Rameshwar Singh v. The State of Bihar & Ors.

Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Patna has been preferred by the petitioner of C.W.J.C. No.10462 of 1996 (Rameshwar Singh Vs. The State of Bihar and others), who is aggrieved by the order dated 8.10.1998, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, whereby the writ petition was dismissed. It arises out of disciplinary proceeding against the appellant.

2. A summary of facts essential for the disposal of this appeal may be indicated. The appellant was in the services of the Bihar Government and was, at the relevant point of time, functioning as Constable in the Bihar Police Force. A departmental proceeding was 2 initiated against him wherein it was alleged that on 26.6.1985, one Laxmi Narain Jha was going on a cycle rickshaw carrying some metal utensils valued at Rs.4,000/-, purchased and owned by him. The appellant allegedly brought him to the police station by practising deception and deprived him of the possession of the utensils. This led to criminal case, wherein he was ultimately acquitted. The appellant was simultaneously subjected to a departmental proceeding. On conclusion of the departmental proceeding, he was inflicted with the punishment of dismissal from service. He exhausted the statutory remedies of appeal etc., which were rejected.

3. He ultimately preferred aforesaid writ petition which has been rejected by the impugned order. The learned Single Judge has held that the departmental proceeding was concluded after observing the principles of natural justice, to the extent that he was permitted to be represented by a lawyer. Full opportunity was afforded to both sides to present their cases. Both sides examined their witnesses in support of their respective stand. He has further found that the writ petitioner had taken the most untenable stand before the 3 learned Single Judge that the departmental proceeding was hit by the bar of limitation engrafted in Section 42 of the Police Act. The contention has been repelled on two-fold grounds, namely, section 42 of the Police Act is inapplicable to departmental proceedings. Secondly, the same had been repealed by section 2 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1871, read with the 1st schedule thereto. The learned Single Judge also noted the submissions advanced on behalf of the writ petitioner that the test identification parade of the alleged owner of the utensils was not held. The learned Single Judge has repelled the contention by observing that test identification parade is not required to be held in departmental proceedings.

4. While assailing the validity of the impugned order, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the enquiry report is based on no evidence, and is based on conjectures and surmises. He submits that it is open to this Court to revise issues of facts. He relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank and others, reported in (2009)2 S.C.C. 570. He also submits that the respondent authorities took up the matter with a pre-disposed mind and were 4 from the very beginning determined to dismiss the appellant from service.

5. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. It appears to us that the issues raised at length by the learned counsel for the appellant are issues of facts and normally cannot be raised in writ jurisdiction, let alone this Court under Clause-10 of the Letters Patent. The writ court is not a forum of facts. It exercises the powers of judicial review with respect to departmental proceedings and the scope of interference is well-established by a long line of cases of high authority. It is well settled that the writ court must satisfy itself that the delinquent functionary was served with a clear charge-sheet, the prescribed procedure was followed, the principles of natural justice were observed, and the punishment meted out to him is not disproportionate to the gravity of the proven charges. On a perusal of the materials on record, it appears that the departmental proceeding fully confirms to the yard-stick indicated above. The appellant was served with a clearly formulated charge-sheet, afforded reasonable 5 opportunity to present his case before the learned enquiry officer. In fact, he had examined witnesses in support of his stand, and had indeed been permitted to be represented by a lawyer.

6. We convinced punishment of penalty of dismissal from service is well-deserved in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The learned enquiry officer has found, and has been upheld by the forum of facts, that the delinquent, being in uniformed service, was on duty and had way-laid the victim, a poor person, and deprived him of the possession of metal utensils valued at Rs.4,000/-. The utility of utensils of the value of Rs.4,000/- of a poor person like the victim in the present case way back on

26.6.1985 can well be conjured in the mind. It may have been his source of livelihood. The appellant was in the position of a protector, and reduced himself to the position of a perpetrator. We, therefore, fully agree with the impugned order of punishment and the order of the learned Single Judge.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant also contended before us that justice should not only be done, but should also be seen to be 6 done. These observations occur in the judgment of the King’s Bench Division in England in the case of Rex vs. Sussex Justices (1924 (1) K.B. 256). That was a case where one F.G. Langham, the clerk to the justices and a member of the solicitor’s firm Langham, Son & Douglas, was then sitting as a clerk, was appointed a deputy for the day when the proceedings took place. The case was heard, and on conclusion of the evidence the justices retired to consider their decision, the deputy clerk retiring with them. The applicant was convicted. Grievance was then raised before the King’s Bench that the deputy clerk was brother of Mr. F.G. Langham, and was himself a partner in the firm of Langham, Son & Douglas, and bias was alleged against him. The King’s Bench set aside the conviction with the observations that “... it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done...”. With the passage of time these observations assumed the character of a legal aphorism. With the passage of time once again, the distinguished Judges of England felt that these observations are being applied in inapplicable situations and, therefore, felt 7 the need of stating the law in the perspective and proceeded to observation in the judgment of the King’s Bench Division in R. Vs. Camborne Justices [1954 (2) All E.R. 850], as follows: “...The frequency with which allegations of bias have come before the courts in recent times seems to indicate that the reminder of LORD HEWART, C.J., in R.v. Sussex JJ. Ex p. McCarthy (6) ([1924] 1 K.B. 259) that it is “of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done” is being urged as a warrant for quashing convictions or invalidating orders on quite unsubstantial grounds and, indeed, in some cases, on the flimsiest pretexts of bias. While endorsing and fully maintaining the integrity of the principle reasserted by LORD HEWART, C.J., this court feels that the continued citation of it in cases to which it is not applicable may lead to the erroneous impression that it is more important that justice should appear to be done than that it should in fact be done.” It is thus evident that both the judgments were rendered in situations where bias was alleged against the functionaries of the court. No such bias has been alleged against anybody in the present case which could have operated against the appellant. On the contrary, as held hereinabove, disciplinary proceeding was conducted against the appellant 8 in accordance with law and has been upheld by the learned Single Judge as well as this Court.

8. There is no merit in this appeal and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. S.K.Pathak/ (S K Katriar, J.) (Jyoti Saran, J.)