Musa Fakruddin Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.

Judgment

1. Civil Application No. 1263/2018, is by the appellant for condonation of delay of 6 years and restoration of Second Appeal No. 404/2003 which stands abated for not bringing LRs. of Respondent No. 4 and 8 on record.   Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were the defendants in the suit.  Respondent No. 3 has died and 904 - CAS. 1262-18.odt his legal heirs are brought on record.  Since Respondent No. 4 – Elahi Fakruddin Shaikh and Respondent No.8 Yusuf Fakruddin Shaikh are real brothers of the applicant, he cannot say that he was not aware about the death of Respondent No. 3.

2. Learned advocate for the applicant has relied on   P. B. Devaswom Vs. Bhargavi Amma : [2009(2) Mh.L.J. 1.   In this   case,   second   appeal   was   filed   in   1993.     The   Appellant   – Managing Committee, then existing was changed in 2003.  The Committee   came   to   know   about   pendency   of   appeal   from   its lawyer on 7.9.2003.   The new Committee filed application for condonation   of   delay   of   394   days   in   bringing   legal   heirs   of respondent on record.  The Apex Court observed that appeal was in   suspended   animation,   as   it   could   not   reach   the   stage   of hearing.  The Appellant was not aware about the death and the advocate for the respondent had not communicated about the death   as   per   Order   22,   Rule   10A   of   C.P.C.     The   Apex   Court observed that the appellant cannot be punished for ignorance of death of the respondent.  The Apex Court observed as follows: 904 - CAS. 1262-18.odt “8. The principles applicable in considering applications for setting aside  abatement  may thus  be summarized as follows : The   words   "sufficient   cause   for   not   making   the (i) application   within   the   period   of   limitation"   should   be understood   and   applied   in   a   reasonable,   pragmatic, practical   and   liberal   manner,   depending   upon   the   facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words   `sufficient   cause'   in   section   5   of   Limitation   Act should   receive   a   liberal   construction   so   as   to   advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bonafides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant. (ii) In considering the reasons for condonation of delay, the courts are more liberal with reference to applications for setting aside  abatement, than  other cases. While  the court   will   have   to   keep   in   view   that   a   valuable   right accrues   to   the   legal   representatives   of   the   deceased respondent when the appeal abates, it will not punish an appellant with foreclosure  of the appeal, for unintended lapses. The courts tend to set aside abatement and decide the matter on merits, rather than terminate the appeal on the ground of abatement. (iii)  The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is not the   length   of   delay,   but   sufficiency   of   a   satisfactory explanation. (iv)  The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by a court depends on the nature of application and facts and circumstances of the case. For example, courts view delays in making applications in a pending appeal more leniently than delays in the institution of an appeal. The courts view applications relating to lawyer's lapses more leniently than 904 - CAS. 1262-18.odt applications   relating   to   litigant's   lapses.   The   classic example   is   the   difference   in   approach   of   courts   to applications for condonation of delay in filing an appeal and applications for condonation of delay in refiling the appeal after rectification of defects. (v)  Want of `diligence' or `inaction' can be attributed to an appellant only when something required to be done by him, is not done. When nothing is required to be  done, courts do not expect the appellant to be diligent. Where an appeal is admitted by the High Court and is not expected to be listed for final hearing for a few years, an appellant is not expected to visit the court or his lawyer every few weeks to ascertain the position nor keep checking whether the contesting respondent is alive. He merely awaits the call or information from his counsel about the listing of the appeal.

3. In   the   present   case,   the   above   ruling   will   not   be applicable as the respondents are real brothers and the appellant cannot say that he was not aware about the death since he has not taken steps to bring on record the legal heirs.   The appeal was in suspended animation.  The delay cannot be condoned on

the principles of equity.   In this regard,   Learned advocate Mr. Tajane, for Respondent No. 3A relied on  Katari Suryanarayan Vs. Koppisetti Subba Rao :   (2009) 11 SCC  183.  There  was a   delay   of   2381   days   and   2601   in   bringing     legal   heirs 904 - CAS. 1262-18.odt of Respondent No. 2 and 3 respectively. It is observed that: “13.  In   the   instant   case   parties   were   neighbours   and hence,   difficult to appreciate that the appellant was not aware of the dates of death of the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3.   Besides, it is difficult to conceive that the petitioners were not in touch with their learned advocates from 1999 to December 2006. If not every week, they are expected to contact   their   lawyers   once   in   a  year.   Ignorance   of   legal consequence   without   something   more   would,   in   our opinion, be not sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Appellants are literates and had been litigating for a long time.”

5. I   find   that   this   ruling   is   squarely   applicable.     The issue   whether   death   of   Respondent   No.   4   and   8   resulted   in abatement,   will   be   considered   later.     If   their   presence   was necessary, on their death, legal heirs should have been brought within time.  For the above reasons, Civil Application No. 1263 of 2018 deserves to be rejected and is accordingly rejected.

6. The applicant in Civil Application No. 1262 of 2018 is   unsuccessful   plaintiff.    He   had   filed   two   suits,  viz.   Regular Civil   Suit   No.   218/1989   and   199/1989   in   the   Court   of   Civil Judge, S. D. Pandharpur. Both suits were in respect of the same land.  The plaintiff's predecessor had constructed a shed on the 904 - CAS. 1262-18.odt plot bearing No. 8, admeasuring 826.6 sq. ft. at village Akluj.  By order   dated   17.1.985   the   said   plot   was   allotted   to   father   of defendant   No.   3   and   the   Collector   passed   order   to   deliver possession of the said plot to defendant No. 3's father.  The said order was challenged in Regular Civil Suit No. 199/1989.   The appellant's   predecessor   filed   suit,   viz.   Regular   Civil   Suit   No. 218/1989 for perpetual injunction against the government that they should not remove the construction.  Both the suits came to be dismissed.  Two appeals were preferred against the judgment and decree of dismissal of both suits.   The decree of dismissal passed   in   R.C.S.   No.   199/1989   was   confirmed,   whereas   the decree in R.C.S. No. 218/1989 was modified.   It was held that the government has no right to remove the said structure, as the said   plot   was   already   allotted   to   father   of   defendant   No.   3. Therefore, injunction was granted against defendant Nos. 1 and 2   but   not   against   defendant   No.   3.     Thus,   appeal   was   partly allowed. Aggrieved by these judgment and orders, the appellant who   is   one   of   the   legal   heirs   of   plaintiff   filed   two   appeals. 904 - CAS. 1262-18.odt Second Appeal No. 404 of 2003 is filed against the judgment and decree of dismissal of R.C.S. No. 218/1989 and decree in the counter­claim therein and decision in appeal,  viz. Regular Civil Appeal No. 241 of 2000 dated 4th December, 2002.  Second Appeal   No.   405   of   2013   is   filed   against   the   confirmation   of judgment and decree in R.C.S. No. 199/1989 and judgment & order in Regular Civil Appeal No. 247 of 2000.

7. The   Appellant   had   engaged   advocate   Mr.   Milind Deshmukh in both matters.  Both the matters were admitted and both   the   matters   were   ripe   for   hearing.     By   order   dated

14.10.2012   there   was   a   direction   to   the   Appellant   to   file   the paper­book within three months from that date.  This order was not  complied.    The   said  order  disclose   that   if  the  paper­book would not be filed, the matter would stand dismissed, without referring   to   the   court.     Learned   advocate   Mr.   Tajane   submits that there was earlier order in 2003 for filing paper­book and this order was freshly passed.  The said order was not complied and both the appeals came to be dismissed.  When Respondent 904 - CAS. 1262-18.odt 3(a)   took   execution   proceeding,   the   appellant   learnt   about dismissal   of   his   Second   Appeal   No.   405/2003.     He   engaged another   advocate   Mr.   Surel   Shah,   who   filed   restoration application, being Civil Application No. 452/2013.   The paper­ book was filed in that matter and by order 26th March, 2013 the appeal  was  restored.     It   is  not   in   dispute   that   application   for restoration   of   Second   Appeal   No.   404/2003   could   have   been filed simultaneously alongwith the said application and if such application   would   have   been   filed,   it   would   have   been   also allowed.

8. Thereafter   Respondent   No.   3(a)   filed   application, being Civil Application No. 775/2015 for expediting hearing of Second   Appeal   No.   405/2003.     In   the   said   application,   he recorded   that   Second   Appeal   No.   404/2003   was   dismissed. Thus the appellant had a notice at least in 2015. Mr. Surel Shah submitted   that   normally   in   such   case,   he   does   not   object   for expeditious hearing and therefore, he did not read it and did not object it. The said application came to be allowed on 28.9.2015. 904 - CAS. 1262-18.odt Then, Second Appeal No. 405 of 2003 was listed before me on

17.06.2018, and at the time of hearing, learned advocate Mr. Tajane   raised   objection   that   dismissal   of   Second   Appeal   No. 404/2003 operates  as  res  judicata  with regard to  the  findings recorded by the lower courts, which have attained finality.  The same   will   have   an   adverse   effect   on   Second   Appeal   No. 405/2003 and it will not be maintainable.   Then on 6.9.2018 learned advocate Mr. Surel Shah took time, and filed this Civil Application No. 1262/2018 for restoration of Second Appeal No. 404/2003.  There is delay of 5 years and 8­9 days in filing this application.     Mr.   Surel   Shah   argued   that   as   soon   as   the Appellant came to know about dismissal of Second Appeal No. 405/2003, he had immediately taken steps for restoration of the same.  The order of submission of paper­book is communicated to   the   advocate,   and   advocate   Mr.   Deshmukh   did   not communicate the said fact to the appellant's previous advocate. Advocate Mr. Deshmukh was negligent and therefore, both the appeals   came   to   be   dismissed.     The   appellant   cannot   be 904 - CAS. 1262-18.odt punished for negligence  of his advocate.   When the appellant came to know about dismissal, he has changed his advocate and has got Second Appeal No. 405/2003 restored.  Somehow, it did not  strike  to him  that  Second Appeal No. 404/2003 was also required   to   be   restored.     Mr.   Shah   was   not   aware   about dismissal of another appeal, i.e. Second Appeal No. 404/2003 alongwith Second Appeal No. 405/2003 for the same reasons. Therefore,   no   such   application   was   filed   for   restoration   of Second Appeal No. 404/2003.   When this fact was brought to the notice by way of filing civil application by the defendant for expediting hearing in 2015, advocate Mr. Shah did not wish to oppose it, and therefore, did not read the contents.   Advocate Mr. Surel Shah relied on following judgments: (i) Kailpada Das Vs. Bimal Krishna Gupta : [(1983) 1 SCC 14].  In this case, the appeal was dismissed for not   supplying   paper­book   by   the   appellant.     The Apex Court observed that: “A procedural step is in aid of justice and not substantive   justice   itself.     Therefore,   penalty   on failure to comply with the court's order providing a procedural   stage   must   be   commensurate   with   or 904 - CAS. 1262-18.odt proportionate to the gravity of the lapse or omission. A   procedural   step   which   facilitates   hearing   of   the appeal cannot impede access to justice.   Supplying paper­books   is   a   procedural   requirement   and   the omission or lapse arising out of non compliance with the   court's   order   regarding   supply   of   paper­books was not of such a serious gravity as to dismiss the appeal.     If   the   High   Court   felt   that   the   appellants were trying to delay the hearing of the appeal and that   on   account   of   this   dilatory   tactics   the respondent­landlords   who   had   obtained   a   decree would suffer, it was open to that court to direct the respondents   to   get   the   paper­books   prepared   and impose the cost of the same on the appellants.   It was also open to the High Court to create a sanction behind its order by providing that if the paper­books were   not   supplied   in   time   the   interim   stay   of possession   would   be   vacated.     Instead   of   these permissible   modes   of  achieving  the   end,  thwarting the access to justice by imposing a disproportionate penalty of dismissal of the appeal by the High Court was not justified and therefore, must be interfered with.” (ii) Imratlal Vs. Collector (LA) : [(2014) 14 SCC 133]. In this case, there was delay of 1110 days for filing the appeal for enhancement of compensation.  It was recorded that the appellants were illiterate villagers and they are not conversant with intricacies of law. They  are   usually   guided   by   their   co­villagers,   who are   familiar   with   proceedings   in   the   courts   or   the advocates with whom they get in touch for redressal of their grievance. 904 - CAS. 1262-18.odt This ruling will not be applicable for the reason that the principles of condonation of delay in the matters of land acquisition compensation are totally different and are based on principles of equality that all the landholders   whose   lands   are   acquired   under   one notification   should   get   equal   compensation, depending on quality of their land.  The principles of condonation   of   delay   in   appeals   from   land acquisition   cases   cannot   be   considered   in condonation of delay other appeals. (iii) Rafiq Vs. Mnshilal : (1981) 2 SCC 788. There was Ex   parte   order   of   dismissal   of   appeal   for   non­ appearance   of   the   appellant's   advocate. The advocate filed an application for recalling the order and permission to participate in the hearing.  It was rejected on the ground of unexplained delay.  It was a case of short delay.   The affidavit was sworn on October 29, 1980, it was not presented to the court till November 12, 1980.   Thus, there was delay of only 14 days.  In the light of these facts, it has been observed that: “3.  The disturbing feature of the case is that under our present adversary legal system where the parties 904 - CAS. 1262-18.odt generally   appear   through   their   advocates,   the obligation   of   the   parties   is   to   select   his   advocate, brief him, pay the fees demanded by him and then trust   the   learned   advocate   to   do   the   rest   of   the things. The party may be a villager or may belong to a   rural   area   and   may   have   no   knowledge   of   the court's procedure. After engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer will look after his interest. At the time of the hearing of the appeal, the personal appearance of the party is not only not required but hardly useful. Therefore, the   party   having   done   everything   in   his   power   to effectively   participate   in   the   proceedings   can   rest assured that he has neither to go to the High Court to inquire as to what is happening in the High Court with   regard   to   his   appeal   nor   is   he   to   act   as   a watchdog of the advocate that the latter appears in the matter when it is listed. It is no part of his job. Mr. A.K. Sanghi stated that a practice has grown up in the High Court of Allahabad amongst the lawyers that   they   remain   absent   when   they   do   not   like   a particular   Bench.   Maybe   he   is   better   informed   on this matter. Ignorance in this behalf is our bliss.” (iv) R. B. Ramlingam Vs. R. B. Bhavaneswari : (2009) 2 SCC 689.   The SLP was filed after a delay of 568 days.   It   was   on   account   of   pendency   of   review application before the Madras High Court.  The issue before   the   Apex   Court   was   whether   the   time consumed in review proceeding will be a sufficient cause or not, as there were divergent opinions.   It was observed that: 904 - CAS. 1262-18.odt “5. …     we   are   of   the   view   that  there   is   a dichotomy between the appellate jurisdiction of this Court   and   discretionary   jurisdiction   under   Article 136   of   the   Constitution   (See:   Kunhayammed   and Ors.   v.   State   of   Kerala   reported   in   2000   (6)   SCC 359).   Reading   the   said   judgment,   it   also   becomes clear that filing of Review Petition is no impediment to the filing of the special leave petition.” “6. …  The test of "sufficient cause" is purely an   individualistic   test.   It   is   not   an   objective   test. Therefore,   no   two   cases   can   be   treated   alike.   The statute of limitation has left the concept of "sufficient cause" delightfully undefined, thereby leaving to the Court   a   well­intentioned   discretion   to   decide   the individual   cases   whether   circumstances   exist establishing sufficient cause. There are no categories of sufficient cause. The categories of sufficient cause are never exhausted. Each case spells out a unique experience to be dealt with by the Court as such.” (v) M.   K.   Prasad   Vs.   P.   Arumugam   :   (2001)   6   SCC

176.   There was exparte decree.   The advocate for the defendant had not communicated decision of the proceeding.  The appellant came to know only after the notice of execution proceeding was received.  He filed   appeal   with   application   for   condonation   of delay of 554 days.  The Apex Court observed that: “Even   though   the   appellant   appears   not   to   be   as vigilant as he ought to have been, yet his conduct does not, on the whole, warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. He should have been more 904 - CAS. 1262-18.odt vigilant   but   on   his   failure   to   adopt   such   extra vigilance should not have been made a ground for ousting him from the litigation with respect to the property, concededly to be valuable. While deciding the application for setting aside the ex­parte decree, the   court   should   have   kept   in   mind   the   judgment impugned, the extent of the property involved and the stake of the parties. The inconvenience caused to the   respondent   for   the   delay   on   account   of   the appellant   being   absent   from   the   court   in   this   case can   be   compensated   by   awarding   appropriate   and exemplary costs.” (vi) In  Pralhad   Tajale   Vs.   State   of   Maharashtra   : (2018) 4 SCC 615  the legality of the order dated

14.5.2012 passed by the State Minister for Revenue (MH) was challenged by way of writ before the High Court   Bombay.     The   writ   petition   was   decided   on

27.11.2012.     LPA   was   filed   before   the   Division Bench. It   was   allowed   to   be   withdrawn   on

24.3.2014,   and   review   application   was   filed   on

17.4.2014 alongwith application for condonation of delay. As the office objections were not removed in spite of extension of time by the registry, the review petition   came   to   be   dismissed   by   the   Registrar   by order   dated   19.10.2015. The   application   for restoration   of   review   petition   was   moved   on

5.3.2018.     But   it   was   rejected   for   not   showing sufficient   cause. The   Apex   Court   relying   on 904 - CAS. 1262-18.odt principles   of   natural   justice   and   philosophy   of necessity   of   giving   opportunity   of   hearing,   as   laid down in  Sangram Singh Vs. Election Tribunal : AIR 1955   SC   125   (para   16   &   17)  held   that   appellant should   have   been   given   one   more   opportunity   to cure the defect and allowed the restoration. “16. …   a   code   of   procedure   must   be regarded   as   such.   It   is  procedure  something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends; not   a   penal   enactment   for   punishment   and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too   technical   a   construction   of   sections   that leaves  no   room   for   reasonable   elasticity   of interpretation   should   therefore   be   guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.” … our laws of procedure are grounded “17. on a principle of natural justice which requires that   men   should   not   be   condemned   unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property   should   not   continue   in   their   absence and   that   they   should   not   be   precluded   from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions   and   where   they   are   clearly   defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large,   and   subject   to   that   proviso,   our   laws   of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably   possible,   in   the   light   of   that principle.” 904 - CAS. 1262-18.odt Learned Advocate Mr. Tajne relied on Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. Vs. G.I.D. Corporation : 2010 (5) Mh.L.J. 262 wherein it is observed that: “The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay.   The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the   legislature.     To   put   it   differently,   the   law   of limitation   prescribes   a   period   within   which   legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power   to   condone   the   delay,   if   sufficient   cause   is shown   for   not   availing   the   remedy   within   the stipulated time.   A reading  of the impugned order makes it clear that the High Court did make a bald reference to the application for condonation of delay filed   by   the   respondents   but   allowed   the   same without   adverting   to   the   averments   contained therein and the reply filed on behalf of the appellant. Not only this, the High Court erroneously assumed that the delay was of 1067 days, though, as a matter of   fact,   the   appeal   was   filed   after   more   than   four years.   Another   erroneous   assumption   made   by   the High Court was that the appellant had not filed reply to   controvert   the   averments   contained   in   the application for condonation of delay. The High Court committed grave error by condoning more than four years’ delay in filing of appeal ignoring the judicially accepted parameters for exercise of discretion under 904 - CAS. 1262-18.odt Section 5 of the Limitation Act.” (vii) P. K. Ramchandran Vs. State of Kerala : (1997) 7 SCC 556. In this case, there was delay of 565 days, which   was   sought   to   be   condoned   on   the   ground that the Advocate  General's office  was fed up with some important arbitration matters.   In this context, the Apex Court observed thus: “   …   We   are   not   satisfied   that   in   the   facts   and circumstances   of   this   case,   any   explanation,   much less reasonable or satisfactory one had been offered by   the   respondents­State   for   condonation   of   the inordinate delay of 565 days.”

9. The factual grounds discussed hereinabove disclose that the appellant engaged advocate Mr. Milind Deshmukh.   It was his duty to intimate the appellant that he has to take steps for supplying paper­book.  The same was not done by him, and therefore, both the appeals, viz. Second Appeal Nos. 4004/2003 and 405/2003 were dismissed on completion of three months on

14.8.2012.  There can be no dispute that this order could have been recalled and the appeals could have been restored if the application was moved in time.   In fact, the advocate did not 904 - CAS. 1262-18.odt inform the appellant about dismissal of these appeals and the appellant   came   to   know   about   dismissal   of   appeals,   when   he received notice of execution. The record shows that immediately thereafter, he changed his advocate and engaged advocate Mr. Surel   Shah.     Unfortunately,   there   was   no   proper   instructions given to advocate Mr. Surel Shah to take steps for restoration of both the second appeals.   He took steps only for restoration of Second   Appeal   No.   405/2003   and   the   same   was   restored without any objections.   The paper­book copies were provided and   the   said   appeal   is   pending   before   this   Court.     It   is   not disputed that Second Appeal No. 404/2003 is closely connected with  Second Appeal No. 405/2003 and its decision is dependent on the decision of other appeal.  Perhaps, there could have been a single suit for prosecuting the rights claimed in both suits.

10. It cannot be disputed that the appellant should have considered   that   since     Second   Appeal   No.   405/2003   was dismissed, he should have made inquiry of  Second Appeal No. 404/2003, as well but the facts indicate that he was interested 904 - CAS. 1262-18.odt in contesting the appeals and he had taken steps for restoring Second Appeal No. 405/2003.  In the light of these facts, I find that   the   judgment   in    Kailpada   Das   Vs.   Bimal   Krishna   Gupta (supra), which lay down that normally an appeal should not be dismissed   on   technical   ground   that   paper­book   was   not supplied, is directly applicable.  As regards the delay, I rely  M. K. Prasad Vs. P. Arumugam (supra), wherein it is observed that in the matters of condonation of delay, the court should consider that hearing the matters on merits is fundamental principle of natural justice. These observations are clearly applicable. It is by way of just part of fair procedure, contemplated under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and if this has not been followed, there   should   be   some   gross   negligence   on   the   part   of   the appellant.  No doubt, there is huge delay of 5 years, 9 months, but   the   fact   that   appellant   has   taken   steps   for   restoration   of another connected appeal, being Second Appeal No. 405/2003 within time is very much relevant.  It was due to inexperience or ignorance of the appellant, he did not take steps for restoration 904 - CAS. 1262-18.odt of both the appeals, which he should have done.  In such case, the negligence can be condoned subject to imposition of heavy costs,   but   opportunity   of   hearing   should   not   be   denied. Considering the fact and delay of 5 years, 9 months, I pass the following order. ORDER (i) (ii) Civil Application No. 1263 of 2018 is rejected. Civil   Application   No.   1262   of   2018   filed   for restoration   of   Second   Appeal   No.   404   of   2003   is allowed subject to payment of cost of Rs.1,00,000/­ to be paid by the Applicant to Respondent No. 3A or to  be  deposited in   this Court  within  30  days.    On failure to pay / deposit the costs within 30 days, this application shall stand dismissed. Vinayak Halemath [A. M. DHAVALE, J.] Sd/­