Yashwant Raj Singh v. Bhognath & Ors.

: Mr. Ashish Shrivastava, Sr. Adv. with Ms. Shotabdi Baghi and Mr. Ashutosh Shrivastava, Advocates For Respondent No.6/State : Mr. Mayoor Khandelwal, Panel Lawyer (Hon’ble Shri Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Order on Board

22.07.2026 2

1. Heard on IA No.01/2018, application for condonation of delay in filing restoration application.

2. Present MCC has been filed for restoration of Second Appeal No.518/1993, which was dismissed for non-compliance of peremptory order dated 21.02.2012.

3. Learned Sr. counsel appearing for the applicant submits that Second Appeal No.518/1993 was listed for hearing on 21.02.2012, wherein PF was directed to be paid for issuance of notice to LRs of respondent No.1. In compliance with the Order dated 21.02.2012, PF was paid by ordinary mode, but it could not be paid by registered mode. Therefore, the second appeal was dismissed. It is further submitted that the applicant was unaware of the dismissal of the admitted second appeal, therefore, delay of about 06 years (2335 days) occurred in filing the MCC, which is bonafide, hence, the delay may be condoned and the present MCC may be allowed. To substantiate his contention, learned Sr. counsel has placed reliance on the order dated

01.11.2017 passed by this Court in MCC No.160/2015 (Tikaram (dead) through Lrs. vs. Kehar Singh (Dead) through Lrs.) and on the judgment of Supreme Court in Banwarilal (Dead) by Legal Representatives and another v. Balbir singh reported in (2016) 1 SCC 607.

6. Learned counsel for the State submits that the State is formal party. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The second appeal was listed on 21.02.2012, but it was dismissed in compliance with the peremptory order dated 12.3.2012. The present Miscellaneous Civil Case (MCC), however, was filed by the applicant/appellant only on 20.09.2018. Thus, there is a delay of 2,335 days, i.e., approximately six years, in filing the present MCC. The explanation 3 offered by the applicant/appellant for the inordinate delay is that he was not aware of the dismissal of the second appeal. Such a statement cannot be accepted in the absence of any specific or satisfactory explanation as to the actual circumstances that prevented the applicant/appellant from filing an application for restoration within a reasonable time. No material has been placed on record to explain the prolonged inaction extending over more than six years. When the second appeal was listed for hearing, it was necessary upon the applicant/appellant to remain vigilant and keep himself informed about the progress of his case. However, he remained completely oblivious to the proceedings and displayed gross negligence and lack of diligence for more than six years. It is also pertinent to note that the original Civil Suit No. 167A/1989 was instituted in the year 1989. The record of the second appeal shows that the civil suit filed by the appellant was dismissed by the trial Court, and the said judgment and decree were affirmed by the first appellate Court. In such circumstances, after the lapse of such a long period, it is quite possible that third-party rights or other interests may have been created in respect of the subject matter of the suit. Therefore, the parties were expected to remain vigilant regarding the status of the litigation. The conduct of the applicant/appellant, however, does not reflect the diligence expected of a litigant who is genuinely pursuing his remedy.

7. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the applicant/appellant has failed to furnish any sufficient or satisfactory cause for condonation of the inordinate delay of 2,335 days in filing the present MCC. The only explanation offered, that he was unaware of the dismissal of the second appeal, is vague, unsubstantiated and wholly insufficient to explain the prolonged inaction of more than six years. The applicant/appellant has failed to disclose the 4 circumstances that prevented him from pursuing the matter with due diligence or from ascertaining the status of the appeal during the intervening period.

8. In the case of Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi,