THE STATE OF AP v. DASINENI VENKATA RAMANABABU

(Per Hon’ble Sri Justice Battu Devanand) All the writ appeals have been filed against the orders passed by the learned single Judges of this Court on different dates in different writ petitions. 4 But, the issue involved in all the writ appeals is one and the same. In all the writ appeals preferred by the State, there is delay in filing the writ appeals and seeking to condone the delay, Interlocutory Applications have been filed.

2. The delay in filing each appeal extracted as herein under: SI.No. WA.No. Delay in Days

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 709 683 466 689 664 495 778 686 714 756 929 714 876 919 869 672 916 747 1664 922 1560 731 1048 806 1139 1139 1139 1139 1139 806 777 883 1143 5

35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 936 1012 729 718 701 1055 714 1142 1142 942 1142 1142 670 641 1675 736 501 966 950 671 1022 870 1300 941 704 962 1144 818 935 959 783 943 1144 810 914 743 1150 1150 693 1150 735 733 1150 6

78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 750 656 662 739 597 1150 719 732 735 748 691 502 740 720 726 725 739 670 555 1150 739 731 790 1154 803 726 738 697 536 783 710 1023 1093 1078 831 1153 936 600 914 1164 1058 555 1190 7

121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 1164 1164 1260 1161 1050 1161 594 1161 1161 1082 921 1099 576 1167 1093 668 1167 954 910 1099 1176 1164 1164 1093 599 740 1055 1085 750 748 613 1750 1161 748 747 1168 1966 1179 1072 1343 1179 1179 497 8

164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 1074 1205 2362 619 1179 908 1179 1091 735 850 1176 879 724 603 1066 1178 1171 764 613 1091 1555 1236 1788 1093 1873 418 1096 1185 1005 1170 337 1101 763

The parties in these Appeals will be referred to as they are

arrayed in the Writ Petitions for convenience.

The issue involved in these cases is pertaining to the recruitment of 2,324 posts of Multi Purpose Health Assistants (Male) [for short “MPHAs 9 (Male)”] in the combined State of Andhra Pradesh which were notified on

20.07.2002. After several rounds of litigation from erstwhile Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad to the Hon‟ble Apex Court, this issue had not attained finality.

On 20.07.2002, the erstwhile Government of Andhra Pradesh issued a notification for recruitment of 2,324 posts of MPHAs (Male) in all the districts in the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh along with some other paramedical posts. As per the said notification, the prescribed qualification is a pass in S.S.C. with a certificate in training course in MPHA (Male) from an institute recognized by the then Government of Andhra Pradesh. With respect to the said notification, some of the candidates approached the erstwhile Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad in O.A.No.6856 of 2002 and batch. The said O.As., were dismissed by the erstwhile Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad on 30.07.2002.

Aggrieved by the same, W.P.No.15107 of 2002 and batch of writ petitions were filed. A Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, by order, dated 11.09.2003, disposed of the writ petitions directing the State Government to prepare the select list of candidates in accordance with the Rules, who possessed S.S.C. and Diploma certificates either from the Government institutions or from four (04) private institutions and issue appointment orders, within a period of four (04) weeks, duly terminating the services of those candidates, who were appointed by virtue of the orders, dated 18.04.2003 passed by the High Court. 10

The order, dated 11.09.2003 in W.P.No.15107 of 2002 and batch were challenged before the Hon‟ble Apex Court in SLP (C) No.1925-44/2004. The Hon‟ble Apex Court was pleased to issue interim order, dated 06.02.2004 not to make any fresh appointments in pursuance of the judgment of the High Court in W.P.No.15107 of 2002 and batch and also directed not to disturb the appointments which have already been made. Thereafter, in the Interlocutory Application filed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the said SLP, the Hon‟ble Apex Court by order, dated 07.08.2006 was pleased to vacate the orders granting stay on 06.02.2004 and permitted the State Government to fill up the vacancies from the selected candidates subject to the outcome of Special Leave Petitions.

At that stage, the Hon‟ble Apex Court recorded the statement of learned Additional Solicitor General that the candidates who were already appointed shall not be reverted. Pursuant to the orders of the Hon‟ble Apex Court, dated 07.08.2006, the State Government had issued G.O.Rt.No.1234, dated 15.09.2006 for filling up of the posts of MPHAs (Male). Though the Government is permitted to fill up the posts from the merit list of 2002 written examination, it appears appellants were made appointments contrary to the merit list. The Hon‟ble Apex Court had dismissed the Special Leave Petitions filed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh by judgment, dated 09.08.2011 and as such the orders passed by the Division Bench, dated 11.09.2003 in W.P.No.15107 of 2002 and batch were confirmed. 11

In view of the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Special Leave Petitions, the persons, who were appointed terms of G.O.Rt.No.1234, dated 15.09.2006 as also by virtue of interim orders passed by the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad based on Intermediate as educational qualification were terminated vide G.O.Rt.No.273, dated 16.02.2012. In compliance of the orders in W.P.No.15107 of 2002 and batch, a fresh list was drawn.

The candidates whose services were terminated by virtue of the G.O.Rt.No.273, dated 16.02.2012, made representations to the Government of Andhra Pradesh. The State Government appointed a committee consisting a group of Ministers to take action on the said representations. As per the advice of the committee of the group of Ministers, the State Government issued G.O.Rt.No.1207, dated 09.10.2013 to take back all the 1,200 MPHAs (Male).

Aggrieved by the action of the Government issuing G.O.Rt.No.1207, dated 09.10.2013, some of the candidates filed O.A.No.7441 of 2013 and batch before the erstwhile Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad. The erstwhile Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad by order, dated 28.11.2013 has dismissed the said O.A.No.7441 of 2013 and batch. Against the same, W.P.No.38060 of 2013 and batch filed before the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. At initial stage, the High Court was pleased to grant stay of appointments made pursuant to G.O.Rt.No.1207, dated 09.10.2013. 12 Thereafter, the High Court was pleased to issue directions on 15.09.2015 in W.P.M.P.No.1015 of 2014 directing the respondent authorities therein to make efforts to implement the judgment of the High Court, dated 09.11.2003 in W.P.No.15107 of 2002 and batch. Pursuant to the said order, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued Memo No.7342/G2/2015-8, dated 24.05.2016 directing the Director of Public Health and Family Welfare, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad to take necessary action as per the orders of High Court, dated

15.09.2015 in W.P.No.38060 of 2013 and batch and to appoint the candidates who are remained in the common seniority list (SSC and Inter) prepared as per the orders of the High Court/Hon‟ble Apex Court after filling up 2,324 posts of MPHAs (Male) and having merit over the individuals appointed through G.O.Rt.No.1207, HM&FW Department, dated 09.10.2013 at first instance by terminating individuals if necessary, those were appointed vide G.O.Rt.No.1207, dated 09.10.2013 and having lesser merit among the individuals, who appointed so and thereafter keeping in view the observation of the High Court and take action to accommodate such terminated individuals as per their merit subject to availability of vacancies of MPHAs (M) with the prior permission of the Government only after completion of above task.

All the facts stated above are undisputed.

At that stage, several writ petitions in W.P.No.2571 of 2023 and batch are filed seeking direction to the respondents therein to strictly adhere to the orders of the High Court, dated 15.09.2015 in W.P.No.38060 of 2013 and batch and also Memo issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh in Memo 13 No.7342/G2/2015-8, dated 24.05.2016 and appoint them as Multi Purpose Health Assistants (Male). The said W.P.No.2571 of 2023 and batch of writ petitions were disposed of on different dates with the following directions: (i) The respondents shall consider the cases of the writ petitioners for appointment as MPHAs within a period of four (04) weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the order, in terms of Memo No.7342/G2/2015-8, dated 24.05.2016 based on their merit, if any candidate less meritorious than the writ petitioners are appointed; (ii) If any of the writ petitioners have not submitted the relevant certificates/documents, they should be called upon to submit the same by granting reasonable time of not less than four (04) weeks; (iii) In the event of any genuine objection for considering the case of any of the writ petitioners, they shall be notified by the same by issuing appropriate notice/communication and afforded an opportunity before taking further action in the matter.

Aggrieved by the orders passed by the learned single Judges in various writ petitions W.P.No.2571 of 2023 and batch on different dates, the State preferred the present writ appeals. All these appeals are heard together with the consent of both sides as common issue involved.

It is also an admitted fact that there is delay in filing the writ appeals. At this stage, the learned Senior Counsel Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, appearing for the respondents, has raised a preliminary objection and sought to hear the delay condonation petitions at first and requested to decide the same. Accordingly, the delay condonation petitions in all the appeals are taken for consideration. 14

Mr. E. Samba Siva Pratap, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the appellants/State Government, would submit that subsequent to the disposal of the writ petitions by the learned single Judges of this Court on different dates, the High Court of Telangana passed final orders in W.P.No.38060 of 2013 and batch, dated 29.11.2024, setting aside the G.O.Rt.No.1207, HM&FW Department, dated 09.10.2013. He would submit that pursuant to the orders passed in W.P.No.38060 of 2013 and batch, dated

29.11.2024 by the High Court of Telangana, the appellants herein have terminated all the appointments issued through G.O.Rt.No.1207, HM&FW Department, dated 09.10.2013. He would submit that as the orders passed in W.P.No.2571 of 2023 are pursuant to the interim orders, dated 15.09.2015 passed in W.P.No.38060 of 2013 and since the final orders were passed in W.P.No.38060 of 2013 by the High Court of Telangana, the interim orders losses its significances. He further contends that in the light of the order, dated

29.11.2024 in W.P.No.38060 of 2013 passed by the High Court of Telangana, the orders passed in all the writ petitions which were under challenge in the present writ appeals have to be set aside.

The learned Additional Advocate General advanced his arguments to substantiate the delay caused in filing the writ appeals is that in view of the order, dated 29.11.2024 in W.P.No.38060 of 2013 passed by the High Court of Telangana, the State has decided to file writ appeals against the orders passed by the learned single Judges of this Court in different writ petitions on different dates, there is delay in filing the writ appeals and the 15 delay is neither willful nor wanton. Accordingly, he prayed to condone the delay in filing the writ appeals, otherwise, he would submit that, the appellants will be put to irreparable loss and hardships.

On the other hand, Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the respondents vehemently opposed to condone the delay in filing the writ appeals in the absence of any sufficient cause to condone the delay. He would submit that the appellants failed to show any sufficient cause to condone the delay and the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavits filed along with the delay petitions are very vague and no proper reasons are stated. Accordingly, he sought to dismiss the delay condonation petitions.

The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents has relied on the latest judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Delhi Development Authority vs. Tejpal and others 1 and would submit that subsequent to overruling of a judgment cannot be a sufficient cause to condone the delay. The relevant portions of the said judgment are extracted herein under:

We find adequate support to our afore-stated reason in Tilokchand & Motichand v. H.B. Munishi2, in which a 5-Judge Bench of this Court had the occasion to consider the question of condonation of delay on the basis of subsequent charge of law. While giving the majority opinion, Hidayatullah, CJ. held:

[…] Everybody is presumed to know the law. It was his duty to have brought the matter before this Court for consideration. In any event, having set the machinery of law in motion he cannot abandon it to 1 (2024) 5 SCR 2 (1969) 1 SCC 110 16 in his than he turn got resume it after a number of years, because another person more the statue declared adventurous unconstitutional, and got a favourable decision. If I were to hold otherwise, then the decision of the High Court in any case once adjudicated upon and acquiesced in, may be questioned in a fresh litigation revived only with the argument that the correct position was not known to the petitioner at the time when he abandoned his own litigation. […]

[emphasis supplied]

Finally, the fourth reason why subsequent overruling of a judgment cannot be a sufficient cause is because when a case is overruled, it is only its binding nature as a precedent that is taken away and the lis between the parties is still deemed to have been settled by the overruled case. It is a settled principle of law that even an erroneous decision operates as res judicata between the parties. Hence, when Manoharlal (supra) overruled Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra) as well as all other cases relying on them, it only overruled their precedential value, and did not reopen the lis between the parties. The mere fact that the impugned orders in the present case were overruled by Manoharlal (supra) would not, therefore, be a sufficient ground to argue that the cases should be reopened.

To sum up, we hold that subsequent change of law will not be attracted unless a case is pending before the competent court awaiting its final adjudication. To say it differently, if a case has already been decided, it cannot be re-opened and re-decided solely on the basis of a new interpretation given to law.

The learned Senior Counsel has also placed reliance on the latest judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Shivamma (died) by LRs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board and others3. The relevant portions of the said judgment are extracted herein under: 3 2025 INSC 1104 17

Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.

The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.

Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. 18

No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.

Learned Senior Counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to the latest order of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in State of Odisha and others vs. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School4 wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court has dismissed the Special Leave Petition filed with a delay of 123 days. The relevant portions are extracted herein under:

20. We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before the High Court but also before this Court. Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as time-barred by the High Court, this Court has been approached by the State of Odisha four months after expiry of the period of limitation.

21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite all the latitude that is shown to a “State”, we are of the clear opinion that the cause sought to be shown here by the State of Odisha is not an explanation but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of discretion has been set up.

The applications for condonation of delay in filing the special leave petition and condonation of delay in re-filing the same, thus, stand rejected, with the result that the special leave petition stands dismissed as time-barred.

22. Having heard the submissions of the learned counsel on either side and upon perusing material available on record, we have to consider whether the reasons stated in the affidavits filed by the petitioners for the delay caused in filing the writ appeals would establish “sufficient cause” for condonation of such a huge delay or not in the light of the judgments of the Hon‟ble Apex Court as stated supra. 4 2026 INSC 148 19

In view of the above submissions made on either side, it is relevant to look into the averments made in the affidavits filed by the petitioners/appellants along with the delay condonation petitions as extracted herein under: “6. It is necessary to submit here that subsequent to the disposal of the above WP No.2571/2023, the Hon‟ble High Court of Telangana passed Final Orders in WP No.38060/2013 on 29.11.2024 setting aside G.O.Rt.No.1207 HM&FW dept. dated 07.10.213.

7. It is submitted that in pursuant to the orders passed in WP No.38060/2013 dated 29.11.2024, the Appellants herein have terminated all the appointments issued through G.O.Rt.No.1207 HM&FW dept. dated 07.10.213. As the orders passed in WP No.2571/2023 are pursuant to the interim orders dated 15.09.2015 passed in WP No.38060/2023 and since the final orders were passed in the above WP No.38060/2013, the interim order loses its significance. Therefore, the order passed in W.P.No.2571 of 2023, dated 03.02.2023 must be set aside in view of the final order passed in W.P.No.38060 of 2013 dated 29.11.2024. However, there is delay in filing this WA due to the above reasons.

8. Hence challenging the said orders passed in WP No.2571/2023 dated 20.03.2023, the appellants herein are filing the present WA. However there is a delay of 709 days in filing the present appeal. The above said delay in filing the Writ Appeal is only for the reasons stated above and is neither willful nor wanton. If this Hon‟ble Court does not condone the delay in filing the present Writ Appeal, the appellants herein will be put to irreparable loss and hardship.

9. It is therefore prayed that this Hon‟ble High Court may be pleased to condone the delay of 709 days in filing the Writ Appeal in the interest of Justice and pass such other order or orders as this Hon‟ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of this case”. 20

On careful perusal of the averments of the affidavits extracted herein above, it is clear that the appellants herein has decided to file writ appeals against the orders passed by the learned single Judges of this Court in several writ petitions consequent to the order, dated 29.11.2024 in W.P.No.38060 of 2013 passed by the High Court of Telangana.

The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Delhi Development Authority’s case (1 supra), it was held that subsequent change of law will not be attracted unless a case is pending before the competent Court awaiting its final adjudication. The Hon‟ble Apex Court clarified that if a case has already been decided, it cannot be re-opened and re-decided solely on the basis of a new interpretation given to that law. Accordingly, it was held that subsequent overruling of a judgment cannot be a sufficient cause when a case is overruled, it is only its binding nature as a precedent that is taken away and the lis between the parties is still deemed to have been settled by the overruled case.

In the light of the finding of the Hon‟ble Apex Court on this aspect, we do not find any substance in the contentions of the learned Additional Advocate General that the State is decided to file these writ appeals as per the order of the High Court of Telangana in W.P.No.38060 of 2013, dated

29.11.2024. Subsequent order of the Telangana High Court, dated

29.11.2024 in W.P.No.38060 of 2013 and batch would not be a ground to file appeals against the orders in several writ petitions which were disposed of by 21 this High Court with certain directions. In our considered view, it would not constitute the “sufficient cause”.

Besides this, the appellants should state valid legal grounds seeking to condone the abnormal delay in filing the writ appeals.

28. In the case of Office of Chief Post Master General and others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and another5 the Hon‟ble Supreme Court while dealing with a petition filed for condonation of delay of 427 days after considering various decisions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, observed as extracted hereunder:

12. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 5 2012 LawSuit (SC) 124 22

13. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.

29. In another judgment, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India while dealing with an application to condone the delay of 663 days came down heavily, while dismissing the said application in The State of Madhya Pradesh and others vs. Bherulal6 as extracted hereunder:

6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorized earlier as “certificate cases”. The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the concerned officer responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any 6 2020 SCC OnLine SC 849 23 action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straight away counsels appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation.

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible.

8. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, we consider appropriate to impose costs on the petitioner- State of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand) to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited in four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officers responsible for the delay in filing the special leave petition and a certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of time.

The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and another7 wherein it is held as hereunder: “28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the 7 1992 (3) SCC 563 24 modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.”

The Hon‟ble Apex Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd8 has emphasized that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a „sufficient cause‟ for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party.

32. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors. 9 , the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and 8 AIR 1962 SC 361 9 AIR 1935 PC 85 25 convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.

It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors.,10 that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.

34. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer,11 this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression „sufficient cause‟ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.

It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting liberal approach and in implementing the statute as it stands. Paragraph 12 reads as under: “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so