Doman Singh v. The State of Bihar & Ors.

on the same lines. The writ petitioner had shown cause by his communication dated 9.3.2002 (Annexure-4), as well as the supplementary communication dated 9.3.2002 (Annexure-4/1). On a consideration of the materials on record including the cause shown by the writ petitioner, respondent no.3 passed the order dated 16.3.2002 (Annexure-3/2), wherein he found that the writ petitioner had not made any attempt for recovery of the dues from the companies in his zone. The cause shown by him was found to be extremely unsatisfactory clearly reflected position that he had not made any attempt at all for recovery. It was further stated therein that the writ petitioner is liable to compulsory retirement in terms of Section 72(a) of the 3 Bihar State Credit and Investment Corporation Resolutions 1976 (hereinafter referred to as „the Resolutions‟). The same was subject to the approval of the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors considered the matter on 23.3.2002, and approved the decision for compulsory retirement of the petitioner, leading to the formal order dated 28.3.2002 (Annexure-1), and impugned herein. The writ petitioner challenged the same by preferring the aforesaid C.W.J.C. No.7349 of 2002, which has been rejected by the impugned order.

While assailing the validity of the order of the learned writ Court, learned counsel for the appellant (writ petitioner) submits that respondent no.3 had passed the order in anticipation of the order of the Board of Directors leaving it with the formality of putting its seal of approval in a mechanical manner. He next submits that the appellant has maintained good record of service and, therefore, material justify petitioner‟s compulsory retirement. The impugned order is beyond the para-meters of compulsory retirement laid down by the Supreme Court. He relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Baikuntha Nath Das and another Vs. Chief 4 District Medical Officer, Baripada and another, reported in (1992) S.C.C. 299.

Learned counsel for respondent nos.3 to 5 has supported the impugned action.

We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. We should first of all acquaint ourselves with the procedure prescribed in this connection, and the authority of respondent no.3 to pass the order. Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to bring to our notice any provision to establish that the Board of Directors is the appointing authority, and not the Managing Director. The usual procedure in the case of Public Sector Undertakings is that such powers are delegated to the Managing Director who is in control of the day-to-day affairs of the Corporation and exercises all powers of the Board of Directors. That apart, we are proceeding on the footing for the sake of argument that the Board of Directors is the appointing authority. We observe from the order dated 16.3.2002 (Annexure-3/2) that the Managing Director passed an order which was subject to the approval of the Board of Directors, and the meeting of which was scheduled to be held on 23.3.2002. It appears 5 from a perusal of the impugned order dated

28.3.2002 (Annexure-1) that the meeting of the Board of Directors was in fact held on 23.3.2002. The appellant‟s case was Agenda Item No.176/4. The Board Directors approved recommendation respondent no.3 compulsorily retire the appellant in terms of Section 72(a) of the Resolutions. The contention is rejected.

Learned counsel for the appellant has also contended that the appellant‟s service record is good and, therefore, there was no basis for the order of compulsory retirement. This is taking a very myopic view of the matter, and overlooks the parameters for compulsory retirement indicated in Baikuntha Nath Das Vs. Chief District Medical Officer (Supra), paragraph 34 of which is reproduced hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference: “34. The following principles emerge from the above discussion: (i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma misbehaviour. suggestion (ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government. government a 6 (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement.

The Supreme Court has clearly laid down that the principles of natural justice are not attracted in the case of compulsory retirement. The respondent authorities yet took the greatest care to afford more than adequate and reasonable opportunity to the appellant to explain his position. We are convinced that the respondent authorities acted very fairly in 9 dealing with the matter. The impugned action cannot be faulted. We respectfully agree with the order of the learned Single Judge.