Ranga Reddy District v. 2 The Labour Court-I Hyderabad

Counsel MR.K.MADHAVA REDDY(SC FOR APSRTC) the Petitioner:MR V.S.K.RAMA RAO FOR Counsel for respondent No.1: MR G.IDYASAGAR Counsel for respondent No.2:AGP FOR LABOUR The Court made the following : O R D E R: At the interlocutory stage, the writ petition is taken up for hearing and disposal with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. The writ petition is filed questioning award dated 30-10-2007, in I.D.No.146 of 2005 on the file of Labour Court-I, Hyderabad, published on 20-12-2007 in G.O.Rt.No.2866. Heard Sri V.S.K.Rama Rao, learned counsel representing S ri K.Madhava Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the petitioner, Sri G.Vidyasagar, learned counsel for respondent No.1. Respondent No.1 was the driver of the petitioner-Corporation. On 13-11-2002, vehicle No.AEZ 3898 driven by respondent No.1 on route Upperpally to Koti met with an accident, resulting in the death of a cyclist. Charge sheet dated 07-12-2002 was issued and following the enquiry, penalty of removal was imposed by the petitioner vide order 20-12-2003. Appeal filed by respondent No.1 ended in its dismissal vide order dated 09-08-2004 passed by the Divisional Manager. Respondent No.1, therefore, moved Labour Court-I, Hyderabad by way of I.D. No.146 of 2005. The said I.D was allowed by the Labour Court by its award dated 30-10-2007. By order dated 28-01-2008, respondent No.1 was reinstated into service and he was retired on his attaining the age o f superannuation with effect from 31-01-2008. Almost one year thereafter, the present writ petition is filed questioning the award of the Labour Court. At the hearing, the learned counsel representing the petitioner submitted that the award of the Labour Court directing reinstatement of respondent No.1 is contrary to law. He submitted that even though the Labour Court is vested with the power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short “the Act”) to interfere with the quantum of punishment, it is not justified in interfering with the findings of fact arrived at by the domestic Tribunal. Sri G.Vidyasagar, learned counsel for respondent No.1, opposed these contentions and submitted that the findings of domestic Tribunal are contrary to the evidence on record and therefore, the Labour Court rightly interfered with the orders passed by the domestic Tribunal. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. From the facts recorded by the Labour Court in its award, it is evident that the Conductor, who gave evidence before the Enquiry Officer, stated that while he was in the process of issuing tickets, the bus was suddenly stopped on hearing some sound from the front portion of the bus; that on getting down from the bus, he noticed that a cyclist was lying on the right side of the road with the cycle lying behind him and that he further observed that the cyclist was found in a drunken condition with alcohol smell coming from him. He also stated that there was no damage either to the cycle or to the bus and that he heard people present there commenting that the driver of the bus was not at fault. Respondent No.1 examined himself in the enquiry and he stated that the cyclist came on the right side and hit the body of the bus and fell down. The Labour Court observed that there is no evidence of eye witness before the Enquiry Officer and the criminal case registered against respondent No.1 ended in his acquittal. The Labour Court relied upon the evidence of the Conductor and found that as the cyclist hit the bus on its rights side, respondent No.1 cannot be held to be guilty of rash and negligent driving. The Labour Court also observed that there is no iota of evidence to establish that respondent No.1 was guilty of rash and negligent driving. Under Section 11-A of the Act, the Labour Court is vested with the power of re-appreciating the evidence and interfering with the quantum of punishment as well. The reasons given by the Labour Court are legally sound. While proof beyond reasonable doubt is not the requirement in a departmental proceeding, no penalty can be imposed by the domestic Tribunal in the absence of any evidence whatsoever to find fault with the charged employee of the alleged misconduct. On a careful appreciation of the evidence, the Labour Court was satisfied that it was a case of no evidence. Therefore, I do not find any error either in law or on fact contained in the impugned award warranting interference of this Court, while exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed as without any merit. As a sequel to dismissal of main petition, interim order dated 29-01-2009 is vacated and WPMP No.1520 of 2009 and WVMP No.823 of 2009 are disposed of as infructuous. C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, J Dated 23rd April, 2009