M/s. Stapathi Govt. Employees Co-op.Housing Society v. Government of Andhra Pradesh

The twin considerations for conferring the jurisdiction on the Special Court as discussed herein above are obviously there shall be unauthorized, illegal or unscrupulous occupation of the land and that occupation shall be without the necessary entitlement thereto. In so far as the first mandatory requirement is concerned, the pleading sufficiently answers the same. It is conspicuously absent and silent as regards the second mandatory requirement. The learned Government Pleader seeks to explain that they have specifically pleaded in the application that it was a case of unauthorised occupation by the land grabber, who grabbed the land, which necessarily means that the said occupation was obviously without any entitlement thereto. The pleading shall have to be construed by going through the application in its entirety and harmoniously. Even in the absence of necessary jargon, the intention shall have to be gathered from out of the averments made inter alia in the application in their entirety is the settled law.

In our considered view there is every force in the contention of the learned Government Pleader that although it was not specifically averred in the application that there had been an unauthorised occupation by a land grabber, who occupied the land with a mala fide intention to make unauthorised constructions there on, the 2nd mandatory requirement namely that it was without necessary entitlement thereto could well be gathered. On the 1st contention of the learned counsel for the writ petitioner that the Special Court has no jurisdiction, merits no consideration for the above reasons. Apropos the 2nd contention, the learned Special Court found that the State Government was the owner of the land and the writ petitioner was the land grabber. Apart from the oral evidence on the point adduced on either side, Special Court relied upon Ex.A-1, the main document sought to be relied upon by the State.

Ex.A-1 was the copy of the Town Survey Land Register. The entry made therein shows clearly that the land in question has been recorded as Government land being in the nature of burial ground. Besides Exs.A- 1, A-2 and A-9 sketches are sought to be relied on. As regards these two documents, the oral evidence on the point appears to be shaky. Sri Syed Shareef Ahmed, learned counsel for the writ petitioner has taken us through the relevant observations made by the Special Court on the oral evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3. There is no reason for us to brush aside those observations made by the Special Court. However, de hors those two documents, Ex.A-1 still could be relied on. In this connection, the contention of the learned counsel for the writ petitioner is that the entries made in the Town Survey Land Register are not conclusive. The learned counsel seeks to place reliance upon a Bench judgment of this Court in STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH Vs.

PRAMEELA MODI [3] in para 62. This Court observed as follows: “the entries in TSLR are no doubt relevant. But, they are not conclusive.” There can be no quarrel, with the proposition sought to be canvassed before us. As a matter of that, it is trite that the entries made in the revenue records cannot confer title. However, there can be no gain saying that they are relevant and till it is otherwise shown or disproved they can prima facie be considered by invoking the presumption under section 114(e) of the Evidence Act. Here, in the instant case, Ex.A-1 is no doubt, the trump card on the side of the 1st respondent. To buttress the said document, the State is further relying upon Exs.A-3 to A-7, which are the copies of the pahanies for the years 1954-55 onwards to 1980-81 i.e. nearly for a period of 30 years. In all these documents, the land in question has been shown as burial ground. These entries made in Exs.A-3 to A-7 would in our considered view strengthen the entry made in Ex.A-1.

Coming to the evidence on the side of the writ petitioner, the main document sought to be relied upon is Ex.B-6. Ex.B-6 is the proceedings of the Special Officer under Urban Land Ceiling Act passed on 30.4.1992 under Section 8(4) and 9 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act. The vendor of the writ petitioner seems to have filed a declaration in respect of the vacant land held by him in accordance with the provisions contained in Urban Land Ceiling Act. In that connection, the competent authority under the Act passed a final order under Section 8(4) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act holding that he was in possession of the excess land. In the declaration filed by the vendor of the writ petitioner, the land in question was clearly shown as the land held by him. It is no doubt true that the proceedings passed by the competent authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act are judicial in nature and obviously the State is not a party thereto.

This point was sought to be explained by the learned Special Court on the premise that the contention of the declarant that the land in question as shown in the declaration should be excluded for the reason that it was not sought to be conveyed by means of a regular sale deed and agreement of sale cannot be taken into consideration so as to exclude the land from the holding of the declarant. There appears every reason in the conclusion thus reached by the learned Special Court. Even otherwise, when we examine the binding nature of the document qua the State, in as much as, the State is not a party thereto and obviously the Order though judicial in nature having not been passed between the parties inter se, we are of the considered view that the observations made if any in Ex.B.6 cannot bind the State. Even otherwise, the dispute in question in the instant writ petition has not fallen for consideration before the competent authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act.

Obviously, the land in question has been shown in the declaration filed by the vendor as a writ petitioner and eventually the competent authority while taking that land into consideration and while computing the lands held by the declarant refused to exclude that land on the ground that contract of sale did not culminate in a sale transaction. Therefore, that document cannot have the effect of denuding the State of its title over the land in dispute in our considered view. Like any other document, more so, the judicial Order it has its own efficacy but when the disputed question comes up for consideration qua the said document that cannot outweigh the other relevant evidence on record adduced by the State. Ex.B-3 is the agreement of sale sought to be relied upon by the writ petitioner to drive home the point. Under this agreement, the Society sought to purchase the land in dispute from its vendor.

It has been rightly eschewed from consideration by the Special Court for the reason that such document is void in view of the provisions contained in the Urban Land Ceiling Act and for the further reason that the declarant was in possession of the excess land. Even otherwise, Ex.B-3 will not confer any title on the writ petitioner being mere contract of sale more particularly in respect of the land, which was found to be in excess under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. In that view of the matter, in our considered view Ex.B-3 cannot be pressed into service to drive home the point that the initial entry over the land in dispute by the writ petitioner cannot be called as unlawful or without entitlement qua the State. From the evidence available on record more particularly having regard to the Exs.A-1, A-3 to A-7, we are of the considered view that the finding reached by the Special Court that the State was owner of the land in dispute cannot be considered as illegal, erroneous and without any jurisdiction.

No illegal omission to consider relevant evidence nor an error in considering any irrelevant evidence, in the process of application of evidence has been shown to us so as to reach a conclusion that the Order in question suffers from the vice of illegality which in fact gives the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to this Court. Barring Exs.B.3 to B.6, the other documents are not relevant to consider on the question of title in between the parties inter se. At any rate, the cumulative effect of the evidence adduced on the side of the writ petitioner cannot have the effect of rebutting the evidentiary value of the entries made in Exs.A-1, A-3 to A-7. When it is obvious that the entries made in Exs.A-1, A-3 to A-7 are relevant though not conclusive and when relevant evidence is available on record, there is nothing shown on either side which can outweigh the relevancy of that evidence or its efficacy, we see no reason as to why Exs.A-1, A-3 to A-7 shall not be relied upon.

In the instant case, the Special Court has rightly relied upon the said documents. From the evidence available on record, it is very difficult to reach a conclusion that the findings reached by the Special Court by appreciating the evidence adduced on either side are in any manner erroneous, illegal and without any jurisdiction. It may be mentioned that this Court is not sitting in an appeal over the judgment of the Special Court. While exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, we are aware of the limitations for exercising such an extraordinary jurisdiction. Unless it is shown before us that the Order in question suffers from the vice of illegality either by considering the illegal evidence or by omitting to consider any relevant evidence, no infirmity whatsoever thus could be seen from the findings arrived by the learned Special Court. Therefore, the facts and circumstances in the instant writ petition do not warrant any interference by this Court. For the above reasons, the writ petition must fail and is dismissed. Under the circumstances, no separate order as to costs. _____________________ T.CH.SURYA RAO, J _____________________ G. CHANDRAIAH, J 08-06-2006 CHV [1] [2] [3] 2004(6) A.L.T. 772(L.B) 2006(3) A.L.D. 10(SC) 2005(3) A.L.T. 379(D.B)