Jatashankar v. State Of Chhattisgarh

: Mr. Mirza Kaiser Baeg, Advocate For Respondents/State : Mr. Ashutosh Shukla and Mr. Sharad Mishra, P.L. 2 SB- Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Order On Board

11.06 .2025

#1. The petitioner herein was working as a Peon in the respondent department and he was suspended by order dated 10/03/1993 on account of his involvement in commission of offence under Section 302 of IPC and since he was convicted for the said offence by learned Sessions Judge on 20/08/1998, he was consequently terminated from service on 24/06/2006. However, his appeal against the order of conviction was set aside by this Court by order dated 17/10/2013 (Annexure P/3) and he was acquitted and was further reinstated on the said post by order dated 06/05/2015 (Annexure P/1). He also made an application for grant of back wages on 01/08/2016 but no action has been taken which led to the filing of this writ petition.

#2. Mr. Mirza Kaiser Baeg, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that petitioner is entitled for back wages as he has been acquitted by the Criminal Court and he has been reinstated on service, however, he has been refused on the basis that the period from the date of his suspension i.e. 10/03/1993 till the date of reinstatement 3 i.e. 06/05/2015 is to be treated as “no work, no pay”, which is absolutely unsustainable in law.

#3. Per contra, Mr. Ashutosh Shukla, learned State counsel would submit that since petitioner was involved in a criminal offence for which he had undergone criminal trial and though he has been acquitted but the period from the date of his suspension till the date of joining will be treated as non-working period and the claim of the petitioner with regard to treating his non-service period as service period and making payment for the same has already been rejected by learned Labour Court vide order dated 23/0/8/2017(Annexure P/2) which is absolutely in accordance with law, therefore, the instant writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

#4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their submissions and went through the records with utmost circumspection.

#5. The issue involved herein is no longer res integra and it stands conclusively determined by their Lordships of the Supreme Court by their judgment first of all in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar 1 in which their Lordships have considered a case where an employee was 1 (1996) 11 SCC 603 4 dismissed from service on account of his conviction by a criminal court for his involvement in an offence under Section 302/34 of the IPC and subsequently, he was acquitted and as a consequence, reinstated. Their Lordships while considering the issue whether back-wages should be paid to the employee for the period between the date of dismissal and the date of reinstatement held as under: - "The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is whether he is entitled to back wages. It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in Under these circumstances, the jail. petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages." 5

#6. Similarly, in the matter of Union of India v. Jaipal Singh2, the principle of law laid down in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) has been followed with approval.

#7. In the matter of Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal3, the Supreme Court has considered a provision in the service regulation which provided that an employee, who is absent from duty without any authority, shall not be entitled to any pay and allowance during the period of such absence (similar to F.R. 17) and held as under: - “15. … It is only if such employee is acquitted of all blame and is treated by the competent authority as being on duty during the period of suspension that such employee is entitled to full pay and allowances for the said period. In other words, the Regulations vest the power exclusively in the Bank to treat the period of such suspension on duty or on leave or otherwise. The power thus vested cannot be validly challenged. During this period, the employee renders no work. He is absent for reasons of his own involvement in the misconduct and the Bank is in no way responsible for keeping him away from his duties. The Bank, therefore, cannot be saddled with the liability to pay him his salary and allowances for the period. That will be against the principle of ‘no work, no pay’ and positively inequitable to those who have to work and earn their pay. …”