A. S. KRISHNA v. State of Madras

It will he convenient first to set out the impugned statutory prov1s10ns. Section 4, omitting what is not material, runs as follows ; S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 401

1.956 A. S. Kri.<hna v. ""'slau~f Madras Venkatarama Ayyar]. 4(1) "Whoever (a) imports, exports, or any intoxicating drug ; or transports or possesses liquor .................................................. (g) uses, keeps or has in his possession any mate rials, still, utensil, implement or apparatus whatsoever for the tapping of toddy or the manufacture of liquor or any intoxicating drug ; or .................................................. (j) consumes or buys liquor or any intoxicating drug; or (k) allows any of the 8.cts aforesaid upon premises in his immediate possession, shall be punished- .................................................. Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section in accordance shall apply to any act done under, and with, the provisions of this Act or terms of any rule, notification, order, licence or permit issued there under. (2) It shall be presumed until the contrary shown- still, utensil, ( a) that a person accused of any offence clauses (a) to (j) of sub-section (1) has committed such offence in respect of any liquor or intoxicating drug or implement or apparatus whatsoever for the tapping of toddy or the manufacture of liquor or any intoxicating drug, or any such materials as are ordinarily used in the tapping of toddy or the manufac intoxicating drug, ture of liquor or any possession of which he is unable to account satisfac torily ; and in his is proved to have been committed (b) that a person accused of any offence under (k) of sub-section (1) has committed suc]i offence clause if an offence premises immediate possession in respect of any liquor or intoxicating drug or any still, utensil, imple ment or apparatus whatsoever for the tapping of toddy or the manufacture of liquor or any intoxicating drug, or any such materials as are ordinarily used tapping of toddy or the manufacture of liquor or any intoxicating drug." 1956 A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras Venkatarama AY.Jlar J. 402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1957] to believe Section 28 provides that if any Collector, Prohibition Officer or Magistrate has reason that an offence under s. 4(1) has been committed, he may issue a warrant for search. Section 29 confers on certain officers power to search and seize articles even without certain circumstances. Section 30 a warrant, under provides for certain classes of officers entering any place by day or night for inspection of stills, imple like. Section 31 authorises the ments, liquor and the officers empowered to make entry under ss. 28, 29 to break open any door or window and remove or 30, they could not make entry. obstacles, Section 32 confers authority on a Prohibition Officer or any officer of the Police or Land Revenue Depart to arrest without warrant any person found committing any offence under s. 4(1). if otherwise Now, the facts are that on November 18, 1953, the Prohibition Officer, Madras City, and the Deputy Commissioner of Police made a search of premises No. 28, Thanikachala Chetty Street, Thyagarayanagar, Madras, and seized several bottles of foreign liquor and soda. The appellant, glasses containing whisky and Lakshmanan Chettiar, was · residing at the premises, three appellants, A. S. Krishna, R. Venkataraman and V. S. Krishnaswamy, were the glass tumblers. All the four found drinking from immediately put under arrest and in due course laid against them for offences under charge-sheets were the Act. The three appellants other than Lakshmanan Chettiar were charged under ss. 4( 1) (a) and 4( 1) (j) for possession and consumption of liquor, and Lakshmanan Chettiar was charged under s. 4(1) (k) for allowing the above acts in premises in his immediate possession, and under s. 12 for abetment of the offences. He was also charged under s. 4(1) (a) on the allegation that though he was a permit-holder, he was in possesSion of more units than were allowed under the permit, and that by reason of the proviso to that section, he had committed an offence under s. 4(1) (a;. Immediately after service of summons, the appellants filed an application under s. 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code, wherein contended that ss. 4(2) and 28 to 32 of the Act were S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 403 repugnant to the provisions of the Constitution, and were therefore void, and prayed that the above ques tion might be referred for the decision of the High Court. The Third Presidency Magistrate, before whom the proceedings were pending, allowed the application, and referred to the High Court as many as seven ques tions on the constitutionality of various sections of the Act. This reference was heard by Rajamannar, C. J., and Umamaheswaram, J., who held, disagreeing with to 32 were valid, the appellants, that ss. 4(2) and 28 and answered reference against them.· Against judgment, the appellants have preferred the present appeals under Art. 136 of the Constitution. 1956 A. S. Krishna v. State of M mlrtll Venkatarama 4.Y;•ar J. Two contentions have been urged in support of the appeals: (1) Section 4(2) and ss. 28 to 32 of the Act are void under s. 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which was the Constitution Act in force when they are the Act in question was passed, repugnant to the provisions of existing Indian with respect to wit, Indian Evi dence Act I of 1872 and Criminal Procedure Code Act No. V of 1898, and impugned sections are to Art. 14 of the Constitution, and have repugnant therefore become void under Art. 13(1). the same matter, because (2) is whether the ( 1) Taking the first contention, the point for deci impugned provisions are hit by the Government of India Act, 1935. Sub is the relevant prov1s1on, s. 107 of section (1) of s. 107, which runs as follows : is competent "If any provision of a Provincial law is repugnant to any provision of a Federal law which the Federal legislature to enact or to any provision of an existing Indian law with respect to one of the matters List, Federal law, whether pjlssed before or after the case may be, vincial law, shall prevail and the Provincial extent of the repugnancy, be void." the provisions of this section, the the Pro the existing Indian to the law shall, then, subject the Concurrent Legislative - enumerated law, or, as For this section two conditions must be fulfilled : ( 1) The provisions of the Provincial law and those of the Central legislation must both be in respect to apply, 1956 A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras V en.l;atarama AyyarJ. 404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1957] law will, is enumerated in the Concurrent of a matter which they must be repugnant to each other. List, and (2) It is only when both these requirements are satisfied that the provincial repugnancy, become void. The to be decided is, is the subject-matter of that bas fore, legislation one impugned in which case s. 107 would be inappli Provincial List, cable, or is it one which falls within the Concurrent List, in which case the further question, whether it is repugnant to be decided ? the Central ' legislation will have that falls within the extent of first question, The Entries in the Lists which are material for the present discussion are the following : List II-Provincial Legislative List.

#2. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts except list ; procedure in Rent and Revenue Federal Court, with to any of respect matters m Courts. 31. to say, production, manufacture, liquors and narcotic drugs, Intoxicating purchase and possession, transport, liquors, opium and other narcotic drugs, but subject, as res to the provisions of List I and, as res pects opium, pects poisons and dangerous drugs, the provisions of List III. sale of intoxicating

#37. Offences against laws with respect of any of the matters in this list. List Ill-Concurrent Legislative List.

#2. Criminal Procedure, the Code of Criminal Procedure including matters included date of the passing of this Ac~. oaths ;

#5. Evidence recogmtion of laws, public acts and records and judicial proceedings. Now, it, is not contested that the Madras Prohibition intoxicating Act, as a whole, is a law falling within Entry 31 of the Provincial list. liquors, The declared object of the enactment as stated in the it is "to bring about the prohibition .... preamble to export, sale and consumption of import, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, puchase, respect of 1956 A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras Venkatarama 4.J.Y•r J. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 405 intoxicating liquors ........ ". And this is carried out in s. 4 ( 1), which enacts prohibition respect of aSo\'e matters, and imposes penalties for breach of same. The other proYisions of the Act may broadly be divided into those which are intended to effectuate s. 4( 1) and those which regulate the grant of licences thus on a topic which and permits. The therefore fall the Provinces and would is r~served to ouu; ide s. 107 (1) of the Constitution Act. legislation sale, legislation that though consumption. etc., of The argument of Mr. N. C. Chatterjee for the appel lant is the Act is within the competence far as it prohibits of the Provincial Legishture in so liquor under porcsession, s. 4(1), the matters dealt with under s. 4(2) and ss. 28 to 32 fall not \Vithin Entry 31 of List II but within Entries 5 and 2 respectively of List III, and to that extent, is on matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. He contends that s. 4(2) enacting as to be drawn by the court on it does a presumption certain facts purely a matter of evidence, and it is therefore not a liquors but evidence. Likewise, law on to 32 deal with he argues, matters pertaining vnrrants, seizure and arrest, and have no connection It is accordingly contended that ss. 4(2) and 28 to 32 are legislation under Entries 5 ;md 2 of List III, and that their validity must be tested under s. 107 (1). being established, deals with what to Criminal Procedure, the provisions in ss. 28 intoxicating intoxicating liquors. in their contention The appellants are s. 4(2) of the Act enacts a rule of evidence but does it follow from this that it is a law on evidence, such as in the Concurrent List? is contemplated by Entry 5 So also ss. 28 to 32 undoubtedly deal with matters of to crimes, but are they for that procedure in relation reason legislation on Criminal to be Procedure Code within Entry 2 of List III ? The basic the appellants assumption on which the argument of in the several Lists are so precisely drawn as to be mutually it must be remembered that we exclusive. But are construing a It is of the 4-77 8. C. India/59 federal Constitution. legislation set out the heads of regarded then, v. State of Madras V enkatatama AJ!)'ar ]. 406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1957] inevitable. respectively to pass on this situation impugned legislation was intra vires, the Dominion and Provincial the doctrine, that there should be a essence of such a Constitution distribution of the legislative powers of the Federation between the Central and the Provinces. The scheme of distribution has varied with different Constitutions, the Constitution enumerates elaborately but even when the topics on which the Centre and the States could legislate, some overlapping of the fields of legislation The British North America Act, 1867, which established a federal Constitution for Canada, ss. 91 and 92 the topics on which the enumerated Dominion and the Provinces could late. Notwithstanding lists were framed so that the as to be fairly full and comprehensive, it was not long before it was found that the topics enumerated in two sectio.1s overlapped, and the Privy Council had the constitutionality of laws made by latures. It was that the Privy Coun that for deciding whether cil evolved regard must be had to its pith and substance. That is to say, if a statute is found in substance to relate to a topic with in the competence of the legislature, it should be held to be though it might incidentally trench on topics not within its legislative competence. The extent of the encroachment on matters beyond its competence may in determining whether that is, whether in law on a matter within its the guise of making a competence, in truth, making a law on a subject beyond its competence. But where that is not encroachment does not affect the vires of the law even as regards the area of encroachment. Vide Citizens Insurance Com pany of Canada v. William Parsons('), The Attorney General of Ontario v. The Attorney-General Dominion of Canada(2), The Attorney-General of Ontario v. The Attorney-General for the Dominion ), Union Colliery Company of British Columpia v. Bryden('), Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General the legislation is colourable, intra vires, even be an element the legislature the position, the fact is, ( 3 (1) [1881) 7 A.C.96. (2) [1894) A.C. 189. (3l [1896) A.C. 348. (4) [1899) A.C. 580. 1956 A. S. Kri.shna v. State of Madras Venkatarama AyyarJ. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 407 Ontario (1), Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney ), and Board of Trustees of Lether General for Canada ( 9 bridge Northern Irrigation District v. Independent Order of Foresters( 3 ). In the Indian The principles legislatures under laid down in the above decisions have in deciding questions as to the vires of been applied statutes passed by Government of India Act, 1935. Subrahmanyan the question was Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goundan ( • ), to whether , the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act IV of 1938, which was within the exclusive compet ence of the Provincial Legislature under Entries 20 in List II was ultra vires, in so far as it related and 21 agriculturists by to promissory notes reason of the fact that under Entry 28, List I, "cheques, bills of exchange, promissory notes and other instruments" were matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Centre. lation was intra vires, Sir Maurice Gwyer C. J. stated the reason in these terms : executed by In holding "It must legislation, inevitably happen interpretation would that blind adherence though purporting to dee! with a sub in another ject in one list, touches also on a subject the different provisions of the enactment may list, and be so closely intertwined to a strictly verbal in a large number of statutes being declared invalid because the Legislature enacting them may appear rule which lated in a forbidden has been evolved by the Judicial Committee whereby 'true nature and charac 'pith and it is ter', for legislation in respect of matters that. ..... " the purpose of determining whether impugned statute sphere. Hence substance' of is examined to ascertain to have list or result This point arose directly Privy Council Bank of Commerce, Ltd. (5 ). There, whether in Prafull Kumar Mukherjee v. The the question was the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940, which for decision before (1) [1937] A. C. 355· (2) [1939] A. C. 117. (3) f1940] A. C. 513. 53 (4) [19-to] F.C.R. 188. (5) [1946-{7] 74 I.A.23. 1956 A. L"', Krishna v. State of Madras Ve11katarama Ayyar J. 408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1957] limited the amount recoverable by a money-lender principal and interest on his loans, was valid in so far as it related to promissory notes. Money-lending 1s the Provincial exclusive competence of within Legislature under Item 27 of List II, but promissory note is a topic reserved for the Centre, vide List I, Item It was held by the Privy Council that the pith and 28. substance of the legislation being money lending, it was valid notwithstanding inciden that it tally encroached on a field of legislation reserved for the Centre under Entry 28. After quoting with appmval the observations of Sir Maurice Gwyer C.J. in Subra!i manyan Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goilndan, (supra) above quoted, Lord Porter observed : impugned this passage correctly "Their. Lordships agree that the rule the grounds on which founded, it applies to Indian as well as to Dominion describes legislation. is not avoided by substituting "No doubt experience of past difficulties has made the provisions of the Indian Act more exact in some particulars, and the existence of the Concurrent List has made it easier to distinguish between those matters which are essential in determining to which list parti cular provision should be attributed and those which are merely incidental. But the overlapping of subject matter two, or even by arranging for a heirarchy of jurisdic tions. Subjects r.rnst still overlap, and where they do, the question must be asked what in pith and substance is the effect of the enactment of which complaint is made, and in what list is its true nature and character found. If these questions could not be asked, to be legislation would be stifled at birth, much beneficient and many of the subjects entrusted to Provincial legis lation could never effectivelv be dealt with." three lists · Then, dealing with the ·question of the extent of the the Federal invasion by the Provincial legislation into fields, Lord Porter observed : "No doubt it is an important matter, not, as Lordships think, because the validity of an Act can be determined by discriminating between degrees of sion, but for the purpose of determining what 1956 A. S. Krishna v •. State of Madras Venkatarama AyyarJ. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 409 to show the question there is the decision of impugned Act. Its provi ~ith and substance of the sions may advance so far into Federal territory as to true nature is not concerned with Pro vincial matters, but is not, has it tres passed more or less, but is the trespass, whatever it be, such as the pith and substance of the impugned Act is not money-lending but promissory notes or banking ? Once that question is determined the other side of the line and the Act falls on one or can be seen as valid or invalid according to its content." Then, the Federal Court in Laklii Narayan Das v. The Province of Bihar(1). There, the question related to the validity of Ordinance No. It IV of 1949 promulgated by the Governor of Bihar. was attacked on the ground that as a legislation in terms of the Ordinance would have been void, under s. 107(1) of the Government of India Act, [he Ordinance itself was void. The object of the Ordinance wa~ the maintenance of public order, and under Entry 1 of that is a topic within the exclusive competence List II, of the Province. Then preventive detention, fines, control of processions and_ public meetings, and there for arrest and trial for offences were special provisions under the Act. The contention was though the sections of the Ordinance relating to maintenance of public order might be covered by Entry 1 in List II, the sections constituting the offences and providing for search and trial fell within Items 1 and 2 of the Con current List, and they were void as being repugnant to the provisions of In rejecting this contention, Mukheriea J. observed : the Criminal Procedure Code. the Ordinance provided imposition of collective "Thus all . the provisions of the Ordinance relate to or are concerned primarily with the maintenance of public order in the Province of Bihar and provide for preventive detention and similar other measures It is true that violation of connection with the same. the provisions of the Ordinance or of orders passed under it have been made criminal offences but offences against laws with rt:spect to matters specified in List II (1) (1g+9] F.C~R. 693. 1957 A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras V tnkalaro.ma Ayyar ]. 410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1957] Item 1 of Item 37 of List II itself, and would come within have been expressly excluded Concurrent List. The ancillary matters laying down the procedure for trial of such offences and the con ferring of that pur jurisdiction on certain courts for pose would be covered completely by Item 2 of List II and it is not necessary for the Provincial Legislature to invoke the powers under Item 2 of the Concurrent List." He accordingly held legislation fell within Entries I and 2 of List II, and that no question of repugnancy under s. I 07 (!) arose. This reasoning furnishes a . complete answer to the contention of appellants. the entire thus be it might then, might The position, summed up : When a law impugned on the ground that it is ultra the legislature which enacted it, vires the powers of what has to be ascertained is the true character of the legislation. To do that, one must have regard to the enactment as a whole, its objects and to the scope If on such examination and effect of its provisions. is found that the legislation is in substance one on a matter assigned legislature, then it must be held to be valid in its entirety, even though trench on matters which are beyond its com dentally petence. It would be quite an erroneous approcah to the question to view such a statute not as an organic whole, but as a mere collection of sections, then dis integrate it into parts, examine under what heads of legislation those parts would severally fall, and by that process determine what portions thereof are intra vires, and what are not. Now, the Madras Prohibition Act is, as already stated, both in form and in substance, a law relating to intoxicating liquors. The presumptions in s. 4(2) are not presumptions which are to be raised in the trial of all criminal cases, as are those enacted in the Evidence Act. They are to be raised only in the trial of offences under s. 4(1) of the Act. They are therefore purely ancillary to the exercise of the legis lative power in respect of Entry 31 in List II. So also, the provisions relating to search, seizure and arrest in to 32 are only with reference to offences sections 28 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 411 • the Act. They have no operation generally or committed or suspected to have been committed under offences which fall outside the Act. Neither the pre sumptions in section 4(2) nor the provisions contained in sections 28 to 32 have any operation apart from offences created by the Act, and must, in our opinion, to be wholly ancillary to the legislation under be held Entry 31 in List II. The Madras Prohibition Act is in its entirety a law within the exclusive com petence of the Provincial Legislature, and the question of repugnancy under s. 107(1) does not arise. 1956 A. S. Krishna v. State of M adrlJI V enkatarama Ayyar J. (2) It therein is next contended that the presumptions raised the Act are repugnant to Art. 14 of the in s. 4(2) of Constitution, and that the section must accordingly be declared to have become void under Art. 13(1). We to see how s. 4(2) offends the requirement are unable as to equality before law or the equal protection of laws. The presumptions enacted therein have to be raised against all persons against whom the facts men tioned argument of are established. The Mr. N. C. Chatterjee is that the facts set out in s. 4(2) on which the presumption of guilt is raised have no the offences themselves, that for reasonable relation example, possession of liquor can be no evidence of possession of m1terials or apparatus for manufacture of liquor under s. 4(1)(g), nor· possession of materials, apparatus liquor, evidence of possession or consumption of liquqr under s. 4(1) (a) and (j), and that therefore the impugned provision must be struck down as denying equal protection. He relied in support of this contention on the following observa J. tions of Holmes '" American Sugar Refining Company (1) : in William N. McFarland for manufacture of .of proof, but there are limits. "As to the presumptions, of course legislatures may go a good way in raising one or in changing is essential burden there shall be some rational connection between the ultimate fact presumed, and the fact proved and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreason:i.ble as to be a purely arbitrary f. & K.C.R. Co. v. Turnipseed ( • )." mandate. Mobile It (1) 241 U.S. 79 at 86-87 ; 60 L. Ed. 899,904. (2) 219 U.S.35,43 ; 55 L. Ed. 78,80. 1956 A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras Venkatarama Ay;·arJ• 412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1957] The law on this subject on Constitutional Law, 1939 Edition, at page 835 : is thus stated by Rottaschaefer • legislature universally "The power of a to prescribe rules of recognised, but it is equally evidence well established that due process limits it in this matter. It may establish rebuttable presumptions only is a rational connection between what is proved and what is permitted to be inferred therefrom." It is thus in liquor, and terms similar the contention reasonable and not hit by The law would thus appear to be based on the due process clause, and it is extremely doubtful whether can have application under our Constitution. But a shows that reference to American authorities clearly the presumptions of the kind enacted in s. 4(2) have been upheld as the due In Albert J. Adams process or equal protection clause. v. People of the State of Neu1 York (1 ), a law of New York had made it an offence to be knowingly in posses sion of gambling instruments, and enacted further instruments was presumptive evid possession of such ence of knowledge. the Act, which makes it an offence to be in s. 4(1) (a) of to s. 4(2) which raises a possession of rebuttable presumption of guilt under s. 4(1)(a). In rejecting the presumption was a violation of the due process clause, the Court observed : in this argument. The policy slips are property of an unusal character, to be and not likely, particularly in found in the possession of innocent parties. Like other gambling paraphernalia, indicates their use or intended use, and may well raise some inference the absence of explanation. against Innocent persons Such would have no trouble in explaining the possession of the posseS>ion is only prima facie evidence, and produce such testimony as will show the truth concern ing the possession of the slips. Furthermore, it is within the established power of evidence which is to be received in the courts of its own government." is the effect of this statute. tickets, and in any event the party is permitted to perceive any force large quantities, their possession their possessor to prescribe the state "We fail (1) 192 U.S. 585 ; 48 L. Ed. 575. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 413 In Robert Hawes v. State of Georgia(1 ), the question arose with reference to a statute of the State of Georgia, to knowingly permit which had made it an offence for distilling persons to locate in premises apparatus It also enacted and manufacturing prohibited liquors. a presumption that when such apparatus was found thereof shall be the person a place, to have knowingly permitted the location of presumed the apparatus. The question was whether this pre sumption was repugnant to the due process clause. In holding that it was not, the Court observed : in occupation 1956 A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras Venkatarama AyyarJ. "Distilling spirits is not an ordinary incident of a farm, and, in a prohibition state, has illicit character and purpose, an<l certainly is not so silent and obscure · in use that one who rented a farm upon which it was or had been conducted would probably be ignorant of it. On ~he contrary, it may be presumed that one on such a farm, or one who occupies it, will know what there is upon act upon the presumption and erect it into evidence of knowledge ; not peremptory, of course, but subject to explanation, and affording the means of explanation." is not arbitrary for the state it. It It is therefore clear in possession of materials, that even on the application of the due process clause, the presumptions iaid down in s. 4(2) cannot be ftruck down as unconstitutional. We should adp that the construction which the appellants seek to put on s. 4(2) that a person in possession of liquor could under that section, be presumed to have ·committed an offence under s. 4(1) (g) or that a person implement or appa ratus could be presumed to have committed offences under s. 4 ( 1) (a) and (j) is not correct. In our opinion, the matters mentioned in s. 4(2) should be read distri butively in relation to the offences mentioned in s. 4(1). Possession of liquor, for example, is an offence under s. 4(1) (a)~ The presumption in s. 4(2) is that if it is should be found in the possession of a person, he presumed to have committed the offence under s. 4(1) (a), satisfactory explanation therefor, unless he could give as for example, that it must have been foisted place without his knowledge. Likewise, it would be an (1) 258 U.S. I; 66.L. Ed. 431. 1956 A. S. Erishna v. State of Madras Venkalarama Ayy"' ], November, 29. 414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1957J implement or apparatus whatsoever offence under s. 4(1)(g) to be in possession of materials, still, tapping of toddy or the manufacture of liquor. Under s. 4(2)(a), if a person is found to be in possession of materials or other things mentioned in the sub-section,. there is a presumption that he has committed an offence under s. 4(1)(g), but it is open to him to account therefore, The satisfactorily reasonable .presumption and in our opinion, based on a misreading of is, the section. the contentions urged on behalf of lants having failed, these appeals are dismissed. contention, relation between the offence the appel therefor. is no Both Appeal dismissed. MOHAMMAD GHOUSE ti. STATE OF ANDHRA [S. R. DAS C.J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA and S. K. DAs, JJ.J Government - Servant-Judicial Officer-DiscipHnary Proceed ings-Enquiry into charges-Jurisdiction of the High Court-Order of suspension pending final orders by the Government-Power of the High Court-Constitution of India, Art. 311-.Madras Civil Services ( ClaSJification, Control and Appeal) Rules, rr. 13, 17(e)-Madras (Disciplinary Proceed in gs Tribunal) Rules, 1948- Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, And hra Civil Services 1953, r. 4(1) (a). The appellant was at the relevant dates posted as Subordinate Judge at Masulipatam and Amalapuram. Charges were made against him of bribery and serious irregularities in the discharge of official duties, and they were enquire<l into by one of the judges of the Madras High Court who sent his reports on August 20, 1953, and November 10, 1953. On the basis of the reports the High Court decided on January 25, 1954, the appellant the charge of bribery and should be dismissed from service on ren1oved from irregularities, and on January 28, 1954, placed hi1n on suspension until further orders. The appellant moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Con~ the order of suspension on the grmJnd (1) that under r. 4(1)(a) of the Andhra Civil Services (Dis· ciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1953, an enquiry into the· lndia for quashing the charge of service on . stitution of