BASAWARAJ & Anr. v. THE SPL. LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER

Aggrieved, the appellants filed appeals under Section 54 of the Act before the High Court on 16.8.2007 with E applications for condonation of delay. The applications for condonation of delay stood rejected as the High Court did not find any sufficient cause to condone the delay, and dismissed the appeals on the ground of limitation. Hence, these appeals. F Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision G does not envisage negative equality but has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some relief/ benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as H well. If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot BASAWARAJ & ANR. v. SPL. LAND ACQUISITION 229 OFFICER be perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which cannot be A claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a Judicial forum, others cannot invoke the B jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a similarly wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. c Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot be stretched too far for otherwise it would make functioning of administration impossible. [Para 8] [236-D-H] Chandigarh Administration & Anr. v. Jagjit Singh & Anr. AIR 1995 SC 705: 1995 (1) SCR 126 Mis. Anand Button Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Ors. AIR 2005 SC 565: 2005 (9) SCC 164; K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. & Ors. AIR 2006 SC 898: 2006 (1) SCR 342; Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab AIR 2010 SC 1937: 2010 (7) SCR 317 - relied on. D E

2.1. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means G that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or facts and "remained inactive". However, F H 230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 8 S.C.R. A circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prev.ented by any B "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. [Para c 9] [2~7 -8-F]

2.2. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, D whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. [Para 11] [238-8-C] Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. E Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors. AIR 1964 SC 1336: 1964 SCR 495; Lala Matadin v. A. Narayanan AIR 1970 SC 1953: 1970 (2) SCR 90; Parimal v. Veena @ Bharti AIR 2011 SC 1150: 2011 (2) SCR 648; Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai AIR 2012 SC 1629: 2012 (5) F SCC 157; Madan/a/ v. Shyamlal AIR 2002 SC 100: 2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 252; Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao & Ors. AIR 2002 SC 1201: 2002 (2) SCR 77 - relied on. Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar AIR 1964 SC 993: 1964 G SCR 946 - referred to.

3.1. The law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power H to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. BASAWARAJ & ANR. v. SPL. LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER 231 "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an A evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. B The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a that, situation. "inconvenience is not"· a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. [Para 12) [238-D-F] It has consistently been held c

3.2. The Statute of Limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have D from lapse of time become stale. [Para 13] [238-G-H]

3.3. An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have E been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence' or laches. [Para 13) [239-C-D] Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff F