one attesting witness atleast has been examined for the purpose of the proving itsdue execution if such witness is alive and capable ofgiving evidence and subject to the process of the Court.In a way, Section 68 gives a concession to those who wantto prove and establish a will in a Court of law byexamining at least one attesting witness even though willhas to be attested at least by two witnesses mandatorilyunder Section 63 of the Succession Act. But what issignificant and to be noted is that that one attestingwitness examined should be in a position to prove theexecution of a will. To put in other words, if oneattesting witness can prove execution of the will in termsof the clause (c) of Section 63, viz., attestation by twoattesting witnesses in the manner contemplated therein, theexamination of other attesting witness can be dispensedwith. The one attesting witness examined, in this evidencehas to satisfy the attestation of a will by him and theother attesting witness in order to prove there was dueexecution of the Will. If the attesting witness examinedbesides his attestation does not, in his evidence, satisfythe requirements of attestation of the Will by otherwitness also it falls short of attestation of will at leastby two witnesses for the simple reason that the executionof the will does not merely mean the signing of it by thetestator but it means fulfilling and proof of all theformalities required under Section 63 of the SuccessionAct. Where one attesting witness examined to prove thewill under Section 68 of the Evidence Act fails to provethe due execution of the Will then the other availableattesting witness has to be called to supplement hisevidence to make it complete in all respects. Where oneattesting witness is examined and he fails to prove theattestation of the Will by other witness there will bedeficiency in meeting the mandatory requirements of Section68 of the Evidence Act."(iii) An excerpt from one other decision reported in 1995 (II)CTC 476 [Kashibai and another vs. Parwatibai and others] would run https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ thus:"10. This brings us to the question of the willalleged to have been executed by deceased Lachiram infavour of his grand-son Purshottam, the defendant No.3.Section 68 of Evidence Act related to the proof ofexecution of document required by law to be attested.Admittedly, a Deed of Will is one of such documents whichnecessarily required by law to be attested. Section 68of the Evidence Act contemplates that if a document isrequired by law to be attested, it shall not be used asevidence until the attesting witness at least has beencalled for the purpose of proving its execution, if therebe an attesting witness alive, and subject to the processof the Court and capable of giving evidence. A readingof Section 68 will show that "attestation" and"execution" are two different acts one following theother. There can be valid execution of a document whichunder the law is required to be attested without theproof of its due attestation and if due attestation isalso not proved, the fact of execution is of no avail.Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 also laysdown certain rules with (C) of Section 63 provides thatthe Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses eachone of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his markto the Will or has seen some other person sign the Will,in the presence and and by the direction of the testator,or has received from the testator a personalacknowledgement of his signature of mark of the suchother person; and each of the witnesses should sign theWill in the presence of the testator, but it shall not benecessary that more than one witness be present at thesame time and no particular form of attestation shall benecessary.(iv) AIR 2007 SC 2219 (Apoline D'Souza v. John D' Souza. Anexcerpt from it would run thus:"20. The ratio of the said decision does not assistthe appellant, as the mode and manner of proof of dueexecution of a Will indisputably will depend upon the factsand circumstances of each case. It is for the propounder ofthe Will to remove the suspicious circumstances, which hasnot been done in this case."25. A bare perusal of the aforesaid decisions wouldunambiguously and unequivocally, pellucidly and palpably, highlightand spotlight that the propounder of the Will has to prove the Willstrictly by way of dispelling the suspicious circumstances and itwould be all the more important, when the Will concerned is havingthe effect of favouring one of the legal heirs to the exclusion of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the other legal heirs of the testators. 26. Obvious and axiomatic, as it is that Narayana Gounder diedleaving behind his son Ramasamy Gounder DW2 (D3) and his threedaughters, viz., Muthaiyammal and Velaiammal, the plaintiffs 1 and 2and D2 Lakshmiammal. If Ex.B2 is a true one, it would have theeffect of depriving all the female heirs from claiming share in thesuit properties. Hence, as per the dicta found exemplified in thevarious decisions referred to supra, the propounder of the Will DW3was bound to prove the Will strictly. Over and above that, there isalso one other suspicious circumstance, which could glaringly benoticeable.27. Ex.B2, the alleged unregistered Will emerged hardly two daysafter Ex.B1, the registered cancellation deed. The pertinent questionarises as to why, Narayana Gounder did not make Ex.B2 itself a deedof cancellation cum fresh Will. It is not uncommon on the part of atestator to cancel the earlier Will and execute a fresh Will byvirtue of one document. It is also to be noticed that Ex.B2 emergedhardly two days after Ex.B1 as an unregistered Will. Hence, in thesecircumstances, the evidence of D.Ws.1, 2 and 3 should be scrutinisedin depth. DW3 (D2) would try to expound and explain that NarayanaGounder cancelled the earlier Will Ex.B12 by executing Ex.B1 as thetestator felt that DW3's sons who were the beneficiaries underEx.B12 did not behave with the testator properly. The relevantexcerpt from the deposition of DW3 would run thus: @gpujpthjpfs; jfg;gdhhplk; rhptu ele;J bfhs;shjjhy; vd;Dila bgaUf;FjpUj;jp capiy vGjpdhh;/ ,e;j brhj;Jf;fs; vy;yhtw;iwa[k; vdJ jfg;gdhh; ,we;jgpd;dpl;L fwhh; bra;J vdJ kfd;fsplk; bfhLj;J tpl;nld;/@Whereas, DW1, Kanthaswamy, the scribe of Ex.B2 in his depositionwould project the intention of Narayana Gounder as though he did notwant to bequeath his properties to anyone. An excerpt from hisdeposition is extracted here under: @jd;Dila brhj;Jf;fis capy; K:yk; ahUf;Fk; ghj;jpag;gLj;j tpUk;gtpy;iy vd;WKd;dpl;l capiy uj;J bra;jhh;/@28. At this juncture, the core question arises as to whatactuated and accentuated, propelled and impelled Narayana Gounderallegedly to execute Ex.B12 the Will, hardly two days after thecancellation deed Ex.B1. It could be an educated guess of any manhaving head over shoulder that a person who intended his son to bethe beneficiary of his property and that his grand sons should not bethe beneficiaries under the earlier Will, while executing a freshWill would narrate those facts and execute the Will in favour of hisson. But, in this case, it was not done so. Absolutely, there is no https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ iota or morsel, shard or shred, speck or dot of evidence as to whattranspired between the execution of Ex.B1 and Ex.B2, so to say,within that short span of two days. As such, the suspiciouscircumstances have not been dispelled by the propounder of the WillDW3.29. The one other suspicious circumstance is that DW1,Kandhasamy, the scribe would depose, as though Narayana Gounderhimself stated that for want of funds, he could not get Ex.B2 theWill registered immediately and that four days thereafter, the samecould be got registered. Had really, what Kandhasamy stated wastrue, absolutely, there could have been no rhyme or reason on thepart of the testator not to get Ex.B2 registered, despite thetestator lived for 14 long months after the alleged execution ofEx.B2. It is therefore a serious suspicious circumstance, relatingto the very emergence of Ex.B2 on 17.03.1982 and that too whenspecifically, the case of the plaintiffs is to the effect that onlyas an after thought and that too, at the time of exchange of notices,DW3 managed to concoct Ex.B2. An excerpt from the deposition of DW3in this regard would run thus:@ .....jfg;gdhh; fhhpaj;jd;W vd; mk;kh xU fhapjk; bfhz;L te;J bfhLj;jhh;fs;/mg;nghJ jhd; gp/2 Ig; gw;wp vdf;F bjhpa[k;/@ @vd; nghpy; ,uz;L Vf;fuh jdpahf epyk; th';fpa[s;nshk;/ g{h;tPf brhj;J 1 Vf;fh; 97brz;l; epyk; nghf ghf;fp epy';fs; vd; jfg;gdhh; Rahh;$pjkhf rk;ghjpj;j brhj;J/@ ///// vd; jfg;gdhh; ,we;j gpd;dpl;L 3 k; ehs; fhhpak; nghJ gpujpthjpfSk; vd;cwtpdh;fs; te;J ,Ue;jhh;fs;/ me;j rkaj;jpy; vd; jhahh; gPnuhtpy; ,Ue;J xU fhfpjk;Mtzk; cs;sJ mJ vd;d btd;W ghh; vd;W vd;dplk; fhz;gpj;jdh;/ mij ehd; th';fpgoj;Jg; ghh;j;njhk;/ 3k; ehs; fhhpak; nghJ jhd; gp/2 capy; gw;wp bjhpa te;jJ/ gp/1gj;jpuj;ij uj;J bra;J 2 ehl;fs; fHpj;J gp/2 gj;jpuk; vGjp ,Ue;jhh;/ gp/2 gj;jpuk; vd;bgaUf;F vGjg;gl;L ,Ue;jJ/ gp/2 capypy; vd; jhahUf;Fk; rhg;ghl;ow;F ve;j tHp tifa[k;bra;atpy;iy/ v';fSf;F thof;ifahf gj;jpuk; vGJk; fe;jrhkp gps;is jhd; gp/2 capy;vGjpdhh;/ ehd; gp/2 gj;jpuj;ij vLj;Jf; bfhz;L ngha; fe;jrhkp gps;is ,lk; nfl;nld;/gp/2 capy; ghh;g;gjw;F Kd;ng gyKiw ehd; fe;jrhkp gps;is re;jpj;J cs;nsd;/ me;jrka';fspy; vd; jfg;gdhh; capy; vGjp itj;Js;s tpguk; gw;wp vd;dplk; fe;jrhkp gps;isbrhy;ytpy;iy/@//////@capy; vGjpa njjpa Kjy; vd; jfg;gdhh; ,wf;Fk; njjp tiu ehd;. vd; jhahh;.jfg;gdhh; Mfpnahh; xd;whfj; jhd; trpj;J te;njhk;/ vd; jfg;gdhh; ,wf;Fk; tiu vd;kfd; nghpy; ,Ue;j capiy uj;J bra;J tpl;L vd; bgahpy; capy; vGjp itj;j tpguj;ijvd;dplk; brhy;ytpy;iy/ vd; jfg;gdhh; ,wf;Fk; njjp tiu vdf;Fk;. vd; jfg;gdhUf;Fk;tUj;jk; vJt[k; fpilahJ/@From the above excerpts, what this Court could understand is thataccording to DW3, the propounder of the Will, was not at all aware https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ of the Will, at the time of its emergence; only after the death ofNarayana Gounder when his mother produced Ex.B2 on the third dayobsequies ceremony of his father Narayana Gounder, he came to knowabout it. Whereas, DW2 Natesan, during cross examination would statethus://////// @ehd; ehuhaz ft[z;lh; ,we;j mLj;j ehs; ,st[f;F ngha; ,Ue;njd;/ehd; jpUk;gp tUk; nghJ. 3 k; gpujpthjp vd; gpd;dhy; te;J v';f mg;gh capy; vGjpitj;jpUe;jhuhnk mjpy; eP rhl;rp ifbaGj;J nghl;oUf;fpwPh;fsh vd;W nfl;lhh;/ Vd;te;J vd;dplk; 3 k; gpujpthjp capiyg; gw;wp nfl;lhh; vd;W vdf;F bjhpahJ/ 3 k;gpujpthjpf;F mth; jfg;gdhh; capy; vGjp itj;j tpguk; bjhpa[k;/@30. A bare comparison of the deposition of DW3 with DW2 wouldindicate that DW2 has not come forward with truth relating to thetime at which, DW3 came to know about Ex.B2, the Will. DW2, is nonebut the close relative of DW3. Even though DW2 would claim that ason the date of attesting, he was not so close to the family of DW3;nonetheless, he would admit that subsequently, DW2's sister'sdaughter was given marriage to D6, who is the son of D3. But onefact is clear that as on the date of deposing before the Court, DW2happened to be the close relative of DW3 and that fact should not belost sight of and consequently he could be labelled as an interestedwitness. DW3 also would candidly state that as of now, his sonsincluding D6 are only enjoying the property and not himself.31. The fact also remains that there is no reference to Ex.B2 inEx.A1, which is a partition deed, emerged on 05.12.1985 amongNarayana Gounder's wife deceased Nanjammal (D1) and D2 to D6 relatingto the suit properties. Had really Ex.B2 emerged in the form of aWill, which was presented before the Court, certainly, it would havefound a place in Ex.A1. Even though in Ex.A1, there is reference toEx.B12, the earlier Will and the cancellation deed Ex.B1,nonetheless, there is no reference to Ex.B2; for which DW3unconvincingly and incoherently would dish out a plea as though ifEx.B2 was referred to in Ex.B1 that would have lead to confusion andobfuscation. An excerpt from DW3's deposition would run thus: @bghJ brhj;J vd;W fwhhpy; vGjpf; bfhLf;f ntz;Lk; vd;W rhh;gjpthsh;brhd;dhh;/ capiy fhl;odhh; rpf;fy; tUfpwJ/ fpiuak; khjphp vGj ntz;o tUk;mjw;fhf capiy fhl;odhy; epiwa !;lhk;g; xl;o tUk; vd;W brhd;dhh;/ bghJ brhj;jhfvGjpdhy; ey;yJ vd;W brhd;djpdhy; capiy fhl;ltpy;iy/@32. I am at a loss to understand as to how, if Ex.B2 wasreferred to Ex.A1, that would have lead to perplexity. 33. The explanation offered by DW3 for non-specification of D2in Ex.A1 as found above is obviously and axiomatically unconvincingand it is not a supposable explanation. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

34. Hence, there is considerable force in the plea of theplaintiffs that Ex.B2 emerged as an after thought.35. The marshalling of relevant facts and the availableevidence would glaringly demonstrate and exemplify that instead ofDW3 dispelling the suspicious circumstances, contributed moresuspicion relating to emergence of Ex.B1 and no more elaboration inthis regard is required.36. DW1, the scribe would depose that serendipitously, thetestator Narayana Gounder picked him up while the former was going toVinayagar temple and he was taken by Narayana Gounder to histhatched shed and he expressed his desire to execute a Will and thattoo, after two days from the emergence of Ex.B1, the saidcancellation deed and these versions would project as to how DW1 hasnot come forward with truth. It is just and necessary to extracthere under the relevant portion during cross examination of DW1.@ehuhaz ft[z;lUf;F mg;nghJ 80 taJ ,Uf;Fk;/ Kjph;e;j taJ/ jw;brayhfmtiu re;jpj;j nghJ mtUila bfhl;lha;f;F brd;W m';F vGjpndd;/ bfhl;lha;f;Fk;mtiu re;jpj;j ,lj;jpw;F 4 gh;yh'; J}uk; ,Uf;Fk;/ jdpahf te;jnghJ vd;id re;jpj;jhh;/bfhl;lhapy; mg;nghJ ehd; m';F brd;w nghJ mtiuj; jtpu ntW ahUk; ,y;iy/ ehd;fhiyapy; nfhapy; nghFk; nghJk; ngdh bfhz;L brd;nwd;/ nfhtpy; brd;w nghJ fhiy8/30 kzp ,Uf;Fk;/ ngg;gh; mtnu itj;jpUe;jhh;/ capiy jahh; bra;a[k; nghJ brhj;Jgj;jpunkh ntW gj;jpunkh vd;dplk; mth; jutpy;iy/@ The above excerpt coupled with the earlier discussion would leave nodoubt in the mind of the Court that the narration of DW1, the scriberelating to execution of Ex.B2, is stranger than fiction. Thetestator at the relevant time was an octagenarian and had he reallyintended to execute the Will, it is doubtful, as to how, he couldhave by chance picked the scribe four furlongs away from his shed andbrought him to his shed and provided him with paper for writing theWill. In fact, as per the evidence available on the defendants'side, the testator wanted the Will also to be registered within fourdays but in reality, it was not registered. Relating to securing thepresence of witnesses, once again the circumstances delineated byDW1, the scribe and DW2 one of the attesting witnesses, who isapparently an interested witness, is far from convincing. DW1 wouldstate that from the shed itself, he showed signs to attestingwitnesses and secured their presence and that they attested the Will.37. At this juncture, I would like to highlight that there isnot even a supposable or believable case – not to talk of a strongcase. Hence, it is just and necessary to refer to Ex.B2, which isniggardly worded and found written in one page. No one would everventure to write such a solemn document and that too in thecircumstances cited supra, in that cryptic manner. Relating to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ description of property, the following words alone are found writtenthere: @vd; FLk;g brhj;jpy; nkw;go vd; kfdpd; ghj;jpak; nghf vdf;Fs;s ghjpghj;jpaj;ij ,jd; K:yk; capy; gpwg;gpj;J ,Uf;fpnwd;@.@nryk; o ehkfphpg;ngl;il rg;o mhpah ft[z;lk;gl;o fpuhkj;jpy; vdf;F ghj;jpag;gl;lghjp brhj;J g{uht[k; vdf;Fs;s nythnjtp g{uht[k; ,e;j capYf;F rk;ke;jg;gl;lJ/@38. D.W.1, the scribe himself would depose as under://///////////// @rhl;rpfs; ve;j Ch; vd;gJ vdf;F bjhpahJ/ mth;fSila jfg;gdhh; bgah;. Ch;ehd; vGjtpy;iy/ rhl;rpfs; ve;j ngdhtpy; ifbaGj;J nghl;lhh;fs; vd;W vdf;FbjhpahJ/@It is apparently clear that DW1 without minching words deposed thatit was not he who put the respective fathers' names of the witnessesin Ex.B2, but in it, the respective fathers' names of the witnessesare found mentioned; and DW1 could not say as to who wrote like that.It is not the case of DW1 that the witnesses themselves had put theirrespective fathers' names besides their signatures. He would alsoanswer that he didn't know with which, pen the witnesses signed. Assuch, all these discrepancies in the evidence of DW1 lend support tothe case of the plaintiffs that witnesses have not signed in thepresence of the scribe, even though the scribe would claim that thetestator and the witnesses had all signed after each one of themseeing the other signing. DW2, Natesan, would state that he did notsee the scribe putting his signature in Ex.B2. It is also pertinentto note that in the entire deposition of DW1 Kanthasamy, there is noassertion by DW1 that he signed Ex.B2 even though in Ex.B2 onesignature is found as one that of the scribe. In fact, during crossexamination, DW1 stated thus:@gj;jpuj;jpy; vGjpaJk; rhl;rpa[k; vd;W nghltpy;iy@As such DW1 does not speak about his signature at all. 39. The basic requirement in a scribe's deposition is that heshould identify his signature in the document scribed by him. But,his deposition is conspicuous of its missing and adding fuel to thefire, DW2 would narrate that he didn't see the scribe signing. Ashas been already pointed out supra, there is no evidence much less,clinching evidence to demonstrate as to who put the respectivefathers' names of the witnesses. In one breath, DW1 would claimthat only with his pen, the witnesses put their signature and inanother breath he would say that he didn't know with which pen, theyput their signatures. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

40. DW2 also in his deposition would not state as to who putthe father's name of the first attesting witness Kakkaverry Ramasamy.These are all serious lacuna in proving the Will. D2 in her writtenstatement would contend as though the plaintiffs got married one andthe same person and that made Narayana Gounder to develop crochetyand itchy as against his daughters, the plaintiffs; whereupon heexecuted the Will Ex.B12; thereafter he cancelled it by Ex.B1 Willand thereat he executed Ex.B2 Will in favour of D3. According to D2,the factum of Narayana Gounder having executed Ex.B2 was known to herand that she also informed the plaintiffs about it. If that be thecase, it is not known as to how D3- Ramasamy could plead totalignorance about the execution of the Will by Narayana Gounder in hisfavour, till his mother handed over the same to him on the third dayof his father's death. As such, the versions as found set out in thewritten statement of D2 do not go hand in hand with the versionsfound in the written statement of D3 also.41. Hence, in these circumstances, it cannot be held thatEx.B2, the " Will" was proved as per law. The perusal of thejudgment of the trial Court, to say the least, is far fromsatisfactory as without adverting to the aforesaid serious lacuna inthe evidence relating to proving of the Will, it held as though theWill was proved. The trial Court was expected to apply its mind onthe suspicious circumstances as highlighted supra, thereat thelearned Judge should have looked for evidence, which are capable ofdispelling such suspicions. However, the trial Court resorted to thedubious approach of blindly believing the version of D.Ws.1 and 2coupled with the version of DW3 and simply recorded the finding infavour of DW3. As such, the findings of the trial Court relating tothe validity of Ex.B2 is liable to be set aside and accordingly, thesame is set aside.42. Accordingly, Point No.1 is decided in favour of theplaintiffs that DW3 the propounder of the Will has not proved Ex.B2.Point Nos.2,3 and 4:43. These points are inter-linked and interwoven, interconnectedand inter-twined with one another and hence taken together fordiscussion.44. The contention of D3 that as per Ex.B9, the "D" form patta,the Government allotted the land bearing Survey No.339/1, measuring 4acres and 55 cents as his exclusive property, runs counter to his ownadmission made in his deposition that all the suit properties weretreated as joint family properties.45. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs would cite thedecision of this Court reported in 2006 (4) L.W.798 (Mrs.Bagirathi https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ and 5 others vs. S.Manivanna and another) and an excerpt from itwould run thus:"11. This submission ignores the basic principle thatthe superstructure was a joint family property so far asSundaraja Naicker and his two sons are concerned. Eventhough Sundaraja Naicker was sued as the ostensible tenantit must be taken that he was being sued on behalf of thejoint family consisting of himself and two male members aswell as other male members of the family and, therefore, thepurchase of land under Section 9 of the City TenantsProtection Act by the father, who was obviously representingthe family must be treated as purchase on behalf of theentire joint family and not in his individual capacity.Therefore, the purchase of such land under City TenantsProtection Act enured to the benefit of the entire jointfamily and it cannot be said that Sundaraja Naicker hadbecome the separate owner of the land and the members of thejoint family continued to be joint owners in respect of thesuperstructure standing on the land. This submission istherefore destined to be rejected."46. It is therefore crystal clear from the reading of theaforesaid judgment that simply because one member of the joint familyacquired right over the immovable property by invoking the Statutoryprovision, automatically he cannot be termed as the absolute owner ofit when the evidence on record speaks to the contrary.47. The decision reported in 2000 (2) MLJ 538 (Sankaranarayananvs. Dhandapani and others) as cited by the learned counsel for theappellant/plaintiff would run thus:"20. In Mt.Bahu Rani v.Rajendra Baksh, AIR 1933 P.C72, a grant was made to two brothers and the questionthat arose for consideration before the Privy Councilwas, whether the grant is taken by the two brothers asjoint tenants or an tenants in common. At page 75 of thereports, it was held thus:"Prima facie a gift to a member of ajoint Hindu family is his separate propertyand will only become joint family propertywhen it descends to his sons, unless hehimself has made it joint family property bythrowing it into the common stock. There isnothing in the terms of these maintenancegrants to these two brothers to suggest thatthe Government intended to make a grant to ajoint family" (Italics supplied). https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

21. In Dattatraya Sitaram v. Shankar Mahadji, AIR1938 Bom.250 and 251, their Lordships relied on KatamaNatchiar's case, 9 M.I.A. 539 and held thus:"It is well established that there isnothing to prevent a member of a joint familyfrom obtaining a grant form Government forhis own benefit: Katama Natchiar's case, 9M.I.A.539. Whether such a grant ensures forthe benefit of the family of which he is amember must, as their Lordships of the PrivyCouncil have held, depend upon the terms ofthe grant; 25 I.A. 195. It is also open tosuch a person to treat, what initially washis separate property, as joint familyproperty; and it is equally possible for thefamily to prove that the consideration paidto Government for the grant originallyproceeded from the family funds. In eitherof these case though initially the grant wasthe separate property of the grantee, theproperty would acquire the character of jointfamily property in which according Hindu Law,the other coparceners would be equallyinterested". (Italics supplied).22. From the above decisions, it is clear thatprima facie, plaintiff is the absolute owner of theproperty and the document does not disclose that it isintended for the benefit of the joint family. As statedearlier, plaintiff is the youngest son of late RamaswamyPillai. The only reason that is mentioned in the writtenstatement to get patta in the name of the plaintiff isthat their father asked the Government to assign the landin favour of the plaintiff to avoid the land being takenover by the Government under the provisions of LandCeiling Act. There is absolutely nothing on record toshow that the family had any property in excess of theceiling area and how the assignment in favour of theplaintiff will help the family to get away from theclutches of Land Ceiling Act it they had excess land.While DW1 was examined he said thus:@mJ g[wk;nghf;F jhpR epyk;/ ic& g[wk;nghf;F epyj;jpy; gl;lhbfhLg;gth;fSf;F ntW epyk; ,Uf;ff;TlhJ/ vd; mg;gh. Rnfhjuh; nghpy; epyk; ,Ue;jjhy; vd; jk;gp ngUf;F gl;lh th';fg;gl;lJ@/So the version of DW1 is entirely different from what hehas stated in the written statement." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ It is clear from the above precedent that even though in the normalcircumstances, the grant given by the Government would enure to thebenefit of the person in whose favour it is granted, nonetheless, ifthe grantee treats it as the joint family property, then the otherco-parceners also would be having equal right in it.48. In view of the supine and categorical admission made by DW3himself that all the suit properties are the self-acquired propertiesincluding the one granted under Ex.B9, the "D" patta, this Courtcould have no hesitation in holding that all the properties are theco-parcenery properties of Narayana Gounder and Ramasamy.49. The learned counsel for DW3 would argue that the suitproperties situated in Survey Nos.189/3, 167/4 and 159/4 are all theself-acquired properties of D3. He would also develop his argumentto the effect that the mill situated in the ancestral property, whichNarayana Gounder obtained in the partition from his original co-parcenery, happened to be the exclusive property of D3 for the reasonthat he after getting funds from his mother-in-law made suchconstruction. 50. In the written statement filed by D3 at para No.3, hecandidly and categorically, without minching words made a supinesubmission to the effect that in the admitted ancestral propertybearing Survey No.159/2, the mill was constructed and from out of theincome derived from the said Mill, some of the suit properties werepurchased in the name of Narayana Gounder. However, he wouldunsuccessfully contend that the said Mill was put up only from out ofthe funds, which he got from his mother-in-law, but to buttress andfortify the same, there is no morsel or modicum of evidence adducedby the defendants.51. It is a trite proposition of law that even if the self-acquired income/ property of a co-parcenery is put into a commonhotch-pot of the co-parcenery, then, it would also be treated as co-parcenery property. I could see no rhyme or reason in the contentionof D3 as to why from such alleged income of the Mill, certain suitproperties should be purchased in the name of the father and certainother properties should be purchased in the name of Ramaswamy (D3).If really only from out of the Mill income, the suit propertiesexcept the land in Survey No.159/2 were purchased then, D3-Ramaswamycould have purchased all the properties in his own name. 52. It is therefore crystal clear that the plea of D3 does notcarry conviction with the Court. But on the other hand, the veryfacts that some of the properties were purchased in the name ofNarayana Gounder and some other properties were purchased in the nameof Ramasamy and that too, when admittedly, till the death of NarayanaGounder, both Narayana Gounder and Ramaswamy lived together in one https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ and the same house as co-parceners are indicative of the fact thatall the properties are co-parcenery properties.53. In Ex.A1 the partition deed dated 05.12.1985, there is noreference to Ex.B2 Will, but only in Ex.A3, the reply notice by thedefendants, there is reference to Ex.B2 and for which also there isno supposable and believable, acceptable and legally agreeableexplanation.54. The learned counsel for the appellant/second plaintiff wouldappositely and appropriately, correctly and convincingly would arguethat even assuming that as per the contention of D3 that with thealleged separate funds he purchased and developed properties andtreated them as the joint property, then it should be taken that theentire property including the one claimed to be the exclusiveproperty, should be made available for the benefit of all the co-parceners. There is also no piece of evidence much less reliableevidence to evince and indicate that D3 purchased the properties inhis name from out of his own income. 55. It is the admitted case on the defendant's side thatNarayana Gounder himself from out of the income derived from theadmitted ancestral properties purchased various other propertiesfound set out in the description of the suit properties. In such acase, it is not known as to how, it could be visualised that theadmitted ancestral property as well as the subsequent propertiesacquired by Narayana Gounder were not yielding sufficient income soas to enable the co-parcenery to acquire the lands in other surveynumbers, over which D3 is claiming exclusively right. It is not thecase of either of the parties that over and above the agriculturalincome and the income derived from the said mill, the family had anyother income.56. There is also one other plausible argument available on theside of the appellant/second plaintiff that D3 himself admitted evenat the time of emergence of Ex.B12, the registered Will that theproperties were all co-parcenery properties, whereupon the concept ofself-acquisition of properties by one of the members had no place inthis case.57. In Ex.B12, the Will dated 14.06.1973, the propertiescontemplated under Ex.B7 the sale deed dated 04.03.1974, whichemerged in the name of DW3, did not find a place in view of theobvious reason that those properties were acquired subsequent to theemergence of Ex.B12. In Ex.A1 also, D3 and others clearly spelt outthat all the properties are co-parcenery properties by the followingwords:@brhj;Jf;fs; KGtJk; ek;k FLk;gj;Jf;F gpJuhh;$pjkhft[k;. Rahh;$pjkhft[k;.ghj;jpag;gl;l FLk;g bghJ brhj;Jf;fs; MfpwJ/@ https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ The fact also remains that first plaintiff Muthayammal executed thesale deed Ex.B6 dated 22.10.1970 in favour of her father NarayanaGounder selling the land bearing Survey No.363/3B1 of the suitproperties and as per the sale deed Ex.B8 dated 10.07.1972 thesecond plaintiff Valliyammal effected the sale in favour of herfather Narayana Gounder, a portion of the suit properties bearingsurvey No.336/5 and those properties sold under Exs.B6 and B8 wereoriginally belonged to Muthaiyammal and Valliyammal and after suchsales, those properties also became the co-parcenery property ofNarayana Gounder and after the death of Narayana Gounder, theplaintiffs being the daughters are entitled to their shares in theshare of Narayana Gounder.58. Accordingly, Point Nos.2, 3 and 4 are decided in favour ofthe plaintiffs as above.Point Nos.5 & 6:59. The ratiocination adhered to in deciding the aforesaidpoints would indicate that all the suit properties under the "B"scheduled properties are the co-parcenery properties of the co-parcenery comprised of Narayana Gounder and Ramasamy Gounder; sinceNarayana Gounder is held to have died intestate, his half share inthe co-parcenery is deemed to have devolved of his son Ramasamy D3and his three daughters, viz., the first plaintiff, the secondplaintiff and D2 equally. Accordingly, the half share of NarayanaGounder should be divided into ¼ th share each in favour of his saidfour children and consequently, the plaintiffs 1 and 2 would get 1/8th share each in the entire suit properties.60. The logic and reason adopted in adjudging the "B" Scheduledimmovable properties shall also be applicable to the "C" scheduledmovable properties. It appears there is scanty and meagre evidenceavailable regarding "C" scheduled properties and during final decreeproceedings evidence are permitted to be adduced by the partiesconcerned and accordingly, the final decree shall follow. 61. The trial Court in the judgment at para No.20 gave itsfinding about the valuation of the suit properties. In my opinion,only during final decree proceedings, the actual value of theproperties should be gone into after entertaining evidence from bothsides and as such, the findings of the trial Court in para No.20under Issue No.5 also is liable to be set aside.62. In the result, the judgment and decree of the trial Court isset aside and the preliminary decree is passed in respect of the suitproperties allotting 1/8 th share each in favour of the first andsecond plaintiffs and D2 is entitled to another 1/8 th share and theremaining share belongs to D3. The plaintiffs are at liberty to apply https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ for final decree praying for the routine and usual reliefs aspermissible in a partition decree, in addition to their right toapply under Order 20 Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, forgetting assessed the mesne profits and for awarding the same as perlaw. Regarding the valuation of properties, the parties are atliberty to adduce evidence during final decree proceedings andaccordingly obtain verdict before the trial Court.63. Point Nos.5 and 6 are answered accordingly.64. In the result, the appeal is allowed. However, there shallbe no order as to costs.Sd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.Registrarvj2ToThe subordinate Judge, Namakkal1 cc To Mr.D.Shivakumaran, Advocate, SR.28551 cc To Mr.K.Sivakumaran, Advocate, SR.3057A.S.No.758 of 1999SSN(CO)SRA(10/02/2009)