Malwati Road, Siddheswar Nagar,Latur, Maharashtra.(Brother-in-law)4.Asma @ KLaturr Vasim Thengade,Age : 30 Years v. The State of Maharashtra,Through Police Station Killari,Latur

Cri. Appln. No. 887-2023.odtIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYBENCH AT AURANGABADCRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 887 OF 20231.Musin Babulal Thengade, Age : 37 Years, Occ. Business,R/o. Malwati Road, Maharana Pratap Nagar, Latur, Maharashtra ( Husband)2.Babulal Allauddin Thengade, Age : 57 Years, Occ. Business, R/o. Malwati Road, Siddheswar Nagar, Latur, Maharashtra.(Father-in-law) 3.Vasim Babulal Thengade, Age : 33 Years, Occ. Business, R/o. Malwati Road, Siddheswar Nagar, Latur, Maharashtra.(Brother-in-law)4.Asma @ KLaturr Vasim Thengade, Age : 30 Years, Occ. Household,R/o. Malwati Road, Siddheswar Nagar, Latur, Maharashtra.(Sister-in-law) ..Applicants VERSUS1.The State of Maharashtra, Through Police Station Killari, Latur. 2.Sow. Reshma Musin Thengade, Age : 30 Years, Occ. Household,R/o. At Post Nanand, Tq. Nilanga, Dist. Latur, Maharashtra .. Respondents …..Shri. Gaurav L. Deshpande, Advocate for the applicants. Shri. G. A. Kulkarni, A.P.P. for Respondent No.1 State.Ms. Namita Thole, Advocate for Respondent No.2 (Appointed) ….CORAM :SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI AND ROHIT W. JOSHI, JJ (2) Cri. Appln. No. 887-2023.odtRESERVED ON : 08.01.2025PRONOUNCED ON : 29.01.2025JUDGMENT (PER ROHIT W. JOSHI, J):-1.The applicants in the present matter have approached this Courtinvoking inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure (for short, “Cr.P.C.”) initially praying to quash theFirst Information Report No.0005 of 2023 dated 6.1.2023 registeredagainst them with police station Killari, District Latur and by way ofamendment for quashing the proceeding bearing Regular CriminalCase No. 46 of 2023 pending before the learned Judicial MagistrateFirst Class Ausa, District Latur for the offences punishable underSections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 read with Section 34 of the IndianPenal Code (for short, “IPC”). The informant is respondent No.2. Theapplicants are related to respondent No.2 as under :-Applicant No.1 is husband, applicant No.2 is father-in-law, applicant No.3 is brother-in-law and applicant No.4- is sister-in-law. Marriage of respondent No.2 with applicant No.1 was solemnizedsomewhere in the year 2011. The couple is blessed with two childrenfrom the wedlock. As per the version of respondent No.2, in the FirstInformation Report, for a period of around three years after themarriage till the birth of their girl child, the relations were cordial asin any normal family. She claims that thereafter applicant No.1-husband started raising doubt about her character. She alleges that (3) Cri. Appln. No. 887-2023.odtapplicant No.1 used to beat her under influence of liquor and also thathe would insist upon her to get a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- from herparents for the purpose of purchasing tools and apparatus for startingplumbing business. It is alleged that in view of the said harassmentand ill-treatment her parents and relatives had been to hermatrimonial home to make her husband and in-laws understand thatthey should treat respondent No.2 properly and live happily. It isstated that three to four months after the said meeting, the behavior ofin-laws was good and she was treated well. She, however, alleges thatafter the said period, the applicant nos.1 to 4 again started ill-treatment and asked her to bring Rs. 2,00,000/- from her parents forthe aforesaid purpose. Respondent No.2 alleges that on 20.10.2019,when she was at her parental house, applicant No.1 came there underinfluence of liquor and again started beating and abusing her and haddemanded Rs. 2,00,000/-. She alleges that when her parents hadintervened he threatened that he would kill her if she does not bringthe amount from her parents and further that he would not cohabitwith her unless she brings the said amount of Rs. 2,00,000/-. She hasfurther stated in the First Information Report that since her husbanddid not take her back from her parental home, she was constrained tolodge complaint with the Women Grievance Redressal Cell, Laturagainst all the applicants and since the applicants did not comeforward for reconciliation, she had lodged the First Information (4) Cri. Appln. No. 887-2023.odtReport. The complaint before Women Grievance Redressal Cell isstated to be made on 11.11.2022. The First Information Report islodged on 06.01.2023. As per the First Information Report, the lastwrongful act is dated 20.10.2019. Drawing our attention to thesedates, the learned Advocate for the applicants Mr. Gaurav Deshpandecontends that the First Information Report deserves to be quashed onthe ground that it is filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation.He thereafter contends that even on merits, respondent No.2 hasfailed to make out any case, the allegations are vague, general andomnibus in nature. He states that the marriage has been solemnizedin the year 2011. Respondent No.2 has two children from themarriage and all of a sudden, has lodged First Information Report on06.01.2023. He claims that, respondent No.2 has taken resort tocriminal proceedings in order to settle matrimonial dispute withapplicant No.1.2.Learned A.P.P. Shri. G.A. Kulkarni, has strenuously argued thatthe offence under Section 498-A of IPC is a continuing offence andtherefore, the First Information Report cannot be quashed on theground of limitation. As regards merits, he contends that theallegations are clear and specific and veracity of the same can beadjudicated only at the time of trial. He would submit that for thepresent the allegations in the First Information Report will have to be (5) Cri. Appln. No. 887-2023.odttaken to be true and correct and accepted on its face value. AdvocateMs. Namita Thole, who is appointed to represent respondent No.2advances submissions on similar lines to oppose the application.3.Respondent No.2 to 4 are father-in-law, brother-in-law andsister-in-law of respondent No.2. We find that all the allegations inthe First Information Report and other statements recorded underSection 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are against applicantNo.1-husband. There is one omnibus statement in the FirstInformation Report against applicant Nos. 2 to 4, stating that they haddemanded Rs. 2,00,000/- along with applicant No.1 and had abusedher, beaten her and did not offer food to her in order to coerce andpressurize her to fulfill the demand. These allegations are clearlygeneral in nature. They are absolutely vague. The date, time or evententative period of the alleged wrong on the part of applicant No.2 to4 is not mentioned. Apart from this, specific act is not attributed toany of the applicant Nos. 2 to 4. The allegation, apart from beingvague, general and unspecific, is also omnibus. The said allegation isclearly an attempt to implicate family members of the husband inmatrimonial dispute inter-se between wife and husband. The presentcase offers another unfortunate example of wife resorting to overimplication. The allegation against applicant Nos. 2 to 4 is absolutelymeaningless and on the basis of such allegation it will not be just and (6) Cri. Appln. No. 887-2023.odtproper to force them to face the criminal prosecution. The applicationdeserves to be allowed with respect to applicant Nos. 2 to 4.4.As regards the applicant No.1, the learned Advocate for theapplicants has only canvassed the point of limitation. The learnedAdvocate for the applicants has strenuously urged that, the FirstInformation Report deserves to be quashed on the ground that it isfiled beyond the prescribed period of limitation. He states that thesentence for offence punishable under Section 498-A is three yearsand therefore as per Section 468 (2)(c) the limitation for takingcognizance of the offence will be three years. Referring to the FirstInformation Report, he states that the last alleged incident is dated20.10.2019, the complaint to Women Grievance Redressal Cell madeon 11.11.2022, the First Information Report is lodged on 06.01.2023and charge sheet is filed on 22.01.2023. He submits that cognizanceof the offences is taken after the prescribed period of limitation. Hestates that limitation of three years should be counted from20.10.2019, which is last alleged incident of ill-treatment. He submitsthat even the complaint before the Women Grievance Redressal Cell isfiled beyond the period of three years. The First Information Report isfiled thereafter beyond the period of limitation. He, therefore, submits that filing of charge sheet and taking cognizance of theoffence is also beyond prescribed period of limitation. Referring to (7) Cri. Appln. No. 887-2023.odtSection 468(1) he submits that since the provision is couched innegative terms, it has to be treated as absolutely mandatory. Withrespect to Section 473, he would submit that there is absolutely noexplanation for extension of time in order to entertain the matterbeyond the prescribed period of limitation and that in the facts of thecase, it will not be in the interest of justice to entertain the matterbeyond the prescribed period of limitation.5.Per contra, the learned A.P.P. has referred to Section 472 of theCode of Criminal Procedure to contend that the offence under Section498-A of IPC is a continuing offence and, therefore, fresh period oflimitation begins to run every moment during which the offencecontinues. He also submits that cognizance can be taken beyond theprescribed period of limitation in view of Section 473. He argues thatSection 468 has to be read in conjunction with Section 473 and thatboth these provisions are required to be interpreted harmoniously. Asregards extension of time, he submits that in case of offence underSection 498-A it is always in the interest of justice to take cognizanceof the matter filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation since thewife who is a victim of cruelty and harassment deserves sympatheticconsideration. He contends that often victims of offence underSection 498-A do not immediately resort to lodging complaints/FirstInformation Reports with a view to save the marriage. As regards (8) Cri. Appln. No. 887-2023.odtinterpretation of Section 473, he states that even in the absence of anyexplanation for the delay, cognizance can be taken with respect toprosecution initiated after prescribed period of limitation in theinterest of justice. He states that the two contingencies viz satisfactionwith respect to explanation offer for delay and interest of justice aretwo separate considerations prescribed under Section 473 of the Codeof Criminal Procedure for extension of period of limitation. Hereferred to word 'or' to contend that even if the delay is not explained, period can be extended in the interest of justice. Both the learnedAdvocates have placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'beSupreme Court in the matter of Arun Vyas Vs. Anita Vyas reported in(1999 )Criminal Law Journal 3479 and Ramesh and other Vs. state ofTamil Nadu reported in (2005) AIR SCW 1319.6.Apart from this, the learned A.P.P. has also placed reliance onjudgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rupali Devi Vs.State of Uttar pradesh reported in AIR OnLine (2019) SC 394.7.Crime never dies is one of the basic principles of criminal law. Inother words right of state to prosecute an offender is not lost withpassage of time. Section 468 of the Cr. P. C. creates an exception tothis general principle of law. It categorizes certain offences based onthe punishment provided and fixes period of limitation for taking (9) Cri. Appln. No. 887-2023.odtcognizance of such offences. Limitation is prescribed for offencespunishable with imprisonment up to three years. Section 498-A is anoffence punishable with maximum sentence of three years. Section468 of the Cr. P. C therefore, applies to Section 498-A of the IPC.8.We accept the contention of learned A.P.P that Section 468(1) ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be read in isolation and that ithas to be interpreted harmoniously with Sections 472 and 473 therein. The said provision although couched in the negative term whichimplies that it is mandatory, will have to be read in conjunction withSection 473 of the Cr.P.C which enables a Court to take cognizance ofoffence beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The period can beextended under Section 473 on two grounds i.e. satisfactoryexplanation for the delay or in the interest of justice. Since theprovision uses the term 'or', period can be extended even if one of theconditions is fulfilled. Therefore, a conjoint reading of Section 468 and473 from the Code will indicate that although the limitation isprescribed for taking cognizance of certain offences, time can beextended in cases where either the delay is properly explained orwhen it is in the interest of justice to take cognizance of the matterdespite the same being barred by limitation. Section 468 of the Cr.P.Cis mandatory in nature in the sense that in case of delay, if properexplanation is not offered or the Court does not find that cognizance (10) Cri. Appln. No. 887-2023.odtshould be taken in the interest of justice despite the delay thencognizance of the offence beyond the prescribed period of limitationwill be barred.9.As regards Section 472 of the Cr. P. C, contention of the learnedA.P.P. that offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is a continuingwrong will have to be accepted, but only with a rider. Although theoffence under Section 498-A of the IPC is a continuing wrong, itwould not mean that limitation would continue to run perennially. The correct interpretation of the provision is provided in the matter ofArun Vyas and another Vs. Anita Vyas (supra) which sates that in caseof offence under Section 498-A, a new starting point of limitation isstart on every occasion when the wrong is committed and the periodof limitation needs to be computed from the last such wrong. We mayprofitably quote paragraph 13 of the said decision, which reads asunder :-“ The essence of the offence in Section 498-A iscruelty as defined in the explanation appended to thatsection. It is a continuing offence and on each occasion onwhich the respondent was subjected to cruelty, she wouldhave a new starting point of limitation. The last act ofcruelty was committed against the respondent, within themeaning of the explanation, on October 13, 1988 when, onthe allegation made by the respondent in the complaint toAdditional Chief Judicial Magistrate, she was forced to (11) Cri. Appln. No. 887-2023.odtleave the matrimonial home. Having regard to theprovisions of Sections 469 and 472 the period of limitationcommenced for offences under Sections 406 and 498-Afrom October 13, 1988 and ended on October 12, 1991.But the charge sheet was filed on December 22, 1995,therefore, it was clearly barred by limitation under Section468(2)(c) Cr. P. C. ’’10. Thereafter, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has further stated inparagraph No. 14 that in complaints under Section 498-A the wifewill invariably be oppressed, who is subjected to cruelty and, therefore, Section 473 of the Cr. P.C should be construed liberally infavour of wife. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has alsocautioned that the words interest of justice employed in Section 473 ofthe Cr. P. C. cannot mean in the interest of prosecution and the trueobject of the provision is to advance the cause of justice by protectingthe oppressed and punishing the offender. The Hon'ble SupremeCourt has also referred to its earlier judgment in the matter of OnkarRadha Manohari (Smt) Vs. Venka Venkata Reddy reported in 1993AIR SCW 3595 that while dealing with Section 498-A of the IndianPenal Code, the Court should not only examine as to whether delay isproperly explained, but also as to whether it is necessary to entertain atime barred matter in the interest of justice.11.In the matter of Ramesh and others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (12) Cri. Appln. No. 887-2023.odt(supra) the accused had raised a contention that the wife had left thematrimonial home on 02.10.1997 and no further act of crueltycontinued thereafter. It was contended that the outer limit for takingcognizance of the offence expired on 03.10.2000 after a lapse of threeyears. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has followed the principle laiddown in Arun Vyas and another Vs Anita Vyas (supra) to record thatthe last act of cruelty becomes starting point of limitation in thematter of offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. Ithas also confirmed the view that cognizance of offence can be takenbeyond prescribed period of limitation in either of the twocontingencies viz delay being properly explained, or in the interest ofjustice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph No.8 of thejudgment that prosecution cannot be nullified at the threshold on theground of limitation and normally the matter should be left to thediscretion of the learned trial Court to decide as to whethercognizance of the offence should be taken after the limitationprescribed has expired.12.As regards the judgment in the matter of Rupali Devi Vs. Stateof Uttar Pradesh AIR ONLINE (2019) SC 394 relied upon by thelearned A.P.P., the principal dispute was with respect to territorialjurisdiction of a Court while dealing with offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. The question was, when a wife is forced (13) Cri. Appln. No. 887-2023.odtto leave her matrimonial home and resides with her parents, the Courthaving jurisdiction over the place of residence of wife will havejurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence under Section 498-A ofthe Indian Penal Code will have the territorial jurisdiction or not. Inthat context, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph No. 14of the judgment as under :-14. “Cruelty” which is the crux of the offence under Section498-A IPC is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary to mean“The intentional and malicious infliction of mental orphysical suffering on a living creature, esp. a human; abusive treatment; outrage(Abuse, inhuman treatment, indignity)”. Cruelty can be both physical or mental cruelty. The impact on the mental health of the wife by overt actson the part of the husband or his relatives; the mentalstress and trauma of being driven away from thematrimonial home and her helplessness to go back to thesame home for fear of being illtreated are aspects thatcannot be ignored while understanding the meaning of theexpression “ cruelty” appearing in Section 498-A of theIndian Penal Code. The emotional distress or physiologicaleffect on the wife, if not the physical injury, is bound tocontinue to traumatize the wife even after she leaves thematrimonial home and takes shelter at the parental home. Even if the acts of physical cruelty committed in thematrimonial house may have ceased and such acts do notoccur at the parental home, there can be no doubt that themental trauma and the psychological distress cause by theacts of the husband including verbal exchanges, if any, thathad compelled the wife to leave the matrimonial home and (14) Cri. Appln. No. 887-2023.odttake shelter with her parents would continue to persist atthe parental home. Mental cruelty borne out of physicalcruelty or abusive and humiliating verbal exchanges wouldcontinue in the parental home even though there may notbe any overt act of physical cruelty at such place. ”13. These observations have been made in the context ofterritorial jurisdiction. The judgment does not deal with theaspect of limitation. Provisions of Sections 468, 472 and 473 ofthe Cr. P.C did not fall for consideration in this case. As againstthis in the cases of Arun Vyas and another Vs Anita Vyas (supra) andRamesh and other Vs. state of Tamil Nadu (supra), the questionof limitation was directly involved and the same is answeredreferring to the relevant statutory provisions. It is settled legalprinciple that judgments of the Courts have to be interpreted inthe backdrop of facts of the particular case. Ratio of a case has tobe understood and appreciated in the backdrop of the facts inwhich the judgment is delivered. The law laid down in thejudgment cannot be divorced from the facts of the case in which itis delivered. A judgment cannot be interpreted like a statute. Itcannot be applied uniformly every where like Euclid’s theorems ofgeometry. Therefore, while dealing with aforesaid threejudgments cited during the course of hearing, we are of theconsidered opinion that the ratio laid down in the matters of Arun (15) Cri. Appln. No. 887-2023.odtVyas and Ramesh which directly deal with the question oflimitation will have to be accepted. The judgment in the matterof Rupali Devi is relating to territorial jurisdiction of a Court todeal with offetnce under Section 498-A of the IPC.14. In the light of above, we are of the opinion that limitationfor offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC shallcommence from the last act of cruelty. Offence under Section498-A of the IPC is a continuing offence implies that each act ofcruelty would offer new starting point of limitation. Limitationfor prosecution under Section 498-A does not continue forindefinite period. Such interpretation will render Section 468 ofthe Cr. P.C. nugatory or otiose for the purpose of Section 498-A ofthe Indian Penal Code which does not appear to be the intentionof legislature. Had there been intention to exclude Section 498-Aof the IPC from the sweep of Section 468 of the Cr. P.C expressprovision could have been made for the said purpose.15.We have noticed that the last incident narrated in the FirstInformation Report is dated 20.10.2019. Within a period of few monthsthereafter i.e. from March 2020 lock-down of Pandemic of Covid-19 wasimposed. Taking note of the situation, the Hon’ble Supreme Court hasextended the limitation for filing of cases from time to time finally up toJune 2022. We may take judicial note of the fact that from March 2020 till (16) Cri. Appln. No. 887-2023.odtabout second wave of Covid-19 pandemic which was April/May 2021, thesituation was very grim, thereafter gradually situation got eased out. However, as stated above, limitation for filing all sort of the cases wasextended by Hon'ble Supreme Court up to June 2022. Having regard to thefacts of the present case, i.e. allegation by the wife regarding illtreatmentincluding abuses and physical act of beating on the part of the husband fordemand of dowry, the Covid-19 situation and the principles laid down bythe Hon’ble Supreme Court, we are of the opinion that the case is made outfor extension of time for taking cognizance of the offence under Section 473of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We are of the opinion that it would be inthe interest of justice that cognizance of the matter should be takenalthough the same is barred by limitation. Normally we would haveremitted the matter to learned Magistrate to decide the aspect of thelimitation, however, having regard to the aforesaid facts, we are of theopinion that it will not be necessary to remit the matter back to the learnedMagistrate. We should also mention that the last alleged incident is dated20.10.2019 and respondent No.2 had approached the Women GrievanceRedressal Cell by filing complaint on 11.11.2022 and had thereafter lodgedthe First Information Report on 06.01.2023. The charge sheet is filed on29.01.2023. Thus, the delay that is caused in the matter is less than onemonth if we consider the date of approaching Women Grievance RedressalCell and around two and half months when we consider the date of lodgingof First Information Report. Even if we consider the date of charge sheet, the delay is only three months and ten days. Having regard to the extent ofdelay and Covid-19 situation coupled with principles laid down by the (17) Cri. Appln. No. 887-2023.odtHon’ble Supreme Court, we are of the opinion that the matter need not beremitted to the learned Magistrate to decide the issue of limitation. Theapplicant No.1 has failed to make out any case for interference. We do notdeem it appropriate to quash the First Information Report against theapplicant No.1.16. We clarify that observations made in the present judgment are onlyfor the purpose of deciding as to whether case for quashing of FirstInformation Report has been made out or not within the narrow scope ofSection 482 of the Cr.P.C. We have not observed anything with respect toveracity or correctness of the allegations levelled against applicant No.1. Thesame shall be decided by the learned Magistrate in accordance with law. Hence, the following order :- ORDER(i)The application is rejected as against the applicant No.1 Musin Babulal Thengade.(ii)The application is allowed with respect to applicant Nos. 2 to 4 namely applicant No.2 Babulal Allauddin Thengade, applicant No.3 Vasim Babulal Thengade, applicant No.4 Asma @ Klaturr Vasim Thengade and First Information Report No. 0005 of 2023 dated 6.1.2023 registered against them with police station Killari, District Latur and Regular Criminal Case No. 46 of 2023 pending before learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ausa, District Latur for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code are quashed against them. (18) Cri. Appln. No. 887-2023.odt(iii)The fee payable to the learned Advocate appointed for represent respondent No.2 is quantified at Rs. 7,000/-(Rupees Seven Thousand only)(ROHIT W. JOSHI) (SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI ) JUDGE JUDGEY.S. Kulkarni