Kartar Singh v. State Of Chhattisgarh

: Shri Awadh Tripathi, Advocate. For Respondent/ : Shri Rahul Tamaskar, GA. State For Respondent : Smt. Swati Agrawal on behalf of Pankaj Agrawal No.4 Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal , J Order On Board 14/01/2026 : KRISHNA KUMAR BARVE Digitally signed by KRISHNA KUMAR BARVE 17:31:35 +0530 2

1. The petitioner has called in question the legality, validity and correctness of the order dated 22.2.2019 (Annexure-P/1) by which his termination period from 18.5.2001 to 14.10.2018 has been held as ‘No work No Pay’.

2. The petitioner was convicted by the Special Judge, Raipur vide judgment dated 31.3.1999 for commission of offence under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and under Section 161 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for 1 year with fine of Rs.1,000/- and to undergo RI for 1 year with fine of Rs.1,000/- respectively with usual default stipulations. Accordingly, the petitioner was terminated from service vide order dated 18.5.2001. This Court, in Cr.A. No.964/1999, vide judgment dated 12.10.2018, set aside his conviction and the petitioner was acquitted of the charges. Consequently, the petitioner was reinstated in service vide order dated

22.2.2019. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition stating that he is entitled for salary for the period form 18.5.2001 to

12.10.2018.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that as the petitioner has been acquitted of all the charges levelled against him, he is entitled for all the consequential benefits. Learned counsel for the petitioner would place reliance on the order passed by this Court in WP(S) No.994/2010 (Shankar Lal Soni Vs. The State of CG & Others) decided on 9.7.2021. 3

4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Corporation would oppose the submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the documents annexed with the writ petition carefully.

6. The issue involved herein is no longer res integra and it stands conclusively determined by their Lordships of the Supreme Court by their judgment first of all in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar 1 in which their Lordships have considered a case where an employee was dismissed from service on account of his conviction by a criminal court for his involvement in an offence under Section 302/34 of the IPC and subsequently, he was acquitted and as a consequence, reinstated. Their Lordships while considering the issue whether back-wages should be paid to the employee for the period between the date of dismissal and the date of reinstatement held as under: - "The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is whether he is entitled to back wages. It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he 1 (1996) 11 SCC 603 4 was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages."

7. Similarly, in the matter of Union of India v. Jaipal Singh2, the principle of law laid down in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) has been followed with approval.

8. In the matter of Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal3, the Supreme Court has considered a provision in the service regulation which provided that an employee, who is absent from duty without any authority, shall not be entitled to any pay and allowance during the period of such absence (similar to F.R. 17) and held as under: - “15. … It is only if such employee is acquitted of all blame and is treated by the competent authority as being on duty during the period of suspension that such employee is entitled to full pay and allowances for the said period. In other words, the Regulations vest the power exclusively in the Bank to treat the period of such suspension on duty or on leave or otherwise. The power thus vested cannot be validly challenged. During this period, the employee renders no work. He is absent for reasons of his own involvement in the misconduct and the Bank is in no way responsible for keeping him away from his duties. The Bank, therefore, cannot be saddled with the liability to pay him his salary and allowances for the period. That will be against the principle of ‘no work, no pay’ and