Alugubelli Venkat Reddy v. Kond

Judgment

IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT ITYDERABAD 1THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.M.MOHIUDDIN APPEAL SUIT No.78 OF 2ol23 DATE: I? .o4.20/26 Between: Alugubelli \renkat Reddy Kondri Redcty Somi Reddy And JUDGMENT ...Appellant ....Respondent Heard Sri K.Rama Krishna, learned counsel for the appellant and sri P.Rzrma Sharana Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent and perused the record.

#2. This :rppeal, filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, I908 (for short, "CPC"), is directed against the judgment and decree ctated 05.08.2022 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Suryapet (for short,'trial Court") in O.S.No.13 of 2O16. The said suit was instituted by the respondent/plaintiff seeking specilic performance of an agreement of sale dated 25.09.2o14 in respect of agricultural [and admeasuring Ac.3.30 Gts in sy Nos.301 and 302, situated at B. Madharam Revenue village, suryapet Mandal (hereinafter referred to as the 'suit schedule property"). By the .-"ril.. T 2 fi' impugned judgment, the trial court decreed the suit, directing the appellant/defendant to execute and register the sale deed in travour of the respondent within one month, faiting which the respondent was granted liberty to have the sale deed executed through due process of Court.

#3. The appellant is the defendant and the respondent is the plaintiff in O.S.No.13 of 2016.

#4. For the sake of convenience and clarity, the parties are hereinafter referred to in the capacity they were arrayed before the trial Court. Plaint Averments (Respondent/ Plaintiff s case I

#5. The case of the plaintiff, as pleaded before the trial Court in O.S.No.13 of 2016, was that the defendant, who is closely related to him, had offered to sell the suit schedule property at the rate of Rs.12,00,OOOl- per acre, fixing the total sale consideration at Rs.45,00,0OO/-.

It was the specific case of the plaintiff that he paid the entire sale consideration to the defendant on various occasions on or before

25.09.2014, and on the said date, the defendant executed an agreement of sale (Ex.Al) at Suryapet in the presence of attesting witnesses, agreeing to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff or his nominee. It was further pleaded that the defendant, at L E. a 3 the time of execution of Ex.Al, had also handed over photocopies of his patterrar passbook and title deed, which were marked as Exs. Alo and A11.

#7. The' plaintiff averred that due to paucity of funds, he could not immediat:ly pursue registration of the sale deed. Subsequently, whenever he approached the defendant requesting execution of the registered sale deed, the defendant evaded performance on one pretext or the other, initially stating that the original pattedar passbook and title deed were misplaced and assuring that the same would be r:xecuted upon tracing the documents.

#8. [t w,as also pleaded that the plaintiff issued a legal notice dated L6.o2.2o 15 (Ex.A2) calling upon the defendant to execute the sale deed. Though the defendant received the said notice, he failed to comply and only sought time. As there was no progress, the plaintiff issued & s,€cond legal notice dated 03.02.2016 (Ex.A6). In response thereto, the defendant caused an interim reply notice dated o5.o3.2olti (Ex.AS) demanding a copy of the agreement of sale, which was duly lurnished by the plaintiff under the cover of a rejoinder notice datt:d 30.04.20]6 (Ex.A9). Despite receipt of the same, the defendant lailed and neglected to perform his part of the contract and, on the contrary, demanded an additional amount of Rs.1s,oo,o00/- on the ground of escalation in land value. l I I { 4

#9. It is the further case of the plaintiff that on O3.O5.2OL6, he, along with village elders including PW2 i.e., one Tarala Saidulu, approached the defendant and requested him to honour the agreement and execute the registered sale deed; however, the defendant categorically refused to do so unlesS the additional amount was paid, thereby necessitating the filing of the suit. trIritten State ment (Appellant/ Defe ndant's case I 1(). The defendant, in his written statement, denied the entire case of the plaintiff. While admitting the relationship between the parties and his ownership over the suit schedule property, he specifically denied execution of the agreement of sale dated 25.09.2014.

#11. It was stated by the defendant that the alleged agreement of sale is a fabricated and created document, brought into existence by the plaintiff by taking advantage of their close relationship and famiLiarity with the defendant's signatures. The defendant asserted that he never agreed to sell the suit propert5r, nor did he receive any sale consideration from the plaintiff at any point of time.

#12. Defendant also stated that the story of payment of consideration and postponement of registration due to paucity of funds is wholly false. [t was also pleaded that immediately upon receipt of the lirst legal notice, he questioned the plaintiff, who allegedly agreed to withdraw the same. '4 5

#13. Additionally, the defendant took a specific plea that the alleged agreemenl. of sale is not duly stamped or registered and therefore is inadmissible in evidence and unenforceable in law, in view of Sections 17 and49 of the Registration Act, 1908 (for short'1908 ActJ. Evidence before the trial Court L4. On behalf of the plaintiff, he examined himself as PWl and reiterated the averments made in the plaint. Plaintiff also examined one of the attesting witnesses to the agreement of sale, namely Tarala Saidulu, as PW2. The ptaintiff relied upon documentary evidence marked as Exs.Al to All, which included the original agreement of sale datei:,25.09.2O21 (Ex.A1), legal notice dated 16.02.2015 (Ex.A2), postal rer:ords (Ex.A3-A7), reply notice dated 05.03.2016 (Ex.A8), rejoinder notice dated 30.O4.2016 (Ex.A9), and copies of the pattedar pass'book and title deed (Ex.A1O and A11).

#15. On behalf of the defendant, he examined himself as DWl and denied ex.ecution of the agreement of sale. Defendant relied upon Ex.Bl, being the reply notice, and Ex.B2, being an unserved registered postal cover, in support of his defence. Findings of the trial Court

#16. Upon consideration of the pleadings, oral evidence, and documentary material on record, the trial Court framed the following issues: ) !.... .-*-Y+".' :.!iffi;!t:. : , 6 't+ i- whether the agreement of sale dated 2s.o9.2o14 is true, valid and binding on the defendant? l1 whether the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of contract? iii. To what relieP

#17. After a detailed appreciation of the evidence, the trial court recorded a categorical finding that the agreement of sale under Ex.A1 is genuine, valid and binding on the defendant. The court, inter alia, took note of the admission of the defendant (Dwl) regarding his signature on Ex.Al and observed that no steps were taken by him to estabtish the plea of forgery by seeking expert opinion. 18. The trial Court further held that the plaintiff had successfully proved payment of entire sale consideration and his continuous readiness and willingness to perform his par: of the contract. Coniequently, the Court held that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of specific performance and decreed the suit with costs, directed execution of the sale deed within one month, failing which libert5r was granted to the plaintiff to get the sale deed executed through process of Court. Subsequent Events during Appeal

#19. During the pendency of the present appeal, the respondent/plaintiff has brought on record certain subsequent developments by filing t.A.No. L of 2025, wherein it has been stated 7 that the a1>pellant/defendant, in disregard of the interim orders and pendency of the appeal, has alienated substantial portions of the suit schedule p'roperty in favour of third parties by executing registered sale deeds dated 04.O2.2O23, 06.02.2023, 13.02.2023 and

15.03.202:i. 2o.. The said conduct of the appetlant/defendant, in dealing with the suit pn>perty during the subsistence of litigation, has been placed on record and assumes significance for adjudication of the present appeal. Submissio:ns on behalf of the Appellant (Defendant) 2L. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant assailed th,: islplrgned judgment and decree dated 05.08.2022 passed in O.S.No. l3 of 2OL6 and advanced his submissions as under: i. That the appellant/defendant never executed the alleged agreement of sale dated 25.Og.2014 (Ex.Al). The respc, ndent/plaintiff, being a close relative and well acquainted with the appellant/defendant's signatLlres, has fabricated the said rlocument by misusing such familiarity, and. the trial Court gravely erred in accepting Ex.Al without subjecting the dispuLted signatures to scientihc examination. ii. That the burden of proving execution of Ex.Al squarely lay upon the respondent/plaintiff. However, the trial Court f ,iqll;$ff: .,,r;,.ffiffii I 8 erroneously shifted the burden onto the appellant/defendant by drawing an adverse inference on the ground that the appellant/defendant did not take steps to send the document for expert examination, which is contrary to the settled iii. That though Ex.Al purports to have been attested by more than one witness, the respondent/plaintiff examined only one attesting witness, namely PW2. The non-examination of the other attesting witnesses, without any explanation, casts serious doubt on the alleged execution of the agreement. iv. That the agreement of sale is stated to have been executed on

25.09-2014, whereas the suit came to be instituted only on

06.05.2016. The appellant/defednant submits that such delay . of nearly two years, in the absence of satisfactory explanation, disentitles the respondent/plaintiff from the discretionary relief of specific performance. v. That the respondent/plaintiff has failed to establish his continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, particularly his financial capacit5r to bear stamp duty and registration charges at the relevant point of time. vi. That the alleged payment of Rs.45,00,OOO/- in cash is not supported by any independent evidence such as receipts, bank 9 transactions, or accounts. The absence of any documentary proof renders the respondent/plaintiff's version inherently doubtful. vii. Thrrt Ex.A1, being a document relating to immovable property of substantial value, ought to have been'compulsorily registered un, ler section 17(1)(b) of the l9o8 Act, as in absence of registration, the said document is inadmissible in evidence for prc, ving any transaction affecting immovable property, in view of Ser:tion 49 of the l9O8 Act.

#22. Tht: appellant/defendant in support of his case relied on the following decisions: a) Lal; ha Singh u. Balwinder Singh and otlrcrsl b) Kaltil corepaclcs Put- Ltd. and others u. Harbans Lal (since dec'eased) through LRs.z Submissions on behalf of the Respondent (plaintiff|

23.. The, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff supportecl the impugned judgment and decree and advanced the following submissions: i. That the appellant/defendant, while deposing as DWl, has catr:gorically admitted that the signature appearing on Ex.Al is l2025 (t) ALD 214 2 AIR 2010 :tc 2809 t l0 {\ his own and that the same is identical to the signature on his written statement. In view of such admission, the execution of the document stands established, and the burden shifts upon the appellant/defendant to substantiate his plea of forgery. Signihcantly, the appellant/defendant did riot take any steps to seek expert examination of the signatures. ii. That the respondent/plaintiff examined PW2, one of the attesting witnesses to Ex.Al, who clearly deposed that the appellant/defendant executed the agreement and received the entire sale consideration. Thus, the law does not mandate examination of all attesting witnesses, and the testimony of one attesting witness, if found credible, is suflicient to prove execution. iii. That respondent/plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The issuance of legal notices (Exs.A2 and A6) and the institution of the suit immediately after the appellant/defendant's final refusal clearly demonstrate such . readiness and willingness. iv. That the linal refusal occurred on 03.05.2016, when the appellant/defendant demanded additional consideration, and the suit was l-rled on 06.O5.2016, i.e., within three days. Thus, there is neither delay nor laches attributable to the re spgnden t/ plain tiff. dZ 1l v Th:tt Ex.A I contains a clear recital acknowledging receipt of the entire sale consideration, and when appellant/defendant has adrnitted his signature on the said document, a presumption ari:;es as to the passing of consideration, which the apJrellant/defendant has failed to rebut by adducing any cor trary evidence. vl. Thert during the pendency of the appeal, the apgrellant/defendant has alienated portions of the suit schedule property in favour of third parties. Such conduct is indicative of ma.,to fides and is aimed at frustrating the decree for specihc perlormance, thereby disentitling the appellant/defendant from any equitable relief. vll. That an agreement of sale, which does not itself create or transfer any right, title or interest in immovable propergr, is not conrpulsorily registrable under section 17 of the 1908 Act, as it applies only to documents which create or declare ights in pre:;enti (vested right). A mere agreement to sell confers only a con[ractual right to obtain a sale deed and does not require registration, and in any event, by virtue of the proviso to Section 49 of the 1908 Act, an unregistered agreement of sale is adnrissible in evidence for the purpose of seeking specific performance. I 1 t2 viii. That Ex.Al was executed on appropriate stamp paper, and even assuming any deficiency, the same is curable by impounding and payment of penalty and does not render the document void or inadmissible in toto. Points for determination

#24. In the light of the pleadings, plaint, written statement, and the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel on either side, the following points arise for consideration in this appeal: I. Whether the agreement of sale dated 25.09.2O 14 (Ex.Al) is true, valid and binding on the appellant/defendant? II. Whether Ex.Al is inadmissible in evidence for want of proper stamping or registration under the provisions of the . Registration Act, 1908? III. Whether the respondent/plaintiff has established his continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract? ry. Whether the trial Court erred in law in shifting the burden of proof with regard to the genuineness of Ex.Al? V. Whether the subsequent alienation of the suit schedule propert5r by the appellant to the third parties during the pendency of the appeal has any bearing on the adjudication of tttepgesent case? ./ / t3 VI. Whether the judgment and decree of the trial Court granting sp,-'cific performance call for interference in this appeal? Conside:ration by this Court Point No.I

#25. The specif-rc plea of the appellant/defendant, as set out in the written statement, is that Ex.Al is a ocreated document" and that the respondr:nt/plaintiff, being closely related and well acquainted with his signzLtures, has fabricated the same. However, a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, particularly the cross-examination of DWl, discloses material admissions which go to the root of the matter. As noticed lry the trial Court and as borne out from the deposition of Dw1, the appellant/defendant has categorically admitted that the signaturt: appearing on Ex.A1 is his own. Appellant/defendant has further admitted that the signature found on his written statement is identical to the signature on Ex.Al. Signilicantly, appellant/defendant has also admitted that he had handed over photocopies of his pattedar passbook and title deed, marked as Exs.AlO and A11, to PWl at the relevant point of time.

#26. In view of the aforesaid categorical admissions, the execution of Ex.Al stands substantially established. Once the executant admits his signature on the document, he can no longer claim the document is a forged instrument in the sense of being a fabrication. The burden I'i l4 and the legal focus shifts upon him to establish, by adducing clear, positive and convincing evidence that his signature was obtained through fraud, d.eceit or misrepresentation. In the present case, apart from making a bald allegation, the appellant/defendant has not taken any steps to substantiate the same. In the absence of any such evidence, the plea of forgery remains unsubstantiated and has been rightly rejected by the trial Court. 27, The testimony of PW2, one of the attesting witnesses to Ex.Al, lends further assurance to the case of the respondent/plaintiff. PW2 has deposed that he was present at the time of execution of the agreement, that the appellant/defendant executed Ex.Al in his presence, and that the entire sale consideration was paid. PW2 has also spoken to the subsequent conduct of the appellant/defendant in demanding an additional amount of Rs.15,00,0OO /- on the ground of escalation in land value. Though PW2 was subjected to cross- examination, nothing material has been elicited to discredit his testimony.

#28. [t is well settled that the execution of a document can be proved by examining even a single attesting witness, if his evidence is found reliable. There is no legal requirement that all attesting witnesses must be examined. Therefore, the evidence of PW2, sufficiently satisfies the requirement of proof of execution. .? l5

#29. Further, the conduct of the appellant/defendant in demanding an additional sum of Rs.15,OO,000 l- for execution of the sale deed, probabilir; es the case of the respondent/plaintiff, as such conduct is wholly inconsistent with the defence of total denial and is indicative of the existe:nce of a prior agreement between the parties.

#30. In view of the aforesaid admissions, coupled with the oral and documentary evidence on record and the absence of any rebuttal on the part of the appellant/defendant, this Court finds no reason to differ frorn the lindings of the trial Court. Accordingly, Ex.A1 is held to be a true, valid and binding agreement of sale executed by the appellant /defendant. Point No.II

#31. It is to be noted that Section 17(1Xb) of the 19O8 Act mandates registration of documents which create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in immovable propert5r of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards. However, it is well settled that a mrlre agreement of sale does not, by itself, create or extinguish any right, title or interest in immovable propert5r, but only embodies a contracttral obligation to execute a conveyance in future. The transfer of owner:ship in immovable property takes place only upon execution and registration of a sale deed. Further, the possession of the schedule property was not transferred under the agreement to sell. 1 t6 {":' Therefore, an agreement to sell is not a document compulsorily registrable under Section 17 ofthe 1908 Act.

#32. It is equally settled that by virtue of the proviso to Section 49 of the 19O8 Act, an unregistered agreement of sale is admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving the contract and for seeking the relief of specific performance. The bar under Section 49 operates only in respect of enforcement of a transa"ction affecting immovable property as such, and not in respect of enforcement of a contractual obligation to execute a sale deed.

#33. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in R. Hem.a.Latha a. Kashthuris, has held as under:

#26. [Jnder the circumstances, a.s per the prouiso to Section 49 of tte Registration Act, an unregistered document affecting immnuable properTg and required bg the Registration Act or the Transfer of Propertg Act to be registered, mag be receiued as euidence of a contract ii a suit for specific perform.ance under Chapter II of the Specift.c Relief Act, 1877, or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effeded. bg registered instrument, laweve4 subject to Section 17(1'A) , of the Registration Act. It is rwt tle ca.se on behalf of either of tlrc parties thnt the document/agreement to sell in qtestion would fall under the category of document a.s per Section 17(1-A) of the Regi.stration Act- Therefore, in the facts and ciranmstances of the case, the High Court ho.s nghtly obserued and teld relging upon the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act tLrut the unregistered doanment in question, namelg, unregi.stered agreement to setl in question shnll be admissible in euidence in a suit for specific performance and ttrc prouiso fs exceptionto tlrcfirst part of fuction 49.

#34. lnsofar as the objection relating to stamp duty is concerned, even assuming that the document is insufficiently stamped, the same does not render the document void or inadmissible in toto. The Court ' 1zozz1 10 scc 72s '.) t7 is empowr:red to impound the document and collect the deficit stamp duty along with penalty before admitting the same in evidence. That apart, it is to be noted that no objection as to insufficiency of stamp duty was raised by the appellant/defendant at the appropriate stage before the trial Court. Such an objection, not having been taken at the earliest ollportunity, cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in appeal.

#35. In the case on hand, Ex.A1 is a simple agreement of sale, which merely records receipt of consideration and an undertaking on the part of tLre appellant/defendant to execute a registered sale deed in future. It. does not, by itself, operate as a conveyance of title. Consequently, registration of the said document is not compulsory. Therefore, the trial Court has rightly received Ex.Al in evidence and relied up()n the same Point No.III

#36. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 mandates that the plaintiff rnust plead and prove that he has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. In the present case, the responde:rt/plaintiff (PWl) has categorically deposed that he possesse(l the necessary financial capacity to meet the expenses towards ,stamp duty and registration charges. Respondent/plaintiff has state,l that he derives an annual income of about Rs.15-2O lakhs

#1. i l8 {,- from agricultural operations and that his sons, who are gainfully employed, also extended linancial support.

#37. The record further discloses that the respondent/plaintiff issued legal notices (Exs.A2 and A6) and, upon receipt of the interim reply, furnished a copy of the agreement urrae, Ex.A9. The said correspondence demonstrates that the respondent was consistently calling upon the appellant/defendant to perform his part of the contract. The suit was instituted immediately after the appellant/defendant's final refusal on 03.05.20 16, thereby evidencing prompt action on the part of the respondent/plaintiff.

#38. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Man Kaur (Dead) bg LRs. a. Hartar Singh Sangho4, has held that to succeed in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove (a) the existence of a valid agrebment of sale, (b) that the defendant committed breach of contract; and (c) that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the obligations in terms of the contract.

#39. [t is also pertinent to note that there is no material on record to indicate that the respondent/plaintiff ever defaulted or exhibited unwillingness to perform his obligations under the contract. The contention that the respondent/plaintiff did not deposit any amount in Court at the time of filing the suit is of no consequence in the facts n lzoro; to scc st2 t9 of the present case, as the entire sale consideration had already been paid. The remaining obligation of the respondent/plaintiff was only to bear the (:xpenses towards stamp duty and registration, for which he has asserted his readiness on oath. Thus, this Court is satisfied that the respondent/plaintiff has duly established continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, as required under Section lti(c) of the Specific Relief Act. Ponit No.IV

#40. In regard to the contention that the trial Court erred in casting the burden upon the appellant/defendant to get the disputed documenl. examined by a handwriting expert, it is to be noted that the respondent/plaintiff has already discharged such burden by producin6l the original agreement of sale (Ex.A1) and examining one of the attesting witnesses, namely PW2, in support of its execution, and once such prima facie evidence was adduced, the onus shifts to the appellant/defendant to rebut the same. Further, the appellant/defendant, while deposing as DW1, has admitted his signature on Ex.Al. In the face of such admission, the plea of forgery could not have been sustained without any supporting evidence. 4L. It isi trite that a party who alleges forgery must take reasonable steps to establish the same, including, where necessary, seeking expert examination of the disputed document. Having failed to do so, I i t' i i i ; : 20 f the appellant/defendant cannot be permitted to assail the findings of the trial Court. Thus, the observation of the trial Court that the appellant/defendant did not take steps to have the document examined by a handwriting expert cannot be construed as an improper shifting of burden, as it is just a commbnt on the failure of the appellant/defendant to substantiate his plea of forgery by adducing appropriate evidence.

#42. Further, the decisions as relied upon by the appellant/defendant do not advance his case for the following reasons: i. ln La.kha Singh (supra 1), the Hon'lcle Supreme Court found pervasive suspicious circumstances such as use of stamp papers procured by the plaintiff's associate, signatures only on the last page of a multi-page document with blanks elsewhere, absence of financial trail for large cash consideration, undervaluation, prolonged inaction, and failure to prove readiness. The agreement to sell in the facts and circumstances of the case was held to be a fabrication. In contrast, in the present case, the defendant (DW1) admitted his signature on Ex-Al and its identity with the one on his written statement, and admitted handing over the copies of the title documents (Exs.A10-A11). Execution is corroborated by PW2; no expert evidence was sought. The plaintiff issued prompt notices, filed 2t the suit without delay, and has established full payment and dernonstrated readiness for registration. Thus, unlike l-a.kha Sirrgh's case (supra 1), there are no suspicious circumstances, no evidentiary gaps, and no perversity in findings. ii. In,Kapll Corepacks (supra 2), the alleged admission arose from a pre-trial, non-oath examination where only the signature portion of an unexhibited document was shown. The Apex Court held such admission unreliable and emphasized that execution must be tested at trial. [n the present case, the adrnission was made on oath during the trial by DWl, with the entire document available, and during his cross-examination. It is ir conscious and voluntary admission, not a product of any prccedural impropriety. The appellant/defendant neither . reb:acted the admission nor sought forensic examination. Tht:refore, the principle in Kapil Corepack's case (supra 2) dor:s not dilute the evidentiary value of apllellant/defendant's admission in this case. Point No.V

#43. It .is brought on record uide I.A. No. I of 2025 during the pendency' of the present appeal, that the appellant/defendant had executed several registered sale deeds in February and March, 2023, alienatinlS substantial portions of the suit schedule property in favour of third parties. ,\ _r 22 f

#44. The Delhi High Court in Otn Prakq.sh u. Santosh Chaddha. while reiterating the view taken in Suryeet Singh v. Harbo; ns Stnghs has held as under:

#17. I find the Supreme Court, in Surjeet Singh Vs. Harbans Singh MANU/SC/OO32/ 1996 : (1995) 6 SCC 50, to twue held that lf alienation/assignment made in d.efiance of an iniunction order is oermitted, it tlould dekat the ends of iustice and the preualent public oolicu. It utas furtlrcr held that when Courts intend a particalar state of affairs to exist uthile in sersin of a lis, that state of affairs is nof onlg required to be maintained but aLso presumed to exist till the Court orders ottrcrwise and tle Court in these circttmstances has the dutg as also the right to treat the alienation/ a.ssignment 6rs hauing not taken place at all and tfle alienee/ assignee in uiolation of tlrc interim order thus cannot claim to be impleaded on the basis o1f assignment as tLrc same would be in disobedierrce of the order of injunctioru. (emphasis supplied)

#45. The particulars of the transactions undertaken by the appellant/defendant are set out in the affidavit liled in support of the I.A.No.l of 2025 filed by the respondent/plaintiff, which are extracted hereunder: tsf,\'til Date of Registration Document l[umber ktent Name of the Party 1 2 3 15-O3-2023 3877 12023 [Ll ot SRO SURYAPET (23Oel 220 l5-o3-2023 3a76/2o23 lrl ot SRO SURYAPET (23oel 338-4 15-03-2023 3875/2023lLl of SRO SURYAPET (23Oel 240 Bandaru Srilatha, W lO Venkatesh, H.No: 2-l- 66 / A2O I t, Mamillagadda, Suryapet Town Polagani Balalrya (Balu Goud), S/O Ramulu, H.No: 3-6-20, Kothagudem Bazar, Suryapet Town Ganna Pullaiah, S/O Guruva15ra, H.No:1-82, Ramapuram Village, Chilukuru Mandal, Suryapeta District '1reos; 6 scc 50 23 $.No Date of Registration Document Number htent Name of the Party 4 15-03-2023 387a/2C23 {tl oI SRO SURYAPET (23Oel l18.33 L3-02-2023 225e /2023 ltl of SRO SURYAPET (2soel

133.33 L3-O2-2023 225812023lLl ot SRO SURYAPET (230e) 150 Banoth Parvathi, W/O Janu, H.No:6-136/3, Bashanayak Thanda, Suryapet Mandal Bommi Venkanna S/O Devayya, H.No:3-85, Kondalarayinigudem, Chiwemla Suryapeta District Mandal, Avudoddi Bharyamma, W/O Srisailam,- H.No:5-l I l, Kudakuda Village, Chiwemla Mandal, Suryapet District Nemanandam Uppalamma, W/O Anjaiah, H.No: l-85, Kudakuda Village, Chiwemla Mandal, Suryapet District, 5082 13 Erpula Sumathi W/O Raju, H.No: I l- 100/ I, Gandhi Nagar Village, Suryapet Mandal and District Guntipalli Shyamala W/O Venkat Narsimha, H.No:2- 1212, Inupaamula Village, Kethepally (Mandal), Nalgonda,5082ll Gaddam Kiran Kumar, S/O Venkanna, H.No:3-101/3, Kondalarayinigudem, Suryapeta Town Gaddam Kiran Kumar, S/O Venkanna, H.No:3- 1Ol /3, Kondalarayinigudem, Suryapeta Town Reddy Yelta Reddy, S/O Somi Reddy, H.No:l-7 l, Yerkaram, Suryapet Mandal, Suryapeta 508376 Modala Ramalingam S/O Lingaiah, D.Kothapally Village, Nagaram Mandal, Suryapet District (Pin Code:5O8279) Rebbaralapatli Poornima, W/O Sambashiva Chary, 5 6 8 9 r3-02-2023 22s7 12o23 ltl ot SRO SURYAPET (23Oe)

108.33 L3-O2-2023 22ffi/2o23ltl of SRO SURYAPET (230e) 200 L3-02-2023 225512023ltl ot SRO SURYAPET (23oe) 10 L3-02-2023 It t3-c2-2023 t2 oa-c2-2023 225a/2o23lrl of SRO SURYAPET (23Oe) 22s3/2o23lrl ot SRO SURYAPET (23Oe) 206r /20.23 lrl ot SRO SURYAPET (23Oe)

165.4

208.7 253 200 13 oa-c2-2023 206o/2023lll ot SRO SURYAPET (23Oe) 2t7.9 Yds l4 0,6-02-2023 r9a3/2O23ltl of SRO SURYAPET (23Oe) 200 Yds -} 24 f S.ItIo Date of Registration Document Number Ertent Narne of the Party 15 06-o2-2023 L9a2/2o23lll ot SRO SURYAPET (23Oe) 200 Yds 16 04-o2-2023 L7 o4-o2-2023 r87a /2023 lrl ot SRO SURYAPET (23Oe) 1873/2023 {Ll of SRO SURYAPET (23Oe)

226.8 Yds 200 Yds H.No:1-178, Mitta Ashwapuram Khammama (Dist) Gudem, Mandal, Rebbaralapalli Poornima, W/O Sambashiva Chary, H.No:1-178, Mitta Gudem, Ashwapuram Mandal, Khammama (Dist) Vatte Jyothi W/O Krishna, H.No: 1 l-67 -1, Gandhi Nagar, Suryapeta Vatte Jyothi W/O Krishna, H.No:1 l-67-1, Gandhi Nagar, Suryapeta

#46. The said conduct on the part of the appellant/defendant cannot be countenanced and has certain legal implications, such as: i. Any transfer of the suit property during the pendency of proceedings is subject to the doctrine of ,is pendens, and the . transferees, if any, would be bound by the outcome of the present appeal. ii. The act of alienating the property, despite the subsistence of the decree and pendency of the appeal, reflects conduct which is not consistent with the stand taken by the appellant/defendant before this Court. While the appellant/defendant has disputed the very execution of the agreement of sale, he has simultaneously dealt with the property in a manner which has the potential to complicate the enforcement of rights claimed by the respondent/ plaintiff. --, \ 25 iii. The relief of specific performance being an equitable relief, the conduct of the parties becomes a relevant consideration. The conduct of the appellant/defendant, in creating third-party interests during the pendency of the appeal, is a factor which cannot be ignored while exercising appellate jurisdiction. In 'riew of the above circumstances, this Court takes note of the aforesaid conduct of the appellant/defendant, which lends support to the case of the respondent/plaintiff and constitutes a relevant factor while ccnsidering whether the decree for specil-rc performance warrants interference. Point No.VI

#47. This Court has independently reappreciated the entire evidence on record, as is required in a first appeal, and upon such reappreciation, this Court hnds that the f,rndings recorded by the trial court are based on a proper appreciation of both facts and law and do not suffer from any perversiqr or material irregulariqr warranting interference.

#48. The evidence of PWl and pw2, read in conjunction with the admissions of Dw1, clearly establish the execution of Ex.Al and the passing of consideration thereunder. The plea of forgery set up by the appellant/defendant remains unsubstantiated, there being no evidence or any other corroborative material in support thereof. 26 b

#49. The trial Court has compared the signatures and recorded a finding that the signatures on the agreement of sale and the written statement are identical. This Court in Kati Mahesutara Rao a. Uppati La.lithq qnd otlrcrs5 has held as under: ll.....Euen in spite of auailabihtg of expert euidence, tle Court can also compare the signatures under Section 73 of lndian Euidence Act and opinion of expert is onlg a guiding factor and it is for the Court belou to examine tlrc entire euidence on record including the euidence of tlrc handwriting expert and. come to a just conclusion. As such, dismissal of the application filed bg the petitioner by tlrc CourT below on this ground bg the Court below is erroneous. 5(). In the facts and circumstances of the case the respondent/plaintiff having been diligently pursuing his remedy since the year 2016 cannot be relegated to a remedy of damages merely on account of the subsequent acts of the appellant/defendant. In the considered view of this Court, the trial Court was justified in decreeing the suit for specilic performance. Conclusion

#51. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the judgment and decree dated O5.O8.2O22 passed by the Principal District Judge, Suryapet in O.S.No.l3 of 2016 are legal, valid and based on proper appreciation of the evidence on record. The appellant/defendant has failed to make out any ground warranting interference in this appeal. Thereby, the present appeal is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. 61zora;3 ALD 37s 27

5.2. Ac,:ordingly, the Appeal Suit is dismissed and the judgment and decree d:rted 05.08.2022 passed in o.S.No.13 of 2016 by the Principal District.[udge, suryapet, is upheld. The appellant shatl execute and register the sale deed in favour of the respondent in respect of the suit schedule propert5r within a period of one (o1). mcinth from the date of this judgment. In default, the respondent shall be entitled to have the sale dee,l executed through the process of the executing court. Having regard to the conduct of the appeltant, particularly in alienatinl3 portions of the suit schedule property during the pendency of the Flroceedings, the Appellant shall pay costs quantilied at Rs.SO,OOtl/- (Fifty thousand Rupees only) to the respondent within a period of two (o2) months from the date of this judgment. Any alienatiorr made by the appellant in respect of the suit schedule propert5r during the pendency of the suit and this appeal, including those reft:rred to in I.A.No.l of 2021 being subject to the doctrine of lis pendens shall not bind the respondent. The respondent shall be entitted to obtain conveyance of the entire suit schedule property through rlue process of the executing court, and such conveyance shall prevail over any pendent lite transfers effected by the appe[ant. The exectrting Court shall issue notice to the subsequent purchasers, if any, and afford them an opportunity of hearing; however, the execution shall proceed in. accordance with law without permitting such pur<:hasers to defeat the decree for specilic performance. [t shall 78 0 be open to such purchasers to work out their remedies, if any, against the appellant independently. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending if any in the appeal, shall stand closed. / /TRUE OOPY / / n^ sd/ - N sRr DEPUTY REG AR ,/ ION OFFICER The Principal District Judge at Suryapet. One CC to Sri Ramakrishna.K., Advocate [OPUCJ One CC Two CD to Sri P.Rama Sharana Sharma, Advocate [OPUC] Copies. To,

#4. JCK W +- rE v HIGH COURT DATED: 77 / 0412026 JUDGMENT: AS.No.78 of 2O23 S'l,ji () () ( i I 2 5 rPs 20m * * I -: Dismissing the Appeal Suit without costs