Febrw,., If v. NAGINDAS ATMARAM KHATRI
Case at a glance
Held
The 1948 Act applied to the land because the 1952 Amendment extended its scope, and the appellants’ tenancy rights under the 1939 Act were preserved. Consequently, the respondent could not evict the appellants except in accordance with the 1948 Act.
Provisions considered
Summary
AI-generated summaryWritten by AI from the judgment text below. It is not part of the judgment and is not legal advice — read the original before relying on it.
Facts
The appellants, representing Prabhubhai Ratanji, sued for eviction of agricultural land within two miles of a municipal limit. The dispute centered on whether the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 applied to the land.
Issues
- Whether the 1948 Act applies to the land in question.
- Whether the 1939 Act tenancy rights were preserved under the 1948 Act’s saving provision.
Holding
The 1948 Act applied to the land because the 1952 Amendment extended its scope, and the appellants’ tenancy rights under the 1939 Act were preserved. Consequently, the respondent could not evict the appellants except in accordance with the 1948 Act.
Reasoning
The court held that the 1952 Amendment brought the land within the 1948 Act’s jurisdiction, and that the saving provision in s. 89(2) of the 1948 Act preserved the 1939 Act rights. The respondent’s contention that the saving provision was inapplicable was rejected.
Practical significance
The decision confirms that the 1952 Amendment extends the 1948 Act to lands within two miles of municipal limits, preserving earlier tenancy rights and limiting eviction to the procedures set out in the 1948 Act.
Judgment
the lease of agricultural land situated within two miles of the limits of the Municipality and filed a suit for eviction. The suit was contested, inter alia, on the ground that under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939, the defendants had acquired tenancy rights. The civil Judge, inter alia, held ~that the 1939 Act was repealed by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948, which did not apply to the suit land, as it was within two n1iie~ of the limits of the Surat Borough Municipality and decreed the suit. On appeal, the District Judge held that the 1948 Act applied to the Suit land and set In second appeal by the plaintiff, aside tpe decree of the trial Court. the High Court held that the suit land was within two miles of the limit:. of the Municipality and therefore, the 1948 Act did not :.tppJy to the suit land. On appeal by Special Leave the appellants contended that their rie; hts under the 1939 Act were saved and preserved under s.
89(2) of the 1948 Act with the result that the lease extended to IO years under the 1939 Act was saved thereunder, and by reason of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment} Act, 1952, which brought the suit land within the scope of the 1948 Act, their rights so preserved came to be governed by the provisions of rhe 1948 Act and, therefore, they could not be evicted except in the manner prescribed tiy the provisions of the Act. The respondent contended that the savin& provi•ion in s. 89(2) of the 1948 Act operates only if is no express provision to the contrary and that the saving of the appellant'• right would be otiose, as he could not enforce his right under the 1948 Act. Held: (i) Before the suit was disposed of, the 1952 Act came into force, and by reason of the extension of the 1948 Act to the suit land, the respondent could not evict the appellants except in the manner prescribed by the 1948 Act.
(ii) The respondent's contention must be rejected. is an express provision found in s. 88(1) of the 1948 Act, in as much as it says that the provisions of ss. 1 to 87 will not apply to the area in question. There (iii) As there was a right recognized by law there was a remedy indicating a and, therefore. in the absence of any special provisions ' 774 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1961 HINlalP bh particular forum for enforcing a particular right the general law of the land would naturally take its course. The High Court. therefore, was bhai ra U• wrong in holding that the appellants could not claim the benefit of the NagindtU "· ram. .A.Ima. provisions of the 1948 Act. Sakharam (a) Bapusaheb Nara)'an Sanos v. Manikchand Morichand Shah [1962] 2 S.C.R. S9, relied on. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 120/62. 'llubba Rao 1. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated April 23, 1959, of the former Bombay High Court in Second Appeal No.
1359 of 1955. M. S. K. Sastri and M. S. Narasimhan, for the appellants. 0. C. Mathur, I. B. Dadachanii and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent. February 14, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 'SuBBA RAo J.-This appeal by special leave raises the question of the applicability of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. 1948 (Born. Act No. 67 of 1948), hereinafter called the '1948 Act', to the tenancy of the land in dispute. The appellants are the legal representatives of one Prabhubhai Ratanji. The suit property is agricultural land situate within two miles of the limits of the Surat Municipal Borough. It was rpart of the erstwhile Sachin State. On May 7, 1946, Nagindas Atmaram Khatri, the respondent herein, who was the owner of the said land, gave a lease of the same in favour of the said Prabhubhai Ratanji for a period of six years. On July 28, 1948, Sachin State became part of the State of Bombay.
From that date the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939, heremafter called the "1939 Act", was the said area. On April 23, 1951, made applicable to Nagindas Atmaram Khatri, the landlord, gave a notice to the defendant terminating the lease from March 31, 1952. After givfog the said notice, he filed Reg. Suit No. 403 of 1952 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Surat, for eviction of the lessee Parbhubhai Ratanji. The suit was contes.ted on various grounds, the main contention being that under the provisions of the 1939 Act, the defendant 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 775 Prabhu· subba Rao J. legal representatives were Hlralal had acquired tenancy rights therein. As the defendant died ~ on September 30, 1955, his brought on record in his place. The learned Civil Judge, inter alia, held that the 1939 Act was repealed by the 1948 Nagindu•· Allfllloo Act and that the latter Act did not ~ply to the suit land, as it was within two miles of the limits of the Surat Borough Municipality.
On that finding, he gave a decree for possession, arrears of rent and mesne profits. Against the said decree, the defendant preferred an appeal to the District Judge. The learned District Judge held that the landlord failed to prove that the suit property was within a distance of two miles of the limits of the Surat Borough Municipality and, on that finding, he ·came to the conclusion that the 1948 Act applied to the suit land and set aside the decree of the trial court awarding possession to the plaintiff, but maintained the decree for arrears of rent. Thereupon, the plaintiff preferred a second appeal to the High Court insofar as the decree of the District Court went against him. The said appeal came up before a Division Bench of that High Court. The High Court held that the suit land was within two miles of the limits of the Surat Borough Municiipality and that, therefore, the 1948 Act did not apply to the suit land.
On that finding, it set aside the decree passed by the learned District Judge and restored that passed by the learned Civil Judge. The defendant have preferred the present appeal. legal representatives of Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the High Court should have held that tbe rights of the ~pellants under the 1939 Act were saved by the 1948 Act. He con tended broadly that the right of the appellants under the 1939 Act were preserved under s. 89(2) of the 1948 Act, with the result that the lease extended to 10 years under the 1939 Act was saved thereunder, and that by reason of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1952 (Born. Act 33 of 1952), hereinafter called the "1952 Act'', which brought the suit land within the scope of the 1948 Act, their rights so preserved came to be governed by the provisions of the 1948 Act and, therefore, the respondent could not evict them except in the manner prescribed by the provisions of that Act.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 196# To appreciate the contentions of the parties it is neces· fi1ralal-Prabhu- sary to trace briefly the history of the relevant provisions. Section 23 ( 1 ) of the 1939 Act, as amended by the 1946 Naginda:· Atma- Aot, read : Subba Rao I "(a) No lease of any land situated in any area in which this section comes into force made after the date of the coming into force of this section in such area, shall be for a period of less than 10 years; and (b) every lease subsisting on the said date or made after the said date in respect of any land in such area sha!J be deemed to be for a period of not less than l 0 years. " The 1939 Act was repealed by the 1948 Act. Section 88 ( 1) of the 1948 Act, as it stood before· the amendment by the 1952 Act, read: "Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act shall apply- { a) (b) ( c) to any area within the limits of Greater Bombay or within the limits of the Muni cipal Borough of. ..... Surat. ; .... and within a distance of 2 miles of the limits such boroughs.
" Section 89 thereof read : "(I ) The enactment specified in the schedule is hereby repealed to the extent mentioned in the fourth column thereof. (2) But nothing in this Act or any repeal effected thereby- ( a) (b) shall save as expressly provided in this Act affect or deemed to affect, 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 777 ( i) any right, title, interest, obligation or ~ liability already acquired, accrued or Hiralal incurred before of this Act; ........ ". the commencement Pro,..,._ V, Nagindas A.- SCHEDULE I -~-·------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Short Title Extent of repeal Year No. Subba Rao I. 1 2 3 4 ----------------------- 1939 XXIX The Bombay Ten- The whole except sections 3, 3-A and 4 as modified in the following manner . .. ancy Act, 1939. ~--------------------- Section 88 of the 1948 Act was amended by the 1952 Act. The relevant part of the amended section reads : " ( I) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act shall apply- ( a) (b) ( c) to any area within the limits of Greater Bombay within the limits of the Municipal Corporations constituted under tli.e Bom bay Provincial Municipal Co!ipOration Act, 1949, within the limits of the Municipal Boroughs constituted under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, and within the limits of any cantonment; ......... ".
The gist of the provisions in their application to a lease of agricultural land situated within two miles of the limits of the Surat Borough Municipality may be stated thus : Such a lease subsisting on the date of the amending Act of 1946, which came into force on April 11, 1946, shall be deemed to be for a period of not less than I 0 years. The 1939 Act was repealed by the 1948 Act. Under s. 88(1) (c) 778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS •am t06f ot the 1948 Act, the provisions of that Act were not applic- Rirt11al-Prt1bhu· able to any area within the municipal limits of the said borough of Surat and within a distance of two .miles of the Nailnd.;· Atma· limits of the said borough; but the right, title and interest of a lessee in such area was preserved under s. 89(2) (b) (i) .~ubba Rao 1. of the said Act. Section 8 8 ( 1) of the 1948 Act, among other things, was amended by the 1952 Act, which came into force on January 12, 1953.
By the said amendment the 1948 Act was extended to any area within a distance . of two miles of the limits of the Surat Borough Municipality. With the result. all the provisions of the 1948 Act would be applicable to a lease of agricultural land subsisting in such an area after the amendment came into force. If so, . such a lease can be terminated only in the manner prescribed by s. 14 thereof. What is the effect of this legal position on the facts of the present case? The relevant facts on which there is really no dispute may now be stated. The lease deed between the appellants' predecessor and the respondent w:is executed on May 7, 1946, for a period of six years commencing from May 3, 1946; that is to say, it would expire in the ordinary course on May 2, 1952. Sachin State became part of the Bombay State from July 28. 1948. After it became part of the Bombay State, the 1939 Act, as amended by the 1946 Act, was extended to that State; with the result the lease which would have expired in May 1952 was statutorily extended by another 4 years, that is, till May 1956.
On December 28, 1948, the 1948 Act came into force. That Act repealed the 1939 Act. It also exempted the lands within , the limits of the Surat Borough Municipality and also lands within two miles of the limits of the said Municipality from the operation of the provisions of the said Act. But, it saved the right or interest of the lessee which he had acquired under the 1939 Act. When the 1952 Act came into force on January 12, 1953, the said lease, protected under the saving clause, was subsisting. By the said amendment, the 1948 Act was made applicable to the land in question which is within two miles of the limits of the Surat Borough Municipality. With the the appellants could be terminated result, the interest of 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT RI<;P(JRTS 779 only under s. 14 of the 1948 Act. On April 23, 1951, the ~ respondent gave a notice to the appellants terminating the Hiralal lease from March 31, 1952, and filed the suit for eviction on April 21, 1952.
But before the suit was dis.posed of, the Nagindas At,,,... 1952 Act came into force, and by reason of the extension of the 1948 Act to the said land, ¢he respondent could not evict the appellants except in the manner prescribed by the 1948 Act. The High Court, therefore, was wrong in holding that the appellants could not daim the benefit of the provi- sions of the 1948 Act Subba Rao J. bliai .. Prabhu- - At this stage another argument advanced by learned counsel for the respondent may also be noticed. The argu ment is that the saving provision in s. 89 (2) operates only if there is no express provision to the contrary, but such an express provision is found in s. 88 (1), inasmuch as it says that the provisions of ss. 1 to 87 will not apply to the area in question. It is further contended that the saving of the appellant's right would be otiose, as he could not enforce his right under the Act. . A similar argument was advanced but was repelled by this Court in Sakharam alias Bapusaheb Narayan Sanas v.
Manikchand Motichand ). There the lands in dispute were situ3!te within Shah ( 1 two miles of the limits of the Poona Municipal Borough. The question was whether the rights of the appellants as protected tenants were affected by the repeal. This Court held that the provisions of s. 88 ( 1) were entirely prospec tive and that they applied to lands of the description con tained in the said Set"tion from the date on which the Act came into force and that they were not intended, in any sense, to be·of confiscatory character. When it was further contended that the right would be illusory, as it could not be enforced under the Act, this Court pointed out that as there was a right recognized by law there was a remedy and, therefore,_ in the absence of any special provisions indicating a particular forum for enforcing a particular right the general law of the land would naturally take its course. This decision is binding on us.
We, therefore, reject this contention. - - - - · · · - - - l I) [1962] l S.C.R. 59. SUPREME COURT REPORTS IPM Even so, learned counsel for the resflondent contended Hiralal-Prabhu- that in the view taken by the High Court it had become unnecessary for it to give its findings on two of the important Nagind:· Atma- issues that arose in the case, namely, issues 3 a.'!d 4, which - are as follows : Subba Rao J. Issue 3. Whether the plaintiff proves that he wants possession for bona fide personal cultivation. Issue 4. Whether the defendant proves that he had not damaged the suit property in view of the decision in Reg. C. Suit No. 619 of 1950 by the Joint Civil Judge (J.D.J, Surat; He, therefore, pointed out that the matter would have to be remanded to the High Court for its decision on the said two points. In view of the supervening circumstances, it is not possible to accede to this argument. As pointed out earlier, on April 23, 1951, the respondent issued the notice on the ground that the tenancy of six years would expire on March 31, 1952.
But by reason of the 1939 Act the tenancy was statutorily extended till 1956. So the said notice had become ineffective and the respondent would not be entitled to any relief on its basis. It would be open to him to take any appropriate proceedings, which the law allows, m a proper In the circumstances the only course open to us tribunal. is to set aside the decree of the High -Court and to restore that of the Dirstict Judge. The parties will bear respective costs throughout. Appeal allowed. 1964 February 14. S. M. KARIM v. MST. BIBI SAKINA (M. HIDAYATULLAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.) Benami Transaction-Protection under s. 66-lf available to transfertt Sub-s. (2) applies to creditors-Suit for adverse possession, if lie.r Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), •· 66.
Questions this judgment answers
What did the Court decide in this case?
The 1948 Act applied to the land because the 1952 Amendment extended its scope, and the appellants’ tenancy rights under the 1939 Act were preserved. Consequently, the respondent could not evict the appellants except in accordance with the 1948 Act.
What was the main issue before the Court?
Whether the 1948 Act applies to the land in question.
Which statutory provisions did this judgment involve?
Agricultural Lands Act; Municipalily-Applicubility of Act; Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939; Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948; Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act; Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1952.
Precedent status how later indexed judgments have treated this case
No known negative treatment found in the Courts & Cases corpus.
This is a result about the indexed corpus, not a finding that the judgment remains good law. Coverage may be incomplete.