The brief facts of the case, as projected by & Ors. v. Jalour Singh & Ors.

The petitioner has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India calling in question the legality, validity and propriety of the award dated 14.12.2022 passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat constituted under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (for short "the Act of 1987"), in case No.351/2022 (Mrigendar Singh Deo v Pradip Kumar Sahu & Anr).

(a)

The brief facts of the case, as projected by the petitioner (non- applicant No.1 before the Permanent Lok Adalat), are that the dispute relates to a parcel of land which, according to respondent No.2 (applicant before the Permanent Lok Adalat), was originally allotted on lease in favour of Maharaja Chandikeshwar Singhdeo. It is pleaded by respondent No.2 that the allotment was duly published in the Gazette on 22.12.1967 and the subsequent transfer in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of respondent No.2 was effected through a registered sale deed dated 02.05.1965. Consequent mutation entries were also recorded in the revenue records and the respondent claims to have remained in lawful possession. (b) The petitioner, however, questioned the legality of the claim of respondent No.2 and asserted that the land continued to be Government land and that respondent No.2 had no lawful title. The dispute ultimately culminated in proceedings before the Permanent Lok Adalat. The Permanent Lok Adalat issued notices to the parties and thereafter proceeded to decide the matter by passing the impugned 3 award in favour of respondent No.2. The award also directed payment of compensation in favour of respondent No.2. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that: (a) the impugned award passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat is wholly without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside, as the same has been rendered by a forum which was not constituted in accordance with the mandatory provisions of the Act, 1987. He would next submit that Section 22B(2) of the Act of 1987 mandates that every Permanent Lok Adalat shall consist of a Chairman, who is or has been a District Judge or Additional District Judge, and two other Members possessing adequate experience in public utility service. The Legislature has consciously employed the expression "shall consist of", thereby making the composition prescribed under the statute mandatory and not directory. Since the jurisdiction of the Permanent Lok Adalat is entirely statutory, it can exercise adjudicatory powers only when it is duly constituted in the manner contemplated under the Act,

1987. (b) Learned counsel would further submit that on the date the impugned award was passed, the Permanent Lok Adalat was not functioning with its complete statutory composition, 4 as one of the Members was not available and the award came to be rendered by an incomplete quorum. Consequently, the adjudicatory body lacked the competence to adjudicate the dispute and the award rendered by such an incompletely constituted forum is a nullity in the eyes of law. (c) He would next submit that the statutory composition of the Permanent Lok Adalat is mandatory and an award passed by an incompletely constituted Permanent Lok Adalat is without jurisdiction and deserves to be set aside. (d) Placing reliance upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dilip Mehta v. Rakesh Gupta & Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2737, learned counsel submits that although the scope of judicial review against an award of the Permanent Lok Adalat is limited, interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is permissible where the award suffers from a jurisdictional infirmity.

According to the petitioner, the defect in the present case goes to the very root of the matter, inasmuch as the adjudicating forum itself was not constituted in accordance with the statute. Without prejudice to the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel also submits that the proceedings before the Permanent Lok Adalat were conducted in violation of the principles of 5 natural justice inasmuch as the petitioner was not afforded an adequate and effective opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned award. (e) Learned counsel would further submit that the application filed before the Permanent Lok Adalat by the respondent No.2 itself was not maintainable in view of Section 22C(1) of the Act of 1987. It is submitted that prior to invoking the jurisdiction of the Permanent Lok Adalat, respondent No.2 had already initiated proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Officer relating to diversion of the land.

Once the dispute had already been taken before the competent authority, the application before the Permanent Lok Adalat was not maintainable. Learned counsel would also submit that the dispute arose out of proceedings governed by the Chhattisgarh Lok Sewa Guarantee Act, 2011, which provides a complete statutory mechanism including an appellate remedy before the Collector. Since respondent No.2 admittedly did not avail the statutory appellate remedy, the application before the Permanent Lok Adalat was premature and not maintainable. (f) On the aforesaid grounds, it is prayed that the impugned award be quashed and the matter be remitted to a duly constituted Permanent Lok Adalat, constituted in 6 accordance with Section 22B(2) of the Act, 1987, for fresh adjudication in accordance with law after granting due opportunity of hearing to all the parties.

Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.2, while supporting the impugned award, submits that: (i) every allegation made in the writ petition is misconceived. It is argued that the petitioner deliberately choose not to participate effectively before the Permanent Lok Adalat despite repeated opportunities. The respondent has relied upon the Gazette publication, lease documents, registered sale deed dated 02.05.1965, mutation entries and subsequent revenue records to contend that the title and possession of respondent No.2 stood established. It is further submitted that the Permanent Lok Adalat first made sincere efforts for conciliation as required by Section 22C of the Act of 1987 and only after failure of conciliation proceeded to adjudicate the dispute. (ii) With regard to the allegation of violation of natural justice learned counsel would next submit that notices were repeatedly issued and opportunities were granted but were not availed by the petitioner. Learned counsel has further argued that the Permanent Lok Adalat has awarded only compensation and not penalty and, therefore, the objection 7 regarding lack of jurisdiction to impose penalty is wholly misconceived. (iii) Reliance has been placed upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 660, Bhargavi Constructions v. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy, (2018) 13 SCC 480 and particularly Dilip Mehta (supra), to contend that the award of a Permanent Lok Adalat can be interfered with only on extremely limited grounds such as fraud, jurisdictional error or violation of natural justice.

Learned State counsel adopts the submissions advanced on behalf of respondent No.2 and submits that the award is reasoned and does not warrant interference.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

The principal question which arises for consideration is - “Whether the impugned Award passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat can be sustained when admittedly it was not functioning with the composition prescribed under the Act,

1987.”

In order to consider the plea raised at the bar, it would be appropriate to consider the provisions contained in the Act of 1987 as also the nature and scope of the said Act.

The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 was enacted to constitute legal 8 services authorities to provide for free and competent legal service to the weaker sections of the society to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities, and to organise Lok Adalats to secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice on a basis of equal opportunity. The Act of 1987 is divided in seven chapters. Section 2(d) defines, “Lok Adalat” means a Lok Adalat organised under Chapter VI. Clause (a) of Section 22A defines, “Permanent Lok Adalat” means a Permanent Lok Adalat established under sub-section (1) of Section 22B, only with respect to “public utility service” as envisaged under clause (b) of Section 22A and such Permanent Lok Adalats have to be established under Section 22B. Section 22B which relates to Establishment of Permanent Lok Adalats states as under: - “22B. Establishment of Permanent Lok Adalats.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 19, the Central Authority or, as the case may be, every State Authority shall, by notification, establish Permanent Lok Adalats at such places and for exercising such jurisdiction in respect of one or more public utility services and for such areas as may be specified in the notification. (2) Every Permanent Lok Adalat established for an area notified under sub-section (1) shall consist of— (a) a person who is, or has been, a district judge or additional district judge or has held judicial office higher in rank than that of a district judge, shall be the Chairman of the Permanent Lok Adalat; and (b) two other persons having adequate experience in public utility service to be nominated by the Central Government 9 or, as the case may be, the State Government on the recommendation of the Central Authority or, as the case may be, the State Authority, appointed by the Central Authority or, as the case may be, the State Authority, establishing such Permanent Lok Adalat and the other terms and conditions of the appointment of the Chairman and other persons referred to in clause (b) shall be such as may be prescribed by the Central Government.

In Bar Council of India v. Union of India (2012) 8 SCC 243, their Lordships of the Supreme Court while highlighting the object of having non-judicial members in a tribunal like Permanent Lok Adalat, have held as under: -

36. It is not unusual to have the tribunals comprising of judicial as well as non-judicial members. The whole idea of having non-judicial members in a tribunal like Permanent Lok Adalat is to make sure that the legal technicalities do not get paramountcy in conciliation or adjudicatory proceedings. The fact that a Permanent Lok Adalat established under Section 22-B comprises of one judicial officer and two other persons having adequate experience in public utility service does not show any abhorrence to the rule of law nor such composition becomes violative of principles of fairness and justice or is contrary to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Their Lordships further held that Permanent Lok Adalat under the Act of 1987 has to be by majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat, and observed as under: -

37. It is true that the award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat under the 1987 Act has to be by majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat. In a given case, it may be that the two non-judicial members disagree with the judicial member but that does not mean that such majority decision lacks in fairness or sense of justice.

In the matter of Karnal Improvement Trust, Karnal v. Parkash Wanti 10 (Smt) (Dead) and another (1995) 5 SCC 159 their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering a matter rendered by a Tribunal constituted under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, while examining the Act of 1922 found that under Section 2(5), the Tribunal constituted under Section 60(1) shall consist of a President and two assessors. In paragraph 6 of the judgment, their Lordships held as under: - A conspectus of the above provisions would given us

6. unerring indication of the legislative animation that the Tribunal shall consist of three members, namely, the President and two assessors and each is co-existent with the others. The Tribunal is a civil court and the President is the Presiding Judge of the court. Being a judicial member, undoubtedly, he has been conferred with power to preside over the Tribunal, summon the witnesses, secure the evidence and decide on questions of law and title and procedure. ...

Their Lordships further held in paragraphs 7 & 12 as under: - “7.

The question thus arises whether the function by the Tribunal as a body is mandatory or directory? The discharge of the duties under the Act are quasi-judicial. The power to determine compensation and other questions involves adjudication. The discharge of the functions by the Tribunal being quasi-judicial cannot be regarded as ministerial. When the statute directs the Tribunal consisting of three members to determine compensation etc. and designates the award as judgment and decree of a civil court, it cannot be held that the quasi-judicial functions of the Tribunal would be considered as directory, defeating the very purpose of the Act. Though inconvenience and delay may occasion in some cases by holding the provisions to be mandatory, but that is an inescapable consequence. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it must be held that the adjudication by the three-member Tribunal is imperative and mandatory. Determination of the compensation in disregard thereof renders the adjudication void, invalid and inoperative.”

12. The principle of law laid down in Karnal Improvement Trust (supra) applies with full vigour to the facts of the present case, as in the instant case also by virtue of Section 22(3) of the Act of 1987, all proceedings before a Permanent Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code and every Permanent Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purpose of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The function of Permanent Lok Adalat is not ministerial 12 and therefore the composition of the Permanent Lok Adalat has to be strictly in accordance with Section 22B(2) of the Act of 1987 (one judicial member as Chairman and other two members being non-judicial members), and decision of the Permanent Lok Adalat has to be unanimous and as per the scheme of the Act of 1987 and in case of difference of opinion, it should be as per majority. Quorum of the Permanent Lok Adalat i.e. one judicial member being Chairman and two non-judicial members being Members, is mandatory quorum which is necessary for constituting competent Permanent Lok Adalat to adjudicate the dispute by way of conciliation or on merits.

Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Karnal Improvement Trust (supra) further repelled the argument that the parties to the dispute have participated in the proceedings of the Tribunal without any demur or protest and therefore setting aside of the award would put them at great hardship. Their Lordships repelling the argument held that acquiescence does not confer jurisdiction and erroneous interpretation equally should not be permitted to perpetuate defeating legislative animation. It has been observed as under: -

22. It is next contended that since the matter is long pending and the appellant has acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the single member award, it is not a fit case warranting interference under Article 136. Acquiescence does not confer jurisdiction and erroneous interpretation equally should not be permitted to perpetuate and perpetrate defeating of legislative animation. ...

13

As such, in absence of mandatory quorum of one judicial member being Chairman and two non-judicial members being Members in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Karnal Improvement Trust (supra), the impugned award of the Permanent Lok Adalat would be void, invalid and inoperative.

Before adverting to the factual aspect, it would be apposite to examine the statutory scheme contained in Chapter VI-A of the Act, 1987.

Section 22A defines "Permanent Lok Adalat" for the purposes of Sections 22 and 22B and also defines "public utility service". The adjudicatory jurisdiction exercised by a Permanent Lok Adalat is, thus, entirely a creation of statute and can be exercised only in the manner contemplated by the Act.

The provisions contained in Sections 22A to 22E constitute an integrated statutory scheme and, therefore, each provision must be construed harmoniously rather than in isolation. Section 22B deals with the establishment of Permanent Lok Adalats. Sub-section (2), which is material for the present controversy, provides that every Permanent Lok Adalat shall consist of a Chairman, who is or has been a District Judge or an Additional District Judge or has held judicial office higher in rank than that of a District Judge, and two other persons having adequate experience in public utility service. The Legislature has consciously employed the expression "shall consist of", thereby making the composition of the Permanent Lok Adalat mandatory. The statute neither contemplates nor permits adjudication 14 by the Chairman sitting singly or by an incomplete Bench. The jurisdiction of the Permanent Lok Adalat, therefore, is conditioned upon its constitution strictly in accordance with Section 22B(2) of the Act.

The distinction between mandatory and directory provisions is well settled. A statutory requirement is mandatory where compliance is indispensable to the validity of the act and where the provision relates to the competence or jurisdiction of the authority itself. On the other hand, a directory provision regulates the manner in which the power is to be exercised and substantial compliance may suffice. The requirement contained in Section 22B(2) falls in the former category. The Legislature has not merely prescribed the procedure to be followed by the Permanent Lok Adalat; it has prescribed the very composition of the adjudicatory forum. A body constituted contrary to the mandate of Section 22B(2) is not the Permanent Lok Adalat contemplated by the statute.

The procedure to be followed by the Permanent Lok Adalat has been prescribed under Section 22C. Under sub-sections (4) to (7), the Permanent Lok Adalat is required to make efforts to bring about an amicable settlement between the parties. It is only upon failure of conciliation that, by virtue of sub-section (8), the Permanent Lok Adalat acquires jurisdiction to decide the dispute on merits. The right to adjudicate under Section 22C(8) is not an independent source of 15 jurisdiction; it is merely the stage at which the jurisdiction already vested in a duly constituted Permanent Lok Adalat becomes exercisable. The provision cannot be read in isolation so as to enable an incompletely constituted forum to exercise adjudicatory powers.

Further, Section 22D provides that while conducting conciliation proceedings or deciding the dispute, the Permanent Lok Adalat shall be guided by the principles of natural justice, objectivity, fair play, equity and other principles of justice, though it is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Indian Evidence Act. Relaxation of procedural law under Section 22D does not dispense with compliance of the mandatory statutory requirement regarding the constitution of the Permanent Lok Adalat itself.

The relaxation contemplated under Section 22D is confined to procedural law. It enables the Permanent Lok Adalat to evolve a flexible procedure by dispensing with the strict application of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act. However, such procedural flexibility cannot be construed as dispensing with the substantive statutory conditions governing the very constitution of the adjudicatory forum. Procedure regulates the exercise of jurisdiction; it does not create jurisdiction where the statute withholds it.

Section 22E declares every award of the Permanent Lok Adalat to be final and binding on all the parties and further provides that such award shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court. The finality 16 attached to an award under Section 22E, however, presupposes that the award has been rendered by a forum lawfully constituted and acting within the bounds of its jurisdiction. A decision rendered by an authority lacking jurisdiction cannot derive legitimacy merely because the statute accords finality to its award.

It is a settled principle that jurisdiction is conferred by statute and must be exercised strictly in the manner prescribed therein. Where the statute creates a special tribunal and simultaneously prescribes the composition in which it shall function, such composition becomes a condition precedent to the valid exercise of adjudicatory power. Any adjudication by a body not constituted in accordance with the statute is rendered without jurisdiction and is void ab initio.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dilip Mehta (supra) while examining the scope of judicial review against an award of the Permanent Lok Adalat, has held that although interference under Articles 226 and 227 is limited, judicial review is nevertheless available where the award suffers from fraud, lack of jurisdiction or violation of the principles of natural justice. Thus, absence of jurisdiction continues to remain a recognised ground for exercise of the writ jurisdiction.

From the above discussion, it is quite vivid that the composition prescribed under Section 22B(2) of the Act, 1987 is mandatory and that an award rendered by an incompletely constituted Permanent Lok Adalat cannot be sustained in law.

Once the Court reaches the conclusion that the adjudicatory forum 17 itself lacked jurisdiction, the submissions advanced by the respondents regarding the sufficiency of evidence, the documents relied upon, the conciliation proceedings or the correctness of the findings on merits cease to assume significance. Jurisdiction is anterior to adjudication on merits, and a decision rendered without jurisdiction cannot be sustained irrespective of the correctness of its conclusions.

Coming to the facts of the present case, the record unmistakably reveals that on the date the impugned Award was rendered, the Permanent Lok Adalat was not functioning with the complete statutory composition contemplated under Section 22B(2) of the Act. One of the Members was not part of the quoram and the matter came to be adjudicated by an incomplete Bench. Such an adjudication is plainly contrary to the statutory mandate. An order passed by an authority lacking inherent jurisdiction is a nullity and cannot be sustained in the eye of law.

The defect in the present case is not a mere procedural irregularity capable of being cured by consent, waiver or acquiescence. It strikes at the root of the jurisdiction of the adjudicatory forum itself.

Since this Court has already held that the impugned award is liable to be set aside on the ground that the Permanent Lok Adalat itself lacked inherent jurisdiction owing to incomplete quoram, it is unnecessary to examine the remaining contentions urged by the petitioner relating to 18 the maintainability of the proceedings under Section 22C of the Act of 1987, the effect of the proceedings pending before the Sub-Divisional Officer, or the applicability of the Chhattisgarh Lok Sewa Guarantee Act, 2011. All such questions are expressly left open to be considered by the duly constituted Permanent Lok Adalat, in accordance with law.

Consequently, the impugned Award dated 14.12.2022 passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat in case No.351/2022 deserves to be and is hereby set aside. The matter is remitted to the concerned Permanent Lok Adalat for fresh consideration by a duly constituted Bench in strict conformity with Section 22B(2) of the Act, 1987.

It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the rival claims and all questions including the maintainability are left open to be decided afresh by the Permanent Lok Adalat in accordance with law after affording due opportunity of hearing to all concerned. The date of hearing be given to the parties well in advance.

The writ petition is accordingly allowed to the above extent. No order as to costs. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) JUDGE