Bhukhiya Bai v. Ramihan Bai

15 - Smt. Sukhro Bai Wd/o Late Ganaram Aged About 55 Years Occupation Cultivators, R/o Village Tulsi, Teshil Balodabazar, District Raipur (M.P.) Now District Balodabazar Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 16 - Raghunath S/o Devprasad Aged About 35 Years Occupation Cultivators, R/o Village Tulsi, Teshil Balodabazar, District Raipur (M.P.) Now District Balodabazar Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 17 - Smt. Lagni W/o Devprasad Aged About 50 Years Occupation Cultivators, R/o Village Tulsi, Teshil Balodabazar, District Raipur (M.P.) Now District Balodabazar Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 18 - Premram @ Junjru S/o Janaram Aged About 35 Years Occupation Cultivators, R/o Village Tulsi, Teshil Balodabazar, District Raipur (M.P.) Now District Balodabazar Bhatapara Chhattisgarh 19 - State Of Madhya Pradesh (Now Chhattisgarh) Through Collector, Raipur (M.P.) Now District Balodabazar Bhatapara Chhattisgarh. (cause title downloaded from CIS Periphery) ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. Akashdeep Sharma, Adv on behalf of Mr. Gajendra Sahu, Advocate. For Res No.4 : Mr. Utkarsh Shrivas, Advocate. For State : Mr. Siddharth Sharma, Panel Lawyer. (Hon’ble Shri Justice ) Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi Order on Board 13/08/2026

#1. Heard on IA No.01/2024, application for condonation of delay in filing restoration application, as the MCC is barred by delay of 5020 days.

#2. Present MCC has been filed for restoration of Second Appeal No.119/2020, which was dismissed for want of prosecution on 24.06.2010. 4

#3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that original appellant had earlier died and applicants who are heirs of original appellant were not aware about the pendency of the appeal and they came to know about dismissal of second appeal in the year 2024 itself and immediately filed this MCC. He further submits that delay in filing the MCC is bona fide, therefore, delay may be condoned and MCC be admitted for hearing.

#4. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposes the above submission and submits that this MCC along with application for condonation of delay has been filed after about 14 years from the date of dismissal of second appeal, therefore, the MCC deserves to be dismissed at threshold.

#5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

#6. The original SA No.119/200 was listed on 24.06.2010, but it was dismissed for want of prosecution on 24.06.2010. The present Miscellaneous Civil Case (MCC), however, was filed by the applicant/appellant only on 02.05.2024. Thus, there is a delay of 5020 days, i.e., approximately 14 years, in filing the present MCC. The explanation offered by the applicant/appellant for the inordinate delay is that the applicants were not aware of the dismissal of the second appeal. Such a statement cannot be accepted in the absence of any specific or satisfactory explanation as to the actual circumstances that prevented the applicant/appellant from filing an application for restoration within a reasonable time. No material has been placed on record to explain the prolonged inaction extending over more than 5000 days. Furthermore, the record of the second appeal shows that the Civil Appeal No.049A/1998 filed by the original appellant was dismissed by the trial Court 09.12.1999. In such circumstances, after the lapse of such a long period, it is quite 5 possible that third-party rights or other interests may have been created in respect of the subject matter of the suit. Therefore, the parties were expected to remain vigilant regarding the status of the litigation. The conduct of the applicant/appellant, however, does not reflect the diligence expected of a litigant who is genuinely pursuing his remedy.

#7. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the applicants have failed to furnish any sufficient or satisfactory cause for condonation of the inordinate delay of 5020 days in filing the present MCC. The only explanation offered, that he was unaware of the dismissal of the second appeal, is vague, unsubstantiated and wholly insufficient to explain the prolonged inaction of more than six years. The applicant/appellant has failed to disclose the circumstances that prevented him from pursuing the matter with due diligence or from ascertaining the status of the appeal during the intervening period.

#8. In the case of Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi, (2021) 18 SCC 384:AIR 2022 SC 332, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the alike issue has observed that the High Court erred in condoning the huge delay of 1011 days in preferring the appeal and thereby set-aside the order observing therein as under:-

7.1 In the case of Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. 1961 SCC Online SC 39, it is observed and held as under: In construing s. 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has 6 accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be light- heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, ILR (1890) 13 Mad. 269, "s. 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words ‘sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant."

7.2 In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala and Anr. (1997) 7 SCC 556, while refusing to condone the delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for seeking condonation of delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. It is further observed that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It is further observed that while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court has to exercise discretion judiciously.

7.3 In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project (2008) 17 SCC 448, it is observed as under: “The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as “statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim “interest 7 reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.”

7.4 In the case of Basawaraj and Anr. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, it is observed and held by this Court that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case. It is further observed that the expression “sufficient cause” cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or there is inaction then there cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. It is observed that each application for condonation of delay has to be decided within the framework laid down by this Court. It is further observed that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would amount to violation of statutory principles and showing utter disregard to legislature.

7.5 In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra), it is observed by this Court that the court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The Courts help those who are vigilant and “do not slumber over their rights.” 8

#9. In the matter of Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak Vs. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation, 2022 SCC Online 64, their Lordship of the Supreme Court held as under :- “9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace, though some contrary opinions have been expressed (in Nav Rattanmal Vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1704). The courts have expressed the view that the law of limitation rests on the foundations of greater public interest for three reasons, namely, (a) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; (b) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disapprove a stale claim; and (iii) that persons with good causes of action (who are able to enforce them) should pursue them with reasonable diligence (State of Kerala Vs. V.R. Kalliyanikutty, (1999) 3 SCC 657 relying on Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, para 605; Halsbury’s lawas of England, Vol. 68 (2021) para

#1005. Equally, change in de facto position or character, creation of third party rights over a period of time, waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure certitude in dealings, are equitable public policy considerations why period of limitation is prescribed by law. Law of limitation does not apply to writ petitions, albeit the discretion vested with a constitutional court is exercised with caution as delay and laches principle is applied with the aim to secure the quiet of the community, suppress fraud and perjury, quicken diligence, and prevent oppression. See Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association, (2005) 7 SCC 510. Therefore, some decisions and judgments do not look upon pleas of delay and laches with favour, especially and rightly in cases where the persons suffer from adeptness, or incapacity to approach the courts for relief. However, other decisions, while accepting the rules of limitation as well as delay and laches, have observed that such rules are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but serve a larger public interest and are founded on public policy. There must be a lifespan during which a person 9 must approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties. (See N. Blarkrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurty, (1998) 7 SCC 123. Referring to the principle of delay and laches, this Court, way back in Moons Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Mehar, President, Industrial Court, Bombay AIR 1967 SC 1450, had referred to the view expressed by Sir Barnes Peacock in The Lindsay Petroleum Company and Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John Kemp, (L.R.) 5 P.C. 21 in the following words: “ Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”

#10. Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By L.Rs. and Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 10 2024 SCC Online SC 513 has held in paragraphs 17, 18, 19, 20 & 21, as under:- “17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing ‘sufficient cause’ in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree- holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights.

#18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramla, Motilal And Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd reported in AIR 1962 SC 361 has emphasized that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party.

#19. In Maqbul Ahmad vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors. reported in AIR 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.

#20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar vs. State of Haryana reported in (2014) 11 SCC 351 wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 11

#21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation.

#11. It is also settled proposition of law that, the doctrine of delay and laches or for that matter statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace, there must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the Court for his remedy. Otherwise there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties.

#12. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the applicant/appellant has failed to establish any sufficient cause warranting condonation of the extraordinary delay of 5020 days. On the contrary, the record reflects complete indifference and lack of diligence in prosecuting the matter. Entertaining such a highly belated application would defeat the very object of the law of limitation and unsettle rights that may have accrued to the opposite parties over the passage of time.

#13. Accordingly, IA No.01/2024, application for condonation of delay, is rejected. Consequently, the present Miscellaneous Civil Case (MCC), being barred by limitation, is dismissed. No order as to costs. Ajay Judge (Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Sd/-