NITYANANDA M. JOSHI & Ors. v. LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA • & Ors.

the order ot the Central Government Labour Court, Bombay, holding that the applications filed by the appellants against the Life Insurance Corporation of India lljllder s. 33C(2) of the IndUS- . trial Disputes Act, 1947, were barred under art. 137 of the Limi tation Act, 1963, insofar as the claim was for period beyond three years. In holding this the Labour Court followed the decision of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in The Manager M/s. P. K. Porwal v. The Labour Court('). The Bombay High Court held that applications filed under s. 3 3C ( 2) of the Industrial Dis putes Act prior to its ameindment by Central Act :XXXVI of 1964 were governed by the period o.f limitation laid down in art. 13 7 of the Limitation Act; 1963, and this article applied to applications under Jaws other than thos.e contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Thfa Court in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. The Presid ing Officer, Labour Court, Hubli(') has dissented from the deci· sion of the Bombay High Court and has held that art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, does not apply to applications under s. 3 3C ( 2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. This Court gave two reasons for coming to this conclusion. The first ground was that in spite of the changes. made in the Indian Limitati~ Act, 1963, no drastic change was intended in the scope of ·art. 13 7 so as to include withiin it all applications irrespective of the fact whether they had any reference to the Code ot Civil Procedure or not. This Court held that in spite of the chainges the interpretation of art. 181 of the Limitation Act. 1908, by this Court in Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva and Others(") would apply to art. 137 of the Limitatiqn Act, 1963. The second ground .given by this Court was that it is only applications to Courts that are intend ed to be covered under art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. · · In our view art. 137 only contemplates applicatiQDS to Courts. In the Third .Division of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, an the other applications mentioned in the various articles are applications filed in a court. Further s. 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides for the .contingency when the prescribed period for a.ny application expires on a holiday and the . only contfugeney contemplated, is "wh¢n the court is closed". Again under s. 5 it is. (I) 70 Born. L. R. 104. (3) [1%4] 3 S.C.R. 700. (2) [1970J 1 s.c.R. s1. B c D E F G H 398 SUPltBME COURT ltEPOltTS [1970] 1 S.C.R. only a court which is enabled to admit an application after the A prescribed period has expired if the court is satisfied applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application. ·It seems to us that the scheme of the Indian Limitation Act is that_ it only deals with applications to courts, and that ·Court is not a court within the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. the Labour It is not lljlCCISary to· express our views on the first ground given by this Court in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. The It seems to us that it Pruiding Officer Labour Court, Hub Ii ( 1 !:t, require serious consideration whether applications to courts r other provisions, apart from Civil Procedure Code, are ). included within art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, or not. The learned counsel for the respondent cQillends ~ls should fail on another ground. He says that these appli ·cations were filed under s. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, while they should have been filed under s. 33C(l). He further says that, at any rate, no application can be filed under s. 33C(2) because the sub-sectioql does not mention how the question is to be decided. There is no force in these submissions. B c D .. It is plain from the wording oi sub-s. ( 1) and sub-s. (2) of s. 33C that the former sub-sectmn deals with cases where money is due to a workman from an employer under a !l'ttlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter VA, while the latter sulHection deals with cases where a workman is eidtitled to receive E from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. Jn the present case applica tions were filed by the employees against the respondent for com puting in terms of mqoey the benefit of holidays and for recoverin_g the amount This case falls squarely within sub-s. (2) of s. 33C. 1bere ia no award or settlement under which the benefit of holidays had already been computed. F It is true tltat sub-s. (2) of s. 33C does not indicate the mode in which the question as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which the benefit should be computed, may be decided. But the sub-sectiQD had left it to the rule-making authQrity to make a suitable provision. This ·is indicated by the expression "subject G 10 any rules that may be made under this Act" in sub-s. (2) of ·t. 33C. Rules have been made and r. 62(2' of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, provides : "Where any workman or a group of workmen is entitled to rccc1ve from the employer any monc:y or any 1-fit which is capable of being computed-in terms of money, the workmen or the group of workmen, as the H (I) [t970) I S.C.lt. 'I. NITYANANDA v. L.I.C. (Sikri, /.) 399 case may be, may apply to the specified Labour Court in Form K-3 lor the de11:mlination of the amount due or, as the aae may be. the 'amount at which such benefit should be computed." According to this rule an application in Form K-3 can clearly be made. In the result the appeals are allowed and the order of Labour Court set aside insofar as the Labour Court held that the applicati<¥JS were barred by art. 13 7 of the Limitation Act. The Labour Court will now pass the final order in accordance with law. The appellants will be entitled to their costs, one hearing fee. V.P.S. Appeals allowed • B c •